Skip to main content

Full text of "Indian corps in France"

See other formats 


STATE  LIBRARY  OF  PENNSYLVANIA 
main,stks  940.9M547 

Indian  corps  in  France, 


0001 


Class  Book  1715^7 


Vo  LU  M E 


P ennsylvania 
State  Library 


IIL  xo 


''ri- 

■ 


■ri."  ‘ --Ai.’*  I 


:V' 


t.-r'- 


ui' 


>»r  -’^ 


h .-  •, , 

•%♦' 

V>.*' 

m/ 


THE  INDIAN  CORPS  IN  FRANCE 


Digitized  by  the  tntemet  Archive 
In  2017  ivlth  funding  trorri 

This  project  Is  trade  possible  bya  grantftorr  the  Institute  of  Museurr  and  Library  Servloes  as  ad  rriniste  red  by  the  Pennsylvania  Departjrenldf  Educatidn  through  the  Office  ofCorrrronwealth  Libraries  and  the  Cdrrrronwealth  of  Pennsylvania,  Terr  Co  rbefL  Governor 


hnpsvrarohlve.opgroetaJIsnndlanoorpsinfraOOltoo 


His  :Majesty  The  Kixg-Emperor. 


[ir.  & D.  Downey. 


Frontispiece. 


THE 


INDIAN  CORPS  IN  FRANCE 


BY  LT-COLONEL  J.  W.  B.  MEREWETHER,  C.I.E., 

INDIAN  ARMY 

AND  THE  RT  HON.  SIR  FREDERICK  SMITH, 

HONOKARY  FELLOW  OF  WADHAM  COLLEGE,  OXFORD, 

TREASURER  OF  CRAY’S  INN 


WITH  AN  INTRODUCTION  BY 

THE  RT  HON.  EARL  CURZON  OF  KEDLESTON 


WITH  PORTRAITS,  ILLUSTRATIONS  AND  MAPS 


PUBLISHED  UNDER  THE  AUTHORITY  OF  HIS  MAJESTY’S  SECRETARY 
OF  STATE  FOR  INDIA  IN  COUNCIL 


NEW  YORK 

E.  P.  DUTTON  AND  COMPANY 


P1UNT£I>  BY 

WILLIAM  CLOWES  AND  SONS,  LIMITED, 
LONDON  AND  DECCLES,  ENGLAND. 


All  rights  reserved 


HIS  MAJESTY  THE  KING-EMPEROE 

THIS  NAREATIVE  OP  THE  VALOUR  OF 
HIS  TROOPS  IS  BY  PERMISSION 


DECJCATED, 


i 

J 

< 


INTRODUCTION 


1 AM  not  at  all  clear  why  an  Introclnction  should  bo 
needed  to  this  important  and  thrilling  narrative  of 
the  deeds  of  the  Indian  Corps  in  France  in  the  early 
days  of  the  Great  War,  in  addition  to  the  excellent 
Preface  which  has  aUeady  been  contributed  by  the 
Authors.  Still  less  is  it  clear  why  a remote  spectator 
should  have  been  urged  to  undertake  the  task.  It 
can  only  be  because  a former  Viceroy  must  have 
enjoyed  many  opportunities  during  his  term  of  office 
in  India  of  making  the  acquaintance  and  realizing 
the  superb  qualities  of  the  Indian  Army,  that  he 
should  bo  invited,  or  would  consent — as  I have 
willingly  done — to  join  in  this  tribute  to  their  latest 
achievement. 

I have  seen  it  frequently  stated,  even  by  high 
authority,  in  the  course  of  the  present  War,  that  the 
Indian  Army  is  raised,  trained,  and  equipped  for 
service  in  India  alone  or  upon  its  frontiers,  and  that 
the  call  to  external  warfare  was  therefore  both  novel 
and  disconcerting.  Such  a claim  would  not  only  be 
indignantly  repudiated  by  the  Indian  Army  itseh, 
but  it  finds  no  foundation  in  history.  During  the 
past  hah-centiu’y,  the  foreign  campaigns  in  which 
that  Army  has  been  employed,  greatly  to  its  credit 
and  glory,  have  extended  from  Egypt  and  even 
Ashanti  on  the  West  to  China  on  the  East,  and  have 
embraced  most  of  the  intervening  countries.  Even 

b 


ix 


X 


INTRODUCTION 


betore  this  War  began  it  was  the  pride  oi  the  Indian 
Army  that  its  British  units  saved  Natal  in  the  Boer 
War  of  1899-1900,  that  it  rescued  the  Legations  at 
Peking  in  1900,  and  that  on  its  banners  were  in- 
scribed the  names  of  hard-fought  engagements  in 
almost  every  part  of  the  African  and  Asiatic 
Continents. 

The  Indian  Army,  in  fact,  has  always  possessed, 
and  has  been  proud  of  possessing,  a triple  function  : 
the  preservation  of  internal  peace  in  India  itself  ; the 
defence  of  the  Indian  frontiers ; and  preparedness  to 
embark  at  a moment’s  notice  for  Imperial  service  in 
other  parts  of  the  globe.  In  this  thhxl  aspect  India 
has  for  long  been  one  of  the  most  important  units 
in  the  scheme  of  British  Imperial  defence,  providing 
the  British  Government  with  a striking  force  always 
ready,  of  admirable  efficiency,  and  assured  valour. 

None  the  less  there  was  a vast  and  vital  difference 
between  the  field  of  war  for  which  the  Indian 
Expeditionary  Force  left  the  shores  of  India  in 
August  1914,  and  any  previous  campaign  in  which 
its  predecessors  had  been  engaged.  These  had  for 
the  most  part  been  conflicts  in  which  the  Indian 
Forces  had  had  to  encounter  an  enemy  of  minor 
importance  and  at  no  high  level  of  military  organiza- 
tion. Only  once,  nearly  40  years  earlier,  when  Lord 
Beaconsfield  had  brought  7000  Indian  troops  to 
Malta,  as  an  evidence  of  Imperial  unity  and  purpose, 
had  an  Indian  Military  Contingent  been  seen  to  the 
West  of  the  Suez  Canal.  Now,  however.  General 
Wilicocks’  Army  Corps  was  to  be  pitted  against  the 
most  powerful  military  organization  on  the  globe, 
against  a European  enemy  who  had  brought  to  the 
highest  pitch  of  sinister  perfection  both  the  science 


INTRODUCTION 


XI 


and  the  practice  oi'  war,  and  wdio  was  about  to  plunge 
not  Europe  alone,  but  the  entire  civilized  world,  into 
such  a welter  of  continuous  devilry  and  horror  as 
the  mind  of  man  had  never  imagined  and  history  had 
never  known.  The  landing  of  the  tw'O  Indian 
Divisions,  numbering  24,000.  men,  on  the  quays  of 
Marseilles  in  September  and  October  1914,  was  a 
great  event,  not  merely  in  the  annals  of  the  Indian 
xUrmy,  but  in  the  history  of  mankind. 

This  book  describes  the  manner  in  w'hich  that 
force,  and  the  drafts  and  reinforcements  by  which 
it  was  followed,  comported  themselves  in  the  fearful 
struggle  of  1914-15.  That  the  Indian  Expeditionary 
Force  arrived  in  the  nick  of  time,  that  it  helped  to 
save  the  cause  both  of  the  Allies  and  of  civilization, 
after  the  sanguinary  tumult  of  the  opening  weeks  of 
the  War,  has  been  openly  acknowledged  by  the 
highest  in  the  land,  from  the  Sovereign  downwards. 
I recall  that  it  was  emphatically  stated  to  me  by 
Lord  French  himself.  The  nature  and  value  of  that 
service  can  never  be  forgotten. 

Neither  should  we  forget  the  conditions  under 
which  these  Indian  soldiers  served.  They  came  to  a 
country  where  the  climate,  the  language,  the  people, 
the  customs,  were  entirely  different  from  any  of 
which  they  had  knowledge.  They  were  presently 
faced  with  the  sharp  severity  of  a Northern  winter. 
They,  who  had  never  suffered  heavy  shell  fire,  who 
had  no  experience  of  high  explosive,  who  had  never 
seen  warfare  in  the  air,  who  were  totally  ignorant  of 
modern  trench  fighting,  were  exposed  to  aU  the 
latest  and  most  scientific  developments  of  the  art  of 
destruction.  They  were  confronted  with  the  most 
powerful  and  pitiless  military  machine  that  the 


Xll 


INTRODUCTION 


world  has  ever  seen.  They  were  consoled  by  none 
of  the  amenities  or  alleviations,  or  even  the  associa- 
tions, of  home.  They  were  not  fighting  for  their 
own  country  or  people.  Thej^  were  not  even  engaged 
in  a quarrel  of  their  own  making.  They  were 
plunged  in  surroundings  which  must  have  been 
intensely  depressing  to  the  sphit  of  man.  Almost 
from  the  start  they  suffered  shattering  losses. 

In  the  face  of  these  trials  and  difficulties,  the 
cheerfulness,  the  loyalty,  the  good  discipline,  the 
intrepid  courage  of  these  denizens  of  another  clime, 
cannot  be  too  highly  praised.  If  disappointment, 
and  even  failui’e,  sometimes  attended  their  efforts, 
their  accomplishment  was  nevertheless  solid  and 
striking.  The  writer  was  at  Neuve  Chapelle,  just 
after  that  historic  combat.  No  record  in  it  excelled 
that  of  the  Indian  troops.  This  volume  contains  the 
tale  of  other  deeds  not  less  heroic  and  daring.  When 
the  first  V.C.  was  pinned  on  to  the  breast  of  an 
Indian  soldier,  not  only  was  the  promise  given  by 
the  King-Emperor  at  the  Imperial  Durbar  of  1911 
redeemed,  but  the  valour  of  Hindostan  received  at 
last  the  full  recognition  of  its  supreme  merit. 

This  volume  deals  chiefly  with  the  stormy  inci- 
dents of  war.  But  any  one  who  visited  the  Western 
front  during  the  period  which  it  covers,  and  saw  the 
Indian  regiments  either  in  the  trenches  or  in  reserve, 
will  also  carry  away  with  him  many  a picture  of 
the  good  fellowship  prevailing  between  British  and 
Indian  soldiers,  of  the  deep  and  characteristic 
devotion  of  the  latter  to  their  British  officers,  and 
of  the  happy  relations  between  the  men  m pagris 
and  the  inhabitants  of  the  country.  The  letters  of 
the  Indian  soldiers  to  their  folk  at  home  w'ould  stand 


INTRODUCTION 


XI 11 


comparison  with  any  that  the  official  post-bag  has 
conveyed,  to  England  from  oiir  owm  heroes  at  the 
front,  in  then  uncomplaining  loyalty,  their  high 
enthusiasm,  their  philosophic  endurance,  and  their 
tolerant  acceptance  of  the  privations  and  sufferings 
of  war. 

That  this  record  should  have  been  compiled  seems 
entirely  right  and  just.  That  it  will  stand  forth  as 
one  of  the  most  radiant  chapters  in  the  glorious 
history  of  the  Indian  Army  is  certain.  That  it  will 
act  as  a stimulus  to  the  martial  spirit  and  loyalty 
of  India  for  generations  to  come,  cannot  be  doubted. 
Nor  wall  it  be  less  a source  of  congratulation  to  its 
readers,  that  the  Indian  Army  wall,  in  more  ways 
than  one,  receive  a well-earned  recognition  of  its 
great  achievement. 

CURZON  OF  KEDLESTON. 


October  1917. 


PREFACE 


This  book  is  an  attempt  to  describe  the  fortunes  of 
the  Indian  Army  Corps  in  Flanders.  Sir  Frederick 
Smith  was  asked  by  Lord  Kitchener  to  undertake 
duties  in  relation  to  the  records  of  the  Corps,  and 
he  served  upon  the  Staff  from  the  month  of  October 
1914,  until  he  became  a member  of  the  Coalition 
Government  in  the  late  spring  of  1915.  The  War 
Office  then  appointed  Lt-Colonel  Merewether  to 
take  his  place.  Both  these  officers  in  the  course  of 
them  duties  had  access  to  the  Corps  and  Divisional 
Diaries,  and  to  regimental  and  other  records,  and 
both  were  honoured,  as  far  as  was  proper,  with  the 
confidence  of  the  General  Officer  commanding  the 
Corps,  Sh  James  Willcocks.  But  the  account  which 
follows  of  the  fortunes  of  the  Corps  does  not,  of 
course,  pretend  to  anticipate  the  official  War  Office 
histor}^  It  is  published  at  the  desire  and  under  the 
authority  of  the  India  Office  ; but  the  authors,  and 
no  one  else,  must  be  answerable  both  for  allegations 
of  fact  and  for  expressions  of  opinion. 

Far  the  greater  part  of  the  labour  involved  in  the 
preparation  of  the  book  has  fallen  upon  Colonel 
Merewether,  who  has  been  retained  in  England  by 
the  India  Office  in  order  that  he  might  devote  himself 
to  the  work.  It  was,  liowever,  his  earnest  desire 
that  his  predecessor  should  assist  him  in  dealing  with 
the  period  before  he  joined  the  Corps,  and  the 


XV 


XVI 


PREFACE 


History  lias  tlierefore  been  produced  as  the  result 
of  joint  authorship,  for  whicli  both  writers  are 
responsible. 

The  present  struggle  has  been  waged  upon  so 
immense  a scale  : so  vast  have  been  the  numbers 
engaged,  so  infinitely  varied  the  theatres,  and  so 
sedulously  preserved  the  “ fog  of  war,”  that  it  seems 
certain  no  single  vTiter  will  ever  produce  a complete 
history  of  it,  and  probable  that  no  combination  of 
writers  will  present  an  adequate  account  in  our 
lifetime.  But  the  piety  and  industry  of  individual 
students  ma}^  shed  a tiny  ray  of  light  upon  the  small 
segment  of  ground  where  their  comrades  lived  and 
fought  and  died.  iVnd  in  this  wa}^  some  deeds  of 
shining  heroism  may  be  rescued  from  the  frosty 
grasp  of  the  military  censors.  It  may  even  be  that 
the  confluence  of  many  individual  efforts  will  afford 
the  only  prospect  of  that  ultimate  History  of  the 
Great  War  which  will  at  once  affright  and  inspire 
our  grandsons,  and  reduce  every  other  military 
history  to  the  remoteness  of  Caesar’s  “ Commentaries.” 

Many  immortal  deeds  have  been  wrought  in  this 
war  without  record  and  without  recognition.  Of 
these  many  had  a flame  and  quality  of  valour  far 
transcending  achievements  which  have  lived  for 
centuries  in  the  pages  of  historians,  or  have  been 
made  musical  in  the  verses  of  great  poets. 

All  the  Armies  of  all  the  Allies  have  suffered  by 
the  suppression  of  contemporary  narrative. 

Perhaps  we  shall  never  have  a complete  story  of 
the  Guards  Brigade  before  it  became  a Division  ; 
of  the  Territorial  Army  hardening  into  veterans  in 
a sea  of  blood ; or  of  that  Scottish  Army — the 
largest  under  one  standard  since  Bannockburn — 


PREFyVOE 


xvii 


which  fought  and  perisliod  in  tlic  unhappy  but 
glorious  struggle  of  Loos. 

Many  units  of  all  kinds  have  failed  to  receive 
contemporary  justice,  but  perhaps  none  more  con- 
spicuously than  those  of  the  Indian  Army  Corps. 
Ludicrous  expectations  were  formed  of  the  part  they 
were  to  play.  The  most  exaggerated  statements 
were  rife  as  to  thek  numbers.  Legendary  accounts 
of  their  performances  in  the  field  filled  the  press 
before  they  had  left  their  place  of  concentration  at 
Orleans.  And  at  the  end  when,  broken  and  bruised 
with  fighting,  they  were  carried  (what  was  left  of 
them)  bleeding  from  Flanders,  there  were  many 
who  in  perfect  good  faith  said  that  the  Indians  had 
been  failures.  It  would  be  truer  to  say  that  the 
Indian  and  British  Regiments  which  together  com- 
posed the  Indian  Army  Corps  in  their  turn  saved 
the  Emphe. 

No  one  who  saw  it  will  ever  forget  the  landmg 
from  the  great  transports  which  began  to  swing  into 
the  harbour  of  Marseilles  in  the  autumn  of  1914,  or 
the  laughing,  sunburnt,  careless  faces  of  the  young 
British  officers  who  leaned  over  the  bulwarks  and 
called  aloud  to  learn  whether  they  were  commg  too 
late.  In  six  months  nearly  all  were  dead.  The 
arrival  of  the  Indian  Corps  was  an  event  to  him  who 
could  presage  the  future,  as  fraught  with  tragedy 
and  pathos  and  “ the  purple  thread  of  doom  ” as 
the  landing  of  that  earlier  force  which  marched  to 
Mons  with  the  same  gaiety,  the  same  valour,  and 
the  same  bloody  predestination. 

We  have  claimed  in  an  earlier  passage  that  the 
Indian  Corps  saved  the  Empire.  The  proposition  to 
those  who  know  the  facts  is  almost  self-evident.  The 


XVlll 


PURFACE 


original  Expeditionary  Force,  with  the  snpplenientary 
Divisions,  had  gone  through  the  Retreat,  the  Marne, 
the  Aisne,  and  the  bloody  hand-to-hand  fighting 
which  at  every  step  marked  the  race  to  the  sea. 

At  the  time  when  the  Indians  landed,  the  resistant 
]iower  of  the  British  Army,  cruelly  outnumbered, 
and  exhausted  by  constant  fighting  against  superior 
artillery  and  a more  numerous  ecpiipment  of  machine 
guns,  was  almost  overcome.  And  except  the  Indian 
Army  there  were  no  other  trained  regular  soldiers 
in  the  Empire  available  at  that  moment  for  service. 

The  territorial  Army — the  finest  material  in 
the  world — had  not  completed  its  training,  and  was 
not  used  and  could  not  be  used,  in  its  own  unitary 
organization  for  many  months.  'Ifiie  Kitchener 
Armies  were  still  a shadov^y  embryo  in  the  womb 
of  improvization. 

The  Empire  was  saved  by  an  alternation  of 
shifts  and  expedients,  each  of  which  just  succeeded 
because  of  the  deathless  valour  and  devotion  of 
the  human  beings  who  were  associated  with  each 
endeavour. 

It  was  saved  first  by  the  Expeditionary  Force, 
secondly  by  the  Indian  Corps,  thirdly  by  the 
'I'erritorial  Divisions,  and  fourthly  by  the  Overseas 
and  Kitchener  Armies.  And  there  is  enough  glory 
and  enough  sacrifice  for  all. 

Of  the  Indian  Corps  it  may  be  said  that  as 
much  was  asked  of  them  as  has  been  asked  of 
any  troops  at  any  period  or  in  any  theatre  of  this 
war.  'I’hey  stemmed  that  first  German  onslaught 
through  the  late  autumn  of  1914,  which  ended  in 
the  bitter  fighting  at  Givenchy.  They  played  a 
glorious  part  in  the  battle  of  Neuve  Chapelle.  The 


PREFACE 


XIX 


second  battle  of  Ypres,  the  struggle  for  the  Aubers 
ridge,  and  the  desperate  assaults  of  Loos — all 
claimed  a toll  of  blood  from  this  devoted  Corps. 
They  were  asked  to  do  much,  and  they  tried  to  do 
everything  thev  were  asked. 

In  the  pages  which  follow,  small  attempt  has  been 
made  at  rhetoric.  It  seemed  to  the  authors,  as  they 
examined  laconic  diaries  and  soldierly  notebooks, 
that  the  story  was  too  noble,  and  in  many  ways  too 
terrible,  to  require  or  indeed  to  justify  the  use  of 
rhetoric.  If  the  account  of  the  fighting  seems  in 
places  cold  and  uninspired,  those  wdio  are  responsible 
can  only  plead  in  extenuation  that  the  story  itself 
is  one  of  almost  inonotonous  heroism  among  sur- 
romidings  which  hardly  ever  Var}-,  and  they  hope 
that  the  simplicity  and  sameness  of  the  narrative 
will  not  have  imxDaired  its  power  to  interest. 

They  are  bold  enough  to  believe  that  they  have 
in  the  main  overcome  the  extreme  difficulty  of 
disentangling  the  narrative.  Unless  they  are  too 
sanguine,  the  account  which  follows  of  the  principal 
actions  in  which  the  Corps  was  engaged  w ill  in  its 
main  features  be  found  accurate,  and  they  do  not 
believe  that  it  will  be  discredited,  or  very  much 
modified,  by  later  research.  No  pains  at  any  rate 
have  been  spared  in  the  examination  of  the  avail- 
able material,  or  in  interviewing  surviving  officers 
upon  incidents  in  wliich  they  bore  a part. 

The  authors  will  be  rex)aid  for  their  labours 
if  they  make  it  easier  for  the  Empire  to  do  justice 
'to  the  Force  of  wliich  they  were  humble  members, 
and  whose  stubborn  valour  they  witnessed  wdth  a 
determination  to  preserve  some  memorial,  however 
inadequate,  of  its  quality. 


CONTENTS 


CHAPIEK  PAGH 

Introduction.  By  the  Et  Honble  Earl  Cdrzon  of 

Kedleston ix 

Preface xv 

I.  Arrival  of  the  Cokpo  in  France 1 

II.  The  First  Battle  of  Ypres 20 

III.  Belief  of  the  French  Cavalry  under  General  Con- 

NEAU  BY  THE  JULLUNDUR  BRIGADE  ....  42 

IV.  Attack  by  Indians  on  Nbuvb  Chapelle  ...  50 


V.  The  Corps  takes  over  the  Line  held  by  the  3ed  and 


5th  British  Divisions,  2nd  Corps  ....  65 

VI.  Attack  on  2nd  Battalion  2nd  Gurkhas  ...  77 

VII.  Visit  and  Death  of  Field-Marshal  Earl  Eoberts  . 90 

VIII.  Episodes  of  Trench  Warfare 96 

IX.  The  Action  of  Festdbert 112 

X.  Visit  of  His  Majesty  the  King-Emperor  . . . 137 

XI.  The  Battle  of  Givenchy  : The  Meerut  Division  . 141 

XII.  The  Battle  of  Givenchy  : The  Lahore  Division  . 155 

XIII.  German  Counter-Attack 175 

XIV.  German  Counter-Attack — Contimoecl  ....  185 

XV.  New  Front  taken  over  after  a Short  Best  . . 199 

XVI.  The  B.attle  of  Nbuve  Chapelle  . ...  205 


XXI 


XXll 


CONTENTS 


CHAPTER 

XVII.  The  Battle  of  Xeuve  CakViLhhv. —Continual 
XVIII.  The  Second  Battle  of  Yfkes  . 


XIX.  The  Second  Battle  of  Ypres — Continual 

XX.  The  Battle  of  Festdbert 

XXI.  Changes  in  Composition  of  the  Corps  . 

XXII.  The  Battle  of  Loos  .... 
XXIII.  The  Battle  of  Loos — Continiicil  . 


XXIV. 


The  Corps  leaves  France  for  other  Theatres 


OF  War 


Conclusion 

Appendix  I.  Description  of  the  Indian  Army 
Appendix  II.  Health  of  the  Indian  Troops  in  France 
Appendix  III.  The  Indian  Soldiers’  Fund 


PAGE 

238 

276 

313 

337 

376 

392 

426 

451 

465 

481 

493 

500 


Index 


505 


LIST  OF  ILLUSTRATIONS  AND  MAPS 


FACING  PAGE 

His  Majesty  the  King-Empeeoe  ....  Frontispiece 

The  Camp  at  Maeseilles 15 

Gbneeal  Sie  James  Willcocks,  G.C.M.G.,  K.C.S.I.,  D.S.O.  17 

Sepoy  Khudadad  Khan,  V.C.,  129th  Baluchis  ....  40 


Geneeal  Map  or  the  Countey  feom  the  Sea  to  the  La  Bassee 

Canal .42 

Sketch  showing  Position  neae  Neuve  Chapelle,  28th  Oct. 

1914 52 


Field-Maeshal  Viscount  Feench  or  Ypees,  K.P.,  G.C.B.,  O.M., 

G.C.V.O.,  K.C.M.G 60 

Maeechal  Jofeee,  Field-Marshal  Sie  Douglas  Haig,  and  Hon. 

Lt-Gen.  H.  H.  Maharaja  Sir  Peatap  Singh  ...  65 

General  Line  held  by  the  Indian  Corps 70 

Field-Maesh.il  Eael  Eobeets  inspecting  the  Indian  Corps, 

12th  Nov.  1914 91 

Naik  Darwan  Sing  Negi,  V.C.,  1st  Bn  o9th  Gaehwal  Kieles  . 126 

Lieut  F.  A.  De  Pass,  V.C.,  34th  Poona  Horse  ....  133 

Indian  Troops  in  the  Trenches  : Winter,  1914  ....  168 

The  Battle  of  Givenchy.  Position  of  the  1st  Seafoeths, 

2/2nd  Gurkhas,  and  58th  Eifles 186 

Battle  of  Neuve  Ch.apelle,  10-12th  March  1915  . . . 220 

Priv-ite  William  Buckingham,  V.C,,  2nd  Bn  Leicestershire 

Eegiment 232 

sxiii 


xxiv  LIST  OF  ILLUSTRATIONS  AND  MAPS 


FACING  PAGE 

Second  Battle  of  Ypres 286 

Corporal  Issy  Smith,  V.C.,  1st  Bn  Manchester  Eegiment  . 292 

Field-Marshal  Earl  Kitchener  and  Sdbadar  Mir  Dast,  V.C., 

55th  Coke’s  Rifles 306 

Lance-Corporal  David  Finlay,  V.C.,  2nd  Bn  Black  Watch  . 352 

Liedt  J.  G.  Smyth,  V.C.,  15th  Sikhs 364 

Lieut-General  Sir  Charles  Anderson,  K.C.B.  ....  395 

The  Battle  of  Loos.  Attack  by  Indian  Corps  . . . 404 

Rifleman  Kdlbir  Thapa,  V.C.,  2nd  Bn  3rd  Gurkha  Rifles  . 410 


THE 

INDIAN  CORPS, IN  FRANCE 


CHAPTER  I 

ARRIVAL  OF  THE  CORPS  IN  FRANCE 

The  German  conception  of  India — A tottering  Empire — The  truth — A 
German  or  a British  India — The  Indian  National  Congi-ess — Dis- 
illusionment— Outbreak  of  war — Mobilization  of  Indian  Expeditionary 
Force  A — Embarkation — Voyage — Arrival  at  Suez — Cairo — Re-em- 
barkation at  Alexandria — Sirhind  Brigade  and  Indian  Mountahi 
Artillery  retamed  in  Egypt — Arrival  at  Marseilles- — Disembarkation 
— Warm  reception  by  the  French — Appointment  of  Lt-General 
Sir  James  Willcocks,  K.C.B.,  K.C.M.G.,  K.C.S.I.,  D.S.O.— En- 
trainment for  Orleans — Enthusiasm  cn  route — Halt  at  Orleans — 
Entrainment  for  the  Front. 

German  policy  liad  long  and  deeply  calculated  upon 
the  effect  of  an  European  War  upon  our  Indian 
Eniphe.  The  conclusions  which  the  Germans 
reached  were  largely  based  upon  them  own  Colonial 
methods  and  upon  the  materials  for  forming  a 
decision  which  were  furnished  by  those  methods. 
They  saw  an  immense  Oriental  Emphe,  peopled  by 
a teeming  population,  and  controlled  thousands  of 
miles  away  by  the  Government  of  these  Islands. 
Having  no  conception  of  the  essential  principle 
upon  which  the  relationship  of  governor  and  governed 
is  determined  in  the  Anglo-Saxon  tradition,  it 
seemed  to  them  axiomatic  that  the  governed  popula- 
tion should  be  awaiting  an  opportunit}^  to  revolt 
against  its  governors.  German  literature  was 
ver}^  fertile  for  many  years  before  this  conflict  in 


B 


2 ARRIVAL  OF  THE  CORPS  IN  FRANCE 


speculations  upon  the  stability  and  cohesion  of  the 
British  Empire  when  submitted  to  the  strain  of  war. 

Their  conclusions  were  very  clear.  The  German 
nation,  of  all  the  nations  in  the  world,  had  mastered 
the  essential  secrets  of  Kultur,  organization  and 
discipline.  No  nation  which  had  not  mastered 
those  secrets — such  was  their  view — could  survive 
the  maelstrom  of  a great  world  war.  In  particular 
the  British  Empire  was  doomed  to  disappear  ; it 
depended  upon  principles  which,  when  analyzed, 
were  everywhere  found  to  be  the  antithesis  of  every 
Prussian  principle.  It  was  undefined,  it  was  un- 
disciplined, it  was  sloppy,  and  it  was  sentimental. 

We  find  traces  of  these  conclusions  in  all  the 
wi'iters  who  represent  German  thought  during  the 
ten  years  which  preceded  the  war.  German  observers 
brooded  attentively  over  every  resolution  of  the 
Indian  National  Congress.  They  watched  over  the 
movements  of  the  North-West  Frontier  with  at  least 
as  much  care  as  the  Indian  Staff,  and  they  expected 
India  under  the  Anglo-Saxon  Government  to  behave 
as  the}^  knew  India  would  have  behaved  under 
Prussian  Government.  General  Bernhardi  told  us 
with  perfect  frankness  of  the  hopes  which  his  country- 
men entertained  of  Indian  disaffection.  Herr  Karl 
Peters  has  quite  recently  informed  the  world  that  the 
two  principal  disappointments  which  Germany  has 
experienced  in  the  war  have  been  in  relation  to  South 
Africa  and  India. 

The  explanation  of  errors  which  may  ultimately 
prove  to  be  very  costly  is  not  difficult.  The  Prussian 
mentality  is  well  acquainted  with  its  own  Colonial 
system  ; it  has  no  understanding  whatever  of  ours  ; 
and  so  it  happened  that  when  the  challenge  was 


GERMAN  MISCALCULATIONS 


3 


given  in  August,  1914,  to  the  British  Empire  and  all 
it  stood  for,  perhaps  the  most  serious  Prussian  error 
was  made  in  relation  to  our  great  Empne  in  the  East. 

It  is  difficult  even  now  to  state  with  precision 
what  were  the  ambitions  which  the  megalomania  of 
Germany  had  formed.  We  know  that  their  rallying 
cry  was  the  march  to  the  East.  We  know  that  the 
conquest  of  Egypt  must  at  certain  periods  of  this 
World  War  have  seemed  to  them  not  an  impossible 
dream.  And  given  a conquered  Egypt  and  a 
disaffected  India,  Germany  might  well  have  realized 
and  even  exceeded  the  dreams  of  Najjoleon. 

The  outbreak  of  war,  unexpected  anywhere  in  the 
British  Dominions,  and  of  all  places  in  the  British 
Dominions  most  unexpected  in  India,  afforded  a 
swift  and  chilling  disillusionment  to  the  hopes  of 
the  German  General  Staff.  Perhaps  the  leading 
spuits  of  that  Staff  had  made  an  error,  surprising 
in  any  thoughtful  man,  but  most  surprising  among 
Prussians.  They  had  taken  their  opinions,  not 
from  the  soldiers  of  India,  but  from  the  agitators  of 
India.  In  fact,  from  the  first  moment  that  it 
became  clear  that  a. powerful  European  antagonist 
was  challenging  the  greatness  of  England  and  the 
position  of  that  Empire  of  which  England  is  the 
centre,  there  followed  a hardening  and  consolidation 
of  feeling  in  India,  which  on  the  whole  must  be 
pronounced  more  remarkable  than  that  which  was 
exhibited  in  any  part  of  the  Empire.  Intelligent 
Indians  are  under  no  delusion  as  to  the  power  of  India 
to  stand  alone.  The  alternative  therefore  presented 
itself  sharply  as  between  a British  Empire  and  a 
Teuton  India,  and  in  this  division  lobby  there  was 
no  minority.  The  telegram  sent  from  the  Viceroy 


4 ARRIVAL  OF  THE  CORPS  IN  FRANCE 


on  tlie  8tli  September,  1914,  will  live  for  ever  in  the 
annals  of  India,  and  will  be  regarded  by  later  ages 
as  the  greatest  tribute  ever  offered  by  a constituent 
state  to  a great  Empire.  The  rulers  of  the  Native 
States  in  India,  the  Viceroy  telegraphed,  numbering 
nearly  700  in  all,  had  with  one  accord  rallied  to  the 
defence  of  the  Empire,  and  offered  them  personal 
services  and  the  resources  of  their  States  for  the 
war.  The  rest  of  the  Viceroy’s  telegram  may  be  set 
out  in  full.  It  contributes  ,a  shining  page  to  the 
history  of  the  British  Empire  : — 

“ From  among  the  many  Princes  and  Nobles  who 
have  volunteered  for  active  service,  the  Viceroy  has 
selected  the  Chiefs  of  Jodhpur,  Bikanm,  Kishangarh, 
Ratlam,  Sachin,  Patiala,  Sir  Pratap  Singh,  Regent  of 
Jodhpur,  the  Heir- Apparent  of  Bhopal  and  a brother 
of  the  Maharaja  of  Cooch  Behar,  together  with  other 
cadets  of  noble  families.  The  veteran,  Sh-  Pratap 
Singh,  would  not  be  denied  his  right  to  serve  the 
King-Emperor  in  spite  of  his  70  years,  and  his 
nephew,  the  Maharaja,  who  is  but  16  years  old,  goes 
w ith  him. 

“ All  these  have,  with  the  Commander-in-Chief’s 
approval,  already  joined  the  Expeditionary  Forces. 
The  Maharaja  of  Gwalior  and  the  Chiefs  of  Jaora  and 
Dholpur,  together  with  the  Heir- Apparent  of  Palan- 
pur,  were,  to  their  great  regret,  prevented  from  leav- 
ing their  States.  Twenty-seven  of  the  larger  States 
in  India  maintain  Imperial  Service  Troops,  and  the 
services  of  every  Corps  were  immediately  placed  at 
the  disposal  of  the  Government  of  India  on  the 
outbreak  of  War.  The  Viceroy  has  accepted  from 
12  States  contingents  of  Cavahy,  Infantry,  Sappers 
and  Transport,  besides  a Camel  Corps  from  Bikanir, 


LOYAL  RESPONSE  OF  INDIAN  CHIEFS  5 

and  most  of  them  have  akeady  embarked.  As  par- 
ticular instances  of  the  generosity  and  eager  loyalty 
of  the  Chiefs  the  following  may  be  quoted : Various 
Darbars  have  combined  together  to  provide  a 
Hospital  Ship  to  be  called  ‘ The  Loyalty  ’ for  the  use 
of  the  Expeditionary  Forces.  The  Maharaja  of 
Mysore  has  placed  Rs.  50  lakhs  at  the  disposal  of 
the  Government  of  India  for  expenditure  in  con- 
nection with  the  Expeditionary  Force. 

“ The  Chief  of  Gwalior,  in  addition  to  sharing 
in  the  expenses  of  the  Hospital  Ship,  the  idea  of  which 
originated  with  himself  and  the  Begum  of  Bhopal, 
has  offered  to  place  large  sums  of  money  at  the 
disposal  of  the  Government  of  India  and  to  })rovide 
thousands  of  horses  as  remounts.  From  Loharu 
in  the  Punjab  and  Las  Bela  and  Kelat  in  Balu- 
chistan come  offers  of  camels  with  ckivers,  to  be 
supplied  and  maintained  by  the  Chiefs  and  Sardars. 
Several  Chiefs  have  offered  to  raise  additional  troops 
for  military  service  should  they  be  required,  and 
donations  to  the  Indian  Relief  Fund  have  poured 
in  from  all  States.  The  Maharaja  of  Rewa  has 
offered  his  troops,  his  treasury,  and  even  his  j)rivate 
jewellery  for  the  service  of  the  King-Emperor.  In 
addition  to  contributions  to  the  Indian  h\md  some 
Chiefs,  namel^y  those  of  Kashmir,  Bundi,  Orchha  and 
Gwalior  and  Indore  have  also  given  largo  sums  to 
the  Prince  of  Wales’  Fund. 

“ The  Maharaja  of  Kashmk,  not  content  with 
subscribing  himself  to  the  Indian  Fund,  presided  at 
a meeting  of  20,000  people  recently  held  at  Srinagar, 
and  delivered  a stirring  speech,  in  response  to  which 
large  subscriptions  were  collected. 

“ Maharaja  Holkar  offers,  free  of  charge,  all 


6 ARRIVAL  OF  THE  CORPS  IN  FRANCE 


horses  in  his  State  Army  which  may  be  suitable  for 
Government  purposes.  Horses  have  also  been 
offered  by  the  Nizam’s  Government,  hy  Jamnagar 
and  other  Bombay  States.  Every  Chief  in  the 
Bombay  Presidency  has  placed  the  resom’ces  of  his 
State  at  the  disposal  of  Government,  and  all  have 
made  contributions  to  the  Relief  Fund. 

“ Loyal  messages  and  offers  have  also  been 
received  from  the  Mehtar  of  Chitral  and  tribes  of 
the  Khyber  Agency  as  well  as  the  Khyber  Rifles. 

“ Letters  have  also  been  received  from  the  most 
remote  States  in  India,  all  marked  by  deep  sincerity 
of  desire  to  render  some  assistance,  however  humble,- 
to  the  British  Government  in  its  hour  of  need. 

“ Last,  but  not  least,  from  beyond  the  borders 
of  India  have  been  received  generous  offers  of  assist- 
ance from  the  Nepal  Durbar  ; the  military  resources 
of  the  State  have  been  placed  at  the  disposal  of  the 
British  Government,  and  the  Prime  ]\Iinister  has 
offered  a sum  of  Rs.  3 lakhs  to  the  Viceroy  for  the 
purchase  of  machine  guns  or  field  equipment  for 
British  Gurkha  Regiments  proceeding  over-seas, 
in  addition  to  large  donations  from  his  private  purse 
to  the  Prince  of  Wales’  Fund  and  the  Imperial 
Relief  Fund. 

“ To  the  4th  Gm’kha  Rifles,  of  which  the  Prime 
Minister  is  honorary  Colonel,  the  Prime  Minister 
has  offered  Rs.  30,000  for  the  purchase  of  machine 
guns  in  the  event  of  their  going  on  service.  The 
Dalai  Lama  of  Tibet  has  offered  1000  Tibetan  troops 
for  service  under  the  British  Government.  His 
Holiness  also  states  that  Lamas  innumerable 
throughout  the  length  and  breadth  of  Tibet  are 
offering  prayers  for  the  success  of  the  British  Army, 


CONTRIBUTIONS  FROM  ALL  CLASSES  7 


and  for  the  happiness  of  sonls  of  all  victims  of 
the  war. 

“ The  same  spirit  has  prevailed  throughout 
British  India.  Hundreds  of  telegrams  and  letters 
have  been  received  by  the  Viceroy,  expressing  loyalty 
and  desire  to  serve  the  Government  either  in  the 
Field  or  by  co-operation  in  India.  Many  hundreds 
have  also  been  received  by  local  administrations. 
They  come  from  Communities  and  Associations, 
Religious,  Political  and  Social,  of  all  Classes  and 
Creeds,  also  from  individuals  offering  their  resources 
or  asking  for  opportunity  to  prove  their  loyalty  by 
personal  service.  The  following  may  be  mentioned 
as  typical  examples  : — 

“ The  AH -India  Moslem  League,  the  Bengal 
Presidency  Moslem  League,  the  Moslem  Associa- 
tion of  Rangoon,  the  Trustees  of  the  Aligarh  College, 
the  Behar  Provincial  Moslem  League,  the  Central 
National  Mohammedan  Association  of  Calcutta, 
the  Khoja  Community  and  other  followers  of  Aga 
Khan,  the  Punjab  Moslem  League,  Mohammedans 
of  Eastern  Bengal,  the  Citizens  of  Calcutta,  Madras, 
Rangoon  and  many  other  Cities,  Behar  Land- 
holders’ Association,  Madras  Provincial  Congress, 
Taluqdars  of  Oudh,  Punjab  Chiefs’  Association, 
United  Provinces  Provincial  Congress,  Hindus  of 
the  Punjab  Chief  Khalsa,  Diwan  representing 
orthodox  Sikhs,  Bohra  Community  of  Bombay, 
Parsee  Community  of  Bombay. 

“ The  Delhi  Medical  Association  offer  the  Field 
Hospital  that  was  sent  to  Turkey  during  the  Balkan 
War  ; Bengali  students  offer  enthusiastic  services 
for  an  Ambulance  Corps,  and  there  were  many  other 
offers  of  medical  aid  ; Zemindars  of  Madras  have 


8 ARRIVAL  OF  THF.  CORPS  IN  FRANCE 


offered  500  liorses,  and  among  other  practical  steps 
to  assist  Government  may  be  noted  the  holding  of 
meetings  to  allay  panic,  keep  down  prices  and 
maintain  public  confidence  and  credit.  Generous 
contributions  have  poured  in  from  all  quarters  to 
the  Imperial  Indian  Relief  Fund.” 

This  memorable  message,  sent  after  personal 
communication  with  many  of  the  rulers  of  India, 
rang  through  the  Empire  and  established  the  attitude 
of  the  natural  leaders  of  Indian  thought.  But  it  may, 
perhaps,  be  asked,  what  was  the  attitude  of  the 
ordinary  Indian  officer  and  the  ordinar^^  private 
soldier  ? Did  the  men  who  mobilized  from  all  parts 
of  India  to  join  the  Colours  appreciate  any  of  the 
issues  of  this  world-wide  struggle  ? Had  the  Gurkhas 
who  sharpened  their  kukris  as  the  train  neared 
Calcutta,  under  the  impression  that  they  were  about 
to  engage  the  enemy,  any  conception  of  the  quarrel 
in  which  they  were  to  fight  and  die  ? The  answer 
is  cpiite  simple,  and  nothing  is  to  be  gained  by  evading 
the  criticism  contamed  in  the  question.  The  Indian 
soldiers  knew  nothing  about  the  merits  of  the  quarrel 
and  cared  less  about  them.  They  fought  because 
they  were  told  by  officers  whom  they  trusted  that  the 
interests  of  the  King-Emperor  and  of  his  Empire 
were  beiiig  menaced  by  enemies  ; they  cared  nothing 
who  those  enemies  were,  and  they  asked  only  the 
opportunity  of  proving  their  soldierly  valour  upon 
the  bodies  of  those  enemies. 

No  greater  tribute  has  ever  been  paid  to  the 
character  and  quality  of  British  rule  in  India  than 
the  passionate  eagerness  of  Inrlian  soldiers  to  fight 
against  any  enemy  who  assailed  the  system  of  which 
they  formed  so  small  a part. 


MOBILIZATION  OF  THE  CORPS 


9 


In  India  the  first  week  of  August,  1914,  was  full 
of  vague  and  alarming  rumours.  It  was  not  until 
the  8th  that  any  definite  military  orders  arrived. 
On  that  day  the  Lahore  (3rd  Indian  War)  Division 
under  Lt-General  H.  B.  B.  Watkis,  C.B.,  and  the 
Meerut  (7th  Indian  War)  Division  under  Lt-General 
C.  A.  Anderson,  C.B.,  received  orders  to  mobilize. 
The  news  was  greeted  with  the  wildest  enthusiasm 
by  all  ranks.  The  Indian  Army  had  been  excluded 
on  grounds  of  policy  from  any  share  in  the  South 
African  War.  Until  this  moment  the  disappoint- 
ment had  never  been  forgotten. 

The  long  years  of  patient  training,  varied  oidy 
by  the  constant  frontier  expeditions  in  which  the  forces 
of  the  Kdng-Emperor  have  had  so  many  opportunities 
of  putting  to  the  test  the  lessons  learned  in  peace, 
were  at  last  to  bear  fruit.  The  night  was  past ; to 
them,  too,  the  day,  DER  TAG,  had  arrived. 

The  curtain  of  a world- wide  theatre  of  war  was 
rising,  but  the  secret  of  the  ultimate  destination  of 
the  Indian  Expeditionary  Force  was  well  kept. 
3'he  East  is  the  forcing-bed  of  rumour  and  lived  up 
to  her  reputation  in  those  great  days  of  speculation. 
For  once  rumour  has  not  exceeded  fact.  From  Neuve 
Chapelle  to  far  Kiao  Chao,  from  the  forests  and 
uplands  of  East  Africa  to  the  graves  of  Gallipoli, 
from  the  sands  and  swamps  of  Mesopotamia  to  the 
scorching  deserts  of  the  Aden  Hinterland,  the  earth 
has  shaken  with  the  tread  of  the  Sikh,  the  Gurkha, 
the  Pathan,  the  Rajput,  the  Jat,  the  Garhwali ; and 
the  enemy,  who  affected  to  disbelieve  their  fidehty 
to  their  King-Emperor,  has  learned  to  know  their 
truth  and  soldierly  valour. 

Their  destination  was  unknown,  but  the  troops 


10  ARRIVAL  OF  THE  CORPS  IN  FRANCE 

never  concealed  their  hope  that  they  would  be  called 
on  to  face  the  foe  in  Europe,  shoulder  to  shoulder 
with  the  British  comrades-in-arms  whom  they  knew 
so  well  alike  in  peace  and  in  war. 

And  here  let  it  at  once  be  placed  on  record  that 
from  first  to  last,  in  sunshine,  in  storm,  in  billet  or 
in  trench,  the  superb  British  regiments  which  formed 
part  of  the  Indian  Expeditionary  Force  to  France 
have  never  failed  to  justify  the  supreme  confidence 
placed  in  them  by  their  country  and  by  their  Indian 
feUow-soldiers.  Their  gallantry  was  beyond  all 
praise  ; their  cheerfulness  under  terrible  conditions 
presented  an  example  of  incalculable  value  to  their 
Indian  comrades.  The  deeds  of  the  Manchesters, 
the  Black  Watch,  the  Leicesters,  the  Connaughts, 
the  Highland  Light  Infantry,  the  Seaforths,  are  bemg 
retailed  now  tlnoughout  the  length  and  breadth  of 
India.  Common  memories  of  suffering  and  heroism 
have  set  a final  seal  upon  the  brotherhood  between 
the  British  and  Indian  soldier. 

It  is  convenient  to  give  in  this  place  a complete 
statement  of  the  fighting  units  of  which  the  Lahore 
and  Meerut  Divisions  were  originally  composed. 

Lahore  Division. 

Commander  : Lt-General  H.  B.  B.  Watkis,  C.B. 

Ferozepore  Brigade. 

Commander  : Brigadier- General  R.  M.  Egerton,  C.B. 

1st  Battalion  Comiaught  Rangers. 

129th  Duke  of  Connaught’s  Own  Baluchis. 

57th  Wilde’s  Rifles  (Frontier  Force). 

9th  Bhopal  Infantry. 


COMPOSITION  OF  THE  CORPS 


11 


Jullundur  Brigade. 

Commander  : Major-General  P.  M.  Carnegy,  C.B. 

1st  Battalion  Manchester  Regiment. 

15tli  Ludhiana  Sikhs. 

47th  Sikhs. 

59th  Scinde  Rifles  (Frontier  Force). 

Sirhind  Brigade. 

Commander  : Major-General  J.  M.  S.  Brunker. 

1st  Battalion  Highland  Light  Infantry. 

1st  Battalion  1st  Fling  George’s  Own  Gurkha 
Rifles. 

1st  Battalion  4th  Gm’kha  Rifles. 

125th  Napier’s  Rifles. 

Divisional  Troops. 

15th  Lancers  (Cureton’s  Multanis). 

Head  Quarters  Divisional  Engineers. 

No.  20  Company  Sappers  and  Miners. 

No.  21  Company  Sappers  and  Miners. 

Signal  Company. 

34th  Sikh  Pioneers. 

Artillery  Units. 

Head  Quarters  Divisional  Artillery. 

5th  Brigade  R.F.A.  and  Ammunition  Column. 
11th  Brigade  R.F.A.  and  Ammunition  Column. 
18th  Brigade  R.F.A.  and  Ammunition  Column. 
109th  Heavy  Battery. 

Meerut  Division. 

Commander  : Lt-General  C.  A.  Anderson,  C.B. 

Dehra  Dun  Brigade. 

Commander  : Brigadier-General  C.  E.  Johnson. 

1st  Battalion  Seaforth  Highlanders. 

1st  Battalion  9th  Gurkha  Rifles. 


12  ARRIVAL  OF  THE  CORPS  IN  PRANCE 


2nd  Battalion  2nd  King  Edward’s  Own  Guiklia 
Rifles. 

Gth  Jat  Light  Infantry. 

Garhwal  Brigade. 

Commander  : Major-General  H.  D’LT.  Keary,  C.B., 
H.S.O. 

2nd  Battalion  Leicestersliire  Regiment. 

2nd  Battalion  3rd  Qneen  Alexandra’s  Own  Gurkha 
Rifles. 

1st  Battalion  39th  Garliwal  Rifles. 

2iul  Battalion  39th  Garliwal  Rifles. 

Bare  illy  Brigade. 

Commander:  Major-General  F.  Machean,  C. V.O., 

G.B. 

2nd  Battalion  Black  Watch. 

41st  Dogras. 

58th  Vaughan’s  Rifles  (Frontier  Force). 

2nd  Battalion  8th  Gurkha  Rifles. 

Divisional  Troops. 

4th  Cavalry. 

No.  3 Company  Sappers  and  Miners. 

No.  4 Company  Sappers  and  Miners. 

Signal  Company. 

107th  Pioneers. 

Head  Quarters  Divisional  Engineers, 

Artillery  Units. 

Head  Quarters  Divisional  Artillery. 

4th  Brigade  R.F.A.  and  Ammunition  Column. 

9th  Brigade  R.F.A.  and  Ammunition  Column. 
13th  Brigade  R.F.A.  and  Ammunition  Column.' 
noth  Heavy  Battery. 


EMBARKATION  AND  VOYAGE 


13 


The  mobilization  was  carried  out  without  a 
hitch,  and  the  Lahore  Division  embarked  at  Karachi 
on  the  24th  August ; the  Meerut  Division,  less 
some  units  which  embarked  at  Bombay,  sailed  from 
Karachi  on  the  21st  September,  having  completed 
its  mobilization  on  the  26th  August. 

When  the  machinery  works  so  perfectly,  the 
embarkation  of  a Division  is  merely  that  of  any  unit 
multiplied  many  times.  The  ordinary  routine  was 
followed  in  each  case.  The  heavy  kit  and  machine 
guns  were  sent  in  advance,  with  generally  a working 
party  of  fifty  men  to  load  them  on  the  ship.  Next 
followed  the  machine-gun  mules,  individuals  into 
whose  philosophy  no  idea  of  discipline  or  system 
ever  entered,  and  the  officers’  chargers.  Last  of  all 
came  the  battalion,  and  the  power  of  discipline  is 
well  illustrated  by  the  fact — to  take  a concrete 
instance— that  the  2/39tli  Garlnvalis  arrived  at  the 
dock  at  11.15  a.m.,  and  were  all  on  board  the  trans- 
port with  their  kit  by  noon. 

The  convoys  were  escorted  by  ships  of  the  Royal 
Navy,  the  Royal  Indian  Marine,  and  at  a later  stage 
by  ships  of  the  French  Navy. 

The  voyage  was  uneventful,  and  the  w^eather 
perfect.  Every  opportunity  was  taken  to  exercise 
men  and  animals.  Much  enthusiasm  was  caused  by 
the  receipt  of  a wireless  message  announcing  the 
naval  victory  off  Heligoland,  and  by  Lord  Kitchener’s 
statement  in  the  House  of  Lords  that  two  Indian 
Divisions  were  on  their  way  to  France.  This  was 
the  first  authentic  news  received  by  the  troops  of 
their  real  destination. 

Between  the  9th  and  13th  September,  the 
Lahore  Division  arrived  at  Suez,  whence  the 


14  ARRIVAL  OF 'THE  CORPS  IN  FRANCE 


Ferozepore  and  Jullundui’  Brigades  entrained  for 
Cairo.  On  the  16th  September  a Divisional  route 
march  through  the  city  took  place.  The  impression 
made  by  the  fine  appearance  and  equipment  of  the 
troops  was  very  marked,  and  the  knowledge  that  so 
many  Musalman  troops  were  on  the  way  to  fight  for 
the  Empire  had  at  the  moment  great  political  value. 

The  Division  re-embarked  at  Alexandria  on  the 
19th  September,  leaving  behind  it  the  Sirhind  Brigade 
and  the  3rd  Mountain  Artillery  Brigade,  and  arrived 
at  Marseilles  on  the  26th  September. 

The  Sirhind  Brigade,  on  arrival  in  Egypt,  was 
ordered  to  assist  in  guarding  the  Canal,  4 companies 
of  the  Highland  Light  Infantry  moving  to  Port  Said 
and  4 companies  to  Suez,  the  remainder  of  the  Brigade 
occupying  Ismailia,  where  they  camped  in  a grove 
on  the  shore  of  the  lake.  Eventually  the  Brigade 
was  ordered  to  stand  fast,  pending  relief  by  Terri- 
torials from  England,  and  it  finally  reached  Marseilles 
on  the  30th  November. 

The  work  of  preparing  for  the  arrival  of  the 
Indian  Expeditionary  Force  at  Marseilles  was,  as 
can  be  easily  imagmed,  extremely  arduous. 

On  the  15th  August,  the  advanced  party,  con- 
sisting of  about  thirty  officers  under  the  command 
of  Lt-Colonel  T.  Fraser,  R.E.,  left  Bombay  for  an 
unknown  destination,  eventually  landing  in  Egypt, 
where  the  necessary  arrangements  for  the  dis- 
embarkation of  the  Indian  Corps  were  made.  Orders 
were  then  received  to  re-embark  at  Alexandria, 
and  the  journey  came  to  an  end  at  Marseilles.  Here 
eighteen  officers  of  the  Royal  Indian  Marine  were 
attached  to  the  party. 

From  this  time  onwards  the  work  was  never-ending. 


•saTiiasHVK  vxv  aiix 


PREPARATIONS  AT  MARSEILLES  15 


The  duties  of  the  Staff  in  siuTOundings  so  novel 
can  perhaps  be  imagined.  The  wharves  had  to 
be  prepared  in  order  to  provide  proper  forming-up 
places  for  the  troops  on  arrival ; arrangements  were 
necessary  to  water  men  and  animals  ; sheds  were 
needed  for  the  reception  of  vast  quantities  of  stores  ; 
berths  required  allocation  for  ships  to  unload.  Camp- 
ing-grounds were  got  ready  ; arrangements  were 
made  for  the  issue  of  new  arms  and  ammunition  ; 
and  last,  but  not  least,  the  most  accurate  time- 
tables had  to  be  prepared  to  ensure  the  punctual 
railing  of  the  troops  to  the  concentration  area. 

Throughout  tliem  task  the  Staff  received  the 
most  cordial  and  tactful  co-operation  from  the 
French  authorities. 

Marseilles  presented  a very  lively  appearance 
to  the  eyes  of  our  officers,  whose  previous  acquaint- 
ance with  the  city  was  made  in  times  of  peace. 
Now  there  were  no  acrobats  or  lace-sellers  on  the 
quays,  no  itinerant  musicians  with  their  eternal 
“ Funiculi,  Funicula.”  Everything  was  given  over 
to  war : almost  daily  French  transports  arrived  filled 
to  the  brim  with  Algerian  troops.  Zouaves,  Chasseiu’s 
d’Afrique  and  Senegalese ; and  it  was  very  interesting 
to  our  Staff  to  compare  these  French  Colonial  troops 
with  our  Indian  forces. 

The  first  convoy  arrived  on  the  morning  of  the 
26th  September  with  the  Lahore  Division  and  part 
of  the  Indian  Cavalry  Corps.  Two  of  the  earliest 
ships  to  be  berthed  were  the  British  India  Company’s 
Mongara  and  Castilia,  having  on  board  elements 
so  diverse  as  a battery  of  Royal  Horse  Artillery, 
a Signal  Company,  a Field  Ambulance,  part  of  a 
Mule  Corps,  and  account  details. 


IG  ARRIVAL  OP  THE. CORPS  IN  FRANCE 

These-'  xyere . soon  disembarked,  but  the  landing 
of  Supply  and  Transport  stores  went  on  all  night, 
and  the  two  vessels  were  away  again  by  9 a.m.  next 
morning,  their  places  being  immediately  taken  by 
two  ships  laden  with  the  1 5th  Lancers. 

As  illustrating  the  accmacy  and  completeness 
of  the  arrangements,  it  may  be  recalled  that  this 
cavalry  regiment,  with  its  horses  and  all  para- 
phernalia, was  on  its  march  to  camp  within  four 
hours  from  the  time  of  the  berthing  of  the  ship. 
And  so  day  after  day  the  work  went  on. 

The  scene  on  the  quays  was  bizarre  and  incon- 
gruous. Working  parties  of  the  Indian  troops  in 
their  sombre  but  business-like  khaki  were  mixed 
with  assistants  in  the  shape  of  French  seamen, 
French  labourers,  stevedores,  and  our  own  Army 
Service  Corps  men.  Noliody  understood  any  one 
else’s  language  ; parties  of  Indians  could  be  seen 
gesticulating  and  illustrating  their  wants  by  vigorous 
pantomime  to  sympathetic  but  puzzled  Frenchmen. 
However,  all  was  good  humour  and  an  intense 
deshe  to  help,  so  matters  soon  arranged  themselves. 

On  marching  away  from  the  docks  to  their 
camping-ground  the  troops  met  with  a remarkable 
reception.  Our  warm-hearted  Allies,  men,  women, 
and  children,  vied  with  each  other  in  showing  honour 
and  kindness  to  the  men  who  had  traversed  so  many 
weary  miles  by  land  and  sea  to  play  their  part  in  the 
World  War  at  its  most  critical  period. 

The  bearing  and  condition  of  the  troops  were 
splendid,  and  the  local  newspapers  gave  generous 
expression  to  the  popular  feelings.  The  equipment 
was  especially  the  subject  of  much  praise,  and  the 
inhabitants  of  Marseilles  are  competent  judges  in 


•fi 


I J 


[Langficr,  Ltd, 

Gknerai.  Sir  James  Wiij, cocks,  G.C.M.G.,  K.C.B.,  K.C.S.I..  D.S.O. 


17.] 


LT-GEN.  SIR  JAMES  WILLCOCKS  17 

such  matters,  for  they  have  seen  many  thousands 
of  their  own  Colonial  troops  pass  through. 

Apart  from  its  geographical  position,  no  more 
suitable  port  than  Marseilles  could  have  been  chosen 
for  the  disembarkation  of  so  many  thousands  of 
Indian  troops,  for  by  its  constant  association  with 
every  form  of  Eastern  trade,  the  city  was  able  to 
provide  many  articles  of  supply  which  would  other- 
wise have  had  to  be  brought  from  India.  For 
example,  a suitable  quality  of  “ atta  ” (flour)  was 
at  once  procurable  at  rates  little  higher  than  those 
obtaining  in  India. 

On  the  30th  September,  Lt-GeneraL  Sir  James 
Whlcocks  arrived  with  his  Staff  by  the  s.s.  Malwa. 
His  appointment  as  Corps  Commander  of  the 
Indian  troops  in  France  had  been  announced  on 
the  27th  September,  and  was  received  with  the 
greatest  enthusiasm  by  all  ranks.  Nor  was  his 
great  reputation  undeserved.  His  name  stood 
high  in  the  Army  as  that  of  a very  stout,  skilful, 
and  efficient  soldier,  who  had  carved  out  a career 
for  himself  without  the  aid  of  patronage,  and  in 
complete  indifference  to  social  and  political  in- 
fluences. Born  in  1857,  he  joined  the  Lemster 
Regiment  in  1878.  He  served  in  the  Afghan  cam- 
paign 1879-80,  and  in  the  Waziri  expedition  of 
1881,  for  which  he  was  mentioned  in  des^Datches. 
He  Avas  promoted  to  the  rank  of  captain  in  1884, 
and  took  part  in  the  Soudan  campaign  of  1885. 
The  years  1886  to  1889  saw  him  engaged  in  the 
Burma  expedition,  from  which  he  brought  away  a 
medal  with  two  clasps  and  a D.S.O.  He  fought  in 
the  Chin  Lushai  expedition  of  1889-90,  and  in  the 
Manipur  expedition  of  1891.  In  1893  he  gained 

c 


18  ARRIVAL  OF' THE  CORPS  IN  FRANCE 


his  majority,  and  in  1897  served  with  the  Tochi 
Field  Force  and  obtained  the  brevet  of  Lieutenant- 
Colonel.  In  1898  he  served  as  second  in  command 
of  the  West  African  Frontier  Force,  receiving,  when 
the  expedition  ended,  the  special  thanks  of  H.M. 
Government.  From  1899  to  1900  he  commanded  the 
West  African  Frontier  Force,  and  m the  latter  year 
the  Ashanti  Field  Force,  wdth  which  he  relieved 
Kumasi.  On  this  occasion  he  was  granted  the 
freedom  of  the  City  of  London,  was  presented  with 
a sword  of  honour  by  the  corporation,  and  was 
mentioned  in  the  King’s  Speech  at  the  opening  of 
his  first  Parliament.  In  1902  he  joined  the  Field 
Force  in  South  Africa,  adding  a medal  and  a clasp 
to  his  soldierly  record.  Fmalty,  in  1908,  he  com- 
manded with  distinction  the  Zakka  Khel  and  Moh- 
mand  expeditions. 

Such  was  the  remarkable  record  of  the  General 
who  led  the  Army  of  India  to  their  great  adventure 
in  Flanders.  No  man  in  the  British  Army  wore  more 
decorations  on  his  breast  for  active  service  than 
James  Willcocks,  and  none  bore  his  honours  more 
modestly  and  more  gallantly.  He  was  now  to  be 
tested  in  surroundings  which  were  novel  even  to  his 
vast  military  experience.  He  was  to  be  placed  in 
situations  more  difficult,  it  may  be  boldly  claimed, 
than  any  other  Corps  Commander  had  to  face.  His 
task  demanded  a subtle  and  intuitive  insight  into 
the  mentality  of  the  East : much  sympathy,  much 
allowance,  and  yet  on  occasion  an  unpitying  severity. 
He  had  at  once  to  hold,  with  two  small,  untried 
Indian  Divisions,  a fine  which  had  tested  the  en- 
durance of  the  two  Divisions  of  English  veterans 
under  General  Smith-Dorrien  whom  he  relieved, 


ENTKAINMENT  FOR  ORLEANS 


19 


and  through  all  his  difficulties,  which  were  far  graver 
than  even  at  this  time  it  is  permissible  to  explain, 
he  never  faltered  in  his  courage  and  never  lost  the 
devotion  of  the  troops  whom  he  understood  so  well. 
One  of  the  vTiters  will  never  forget  his  conversation, 
after  the  battle  of  Neuve  Chapelle,  with  an  Indian, 
officer  of  a shattered  but  heroic  battalion.  “ There 
are  very  few  of  you  left,  Subadar  Sahib,”  said  the 
General  with  deep  emotion.  “ There  are  twice  as 
many  as  there  were  until  the  General  Sahib  visited 
us,”  replied  the  officer,  bleeding  as  he  spoke  from 
two  severe  wounds. 

General  Willcocks  has  preserved  a complete 
documentary  record  of  the  whole  period  during  which 
he  commanded  the  Indian  Corps.  His  advice  as 
to  the  demands  which  it  was  possible  to  make  upon 
the  troops  for  which  he  was  responsible  was  not 
always  accepted  by  superior  authority ; perhaps 
imperious  necessity  sometimes  prescribed  a different 
course.  But  he  was  seldom  wrong  in  his  estimate, 
and  a close  study  of  his  confidential  papers  establishes 
more  and  more  clearly  his  sagacity,  his  prescience 
and  his  courage. 

The  Lahore  Division  remained  at  Marseilles  till 
the  30th  September,  the  interval  being  utilized 
chiefly  m re-arming  with  new  rifles  and  ammunition, 
and  m providing  the  troops  wdth  warm  clothing. 

On  the  30th  September  the  Division  entrained 
for  Orleans,  where  it  arrived  on  the  3rd  October. 
Throughout  the  journey  the  greatest  hospitality 
and  kindness  were  shown  to  the  troops  by  the 
generous-hearted  French  people.  Enormous  crowds 
gathered  at  all  the  stations  where  the  trains  stopped  ; 
fruit,  flowers,  coffee  and  biscuits  were  lavished  on 


20  ARRIVAL  OF  THE  CORPS  IN  FRANCE 


the  men,  and  each  station  was  a surging  mass  of 
humanity,  waving  flags  and  cheering  “ les  Hindus,” 
as  the  people  called  oiu*  men. 

The  Division  camped  at  the  Champs  de  Cer- 
cettes,  about  six  miles  from  Orleans,  where  it  re- 
inained  till  the  1 8th  October.  This  period  was 
utilized  in  completing  transport,  etc.,  in  which  many 
difficulties  were  experienced.  As  General  Service 
wagons  were  not  available,  their  place  was  taken 
by  tradesmen’s  vans  very  similar  to  those  used  by 
English  railways  for  luggage  ; these  were  drawn  by 
two  horses  and,  if  carefully  packed,  could  carry  about 
2000  lbs. 

On  the  18th  October,  a very  wet  day,  the  Division 
entramed,  still  without  the  Sirhind  Brigade,  and  at 
Arcpies  and  Blenderccpies,  where  they  arrived  on  the 
20th  October,  the  men  had  their  first  experience  of 
billets,  and  the  campaign  could  be  said  to  have 
])egun. 


CHAPTER  II 


THE  FIRST  BATTLE  OF  YPRES 

First  battle  of  Ypres — Arrival  of  Lahore  Division  at  the  front — Ferozepore 
Brigade  attached  to  British  Cavalry  Corps — General  situation — 
Attack  on  German  position — Fighting  spirit  of  the  troops — Enemy‘s 
attack  on  Messines  front — Gallantry  of  Captain  Forbes’  Company 
57th  Rifles — 129th  Baluchis  heavily  attacked — Attack  on  Messines 
by  nine  German  battalions — Heavy  losses  of  British  officers — Sepoy 
Khudadad  Khan’s  Victoria  Cross. 

On  the  21st  October,  the  Lahore  Division,  without 
the  Sirhind  Brigade,  marched  to  the  area  round 
Wallon  Cappel  and  Lynde. 

Orders  were  then  received  for  the  1st  Battalion 
Connaught  Rangers,  under  Lt-Colonel  H.  S.  Raven- 
shaw,  to  move  by  motor-bus  viii  St  Sylvestre  and 
Bailleul  to  IVulverghem,  which  they  reached  in  the 
early  morning  of  the  22nd  October,  coming  under 
the  orders  of  General  Allenby,  Commanding  the 
Cavalry  Corps,  by  whom  they  were  attached  to  the 
1st  Cavalry  Division  under  General  De  Lisle. 

The  57  fh  Rifles,  under  Lt-Colonel  F.  W.  Gray, 
D.S.O.,  on  the  return  of  the  motors,  moved  up  to 
Wulverghem,  about  seven  miles  south-west  of  Ypres, 
and  were  attached  to  the  2nd  Cavalry  Division  under 
General  Gough.  Half  of  the  battalion  was  then 
placed  at  the  disposal  of  General  Bingham,  Command- 
ing the  4th  Cavalry  Brigade,  and  half  with  General 
Chetwode’s  5th  Cavalry  Brigade,  both  Brigades 
being  in  the  vicinity  of  Wytschactc. 


22  THE  FIRST  BATTLE  OF  YPRES 


This  arrangement  continued  till  the  26th  October, 
the  57th  remainmg  in  the  trenches.  On  the  same 
date  the  remainder  of  the  Ferozepore  Brigade 
marched  to  Bailleul  and  billeted. 

Thence  the  129th  Baluchis,  under  Lt-Colonel 
W.  M.  Southey,  proceeded  by  bus  to  St  Eloi,  where 
they  were  also  attached  to  the  2nd  Cavalry  Division 
and  placed  at  the  disposal  of  General  Vaughan, 
Commanding  the  3rd  Cavalry  Brigade.  The  honour 
of  being  the  first  British  battalion  of  the  Indian 
Corps  to  enter  the  trenches  therefore  belongs  to 
the  1st  Battalion  Connaught  Rangers,  the  first  Indian 
battalion  being  the  57th  Rifles,  closely  followed  by 
the  129th  Baluchis. 

The  position  at  this  moment  was  briefly  as  follows 
in  the  immediate  front  occupied  by  the  Cavalry 
Corps  to  which  the  units  of  the  Ferozepore  Brigade 
were  attached. 

The  key  to  Ypres  in  the  south  lay  in  the  ridge 
which  commences  in  the  west  with  the  Mont  des 
Cats  and  runs  eastward  for  some  eleven  miles  to 
Wytschaete,  between  the  Poperinghe — Ypres  road  on 
the  north  side  and  the  river  Lys  on  the  south.  Rising 
as  it  does  in  places  to  a height  of  several  hundred 
feet,  with  a maximum  breadth  of  two  miles,  the 
occupation  of  this  ridge  by  the  enemy  would  have 
entailed  the  evacuation  by  the  British  of  Ypres, 
Vlamertinghe  and  Poperinghe.  It  was  imperative, 
therefore,  at  all  costs  to  prevent  the  Germans  from 
gaining  a footing  on  the  ridge. 

The  Cavalry  Corps,  the  strength  of  which  was 
barely  4,500  sabres,  was  holding  the  space  between 
Zandvoorde  and  Wytschaete  with  its  right  resting 
on  the  north-east  corner  of  Ploegstert  wood,  which 


THE  TURNING-POIKT 


23 


will  always  be  known  to  the  British  soldier  as  “ Plug 
Street.”  This  wood  was  a sparsely  treed  patch, 
nearly  two  miles  long  by  three-quarters  of  a mile 
broad.  The  ground  was  mostly  bog,  while  the 
slightest  rain  rendered  the  road  almost  impassable. 
Here  the  Cavalry  Corps  joined  hands  with  the 
3rd  Corps,  which  held  the  front  from  the  eastern 
extremity  of  the  wood  through  Le  Gheir,  crossing 
the  river  Lys  about  a quarter  of  a mile  south  of 
Frelinghien. 

On  the  22nd  October  the  1st  Cavahy  Division 
took  over  the  section  of  the  defence  from  the  river 
Douve  to  a point  east  of  Messines,  linking  up  with 
the  4th  Division  on  the  right,  and  the  2nd  Cavalry 
Division  on  the  left,  which  carried  the  line  on  north- 
wards for  3i  miles,  its  right  on  Messines  in  touch 
with  the  1st  Cavalry  Division,  and  its  left  at  the 
canal  bridge  east  of  Hollebeke  in  touch  with  the 
3rd  Cavalry  Division. 

The  fighting  for  some  time  past  had  been  of  a 
hammer  and  tongs  order,  with  alternate  gains  and 
losses  on  both  sides.  The  21st  October  may  be 
taken  as  the  turning-point,  as  on  that  day  the 
Germans  commenced  an  offensive  along  the  whole 
line  from  La  Bassee  in  the  south  to  Menin  in  the 
north,  the  British,  except  on  the  extreme  left,  being 
pinned  down  to  the  defensive. 

The  position  was  critical,  for  the  AUies  were  out- 
numbered and  outgunned.  There  was  no  prospect 
for  several  days  of  our  receiving  any  substantial 
reinforcements,  while  it  was  known  that  the  enemy 
was  bringing  up  large  bodies  of  troops  from  the  east. 
Sir  John  French  had  no  illusions  on  the  subject. 
In  his  despatch  of  the  14th  November,  he  remarked, — 


24 


THE  EHTST  BATTLE  OF  YPRES 


“ I frilly  realized  the  difficult  task  which  lay 
before  us  and  the  onerous  rule  which  the  British 
Army  was  called  upon  to  fulfil.  That  success  has 
been  attained,  and  all  the  enemy’s  desperate  attempts 
to  break  through  our  line  frustrated,  is  due  to  the 
marvellous  fighting  power  and  the  indomitable 
courage  and  tenacity  of  officers,  non-commissioned 
officers  and  men.  No  more  arduous  task  has  ever 
been  assigned  to  British  soldiers  ; and  in  all  their 
splendid  history  there  is  no  instance  of  their  having 
answered  so  magnificent^  to  the  desperate  calls 
which  of  necessity  were  made  upon  them.” 

On  the  23rd  October,  two  companies  of  the 
Connaughts  relieved  the  Essex  Regiment  in  front  of 
Messines,  the  remaining  two  companies  taking  over 
cavalry  trenches  at  the  same  place  on  the  24th. 
The  battalion  Head  Quarters  occupied  a convent 
in  IMessines,  Avhich  was  shelled  on  the  26th,  but 
r\  ithout  casualties.  This  notice  to  cprit  was  accepted 
in  the  spirit  in  'which  it  was  meant,  and  it  was 
fortunate  that  the  move  was  made  without  delay, 
for  the  convent  was  shortly  afterwards  very  heavily 
bombarded,  the  church  being  burnt  down.  Orders 
were  then  received  to  hand  over  the  trenches  to  the 
cavahy. 

The  relief  was  commenced  in  daylight,  and  was 
carried  out  with  considerable  difficulty,  as  the 
Germans  had  the  range  to  a nicety,  their  slrrapnel 
and  rifle  fire  causing  several  casualties.  The  57th 
Rifles  occupied  trenches  near  Oost  Taverne  with  the 
Afridi  Compan^g  the  Dogra  Company  being  between 
Wytschaete  and  Messines.  Them  first  casualties 
took  place  that  night  during  a small  German  attack 
which  was  repulsed. 


PLAN  OF  ATTACK 


25 


The  temper  of  the  men  was  strikhigly  illustrated 
dm’iiig  this  affah’.  Sepoy  Usman  Khan  (55th  Rifles 
attached)  was  hit  by  rifle  Are  but  refused  to  leave  ; 
he  was  agam  hit,  and  again  declined  to  give  way. 
Fmally,  a large  piece  of  flesh  was  blown  away  from 
both  legs  by  a shell  splinter,  and  he  was  carried 
back.  For  his  gTand  example  he  was  awarded  the 
Indian  Distinguished  Service  Medal. 

On  the  26th  October,  orders  were  issued  for  an 
attack  on  the  enemy’s  lines.  The  general  idea  was 
that  the  1st  Cavalry  Division  should  hold  Messines. 
The  Connaughts  and  57th,  pivoting  on  Messines, 
were  to  attack  towards  the  line  Gapaard — ^Avest  of 
Wambeek,  while  the  2nd  Cavah}^  Division  attacked 
the  line  from  Avest  of  Wambeek — Houthem,  the 
operations  bemg  supported  by  the  1st  Cavalry 
Division  at  Messines,  and  by  Are  from  our  trenches. 

T’lie  2nd  Cavalry  DiAusion  Avas  dhected  to  com- 
mence the  attack  at  3 p.m.  Tlic  129th.  Baluchis, 
under  the  orders  of  General  Vaughan,  Avere  to 
co-operate  Avith  the  attacks  on  the  right  and  left 
toAvards  the  line  w^est  of  Wambeek — Houthem. 
The  4th  and  5th  Cavah?}^  Brigades  AA^ere  held  in  close 
reserve. 

The  ground  over  w- Inch  the  attack  Avas  to  be  made 
Avas  of  a difficult  nature,  consisting  of  a series  of  Ioav 
hills,  the  slopes  of  Avhich  fell  toAvards  the  Gaapard — 
Oost  Taverne  line.  There  Avas  little  or  no  cover, 
AAdiile  in  the  Aucinity  of  Oost  Taverne  there  w^as  a 
small  Avood  wLich  served  to  mask  the  movements 
of  the  enemy. 

The  morning  of  the  26th  October  broke  grey 
and  misty.  Rain  had  fallen  throughout  the  night, 
and  the  trenches  \a  ere  deep  in  mud  and  AA  iiter. 


26  THE  FIRST  BATTLE  OF  YPRES 


The  trenches  of  those  far-off  days  were  very 
different  from  the  elaborate  field  fortifications  of 
the  present  time.  As  often  as  not  they  were  merely 
ordinary  ditches,  improved  to  the  best  of  our  ability, 
as  time,  means  and  opportunity  might  allow.  The 
line  of  defence  was  not  continuous.  Gaps  existed 
everywhere,  through  which  snipers  crept  at  night 
and  shot  our  men  from  the  rear.  It  was  no  uncommon 
occurrence  for  a company  to  find  in  the  early  morning 
that  a section  of  trench  on  their  right  or  left  had  been 
evacuated  by  our  men  during  the  night,  and  had  been 
occupied  by  the  enemy.  The  first  notice  of  the 
change  of  tenants  was  frequently  given  in  the  shape 
of  a shower  of  bombs  or  an  enfilade  rifle  or  machine- 
gun  fire. 

Such  attempts  at  drainage  of  the  trenches  as 
could  be  made  were  of  the  most  primitive  description. 
In  the  lower-lying  ground,  the  water-level  was  so  high 
that  trenches  could  not  be  sunk  to  a depth  sufficient 
to  give  adequate  cover.  A few  hours’  rain  sufficed 
to  fill  them  knee-deep  with  mud  and  water. 

The  communication  trenches,  where  they  existed, 
were  very  imperfect,  and  there  were  many  instances 
of  wounded  men  being  drowned  in  them  when  at- 
tempting to  find  thek  way  back  from  the  firing 
line.  It  would  be  impossible  to  imagme  conditions 
more  terrible  for  Eastern  troops.  No  language 
can  describe  then  sufferings,  carried  swiftly  from 
a fierce  tropical  sun  to  the  wet  and  winter  of 
Flanders. 

The  attack  commenced  at  3 p.m.,  and  by  5 p.m. 
had  progressed  without  much  opposition  to  a distance 
ranging  from  200  to  1000  yards  at  different  points. 
The  Connaughts  on  the  right  unfortunately  lost 


THE  FIRST  BRITISH  OFFICER  KILLED  27 


direction  while  feeling  for  the  57th  in  the  growing 
darkness. 

It  is  significant  of  the  extreme  difficulty  which 
existed  with  non-continuous  lines  in  distinguishing 
our  old  trenches  from  those  of  the  enemy,  that  a 
party  of  a certain  regiment  reported  in  all  good 
faith  that  they  had  taken  at  least  one  line  of  German 
trench,  the  occupants  of  which  had  cleared  out. 
The  truth  was  that  our  men  had  occupied  a section 
of  trench  which  had  been  abandoned  by  us,  and  as 
bullets  were  flying  about  promiscuously,  they  believed 
that  the  enemy  had  fired  at  them  and  fled. 

The  57th  Rifles  had  begun  the  day  with  bad  luck. 
The  enemy  shelled  Wytschaete  heavity.  Lt-Colonel 
Gray,  the  Commanding  Officer,  who  had  just  re- 
turned from  the  trenches  with  the  adjutant.  Captain 
W.  S.  Trail,  was  severelj^  wounded  in  the  right 
shoulder  by  shrapnel.  The  absence,  even  temporary, 
of  an  officer  of  his  experience  was  a heavy  blow  to 
the  regiment  at  the  very  outset  of  the  campaign. 
The  57th  got  on  by  degrees,  but  darkness  fell  before 
they  reached  their  objective,  and  the  order  to  retire 
was  then  received  from  Head  Quarters.  Their 
casualties  were  slight,  being,  in  addition  to  Lt-Colonel 
Gray,  only  eleven  rank  and  file  wounded. 

The  129th  Baluchis,  operating  with  the  3rd 
Cavalry  Brigade,  made  slow  progress,  owing  to  the 
difficulties  of  the  ground  and  the  necessity  of  keepmg 
touch  with  the  other  units.  The  attack  came  under 
fairly  heavy  shell,  machine-gun  and  rifle  fire.  Early 
in  the  advance,  Captain  Hampe- Vincent,  while 
gallantly  leading  his  men,  fell  mortally  wounded,  the 
first  officer  of  the  Indian  Corps  to  lose  his  life  in  the 
war  in  Europe. 


28  THE  FIRST  BATTLE  OF  YPRES 


Darkness  liad  begun  to  fall  when  No.  2 Coinpaiiy 
at  last  succeeded  in  pushing  to  a point  within  200 
3"ards  of  the  German  trenches.  The  men  were 
very  keen  to  carr}^  the  assault  through,  but  as 
the  attack  had  not  progressed  in  other  sections, 
and  dhe  darkness  was  now  rendering  movement 
very  uncertain,  orders  were  given  to  retire  to  their 
original  line. 

The  orders  were  fortunate,  for  the  position,  pro- 
tected as  it  was  by  at  least  four  skilfully  placed 
machine  guns,  would  probably  have  proved  too 
strong  to  offer  any  chance  of  success  to  so  small  an 
assaulting  force.  The  1 29th  lost  in  the  action  Captain 
Hampe-Vincent  and  9 other  ranks  killed,  48  wounded 
and  4 missing.  This  concluded  the  day’s  operations. 

Nothing  of  any  value  was  effected,  and  had  not 
this  been  the  first  action  in  which  Indian  troops 
were  enga.ged,  it  would  not  have  received  so  much 
notice.  It  served,  however,  to  test  the  fighting 
spii  it  of  the  men  under  novel  and  trying  conditions, 
and  it  is  satisfactory  to  note  that  the  behaviour  of 
the  troops  was  throughout  admhable,  their  dis- 
appointment at  being  ordered  to  retire  before  coming 
to  conclusions  with  the  enemy  being  very  marked. 

On  the  27th  October  the  Connaughts  were  with 
the  1 st  Cavahy  Division,  the  1 29th  Baluchis  with  the 
3rd  Cavahy  Brigade ; of  the  57th  Rifles  half  a 
battalion  was  with  the  4th  and  half  a battalion 
with  the  5th  Cavahy  Brigades,  Head  Quarters  being 
at  Wytschaete.  On  the  28th,  two  companies  of  the 
57th  were  transferred  to  the  1st  Cavahy  Division  at 
Messines  to  relieve  the  Connaughts,  who,  with  the 
Brigade  Head  Quarters,  left  to  join  the  Division 
further  south.  The  9th  Bhopal  Infantry  had,  since 


HEAVY  GERMAN  ATTACK 


29 


the  commencement  of  operations,  been  with  Brigade 
Head  Quarters.  They  left  on  the  26th  October  to 
rejoin  the  Division. 

The  27th,  28th  and  29th  October  were  not  marked 
by  any  very  resolute  attack  on  the  part  of  the  enemy, 
but  a faudy  heavy  bombardment  was  kept  up,  to 
which  our  guns,  inferior  in  strength  as  the}^  were, 
replied  to  the  best  of  their  ability.  Messines  was 
continually  shelled  by  night  as  well  as  by  day,  while 
the  enemy  made  frequent  hah-hearted  attacks. 

Diwing  the  night  of  the  29th-30th  October  reports 
were  constantly  received  from  the  outposts  that 
considerable  movements  of  the  enemy  were  in 
progress  along  oiu?  front.  Owing  to  the  easterly 
wind  which  brought  up  heavy  mist,  aeroplane  recon  - 
naissance  could  reveal  nothing,  but  the  early  morning 
of  the  30th  brought  a plain  explanation  of  the 
movements. 

At  6 a.m.  the  Germans  opened  a very  heavy  fire 
with  howitzers  and  field  guns  against  the  left  of  the 
2nd  Cavalry  Division,  the  sounds  heard  during  the 
night  having  evidently  been  due  to  the  bringing 
into  position  of  these  guns.  At  the  same  time  the 
position  on  the  Zandvoorde  ridge,  held  by  the  3rd 
Cavalry  Division  under  General  Byng,  was  bombarded 
with  great  violence.  Messines  suffered  very  severely. 
Shells  fell  fast  m every  part  of  the  town,  but  luckily 
all  the  inhabitants  had  been  evacuated,  and  casual- 
ties were  confined  to  the  troops. 

The  7th  Cavahy  Brigade  was  most  severely  tested. 
Their  trenches  were  hammered  with  heavy  shells, 
and  were  practically  obliterated,  many  men  beino; 
buried  under  the  ruins.  At  the  same  time  the  attack 
was  pressed  home  by  overwhelming  masses  of  infantry. 


30 


THE  FIRST  BATTLE  OF  YPRES 


The  2nd  CavaFy  Division  fought  hard  to  hold  its 
position.  A squadron  of  the  1st  Life  Guards  under 
Lord  Hugh  Grosvenor,  and  another  of  the  2nd  Life 
Guards  under  Captain  Vandeleur  were  surrounded 
in  then’  trenches  by  the  Germans.  Scorning  sur- 
render, they  fought  to  the  last,  and  were  absolutely 
wiped  out  in  hand-to-hand  fighting  against  hope- 
less odds. 

The  Division  w^as  compelled  to  fall  back  to  the 
ridge  of  Klein  Zillebeke,  about  a mile  to  the  north 
and  slightly  to  the  east  of  the  now  famous  Hill  60. 
Here,  with  the  aid  of  two  regiments  from  the  CavaFy 
Corps,  it  managed  to  hold  its  position  until  relieved 
at  nightfaU. 

In  the  meantime,  the  2nd  CavaFy  Brigade,  with 
which  were  the  129th  Baluchis  and  2 companies 
of  the  57th  Rifles,  was  passing  through  a critical 
period.  The  hostile  artillery  fFe  became  heavier 
and  heavier.  It  was  soon  evident  that  some  forty 
guns  were  in  action  instead  of  the  six  which  had  been 
thing  for  the  past  few  days. 

At  noon  it  was  ascertained  that  the  enemy  was 
massing  all  along  the  front,  but  especially  opposite 
the  sahent  held  by  the  5th  Lancers,  whose  strength 
at  that  point  was  only  ninety  rifles.  At  12.30  p.m. 
two  battalions  attacked  the  5th,  who  held  on  until 
the  enemy  was  almost  upon  them,  and  only  retired 
after  losing  over  thFty  of  then  small  number. 

The  Division,  in  fact  the  Corps,  had  become  so 
weak  numerically  that  the  defensive  line  consisted, 
not  of  a continuous  line,  or  even  of  a broken  line,  of 
trenches,  but  merely  of  a thin  scrawl  of  more  or  less 
detached  posts.  As  a result,  the  enemy  having  once 
gained  a footing  in  a section  of  the  line,  was  able 


ORDEAL  OF  THE  57th 


31 


to  enfilade  each  post  in  succession.  The  position 
was  untenable,  and  a general  retirement  was  im- 
perative. 

This  movement,  always  one  of  great  danger  and 
difficulty  in  the  face  of  an  enemy  superior  in  numbers 
and  in  guns,  was  as  a whole  carried  out  dehberately 
and  in  good  order  during  the  afternoon,  the  enemy’s 
infantry  pressing  hard. 

A troop  of  the  20th  Hussars,  which  did  not  com- 
mence its  retirement  until  the  enemy  was  within 
three  hundred  yards,  lost  very  heavily.  Captain 
L.  Forbes  was  in  command  of  No.  3 Company 
(Punjabi  Mahomedans)  of  the  57th  at  this  pomt, 
near  Cost  Taverne.  For  some  unknown  reason, 
but  probably  because  all  communication  had  been 
cut  by  the  enemy’s  shell  fire,  the  order  to  retire  did 
not  reach  Captain  Forbes  in  time  to  permit  of  the 
movement  being  made  deliberately.  Not  having 
received  any  order  to  rethe,  he  saw  no  reason  to  do 
so,  and  held  on  to  the  last.  When  eventually  the 
order  did  arrive,  it  was  too  late.  The  enemv’s 
infantry  were  upon  them,  and  both  flanks  of  the 
company  were  enveloped  in  a murderous  machine- 
gun  fire. 

During  the  retirement,  the  half  company  under 
the  command  of  Lieutenant  Clarke  was  threshed  out 
by  machine  guns,  and  practically  none  escaped. 
The  remains  of  the  company,  now  reduced  to  some 
sixty  men  of  its  origmal  one  hundred  and  forty,  retired 
to  Wytschaete,  where  it  took  up  a previously  prepared 
position  about  a quarter  of  a mile  north-east  of  the 
village. 

On  the  right  of  the  Hne  the  bombardment  had 
not  been  quite  so  heavy,  and  Major  Willans  was 


32  THE  FIRST' BATTLE  OF  YPRES 


able  to  withdraw  his  company  of  Sikhs  and 
the  machine  guns  to  a position  slightly  east  of  the 
Wytschaete — Messines  road.  During  the  night  the 
Germans  continued  to  bombard  the  trenches  as  also 
the  village  of  Wytschaete,  which  was  now  a mass  of 
ruins. 

In  the  meantime,  the  129th  Baluchis  under 
Lt-Colonel  Southey  had  been  undergoing  a searching 
test.  No.  1 Company  under  Captain  Adair  and  No. 
2 under  Major  Humphreys  relieved  C Section  of  the 
line  and  the  reserve,  while  No.  3 under  Major  Han- 
nyngto]!  and  No.  4 under  Major  Potter  were  relieved 
by  the  cavalry,  and  ordered  to  billets  early  in  the 
morning  of  the  30th.  No.  4 Company  was  success- 
fully withdrawn  under  fairly  heavy  fire.  No.  3 
Company’s  progress  rearwards  was  arrested  by  very 
lieavy  shelling,  and  it  had  to  take  refuge  behind  a 
farm  slightly  in  rear  of  the  trenches. 

At  about  6.30  a.m.  the  enemy  opened  a very 
heavy  artiller^^  lire  on  the  whole  of  our  position, 
Major  Humphreys  being  mortally  wounded  in  the 
reserve  trenches  ; a number  of  otiier  casualties  also 
took  place  at  this  time. 

Shortly  after  noon,  all  available  men  of  the 
battalion  were  ordered  to  reinforce  the  firing  line, 
which  was  being  hard  pressed  by  artillery  fire  as  well 
as  by  infantry  with  machine  guns.  The  Germans 
had  chosen  the  moment  for  attack  very  skilfully. 
The  fact  that  reliefs  of  this  part  of  the  line  were 
taking  place  was  doubtless  knowm  to  them  through 
then*  elaborate  system  of  espionage,  and  greatly 
added  to  the  confusion.  In  some  cases  orders  did 
not  arrive  at  all,  in  others  they  were  incorrectly 
delivered  or  were  misunderstood. 


ATTACK  ON  MESSINES 


33 


Three  platoons  of  No.  3 Company  had  talcen 
refuge  behind  the  farm  before  mentioned,  one  platoon 
only  having  managed  to  get  back.  Colonel  Southey 
took  No.  4 Comj)any  and  the  one  platoon  of  No.  3 
back  towards  the  firing  line,  but  found  the  whole 
line,  British  and  Indian,  retiring.  He  then  sent  his 
men  to  hold  a wood  on  the  right  flank  and  rallied 
those  who  were  retreating,  ordering  them  to  hold 
positions  covering  the  right  and  centre  of  the  chateau. 
In  the  meantime,  Lieutenant  Lewis,  who  had  replaced 
Major  Humphreys,  when  that  officer  was  mortally 
wounded  early  in  the  day,  returned  from  the  front 
line,  and  with  Subadar  Adam  Khan  held  the  ]Dosition 
against  heavy  odds  until  ordered  to  retire,  which 
he  did  very  deliberately,  holding  the  enemy  in  check 
with  his  fire. 

About  4 p.ni.  orders  were  received  from  the 
General  Officer  Commanding  3rd  Cavaky  Brigade 
to  withdraw  to  the  trenches  north  of  the  chateau. 
After  a brief  wait  to  allow  our  guns  to  clear,  this 
movement  was  successful!}^  carried  out. 

The  day  had  been  a very  trying  one,  and  our 
losses  were  correspondingly  heavy.  Between  the 
hours  of  3 and  4 a.m.  on  the  31st  October  a fierce 
onslaught  was  made  on  Messines  by  nine  German 
battalions,  a very  heavy  bombardment  having  been 
kept  up  thi'oughout  the  night.  The  enemy  advanced 
at  the  jog-trot  which  later  became  so  familiar,  ac- 
companying the  movement  with  the  usual  raucous 
guttural  sounds.  They  poured  over  the  trenches 
of  the  57th  in  wave  after  wave. 

Major  Barwell,  who  was  in  the  57th  support 
trenches,  hearing  a prolonged  burst  of  fire  from  No.  4 
Company,  at  once  rushed  forward  to  get  to  the 

P 


34  THE  FIRST  BATTLE  OF  YPRES 


front  trenches,  but  before  he  had  gone  many  yards 
was  shot  dead  ; several  men  were  killed  or  wounded 
in  gallant  attempts  to  bring  him  in. 

Captain  Gordon,  in  command  of  No.  2 Company, 
seemg  that  No.  4 was  being  very  heavily  attacked, 
called  on  his  company  to  counter-attack.  As  he 
rose  to  lead  them,  he  too  was  shot,  and  died  almost 
at  once. 

Lieutenant  Molony,  company  officer  of  No.  2, 
heard  the  Germans  charging  on  his  right  and  suddenly 
saw  three  distinct  masses  of  the  enemy  at  a distance 
of  about  seventy-five  yards.  The^^  had  apparently 
just  taken  the  trench  on  his  right.  Lieutenant 
Molony  had  no  thought  of  retreat,  and  opened  rapid 
fire,  which  soon  put  an  end  to  the  German  cheering, 
and  the  enemy  began  digging  himself  in.  Our 
trench  was  to  some  extent  protected  by  a thick  hedge 
and  trees,  which  made  it  difficult  for  the  enemy  to 
see  exactly  where  they  were  shooting.  The  duel 
went  on  for  almost  two  hours,  when  suddenly  a 
sweeping  enfilade  fire  was  opened  from  the  right  on 
the  devoted  little  party,  by  this  time  very  gravely 
reduced  in  numbers.  Lieutenant  Molony  got  his 
men  out  of  the  trench,  and  they  lay  down  in  the  open 
about  20  yards  behind,  in  prolongation  of  a cavalry 
trench,  keeping  up  rapid  fire  as  long  as  the  ammu- 
nition lasted.  At  this  moment  Lieutenant  Molony 
was  badly  hit  in  the  arm,  but  before  he  became 
unconscious  he  ordered  Jemadar  Ram  Singh  to 
hold  on,  only  retiring  should  the  cavalry  do  so.  The 
wounded  officer  eventually  managed  to  crawl  back 
to  a trench  in  rear,  whence  he  was  taken  to  an  aid 
post  established  in  a cellar. 

Jemadar  Ram  Singh  was  about  the  only  survivor 


HEROIC  DOGRAS 


35 


of  this  party,  the  remainder  being  wiped  out  by  the 
frightful  fire  which  the  enemy  brought  to  bear  on 
them  as  they  were  lying  in  the  open. 

Jemadar  Kapur  Singh  also  fought  it  out  until 
all  but  one  wounded  man  had  been  put  out  of  action, 
and  then,  rather  than  siurender,  shot  himseK  with 
his  last  cartridge. 

Even  this  war  can  present  few  more  devoted 
pictures  than  the  death  of  these  noble-hearted 
Dogras  and  the  heroic  Indian  officer  who  chose 
rather  to  follow  his  men  than  to  surrender. 

The  57th  in  this  part  of  the  field  were  now'  left 
without  a single  British  officer. 

Subadar  Arsla  Khan,  the  senior  Indian  officer 
remaining,  seeing  that  No.  4 Company  was  being 
overwhelmed,  made  a counter-attack  with  the  bayonet 
in  a gallant  but  vain  attempt  to  succour  it.  He  was, 
however,  quite  outnumbered,  and  was  pushed  back 
to  the  support  trench  by  sheer  weight,  losing  heavily 
in  the  process.  Recognizing  the  hopelessness  of  the 
position,  he  succeeded,  with  the  greatest  coolness, 
in  retiring  the  remnant  of  his  men  to  Messines. 
His  gallantry  was  recognized  by  the  award  of  the 
Order  of  British  India,  2nd  Class,  with  the  title  of 
Bahadur. 

While  this  was  going  on,  a determined  attack 
had  been  made  on  No.  3 Company  north  of  Wyt- 
schaete,  under  Captain  Forbes,  who  held  on  until 
the  enemy’s  numbers  again  told,  and  enabled  them 
to  force  their  way  through.  Captain  Forbes  being 
badly  wounded  in  the  shoulder. 

Havildar  Gagna  was  holding  a portion  of  this 
trench  with  a few  men.  When  the  Germans  burst 
upon  him,  sanguinary  hand-to-hand  fighting  took 


36  THE  FIRST  BATTLE  OF  YPRES 


place  in  which  most  of  the  57th  were  put  out  of 
action.  The  Havildar  fought  it  out  and  killed 
five  Germans,  when  his  bayonet  broke.  With  a 
sword  which  he  picked  up,  he  continued  the  un- 
equal combat  until,  after  receiving  six  wounds, 
he  collapsed.  Happily,  when  the  trench  was  re- 
taken he  was  found  still  alive,  and  was  afterwards 
rewarded  with  the  2nd  Class,  Indian  Order  of 
Merit. 

A counter-attack  was  at  once  organized  and 
delivered  with  the  bayonet  by  a squadron  of  the 
5t]i  Dragoon  Guards  and  a company  of  the  57th. 
After  ferocious  hand-to-hand  fighting,  the  57th 
were  reinstated  in  a portion  of  their  trench. 

During  the  night  the  enemy  continued  to  press 
his  advantage  on  the  left  of  the  line,  and  in  the 
morning  of  the  1st  November,  when  Major  Swifte 
and  Captain  Trail  went  up  to  the  front  line,  they 
believed  that  the  hundred  men  with  them  were  all 
that  remained  of  the  57th.  To  their  delight,  they 
found  Major  Willans  with  about  another  hundred 
men,  mostly  Sikhs,  with  whom  he  had  held  out 
during  the  night  against  all  attacks,  although  the 
Germans  were  well  past  him  on  both  flanks. 

With  Major  Willans  was  Lieutenant  Fowler, 
in  charge  of  the  regimental  machine  guns,  which  he 
fought  with  great  gallantry  throughout  the  action. 
While  crossing  a road  under  heavy  fire  in  search  of 
information,  he  was  wounded  in  several  places  by 
a high  explosive  shell  which  burst  quite  close  to  him. 
For  his  gallant  conduct  he  was  awarded  the  Military 
Cross,  while  Major  WiUans  received  the  D.S.O. 

Captain  Trail,  the  adjutant  of  the  57th,  had  been 
conspicuous  for  his  disregard  of  danger,  and  had 


FRENCH  REINFORCEMENTS 


37 


rendered  the  most  valuable  assistance  to  the  Com- 
manding Officer,  For  his  services  he  received  the 
Military  Cross. 

The  57th  nobly  sustained  the  reputation  which 
they  had  earned  in  other  fields.  Sikhs,  Dogras,  and 
Afridis  vied  with  each  other  in  heroism,  inspirited 
by  the  bravery  of  their  British  officers. 

We  must  now  return  to  the  129th  Baluchis, 
whom  we  left  holding  a wood  and  covering  the  right 
and  centre  of  a chateau. 

Early  in  the  morning  of  the  31st  October,  the 
enemy  was  observed  to  be  moving  infantry  up  to 
Oost  Taverne  and  the  w’ood  shghtly  to  the  west, 
but  our  artillery  prevented  them  from  pressing  very 
seriously.  The  second  Division  was  reinforced  at 
noon  by  tliree  French  battalions  with  twelve  guns, 
which  arrived  at  St  Eloi,  whence  they  moved 
forward  towards  Oost  Taverne  and  Hollebeke  and  to 
a great  extent  cleared  the  front  of  the  .3rd  Brigade, 
which  had  hitherto  been  closely  pinned  down  to  its 
trenches.  The  Brigade  was  thus  enabled  to  assemldo 
by  nightfall,  but  before  this  could  be  effected,  it 
was  necessary  to  turn  a body  of  the  enemy  out  of 
a farm  in  which  they  had  been  allowed  to  gain  a 
footing,  under  the  impression  that  they  were  French. 
This  operation  is  described  by  Major-General  Gough, 
Commanding  the  2nd  Cavalry  Division,  as  having 
been  very  well  carried  out  by  Lt-Colonel  Southey 
and  some  of  the  129th. 

In  the  early  morning  of  the  31st  three  com- 
panies of  this  regiment  were  sent  up  to  support 
the  18th  Hussars,  and  at  dark  took  over  fom’  of  their 
trenches.  Shortly  afterwards,  a heavy  fire  was 
opened  on  their  riglit,  Avhich  steadily'  increased. 


38 


THE  FIRST  BATTLE  OF  YPRES 


News  was  then  received  that  Captain  Maclean  had 
been  wounded. 

About  midnight,  Colonel  Southey  received  a 
message  from  the  General  Officer  Commanding  the 
3rd  Cavalry  Brigade  that  a farm  which  was  held  by 
Major  Potter  with  part  of  No.  4 Company  had  been 
taken  by  the  enemy.  It  appeared  that  a small  body  of 
Germans  had  advanced  on  the  farm  with  the  utmost 
assurance,  so  much  so  that  No.  4 Company,  not 
well  versed  in  the  difference  in  appearance  between 
French  and  Germans — this  at  first  was  a constant 
and  very  serious  difficulty  for  our  Indian  troops — 
believed  tliat  they  were  French.  Fire  was  con- 
sequently not  opened  until  they  were  practically  in 
the  farm,  which  was  only  held  by  a few  of  our  men. 
After  a brief  struggle.  Major  Potter  withdrew  the 
men  to  a trench  al)out  fifty  3mrds  to  the  rear  of  the 
farm,  having  accounted  for  some  fifteen  of  the 
enemy. 

Colonel  Southey  tlien  came  up,  and  at  about 
3 a.m.  on  the  1st  November,  he  attacked  the  left  of 
the  farm,  wliile  Major  Potter  attacked  on  the  right. 
The  129th  w’ere  thoroughly  in  their  element  in  this 
kind  of  fighting,  and  chased  the  eneni}^  from  room  to 
room  of  the  building,  killing  ten  and  wounding 
three.  Those  wlio  had  not  bolted  then  surrendered, 
to  the  number  of  fourteen.  As  one  of  the  129th 
remarked,  “ It  wms  a very  good  game.” 

Shortly  after  this,  the  129th  were  ordered  to  hand 
over  their  trenches  to  the  French  cavalr}^^  and  to 
rejoin  the  Ferozepore  Brigade.  On  their  way  south, 
they  were  inspected  b}^  Major-General  H.  P.  Gough, 
Commanding  2nd  Cavalrj^  Division,  wffio  thanked 
the  battalion  for  its  assistance,  and  added  that 


HEAVY  CASUALTIES  39 

he  would  send  in  a,  very  favom-able  report  on  its 
behaviom’. 

The  57th  Rifles  and  129th  Baluchis,  both  under 
Lt-Colonel  Southey,  rejoined  Head  Quarters  a few 
days  later. 

Thus  ended  then  part  in  the  famous  Fnst  Battle 
of  Ypres,  the  first  serious  engagement  in  which 
Indian  troops  fought  in  the  war.  Both  regiments 
possessed  previous  experience  of  fighting  in  parts 
beyond  the  confines  of  the  Indian  Empire,  for  the 
57th  saw  service  in  China  in  1900,  while  the  129th 
bear  on  their  Colours  “ Tel-el-Kebir  ” and  “ Egypt, 
1882.”  During  this  long-drawn-out  and  fiercely 
contested  battle,  they  fully  sustained  their  own 
reputations  and  the  honour  of  the  Indian  Army. 

The  casualties,  as  was  to  be  expected  from  the 
nature  of  the  fighting,  were  heavy.  The  57th  lost 
Major  E.  E.  BarweU  and  Captain  R.  S.  Gordon  killed. 
Captain  L.  Forbes,  Lieutenants  E.  K.  Fowler  and 
C.  W.  Moloity  wounded,  while  Lieutenant  H.  S. 
Clarke  w'as  missing.  Indian  officers : one  killed, 
one  wounded,  two  missing.  Other  ranks : 192 

killed  or  wounded  and  98  missing,  of  whom  the 
majority  were  killed. 

The  losses  of  the  129th  Baluchis  were  Major 
G.  G.  P.  Humphreys,  Captains  W.  F.  Adair  and 
P.  C.  Hampe-Vincent  killed,  while  Captains  F.  A. 
Maclean  and  R.  F.  Dill,  with  Lieutenant  H.  V. 
Lewis  were  wounded.  Of  the  Indian  officers,  three 
were  killed  and  two  wounded.  Other  ranks  : 164 
killed  or  wounded  and  64  missing,  of  whom  again 
the  majority  were  probably  killed. 

The  respect  and  affection  felt  by  the  Indian 
soldier  for  his  British  officers  is  well  known.  No 


40 


THE  FIRST  BATTLE  OF  YPRES 


officers  of  any  army  in  the  world  at  any  period  of 
the  world’s  history  have  ever  fought  with  more 
valour  and  devotion  than  the  British  officers  of  the 
Indian  Army  Corps.  Those  who  fought  and  fell  in 
these  first  engagements  were  typical  of  a very  noble 
and  heroic  class. 

Major  Humphreys  is  spoken  of  as  having  on  ever}'^ 
occasion  commanded  his  company  with  the  greatest 
coolness  and  judgment. 

C!aptain  Adair  had  shown  himself  to  be  a most 
gallant  leader.  When  mortally  wounded  and  lying 
under  heavy  fire,  Havildar  Zauf  Khan  and  two  men, 
with  that  devotion  to  their  officers  which  has  so 
often  been  shown,  attempted  to  get  Captain  Adair 
away.  He  refused  to  be  an  encumbrance  to  them, 
saying  that  he  was  mortally  wounded. 

Captain  Hill  was  in  command  of  the  machine  guns. 
When  one  gun  was  put  out  of  action,  he  ordered  the 
men  to  retire.  He  then  continued  to  fight  the  other 
gun  until  he  was  severely  wounded  in  the  head  by 
a shell.  His  gallantry  was  recognized  by  the  award 
of  the  D.S.O. 

His  men  remained  in  action  until  they  were 
rushed  by  the  enemy  in  overpowering  numbers,  and 
all  died  fighting  to  the  last,  except  Sepoy  Khudadad 
Khan,  who,  although  grievously  wounded  and  left 
by  the  enemy  for  dead,  managed  to  crawl  away  and 
escaped  with  his  life.  For  his  very  conspicuous 
bravery  he  was  awarded  the  Victoria  Cross,  being 
the  first  Indian  soldier  to  receive  this  great  honour. 

The  names  of  these  gallant  machine  gunners 
deserve  special  record.  They  were— Havildar 
Ghulam  Mahomed,  Sepoys  Lai  Sher,  Said  Ahmed, 
Kassib  and  Lafar  Khan.  They  were  honoured  in 


{Daily  Mirror. 

Sepoy  Kiiudadad  Kiiax,  V.C.,  129T11  Eaexjciiis. 


40.] 


1 


MAJOR=GENEKAL  ALLENBY’S  REPORT  41 


death,  for  the  Havildar  received  the  Indian  Order 
of  Merit,  while  the  sepoys  were  awarded  the  Indian 
Distinguished  Service  Medal. 

Major-General  Allenby,  Commanding  the  Cavalry 
Corps,  reported  to  the  Indian  Corps  Commander  in 
terms  of  great  praise  of  the  behaviour  of  the  57th 
and  129th  while  under  his  command. 


CHAPTER  HI 

RELIEF  OF  THE  FRENCH  CAVALRY  UNDER  GENERAL 
CONNEAU  BY  THE  JULLUNDUR  BRIGADE 

Fosition  of  (he  2nd  Corps  under  General  Sniith-Dorrien — British  attempt 
to  strike  towards  Lille — Heavy  German  offensive — Julhmdur  Brigade 
in  trenehes — Sir  John  French’s  appreciation—  Trouble  with  spies— 
Last  reserves  brought  uj) — Casualties. 

While  this  battle  was  taking  place  in  the  north, 
stirring  events  were  happening  further  south. 

It  is  necessary  to  describe  briefly  the  position  of 
the  2nd  Corps  under  General  Sir  Horace  Smith- 
Dorrien,  with  which  the  Indian  Corps  was  destined 
to  be  intimatel}"  connected. 

As  ah’ead}^  stated,  the  line  from  east  of  Messines 
and  Armentieres  to  a front  west  of  Radhinghem  was 
held  by  General  Allenby’s  Cavalry  Corps  and  General 
Pulteney’s  3rd  Corps,  with  General  Conneau’s  French 
Cavalry  on  its  right.  The  Germans,  opposed  by  our 
2nd  Corps,  were  attac]?;ing  from  the  direction  of 
Lille  towards  La  Bassee  and  Bethune. 

On  the  19th  October,  the  2nd  Corps  held  a line 
from  Givenchy,  near  the  La  Bassee  Canal,  forming 
a salient  eastwards  to  the  north  of  the  La  Bassee — 
Lille  road  to  Herlies,  thence  to  Aubers  on  the  famous 
ridge  which  has  cost  us  so  many  brave  lives,  both 
British  and  Indian  ; thence  north-east  to  a point 
near  Radinghem,  where  it  connected  with  General 
Conneau’s  Cavaby. 

The  5th  Division  held  the  right  of  the  line,  the 


OSTEND. 


CANi^L 


iTHOUROUT 


FOREST  OF  HOUnULSf 


BIXSCHOOTE^''  S 

-^ANGEIVM£K 

k-^'^FaCt^EN^  ** 

,-^^S-JUUEN  . 
B0ESIN’GHE’1\]1  WIELTJE-7 

VLAMERTINGHE  ELUV^LT  \ 


rSTEENSTRAATE 


'PASSCHENDAELE 


^'/POPERINGHE 


JHOUEBEI 


DOM  o- 

i\\l.vSlELD! 


BAILIEUL 


TOURCQINiGv 


FRELINGHER^ 


ESTAIRES 


MERVILli; 


^ ^JLEURBAIX  

ENTIE 

— RADINGHEIvrr;, 
?wrl  ’^^FRCMELLES"'*^^'^ 
AUBERS  afOIIR^ 
J^NEUVE  CHAPELLE  ’ 

" 4©  ^ 

BoisbuaiEz  ff 
>y  1 0 L A I N E 


HEBOURG 
TYAAST  ^ 


JLLE 


illCHEBOURG  &■ 
^ L’AVOUE 
A QUINQUE  RUE^, 
FESTUBERT„;. 
S2^  GIVENCHY  . 


VEJMEJ^LES 
'ii  W 


ADAPTED  BY  PERMISSION  OF  THE  DAILY  MAIL. 

General  map  of  the  country  from  the  Sea  to  the  LaBa^see  Canal. 


OUR  LINE  WITHDRAWN 


43 


3rd  Division  the  left.  La  Bassee  was  held  by  the 
Crown  Prince  of  Bavaria,  as  also  was  the  La  Bassee — 
Lille  Canal  and  the  country  immediately  to  the 
south  and  east. 

Our  first  endeavoim  was  to  strike  tlu’ough  Fournes 
at  the  La  Bassee — Lille  line,  and  thus  to  cut  off 
La  Bassee.  The  Germans,  however,  anticipated 
this  move,  and  after  the  20th  October  General  Smith- 
Dorrien  found  that  he  could  not  at  the  best  hope  to 
do  more  than  to  hold  his  ground  and  keep  the  enem\^ 
off  Bethune. 

On  the  morning  of  the  22nd  October,  the  enemy 
made  his  first  attack  on  a large  scale.  The  5th 
Division  on  the  right  was  pushed  out  of  Violaines 
between  Givenchy  and  Lorgies,  the  further  progress 
of  the  German  advance  being  only  checked  by  a 
vigorous  counter-attack  by  the  3rd  Worcesters  and 
2nd  Manchesters.  It  was  evident  from  the  strength 
of  the  attack  that  the  3rd  Division  on  our  left  would 
be  unable  to  hold  its  ground.  On  the  night  of  the 
22nd  October,  therefore,  the  line  was  withdrawn  to 
a position  running  east  of  Givenchy,  in  front  of 
Neuve  Chapelle  to  a salient  near  Aubers  and  so  on 
to  Fauquissart,  south-east  of  Laventie.  At  this 
time  the  2nd  Corps  consisted  of  two  Divisions,  the 
3rd  and  5th,  together  with  one  Brigade,  amounting 
to  about  32,000  men  in  all,  amongst  which  were 
some  French  units. 

On  the  24th  October,  the  whole  line  was  vigorously 
attacked,  but,  mainl}^  by  the  help  of  our  artillery, 
the  assault  was  beaten  off  before  it  reached  our 
trenches.  In  the  evening  the  3rd  Division  was  sorely 
tried,  but  the  position  was  saved  by  the  1st  Wilt- 
shires  and  1st  West  Kents. 


44  RELIEF  OF  THE  FRENCH  CAVALRY 


By  this  time  the  Corps,  which  had  been  fighting 
for  ten  days,  was  beginning  to  feel  the  strain. 
Luckily,  the  Lahore  Division  under  Lt-General 
Watkis  had  just  arrived,  without,  however,  the 
Ferozepore  Brigade,  which  was  with  the  Cavalry 
(Jorps  near  Messines,  and  the  Sirhind  Brigade,  still 
in  Egypt. 

The  remaining  Jullundur  Brigade  was  . at  once 
utilized  on  the  left  of  the  Corps,  taking  over  the 
ground  held  by  General  Conneau’s  Cavalry,  which  was 
moved  northwards.  The  15th  Sikhs,  34th  vSikh 
Pioneers  and  59th  Rifles  were  pushed  up  to  support 
the  Freneh  Cavalry,  with  orders  to  counter-attack 
if  the  French  were  driven  out  that  day.  If  not, 
they  were  to  relieve  the  Cavaky  at  nightfall.  This 
relief  w'as  advisable  for  two  reasons — because  the 
French  were  filling  a gap  between  two  of  our  Brigades, 
and  because  they  had  been  in  the  trenches  for  ten 
very  strenuous  days. 

From  this  date  until  the  1st  November  the  three 
battalions  w^ere  fated  to  undergo  a harassing  experi- 
ence. Space  does  not  permit  of  a ver^^  detailed 
account,  but  a brief  description  will  give  some  idea 
of  the  conditions  under  wfiiich  our  troops  had  to 
fight  in  those  far-off  daj^s,  when  they  were  out- 
numbered and  outgunned,  and  were  without  the 
bombs,  grenades  and  other  munitions  which  are  now^ 
provided  as  naturally  and  as  regularly  as  their 
daily  food. 

The  15th  Sikhs  on  the  right  were  in  touch  with 
the  Gordon  Highlanders,  who  w^ere  the  left  battalion 
of  the  8th  British  Infantry  Brigade  ; the  59th  Rifles 
carried  on  the  line  to  the  left,  where  one  company 
of  the  34th  Pioneers  under  Captain  Bailey  took  over 


DIFFlCUiyriES  OF  NIGHT  MARCHES  45 

an  advanced  post  from  the  French  and  linked  up  the 
59th  with  the  19th  British  Brigade  on  the  left. 

This  detachment  was  attacked  within  an  hour 
of  its  relieving  the  French,  and  during  the  night 
Captain  Bailey  was  wounded  severely  and  Lieutenant 
Browne  slightly.  The  defence  was  very  ably  carried 
on  by  Subadars  Sher  Singh  and  Natha  Singh  till 
the  evening  of  the  26th,  when  Major  Gib  took  over 
command.  Subadar  Sher  Singh  received  the  Indian 
Order  of  Merit,  2nd  Class,  for  his  gallant  leadership. 

This  relief  was  the  first  experience  by  Indian 
troops  of  the  difficulties  of  moving  at  night  across 
unknown  country,  cut  up  as  it  was  by  wire  entangle- 
ments and  deep  ditches  full  of  water  and  mud.  Tlie 
men  were,  moreover,  under  fire  for  a great  part  of 
the  time,  and  had  much  difficulty  in  finding  the 
French  trenches. 

On  arrival,  it  was  seen  that  the  front  was  far  too 
long  for  the  number  of  men  available.  The  59th, 
for  instance,  had  to  occupy  a front  of  1500  yards. 
There  was  no  help  for  it,  as  there  were  no  more  men 
to  be  had.  The  relief  was  successfully  carried  out 
between  6 p.m.  and  midnight. 

At  about  8 p.m.  the  Gordons  on  the  right  were 
heavUy  attacked,  and  their  line  was  broken.  The 
first  intimation  of  this  occurrence  received  by  our 
men  was  the  sound  of  Germans  shouting  in  rear  of 
the  right  of  the  15th  Sikhs,  and  it  was  evident  that 
an  unknown  number  of  the  enemy  had  got  through. 
In  the  inky  darkness  it  was  impossible  to  find  out 
exactly  what  had  happened,  but  after  a time  every- 
thing became  quiet,  and  it  seemed  that  the  Germans 
had  not  followed  up  their  advantage.  As  a matter  of 
fact,  the  4th  Middlesex,  gallantly  led  by  Lt-Colonel 


46  RELIEF  OF  THE  FRENCH  CAVALRY 


Hull,  had  at  once  counter-attacked,  and,  hurling  back 
the  enemy  at  the  point  of  the  bayonet,  had  restored 
the  position. 

During  the  night  there  were  intermittent  attacks, 
which,  although  they  were  not  pressed  home,  caused 
a number  of  casualties.  The  difficulty  of  the 
position  was  increased  by  the  fact  that  telephonic 
communication  wdth  Brigade  Head  Quarters  could 
not  be  established,  owing  partly  to  the  wires  being 
cut  by  shells,  and  partly  to  the  operations  of  spies, 
of  whom  there  were  at  this  period  many  behind  our 
lines. 

On  the  25th  we  were  repeatedly  attacked. 
Captain  Scott  of  the  59th  was  shot  tlrrough  the  head 
and  killed.  Lt-Colonel  Gordon  and  Lieutenant 
Henderson  of  the  15th  w^ere  wounded,  and  the 
command  of  the  regiment  devolved  on  Major  Carden. 

The  enemy’s  artillery  fire  became  heavier  and 
heavier,  and  it  seemed  that  he  was  meditating  an 
attack  on  the  section  held  by  the  59th.  Two 
companies  of  the  34th  were  brought  up,  with  orders 
to  counter-attack  if  the  59th  were  driven  back. 
About  this  time  the  German  snipers  became  very 
active  and  caused  many  casualties,  occupying  every 
point  of  vantage  with  very  great  resolution. 

Throughout  the  day  the  15th  Sikhs  w^ere  sub- 
jected to  very  heavy  shell  ftre,  and  after  dark  our 
centre  and  right  w^ere  hard  pressed,  but  held  their 
own  till  3 a.m.,  when  the  attack  ceased.  The  re- 
mainder of  the  34th  reinforced  the  firing  line,  leaving 
absolutely  no  Brigade  reserve,  but  at  7 p.m.  half  of 
the  47th  Sikhs  arrived,  a very  welcome  addition, 
as  the  situation  was  rapidly  becoming  critical. 

The  night  was  a trying  one,  very  w’^et  and  cold. 


ACTIVITY  OF  SPIES 


47 


and  the  men,  who  had  now’  been  fighting  without 
sufficient  food  a.nd  with  little  or  no  sleep  for  two 
days,  were  soaked  to  the  skin. 

The  question  of  rations  was  an  anxious  one. 
The  only  way  in  w’hich  they  could  be  brought  up 
was  by  collecting  them  at  some  central  spot,  about 
400  yards  behind  the  line,  and  then  waiting  for  a 
iuU  in  the  firing.  If  there  w^as  no  lull,  there  were 
no  rations. 

The  position  of  the  Regimental  Staffs  w’as  no 
enviable  one,  for  they  had  several  times  been  shelled 
out  of  the  houses  in  which  they  had  established  them- 
selves. This  was  undoubtedly  due  to  the  activity 
of  spies,  for  everywhere  along  the  British  front  it 
had  been  remarked  that,  however  often  Head  Quarters 
might  be  changed,  the  enemy’s  guns  were  soon  able 
to  re-locate  them. 

The  26th  passed  fairly  quietly,  but  the  Germans 
were  reported  to  be  massing  in  front  of  our  centre. 
On  the  27th  at  7 a.m.  the  59th  were  heavily  attacked, 
and  No.  3 Company  under  Captam  Martin  was  losing 
men  fast.  In  attempting  to  reinforce  him,  Captain 
Murray  was  severely  wounded.  A vigorous  fire 
fight  followed,  and  after  an  hour’s  hard  tussle  the 
enemy  was  beaten  back  to  his  trenches  all  along 
the  line,  Captain  Vaughan-Sawyer,  the  mterpreter 
of  the  34th,  falling  a victim  to  a sniper  during  the 
attack. 

The  rest  of  the  day  passed  more  quietly  than 
usual,  except  for  the  activities  of  the  snipers,  who 
prevented  rations  from  being  brought  up  till  after 
dusk.  During  the  day  the  men  were  greatly  en- 
couraged by  a message  from  Sir  John  French,  warmly 
commending  the  manner  in  which  the  Jullundm 


48  RELIEF  OF  THE  FRENCH  CAVALRY 


Brigade  had  maintained  its  position  during  the 
day’s  fighting. 

The  15th  Sikhs  had  been  so  worried  by  snipers 
that  a house-to-house  search  was  cariled  out  in  the 
village.  Several  of  the  haunts  of  these  gentry  were 
discovered  by  the  presence  of  empty  German 
cartridge  cases.  In  the  end  a number  of  men 
were  sent  off  to  Head  Quarters  under  escort,  and 
for  a time  there  was  comparative  peace.  There  is 
no  doubt  that  at  that  period  the  spying  and  general 
observation  arrangements  of  the  enemy  were  much 
superior  to  ours,  for  it  was  noted  that  whenever  a 
few  officers  were  collected  together,  that  part  of  the 
trench  was  at  once  subjected  to  heavy  fire. 

The  28th  was  marked  by  two  determined  attacks, 
which,  with  the  aid  of  our  artillery  and  machine  guns, 
were  both  repulsed  with  considerable  loss.  Curiously 
enough,  the  Germans  did  not  support  their  night 
attacks  by  artillery  fire,  although  our  guns  were 
largely  instrumental  in  beating  them  back.  The 
29th  passed  cpiietly,  but  by  this  time  the  front, 
always  far  too  extended  tor  the  men  available,  was 
very  thinly  held,  as  the  casualties  had  been  heavy 
and  continuous. 

The  position  was  most  grave.  On  the  27th, 
the  15th  Lancers  had  been  sent  up  as  reinforce- 
ments. They  represented  absolutely  the  last  avail- 
able reserves.  In  the  event  of  a really  strong  attack, 
nothino;  remained  but  for  our  men  to  die  where  they 
stood.  Happily,  the  attack  did  not  come,  and  by 
the  1st  November  the  defenders  were  relieved  by  the 
two  remaining  regiments  of  the  Brigade,  one  of  which, 
the  47th  Sikhs,  had  meantime  been  heavily  engaged 
in  the  attack  on  Neuve  Chapelle,  and  were  in 


CASUALTIES  49 

consequence  only  able  to  take  over  the  front  of  tbice 
companies. 

The  casualties  dining  the  period  24th  October  to 
1st  November  were  severe. 

The  15th  Sikhs  lost  3 British  and  3 Indian  officers 
wounded ; other  ranks,  1 1 killed,  240  wounded,  and 
12  missing.  These  casualties  were  largely  due  to 
shrapnel,  and  occurred  chiefly  on  the  26th  and  27th, 
before  the  regiment  was  properly  entrenched. 

The  59th  Rifles  had  1 British  officer  Idlled, 

1 British  and  2 Indian  officers  wounded,  13  other 
ranks  killed  and  1 89  wounded. 

The  34th  Pioneers  lost  1 British  officer  killed, 

2 British  and  3 Indian  officers  wounded,  15  other 
ranks  killed  and  89  wounded. 

The  47th  Sikhs  had  2 British  officers  and  118 
other  ranks  wounded. 


E 


CHAPTER  IV 


ATTACK  BA^  INDIANS  ON  NEUVE  CHAPELLE 

Situation  round  Neuve  Chapelle— British  evacuate  villago — Counter- 
attack by  Indian  troops — Gallantry  of  47tli  Sikhs  and  Sappers  and 
Miners — Heroism  of  British  officers — Lieutenant  Nosvorthy,  R.E. — 
Counter-attack  unsuccessful— Heavy  casualties — Honours  awarded — 
Daring  recoimaissance  by  LieutencPnt  Brunskill,  47th  Sikhs — Legendary 
achievements  of  Indian  troops. 

It  is  now  necessary  to  move  sliglitl}^  southwards 
towards  the  village  of  Neuve  Chapelle. 

On  the  26th  October,  the  enemy  managed  to  gain 
a footing,  after  a violent  struggle,  on  the  north-east 
side  of  the  village,  having  advanced  under  cover  of 
the  Bois  du  Biez,  which  lies  slightly  to  the  east. 

During  the  next  da3A  desperate  hand-to-hand 
lighting  took  place  for  the  possession  of  the  village. 
In  spite  of  our  vigorous  counter-attacks,  the  Germans 
still  clung  to  their  hold  for  the  greater  part  of  the 
day,  but  towards  dark  w^e  gTadually  retook  most  of 
the  ground  held  by  the  enemy.  At  this  juncture 
heavy  German  reinforcements  were  brought  up, 
and  om*  troops,  fighting  with  the  greatest  valour, 
were  forced  back  by  sheer  weight  of  numbers,  the 
entire  village  being  taken  from  us. 

The  troops  engaged  in  this  fighting  were  mostly 
of  the  7th  and  9th  British  Brigades.  Amongst 
them  the  West  Kents  especially  distinguished  them- 
selves, holding  on  to  theh  isolated  trenches  from 


SERIOUS  POSITION  OF  2nd  CORPS  51 


beginning  to  end,  until  relieved,  eventuaU}'  coming 
out  of  action  with  only  two  officers,  both  2nd  Lieu- 
tenants, who  were  rewarded  with  the  D.S.O. 

This  success  on  the  part  of  the  Germans  chove  a 
salient  into  our  line  which  it  was  iinperative  to 
rectify  without  delay.  At  5 p.m.  on  the  27th,  a 
message  was  received  to  the  effect  that  the  Com- 
manding Officer  and  the  Adjutant  of  the  West  Kents 
had  been  killed,  and  that  the  Germans  were  coming 
on  very  fast  through  the  south  of  Neuve  Chapelle. 
This  was  followed  quickly  by  a report  from  the 
Wiltshhes  and  South  Lancashires  that  they  were 
nearly  surrounded,  and  had  been  forced  to  retire, 
but  w^ere  engaging  the  enemj?'  on  the  west  side  of  the 
village,  in  order  to  check  them,  before  rething 
further  after  dark. 

This  news  pointed  to  the  probability  of  a gap 
being  created  between  the  3rd  and  5th  Divisions, 
which  would  seriously  affect  the  wdiole  position 
of  the  2nd  Corps.  The  9th  Bhopals,  under  Lt- 
Colonel  Dobbie,  were  at  once  ordered  to  counter- 
attack in  the  direction  of  Pont  Logy,  wdth  the 
object  of  taking  in  flank  the  enemy  w ho  was  reported 
to  be  advancing  west  of  Neuve  Chapelle. 

The  Bhopals  moved  off  across  enclosed  countiy 
cut  up  by  bogs  and  barbed  wire,  which  in  the  darkness 
caused  some  confusion ; but  eventually  the  whole 
battalion  reached  the  neighbourhood  of  the  West 
Kent  trenches  and  established  touch.  Confused 
fighting  took  place  in  the  hamlet  south  of  Neuve 
Chapelle,  during  which  No.  1 Company,  under 
Captain  Jones  and  Lieutenant  Wade,  put  about 
thu’ty  Germans  out  of  action. 

The  position  at  this  juncture  was  very  critical, 


52  ATTACK  ON  NEUVE  CHAPELLE 


as  the  enemy  had  almost  succeeded  in  enveloping 
the  West  Kents  and  were  actually  firing  into  them 
from  the  rear.  At  this  most  opportune  moment, 
the  Bhopals  arrived  on  the  right  flank  of  the  Germans, 
who  were  forced  to  retii’e  with  some  loss. 

During  this  chaotic  fighting.  Lieutenant  Mullaly 
of  the  Bhopals  was  unfortunately  captm’ed.  The 
battalion  then  entrenched  itseh  under  a heavy  fire, 
Lt-Coloiiel  Anderson  being  mortally  wounded  at 
this  time. 

By  now,  the  20th  Company  Sapx^ers  and  Miners, 
under  Captain  Paris,  R.E.,  and  the  21st  Company 
under  Captain  Richardson,  R.E.,  had  come  up, 
while  the  47th  Sikhs  under  Major  Davidson  had 
moved  uj)  into  line  on  the  left  of  the  Bhopals.  Dark- 
ness stox^ped  further  advance,  and  it  was  found  that 
a considerable  gap  existed  between  the  47th  and  the 
Bhopals.  Brigadier- General  McCracken  considered 
it  necessary  to  utilize  tho  Sax^pers  and  Miners  to  fill 
this  gax),  as  they  were  the  onlj^  troops  immediately 
available,  although  it  was,  of  course,  not  intended  that 
such  highly  and  sx3eciall3r  trained  men  should  be 
used  for  the  ordinary  fighting  duties  of  infantry. 

Erequent  attacks  were  made  during  the  night  by 
the  enemjq  but  were  repulsed,  and  the  trenches  on 
the  north-east  side  were  swept  by  machine-gun  fire, 
while  a German  searchlight  was  playing  on  the  left 
of  the  position  from  the  outskirts  of  Neuve  Chapelle. 
At  10.30  a.m.  on  the  28th,  our  artillery  commenced 
a bombardment  which  continued  for  half  an  hour. 

A portion  of  the  Bhopals  remaining  with  the  West 
Kents,  the  47th  Sikhs  advanced  on  the  village  with 
the  20th  and  21st  Companies  Sappers  and  Miners, 
and  covered  the  700  yards  of  open  ground,  alternately 


\ 

\ 


Sketch  showing 

Positions  near  Neuve  Chapelle 
October  ZB*]’  1914. 


Scale  of  Yards 


500 


0 


_l 

1000 


2000 


52 


\ 


as  ■ 
the 
froi 
the 
wh( 

of 

bat 

Lt-' 

this 


unc 
uiic 
whi 
mo 
lies 
a c» 
B\v 
it  L 
thii 
av£ 
sue 
use 

the 

the 

wh 

of 

At 

al 

Ke 

tin 


an 


DESPERATE  FIGHTING  IN  THE  STREETS  53 

firing  and  rushing.  Casualties  were  numerous,  but 
the  excellence  of  our  fire  control  saved  us  a much 
heavier  loss. 

When  our  men  were  about  100  3"ards  from  the 
outskirts  of  the  village,  the  Germans  in  the  front 
trenches  began  to  bolt,  pursued  b}"  the  gallant  Sikhs 
and  Sappers  Avith  the  ba3mnet,  a few  being  killed 
and  some  captured.  The  Indians  then  tore  on  into 
the  village,  Sikhs  and  Sappers  mixed  together  and 
worked  in  parties  up  the  streets,  fired  on  b3’  the  enem3" 
from  the  roofs  of  houses. 

By  degrees  the  houses  were  cleared  after  desperate 
hand-to-hand  fighting,  in  which  a man  of  the  47th 
is  reported  to  have  captrued  three  Germans  out  of 
eight  in  a house,  having  previousR  killed  the  other 
five.  From  another  house  the  47th  recovered  a 
wounded  British  soldier  (a  relic  of  the  previous  hard 
fighting)  and  two  wounded  Germans.  The  latter 
were  searched,  and  one  of  them  lifted  up  his  voice 
and  wept  bitterhy  evidentl3'’'  thinking  that  oiu  men 
were  feeling  for  a soft  place  in  Avhich  to  insert  a 
bayonet.  He  refused  to  be  comforted  until  a stalwart 
Sikh  patted  him  kindl3"  on  the  back  and  said,  “ Be 
not  afraid  ! ” 

On  reaching  the  cross-roads  in  the  centre  of  the 
village,  the  troops  came  under  a frightful  machine- 
gun  fire.  Captain  McCleverHy  alwa3’^s  in  advance, 
cheering  on  his  men  just  as  he  had  cheered  on  the 
regimental  hockey  team,  dashed  across  the  roads, 
the  rest  following  close  on  his  heels,  but  he  was  shot 
dead  at  a corner  house  b3^  a German  concealed  01113’^ 
a few  yards  away.  Major  Davidson  and  others  tried 
to  stalk  the  man  with  revolvers,  but  he  was  not  to 
be  drawn. 


54  ATTACK  ON  NEUVE  CHAPELLE 


A Pujijabi  Mahomedan  of  the  Sappers  calmly 
put  the  others  aside,  telling  them  to  leave  it  to  him. 
BTe  knelt  down  in  the  road,  and  quietly  waiting  until 
the  German  put  his  head  out  for  another  shot, 
killed  him  on  the  spot.  He  continued  to  wait,  amidst 
the  machine-gun  bullets  drifting  like  rain,  for  a chance 
at  a second  man  whom  he  believed  to  be  there,  but  if 
the  sniper  existed,  he  was  too  wary  to  show  himself. 
In  the  turmoil,  the  name  of  this  hero  could  un- 
fortunately not  be  ascertained,  or  he  would  have  been 
recommended  for  a verv  high  honour. 

Oiu  losses  were  rapidly  becoming  serious  from 
the  rifle  Are  of  the  enemy  in  the  houses,  and  from 
the  raking  fii’e  of  several  machine  guns  posted  outside 
the  village  and  sweeping  the  main  street.  Lieutenant 
Hayes-Sadler  of  the  20th  Company  Sappers  and 
Miners  determined  at  all  costs  to  put  a stop  to  the 
ravages  of  the  machine  guns,  and  headed  a splendid 
charge  against  the  nearest,  but  without  avail.  His 
men  were  mown  down  and  he  fell  shot  througli  the 
head. 

Tlie  blood  of  our  men  was  up,  and  nothing  could 
stop  them  ; after  a prolonged  and  ferocious  struggle, 
the  whole  of  the  main  street  was  captured.  The 
Germans  held  on  like  a vice,  and  each  house  formed 
a small  fortress  which  had  to  be  stormed  before 
further  advance  could  be  made. 

Captain  Paris  of  the  20th  Company  was  wounded 
several  times,  but  refused  to  leave,  and  was  eventually 
taken  prisoner. 

The  21st  Company  was  also  doing  its  part  man- 
fully, but  its  losses  were  terrible.  Captain  Richard- 
son charged  with  impetuous  valom’  ahead  of  his  men, 
and  was  actually  killed  on  the  far  side  of  the  village 


GERMAN  COUNTER-ATTACK 


after  the  main  street  had  been  captured.  His  two 
subalterns,  Lieutenants  Rohde  and  Almond,  fit 
followers  of  a dauntless  leader,  were  killed  just  as 
victory  appeared  to  be  within  their  grasp.  Lieu- 
tenant Eitzmaurice  was  badty  wounded,  but  kept 
going  as  long  as  he  could  stand,  and  then  managed 
to  crawl  back  to  safety. 

The  fighting  went  on,  counter-attack  following 
counter-attack,  the  Germans  using  the  dead  bodies 
of  their  own  men  as  cover.  Major  Davidson  was 
collecting  his  men  for  a final  charge,  when  the  enemy 
brought  up  an  overpowering  counter-attack  from 
the  north  and  east,  and  at  the  same  moment  the 
machine-gun  fire  redoubled  its  fury  down  the  main 
street. 

Without  immediate  reinforcements,  the  position 
of  the  47th  was  now  quite  untenable,  as  their  losses 
had  been  very  heavy.  Reinforcements  there  were 
none,  and  Major  Davidson  was  compelled  to  give 
up  all  he  had  won  at  such  fearful  cost,  and  retire. 
The  Ime  of  retreat  lay  over  about  500  yards  of  open 
ground  exposed  to  a tornado  of  shell  and  machine- 
gun  fire,  and  the  bodies  of  our  men  soon  lay  thick 
on  the  ground,  but  eventually  the  remains  of  the  half 
battalion  got  back  to  comparative  safety,  only  68 
out  of  289  actually  collecting  on  the  La  Bassee 
road. 

The  men  were  suffering  terribly  from  want  of  water 
and  were  absolutely  dead  beat,  but  the  enemy  was 
counter-attacking  all  along  the  front,  and  every  man 
was  requhed.  Major  Davidson  was  ordered  to 
collect  at  Rouge  Croix  as  many  of  the  battalion  as 
were  left,  with  a view  to  holding  the  cross-roads, 
which  were  almost  certain  to  be  attacked.  He 


r,G  ATTACK  ON  NEUVE  CHAPELI.E 

asked  liis  men  whether  they  could  do  it,  exhausted 
as  they  were,  and  to  his  delight  found  that  they 
clearly  resented  being  asked  such  a question.  Off  they 
marched  again  towards  Rouge  Croix,  hut  were  met 
by  orders  to  go  into  billets. 

Such  was  the  spirit  which  animated  officers  and 
men  of  the  Indian  Corps,  and  it  is  on  record  that 
dmang  the  retreat  from  the  village,  under  a fire  de- 
scribed as  hellish,  the  men  were  laughing  and  joking 
with  each  other.  Captain  Brown,  afterwards  killed, 
standing  up  at  the  halts  to  fire,  his  example  being 
copied  by  many  of  the  men. 

Major  Davidson  had  tliroughout  this  confused 
and  ding-dong  fighting  shown  the  highest  qualities  of 
bravery  and  leadership,  and  was  awarded  a brevet 
Lt-Coionelcy  in  recognition  of  his  services. 

The  47th  Sikhs  were  raised  in  1901  and  have  no 
])att]e  honoiu's  on  their  Coloms.  Throughout  its 
service  in  France,  this  magnificent  regiment  never 
failed  to  answer  all  calls  ; its  reputation  would  be 
secure,  and  its  right  to  fight  shoulder  to  shoulder  with 
our  best  troops  would  be  established,  if  based  only 
on  the  record  of  Neuve  Chapelle  ; but  this  action 
was  onty  one  of  many  in  which  the  47th  distinguished 
themselves. 

In  the  meantime,  the  Bhopals  had  made  some 
progress,  and  a portion  of  them  under  Major  Jamieson 
even  reached  the  original  trenches  of  the  Wiltshires, 
while  another  party  arrived  at  the  same  line  of 
trenches  further  to  the  east,  after  forcing  their  way 
through  a part  of  the  village.  Here,  however,  they 
found  themselves  confronted  by  very  superior  forces 
of  the  enemy,  and  without  support.  The  remnants 
of  these  small  detachments  eventually  found  their 


GALLANTRY  OF  SAPPER  DALTP  STNGH  r>7 

way  back  through  Neiive  Chapelle,  losing  heavil}’ 
as  they  went  by  the  enemy’s  fire  from  the  houses. 

Lieutenants  Nosworthy  and  Rait-Kerr  of  the 
20th  Company  Sappers  and  Miners  now  found  them- 
selves in  the  centre  of  the  village,  with  only  about 
twenty  men  left,  the  casualties  having  been  very 
heavy,  and  in  the  absolute  chaos  which  reigned  the 
company  had  become  split  up. 

Speed}^  reinforcement  was  necessary,  so  Lieu- 
tenant Rait-Kerr  volunteered  to  go  back  over  the 
bullet-swept  open  to  try  and  bring  up  more  men, 
but  he  was  hit  before  he  had  gone  two  hundred 
yards.  Sapper  Dalip  Singh  ran  to  his  officer’s  assist  - 
ance and  helped  him  under  cover.  He  then  stood 
over  him  and  kept  off  several  parties  of  Germans  by 
his  fire.  On  one  occasion — a feat  almost  incredible, 
but  well  established — he  was  attacked  by  as  many 
as  twenty  of  the  enemy,  but  beat  them  off,  and 
got  Lieutenant  Rait-Kerr  away.  This  officer’s 
indomitable  spirit  is  shown  by  the  fact  that  when 
Lieutenant  Nosworthy  eventually  retired,  he  found 
him  just  recovering  from  the  shock  of  his  wound, 
])ut  preparing  to  try  and  crawl  back  to  the  fight. 
For  his  signal  act  of  bravery  and  devotion  Sapper 
Dalip  Singh  received  the  2nd  Class  of  the  Indian 
Order  of  Merit. 

Prominent  among  the  few  men  still  left  vdth 
Lieutenant  Nosworthy,  was  Subadar  Gunpat  Malia- 
deo,  who  throughout  fully  merited  by  his  bravery 
the  reward  of  the  2nd  Class  of  the  Order  of  British 
India  which  he  received. 

Subadar  Malla  Singli,  too,  fought  with  supreme 
disregard  of  danger,  and  when  retreat  was  inevitable, 
he  conducted  his  small  party  v ith  the  greatest  skill 


58  ATTACK  ON  NEUVE  CHAPELLE 


and  coolness.  For  bis  gallantry  tliroughout  the  action 
he  received  the  Military  Cross. 

Lieutenant  Nosworthy  is  known  in  an  army  of 
very  brave  men  for  his  genuine  and  irrepressible 
love  of  fighting  ; in  the  most  awkward  and  dangerous 
positions  he  is  always  the  same,  gay,  seh-possessed, 
and  resourceful.  He  was  wounded  on  this  as  on 
other  occasions,  but  nothing  seemed  to  damp  his 
sph'its.  His  last  achievement  was  to  be  shot  through 
the  heart  at  the  battle  of  A'pres  in  April,  1915,  and 
to  recover,  destined  to  take  part,  with  nerves  un- 
affected, in  other  conflicts.  You  could,  until  all 
was  lost,  as  easily  have  moved  the  three  Musqueteers 
from  them  famous  breakfast  as  you  could  have  moved 
this  man  from  Neuve  Chapelle. 

With  the  scanty  remnant  of  his  company,  he 
proceeded  to  build  a barricade  in  the  cross-road  off 
the  main  street,  and  thus  checked  the  enfilade 
machine-gun  fire.  He  then  ensconced  himself  in  a 
couple  of  houses  and  held  his  position  while  waiting 
for  the  reinforcements  which  were  never  to  arrive. 
Two  other  messengers  were  sent  off,  but  neither  got 
through. 

At  about  .3.30  p.m.  a weary  battle-worn  party 
of  Indians  with  one  British  officer  was  seen  approach- 
ing by  the  road  which  the  Sappers  were  holding. 
These  proved  to  be  Major  Jamieson  and  a small  body 
of  Bhopals  who,  having  penetrated  to  the  Wiltshires’ 
trenches,  had  been  forced  to  retme  in  the  face  of 
numbers.  On  their  arrival  Lieutenant  Nosworthy, 
still  full  of  fight,  led  a charge  against  one  of  the 
numerous  machine  guns,  but  it  failed,  and  it  was 
evident  that  the  only  possibility  of  avoiding  death 
or  capture  lay  in  immediate  retirement. 


BRITISH  LOSSES  IN  THE  ATTACK  59 


Of  the  company  of  Sappers  only  thirteen  men 
retired  with  Lieutenant  Nosworthy.  Most  of  the 
others  had  died  gallantly,  while  some,  cut  off  from 
their  officer,  had  retired  with  Subadar  Malla  Singh. 
The  21st  Compa.ny  had  vied  with  the  20th  in  bravery, 
Subadars  Ganga  Charan  Dixit,  who  was  wounded, 
and  Ismail  Khan  being  prominent  amongst  brave 
men  for  their  gallantrjx  They  received  the  Indian 
Distinguished  Service  Medal. 

The  attack  was  magnificently  carried  out,  and  w’^as 
within  an  ace  of  success.  As  usual  in  those  days, 
our  hands  were  tied  by  the  lack  of  men  ; and  by 
degrees  we  were  learning  the  lesson  that  to  take  a 
position  was  one  thing,  to  hold  it  another,  mvolving 
the  employment  of  a sufficient  depth  of  troops.  It 
seems  probable  that,  had  reinforcements  been  avail- 
able, the  47th  and  Sappers  would  have  held  the 
village  which  they  took  with  such  superb  elan  and 
at  such  a heavj^  cost. 

The  stubbornness  and  bravery  with  which  our 
men  fought  can  be  gauged  by  the  losses.  The 
47th  lost  Captain  McCleveity,  one  Indian  officer 
and  16  men  killed,  and  Major  Browiie,  three  Indian 
officers  and  156  men  wounded,  out  of  a total 
of  289. 

The  9th  Bhopals  lost  Lt-Colonel  Anderson  and 
one  Indian  officer  killed,  Captain  Jones  and  Lieu- 
tenant Wade  wounded  and  missing.  Captain  Irvine 
wounded.  Lieutenant  Mullaly  a prisoner,  the  casual- 
ties amongst  other  ranks  being  262. 

For  his  gallantry  Captain  G.  D.  Martin  received 
the  Military  Cross,  while  Subadar  Major  Bhure 
Singh  and  Havildar  Amar  Singh  were  awarded  the 
Indian  Distinguished  Service  Medal. 


CO  ATTACK  ON  NEUVE  CHAPELLE 

Not  a single  one  of  the  British  officers  of  the 
Sappers  and  Miners  came  out  scathless. 

In  the  20th  Company,  Lieutenant  Hayes-Sadler 
was  killed,  Captain  Paris  wounded  and  missing ; 
Lieutenants  Nosworthy  and  Rait-Kerr  were 
wounded,  while  the  losses  in  other  ranks  amounted 
to  54  out  of  150  who  went  into  action. 

The  casualties  of  the  21st  Company  were  Captain 
Richardson,  Lieutenants  Rohde  and  Almond  killed, 
and  Lieutenant  Fitzmaurice  wounded,  the  losses  in 
other  ranks  amounting  to  57. 

^riie  magnificent  conduct  of  the  troops  was 
recognized  l)y  Field-Marshal  Sir  John  French,  who, 
in  his  despatch,  dated  20th  November,  1914,  re- 
marked as  follows 

“ On  the  28th  October  especially  the  47th  Sikhs 
and  the  20th  and  21st  Companies  of  the  Sappers  and 
Miners  distinguished  themselves  by  their  gallant 
conduct  in  the  attack  on  Neuve  Chapelle,  losing 
heavily  in  officers  and  men.” 

General  Sir  Horace  Smith-Dorrien  also  sent  his 
warmest  congratulations  on  the  splendid  conduct 
of  the  troops. 

The  history  of  the  Indian  Army  contains  few 
nobler  pages  than  that  of  the  28th  October,  1914. 

On  the  3rd  November  volunteers  were  called  for 
to  undertake  the  dangerous  work  of  reconnoitring 
the  ground  in  front  of  oirr  Imes,  and  securing  as  much 
information  as  possible  about  the  German  trenches. 
The  47th  Sikhs  were  then  holding  a section  of  the 
line  near  Picantin,  and  from  amongst  the  many 
competitors  for  the  work.  Lieutenant  Brunskill  ^vas 
selected,  and  he  decided  to  take  with  him  only  one 
man,  Scout  Havildar  Munshi  Singh. 


[C.  Vnndyck,  Ltd. 

Fiei^d-Marsiiai,  Viscount  French  of  Ypres,  K.P., 

O.M.,  G.C.V.O.,  K.C.M.G. 


6o.] 


LIEUT.  BRUNSKILL’S  RECONNAISSANCE  G1 

The  weather  conditions  were  perfect  for  such 
work,  for  although  there  was  a heavy  ground  mist 
the  bright  moon  penetrated  it  and  made  it  possible 
to  see  fairly  clearly  up  to  a distance  of  about  thhty 
yards,  and  to  sketch  and  make  notes  as  well  as  in 
broad  daylight. 

Lieutenant  Brunskill  and  Havildar  Munshi  Singli 
crawled  out,  and  stealthily  advanced  for  about 
five  hundi'ed  yards,  making  a rough  field  sketch  as 
they  went  along.  Suddenly  they  sighted  what 
appeared  to  be  a German  trench  about  thhty  yards 
ahead ; they  lay  absolutely  still  for  some  time, 
listening  and  hardly  daring  to  breathe.  The  ground 
was  full  of  shell  holes,  and  it  hardly  seemed  possible 
that  they  could  have  approached  so  near  without 
being  heard  by  the  enemy,  who,  at  any  moment, 
might  open  rapid  fire  on  them,  the  result  of  wdiich 
at  thhty  yards’  range  can  easily  be  imagined. 

To  make  doubly  sure.  Lieutenant  Brunskill 
decided  to  creep  back,  make  a detour  to  a flank  and 
approach  the  trench  a,t  a fresh  spot.  The  man- 
oeuvre succeeded  admhably  ; the  pah  of  adventimers 
crawled  right  up  to  the  parapet  with  theh  hearts, 
stout  as  thev  were,  in  theh  mouths.  Not  a sound 
was  to  be  heard.  Was  the  enemy  asleep  or  w'as  he 
only  waiting  for  them  to  show  themselves  over  the 
parapet  before  disposing  of  them  with  the  bayonet  ? 
It  was  impossible  to  say,  so  the  audacious  couple 
slowly  crept  over  the  parapet  and  looked  in.  As 
they  had  suspected,  it  was  the  German  front  hue 
trench,  and,  by  the  mercy  of  Heaven,  unoccupied.  A 
thorough  inspection  of  the  trench  was  made.  It  proved 
to  be  a wide  ditch,  with  dug-outs  for  two  men  at 
every  ten  yards,  and  snipers’  posts  for  men  lying  down. 


62  ATTACK  ON  NEIA^E  CHAPELLE 


After  collecting  a helmet,  some  letters  and  einpt}* 
cartridge  cases,  Lieutenant  Bnniskill  decided  to 
return  at  once  with  his  information.  When  he  had 
accomplished  about  half  of  the  return  journey,  both 
British  and  Germans  opened  fii’e,  apparently  at 
nothing,  but  luckily  the  bullets  went  high. 

During  this  expedition  the  gallant  Munshi  Singh 
had,  owing  to  excitement  and  the  exertion  of  pro- 
longed crawling  over  broken  ground,  developed  such 
unusually  stertorous  breathmg  as  to  cause  Lieutenant 
Br unskill  to  fear  that  he  might  be  heard  before  he 
was  seen.  On  his  next  two  hazards,  therefore,  he 
took  in  his  place  Sepoy  Tawand  Singh. 

On  both  these  occasions  Lieutenant  Brunskill 
calmly  crawled  tlmough  the  first  line  of  German 
trench  and  to  within  thirty  j^ards  of  the  second  line, 
Avhich  was  about  a hundred  ^'ards  in  rear  of  the  first. 
He  was  thus  enabled  to  make  a fairly  accurate  map  of 
the  ground  between  om*  trenches  and  the  enemy’s 
second  line  on  a front  of  about  250  yards. 

On  his  last  ai')proach  to  the  German  second  line, 
M hich  was  evidently  strongly  held,  as  the  sound  of 
talkmg  was  very  audible.  Lieutenant  Brunskill 
received  unpleasant  proof  that  the  enemy  was  wide 
awake,  for  an  adva-nced  post  opened  fire  at  thirty 
yards’  range,  and  the  fire  was  soon  taken  up  by 
every  one  in  the  neighbourhood.  The  ground  was 
hissing  with  bullets,  and  was  lit  up  by  numerous 
flares.  By  some  mhacle,  neither  Lieutenant  Bruns- 
kill nor  his  companion  was  hit,  and  they  succeeded 
m making  their  escape,  only  to  be  greeted,  when 
nearing  our  own  wire,  by  rapid  fire  from  their  friends, 
who  took  them  for  Germans.  However,  no  harm 
was  done,  and  Lieutenant  Brunskill  was  able  to  make 


GURKHAS  WITH  LONG  GREY  BEARDS  G3 


a most  valuable  report.  In  addition  to  the  sketch 
of  the  ground,  he  had,  by  careful  listening,  been  able 
to  locate  the  road  by  which  supplies  were  brought  up 
to  the  German  line,  and  our  guns  were  thereafter 
enabled  to  pay  the  road  the  attention  which  it 
merited. 

A few  days  later  Lieutenant  Brunskill  was 
severely  wounded  while  making,  in  broad  daylight, 
a sketch  of  the  front  of  our  line.  The  gallantry  and 
skill  shown  by  him  durmg  his  very  dangerous  recon- 
naissance well  deserved  the  Military  Cross  which  was 
bestowed  on  him_. 

Remarkable  features  of  this  reconnaissance  were 
the  facts  that  the  German  front-hne  trench  was 
unoccupied  night  after  night,  and  that  no  German 
patrols  were  out.  This  state  of  affairs  can  onlj^  be 
ascribed  to  the  extraordinary  legends  which  at  that 
time  were  cm’rent  in  both  German  and  English 
newspapers  concerning  the  uncanny  properties  of 
the  Indian  troops.  Pathans  with  glittering  eyes, 
knives,  and  teeth  were  (so  it  was  said)  crawling  up 
to  German  trenches,  and  extracting  the  occupants 
from  then  lairs  ; Gurkhas  v/ith  long  grey  beards 
w'ere  being  landed  from  transports  along  the  Belgian 
coast,  and  were  making  a practice  of  blowmg  up 
German  munition  depots  miles  in  rear  of  the  enemy’s 
lines.  V/hen  om’  scouts  were  caught  in  an  awkward 
place  they  were  never  nonplussed,  for  in  the  twinkling 
of  an  eye  (so  a German  paper  gravely  announced) 
they  threw  the  end  of  a rope  in  the  air,  and  climbing 
up  it,  disappeared,  one  by  one,  from  view.  It  is  not 
surprismg  that  the  enemy  w^as  alarmed,  or  that  the 
British  public  expected  miracles  where  only  good 
honest  fighting  qualities  were  forthcoming. 


64 


ATTACK  ON  NEUVE  CHAPELLE 

4Te  casualties  of  the  C'orps  up  to  and  including 
the  3rd  November,  1914,  amounted  to: — • 


British  officers 

Killed. 

. 18 

Wounded. 

28 

Missing. 

8 

Indian  officers 

(1 

22 

5 

Other  ranks,  Brit  ish 

. 2.-) 

63 

6 

„ „ Indian 

. 133 

1342 

333 

Total 

. 182 

1455 

352 

[Official, 


Mareciiat^  Joffre,  Fifxd-AIarsiiaf  »Sir  Dougi.as  Haig,  and 
Hon.  Ft-(tRn.  H.  H.  Maharaja  vSir  Pratap  vSingii. 


65-J 


CHAPTER  V 


THE  CORPS  TAKES  OVER  THE  LINE  HELD  BY  THE 
3rd  and  5th  BRITISH  DIVISIONS,  2nD  CORPS 

AiTival  of  the  Meerut  Division  and  Secunch-abad  Cavalry  Brigade — Indian 
Corps  now  complete,  except  Sirhind  Brigade  still  in  Eg;vi')t — Corps 
takes  over  portion  of  line  held  by  2nd  Corps — Description  of  existing 
conditions— 2nd  Battalion  8th  Gurkha  Rifles  bombed  and  shelled  out 
of  them  trenches — Very  heavy  casTialties — Counter-attack  partially 
successful — Casualties  of  58th  Rifles  in  counter-attack. 

The  Meerut  Division,  under  the  command  of  Lt- 
General  C.  A.  Anderson,  C.B.,  the  greater  portion 
of  which  left  Karachi  on  the  21st  September,  and 
was  joined  by  the  remainder  of  the  Division  at  sea 
on  the  23rd  September,  arrived  at  Marseilles,  cdter 
a fine  and  uneventful  voyage,  on  the  11th  October. 

Amongst  the  first  arrivals  v^ere  Theii’  Highnesses 
Maharaja  Sir  Pratap  Singh,  the  Maharaja  of  Jodhpur, 
and  the  Maharaja  of  Bikanu,  who  came  to  place 
then  swords  at  the  service  of  the  King-Emperor. 

The  Division  remained  there  till  the  19th  October, 
when  it  entrained  for  Orleans,  where  it  was  com- 
pletely concentrated  on  the  22nd  October. 

The  scenes  at  Marseilles  and  on  the  journey  by 
train  were  very  similar  to  those  enacted  during  the 
progress  of  the  Lahore  Division.  Nothing  was  too 
good  for  the  troops,  and  the  inhabitants  of  each 
town  on  the  route  flocked  to  the  railway  stations 
to  welcome  oiu*  men,  who  were  almost  overwhelmed 
by  their  kindness. 

E 


66  THE  CORPS  TAKES  OVER  THE  LINE 


The  Division  arrived  at  the  front  on  the  29th 
October,  followed  a few  days  later  by  the  Secimdrabad 
Cavahy  Brigade  and  the  Jodhpur  Lancers  under 
Brigadier-General  F.  Wadeson. 

The  Indian  Army  Corps  was  now  complete  in 
France,  with  the  exception  of  the  Su’hind  Brigade 
still  in  Egypt,  and  the  moment  had  arrived  for  it  to 
take  its  full  share  in  the  general  scheme. 

Orders  were  at  once  issued  for  the  Corps  to  take 
over  the  portion  of  the  line  held  bj^  the  3rd  and  5th 
British  Divisions,  the  Corps  being  strengthened  by 
lOo  units  of  British  infantry  and  artillery,  pending 
the  arrival  of  the  Sirhind  Brigade  and  the  return  of 
a portion  of  the  Lahore  Division  from  operations 
with  the  Cavalry  Corps  further  north. 

The  line  to  be  occupied  extended  from  just  north 
of  Givenchy  in  the  south,  past  the  front  of  Riche- 
bourg  I’Avoue,  making  a re-entrant  round  the  rear 
of  Neuve  Chapelle,  on  past  Chapigny  to  FaiTcpiissart, 
and  then  eastward  to  Rouges  Bancs  just  north  of 
Fromelles.  The  order  of  Brigades  from  south  to 
north  was  as  follows  : — 

Bareilly,  Garhwal,  Dehra  Dun,  then  the  four 
British  battalions  temporarily  attached  from  the 
2nd  Corps,  and  finally  the  Jullundur  Brigade  of  the 
Lahore  Division. 

The  relief  of  the  2nd  Corps  was  successfully 
carried  out  during  the  night  of  the  29th  October.  A 
heavy  downpour  of  rain  made  the  whole  country 
into  a vast  quagmire.  Communication  trenches  in 
those  days  were  practically  non-existent.  The  troops 
had  to  reach  the  front  line  as  best  they  could,  crawling 
up  any  ditches  which  led  in  the  required  direction, 
crouching  behind  banks  and  sheltering  behind  trees. 


DISMAL  SUREOUNDINGS 


b/ 

By  the  time  they  arrived  in  the  fire  trenches  they 
were  soaked  through  and  through,  and  caked  with 
mud  from  head  to  foot.  In  spite  of  these  di’aAv- 
backs,  there  were  few  casualties,  and  the  men  were 
in  high  spirits  at  attaining  the  goal  which  they  had 
sought  from  so  far  across  the  sea.  The  2/3rd  Gurkhas 
had  to  evacuate  their  Head  Quarters  during  the  night, 
as  they  were  heavily  shelled  bj^  way  of  a welcome  to 
the  front. 

As  has  been  seen  earlier,  our  offensive  towards 
Lille  had  been  brought  to  an  abrupt  conclusion, 
and  for  some  days  the  Germans  had  been  attacking 
heavily  along  the  whole  line  from  La  Bassee  to 
Messines,  keeping  us  in  om  turn  pinned  down  to  the 
defensive.  The  term  “ defensive  ” is,  however, 
a little  misleading  when  referring  to  the  state  of 
affairs  which  exists  when  two  bodies  of  troops  are 
entrenched  within  a few  yards  of  each  other,  and  both 
are  straining  every  nerve  and  muscle  to  do  the  greatest 
possible  damage  to  the  opponent. 

The  line  held  by  the  Indian  Corps  from  the  time 
of  its  arrival  at  the  front  to  that  of  its  final  departure 
for  other  theatres  of  war  may  be  fairly  described  as 
one  of  the  least  attractive  sections,  either  from  the 
picturesque  point  of  view  or  from  that  of  comfort. 
On  taking  a hasty  survey  from  our  trenches,  the  eye 
was  met  by  a vast  expanse  of  low-lying  cultivable 
land,  cut  up  by  innumerable  roads  and  lanes,  and 
dotted  with  small  villages  and  isolated  farms. 
During  a great  part  of  the  year,  as  far  as  the  eye 
could  reach  there  stretched  a dismal  sea  of  mud, 
almost  the  only  break  consisting  of  suspicious-looking 
pools  of  water,  proving,  on  further  investigation, 
to  be  flooded  shell  holes,  with  which  the  ground  was 


68  THE  CORPS  TAKES  OVER  THE  LINE 


thickly  pitted.  The  only  prominent  objects,  to 
some  extent  relieving  the  eternal  monotony  of  the 
scene,  were  a few  copses  or  woods,  amongst  which 
Avas  the  Bois  de  Biez,  so  long  a stronghold  of  the 
enemy,  and  in  the  distance  the  Aubers  ridge,  so  near 
and  yet  so  far. 

I'he  fields  were  interspersed  with  orchards  and  the 
roads  fringed  with  trees.  In  consequence,  extended 
observation  was  impossible  except  by  means  of 
aeroplanes,  of  which,  at  that  ])eriod,  we  possessed 
relatively  very  few.  The  short  distance  below  the 
surface  at  which  water  was  found  rendered  the 
digging  of  deep  trenches  impossible  in  places,  while 
even  a moderate  fall  of  rain  reduced  the  inhabitants 
of  the  trenches  to  a state  of  discomfort  quite 
indescribable. 

The  chief  industiy  of  the  natives  of  this  forlorn 
district  is  the  cultivation  of  beetroot  for  sugar. 
The  beets  are  stacked  in  a kind  of  silo,  the  aroma 
from  Avhich  has  often  seriously  perturljed  men  who 
could  endime  the  proximity  of  a dead  German 
without  flinching.  In  winter  the  beet  fields  became 
morasses,  OAmr  Avhich  aiy  rapid  movement  was 
almost  impossible.  The  outlook  in  summer,  when 
No  Man’s  Land  AA^as  carpeted  with  poppies  and 
daisies  and  the  mud  of  winter  had  given  place  to 
straggling  self-sown  crops,  Avas  not  unpleasing,  but 
on  a typical  winter’s  day,  Avith  a steady  cold  doAvn- 
pour  converting  the  fire  trenches  into  fetid  water- 
logged ditches,  and  .tl^e  communication  trenches 
into  bottomless  muddy  streams,  the  drear  and  chilly 
discomfort  of  the  Avhole  scene  was  enough  to  appal 
the  stoutest  heart. 

I’he  feelings  of  Orientals  coming  from  fierce 


GERMAN  PREPAREDNESS 


09 


sunshine  to  surroundings  like  these  cannot  be  de- 
scribed and  can  hardly  be  imagined.  Those  who  saw 
them  in  the  trenches  in  these  months  wiU  never 
think  without  emotion  of  the  shining  coiirage  and 
the  superb  devotion  which  they  never  ceased  to 
display. 

At  the  outset,  the  Alhes  laboured  under  a heavy 
handicap.  The  Germans,  with  the  foresight  and 
thoroughness  which  have  throughout  marked  their 
conduct  of  the  war,  had  provided  themselves  with 
every  description  of  apparatus  necessary  for  such 
close-quarter  siege  warfare  as  this.  They  possessed 
bombs,  trench  mortars,  rifle  grenades,  searchliglits 
and  “ sausage  ” observation  balloons,  and,  looking 
still  further  ahead,  they  were,  as  we  found  to  our 
cost,  even  then  preparing  their  devilish  gas  and 
flame  throwers. 

We  had  none  of  these  things,  and  for  quite  a 
considerable  period  our  only  bombs  were  those 
manufactmed  locally  from  empty  jam  tins.  Under 
such  conditions,  and  considering  the  thinness  of 
our  line,  it  is  marvellous  that  it  was  kept  intact 
during  alb  those  weary  months.  The  Germans 
were  to  learn  that  the  line-drawn  khaki  cord  was 
whipcord  : it  strained  ; it  bent  ; but  it  never 
broke. 

The  enemy  was  not  long  in  greeting  the  Corps, 
for  shortly  after  midnight  of  the  29th-30th  October, 
he  attacked  the  2/8th  Gurkhas  in  a half-hearted 
manner,  and  three  times  during  the  night  delivered 
a burst  of  fire  on  oim  trenches,  each  burst  being 
preceded  bjr  shelling  and  an  exhibition  of  fireworks. 
The  Gurkhas  were  in  a most  unenviable  position. 
9''hey  had  only  just  arrived  in  their  trenches,  which 


70  THE  CORPS  TAKES  OVER  THE  LINE 


were  already  half  full  of  mud  and  water,  while  the 
pitiless  rain  showed  no  signs  of  ceasing.  But 
far  more  serious  than  the  weather  was  the  fact  that 
the  trenches  had  been  adapted  for  taUer  men,  and 
the  little  Gurkhas  were  unable  to  fire  over  the  parapet. 
Steps  were  at  once  taken  to  remedy  this  defect, 
but  the  constant  shelling  and  rifle  fire  gave  the  men 
little  chance  of  effecting  any  material  improvement. 

T’he  position  held  by  the  Gurkhas  was  in  the 
triangle  formed  by  the  Quinque  Rue  and  the  road 
from  Festubert,  the  line  being  extended  southwards 
towards  Givenchy  by  the  Devons.  The  trench  was 
merely  a ditch  which  had  been  adapted,  the  original 
brick  culverts  still  existing  in  some  places.  By 
daylight  on  the  30th  the  telephone  wires  had  all 
been  cut  by  shell  fire,  and  shortly  afterwards  the 
Germans  made  a determined  attack  which  was 
beaten  off. 

3die  shelling  went  on  all  day,  and  culminated 
in  a concentration  of  heavy  guns  and  howitzers 
upon  the  Gurkha  trenches.  This  continued  without 
the  slightest  pause  for  about  four  hours.  The 
enemy  had  got  the  exact  range  of  the  trench  occupied 
by  Major  Wake.  Shell  after  shell  dropped  right  in 
the  trench,  burying  many  men  and  blowing  others 
to  atoms.  Still  the  Gurkhas  held  on  and  drove 
back  several  attacks  between  8 a.m.  and  noon.  At 
this  moment  the  supply  of  ammunition  began  to 
run  low,  but  Lt-Colonel  Morris  was  able  to  get  a 
message  through  to  General  Macbean,  to  say  that 
he  was  all  right,  except  as  regarded  ammunition. 

Affairs,  however,  had  not  yet  reached  the  climax. 
At  1 p.m.  the  enemy  in  great  force  attacked  the 
trench  held  by  Captains  Hayes-Sadler  and  Wright, 


General  Line  held  by  Indian  Corps 


[lAVtNTlE 


BHiriSH  jJhl 
. CLRMAH UNt 


Cnin  BuWt 


[ournet- 


•'S'Vwut  V 


^SAINOHIH- 


fl 


^aJomi 


t*fO«ln' 


ScflJ*  of 


70  TWP.  riORPS  TAKES  OVER  THE  LINE 


pi 

fa 

tb 

tb 

SI 

bi 

lit 

tr 

fn 

to 

m 

bi 

ds 

be 

G< 

be 

in 

ui 

th 

en 

b) 

th 

to 

ba 

th 

rn 

m 

he 

A 

tr 


ATTACK  ON  THE  2nd  BN.  8th  GURKHAS  71 


who  succeeded  in  keeping  them  at  bay  for  over  an 
hour.  To  add  to  Colonel  Morris’s  anxieties,  a message 
came  from  Major  Wake  that  he  was  very  hard 
pressed  and  m urgent  need  of  reinforcement,  followed 
by  an  appeal  from  the  Devons  on  the  right,  who  were 
also  being  heavily  attacked,  had  used  up  all  then 
supports,  and  were  badly  m need  of  assistance. 

The  position  was  extremely  critical.  In  manj^ 
places  the  parapet  and  trench  had  been  obliterated  ; 
numbers  of  the  defenders  were  bmied  beneath  the 
debris,  and  the  ammunition  was  nearly  exhausted. 
Colonel  Morris,  gallant  officer  as  he  so  often  proved 
himself  to  be  before  he  met  his  death  at  the  battle 
of  Loos  in  September,  1915,  was  determined  to  hold 
on  at  all  costs.  He  sent  an  urgent  appeal  to  General 
Macbean  for  assistance,  at  the  same  time  telling 
Major  Wake  and  the  Devons  tha,t  they  must  at  all 
hazards  hold  out  till  dark.  Shortly  afterwards, 
Major  Barlow,  himself  already  thrice  wounded 
but  still  carr3dng  on  m the  way  the  British  officer 
does,  sent  Captain  Davidson  over  to  help  Major 
Wake,  closely  followed  by  Captain  Stack,  who  was 
immediately  wounded  in  the  neck,  but  managed, 
mortally  hint  as  he  was,  to  stagger  back  to  ask  for 
more  men.  Captain  Davidson  was  also  wounded, 
and  was  last  seen  firing  at  the  oncommg  enemy 
with  his  revolver,  as  he  lay  on  the  ground. 

Major  Barlow  sent  fifteen  men,  and  himself 
moved  up  to  the  right,  whence  he  succeeded  in  driving 
the  Germans  back  ; but  it  was  too  late.  The  enemy 
had  managed  to  work  round  the  right  trench,  in 
which  there  were  now  only  ten  survivors,  and 
Colonel  Morris  had  himself  to  move  hastily  to  the 
left  to  avoid  being  captured. 


72  THE  CIOHPS  TAKES  OVER  THE  LINE 

At  the  same  time  Major  Barlow,  being  unable 
to  leave  the  front  line  and  having  no  combatant 
officer  left,  despatched  Captain  Mac  Watters,  I.M.S., 
to  report  the  situation,  and  to  get  the  guns  tmmed 
on  to  a red  farmhouse  situated  about  300  yards  to 
the  right  front  of  our  line.  This  house  had  been 
occupied  by  the  Germans,  who,  from  the  upper  and 
lower  stories,  kept  up  an  infernal  bre  which  com- 
manded and  enfiladed  the  right  of  our  trenches. 
As  the  latter  were  completely  blocked  by  the  debris 
of  the  parapet  and  by  dead  and  wounded,  any 
reinforcements  moving  up  from  the  left  were  com- 
pelled to  get  out  in  the  open,  when  they  at  once 
became  targets  for  a storm  of  bullets.  It  was  in 
this  manner  that  Major  Barlow  had  been  twice  hit, 
the  bullets  entering  his  right  shoulder  within  a 
couple  of  inches  of  each  other  and  inflicting  terrible 
wounds. 

Owing  to  reinforcements  being  held  up  by  the 
fire  from  the  farm,  the  Germans  were  eventuallj^ 
enabled  to  break  through  the  right  and  take  the 
remainder  of  the  defenders  in  the  rear.  Otherwise 
the  surviving  officers  felt  convinced  that  the  trenches 
would  have  been  held,  however  vigorously  they 
might  have  been  shelled. 

Captain  MacWatters  had  a difficult  and  dangerous 
task  to  perform,  for  he  had  to  get  out  of  the  trench 
and  cross  the  open  under  heavy  fire,  and,  crawling 
through  a hedge,  to  reach  a farmhouse  in  which 
Head  Quarters  had  been  established.  By  the  time 
he  had  overcome  the  dangers,  it  was  too  late.  The 
fire  from  the  farm  had  done  its  deadly  work.  Major 
Wake,  Captains  Hayes-Sadler,  Hartwell,  and  Wright 
had  fallen  victims,  and  the  regimeiit  was  the  poorer 


NARROW  ESCAPE  OF  MAJOR  RARLOW  73 


by  the  loss  of  four  splendid  British  officers  and  many 
good  men. 

The  2/8th  Gurkhas  were  fortunate  in  embarking 
on  this  war  in  possession  of  a particularly  fine  body 
of  officers,  and  it  was  by  the  cruellest  of  bad  luck 
that  the  regiment  at  the  very  outset  suffered  the 
loss  of  no  less  than  nine  of  their  small  number. 

Major  Barlow  was  now  in  a most  perilous  position, 
for  his  men  had  to  fire  both  to  front  and  rear  to  keep 
the  enemy  off,  while  he  himself  was  too  weak  to 
stand.  However,  game  to  the  end,  he  ordered  a few 
men  to  try  and  hold  some  adjacent  farm  ljuildings, 
and  then  he  fainted  from  loss  of  blood,  just  as 
another  attack  was  commencing.  He  fell,  luckily, 
into  a ditch,  where  he  remained  unobserved  by  tlie 
Germans,  until,  recovering  consciousness,  he  managed 
to  crawl  back,  being  shot  at  several  times  on  the 
way.  By  this  time  there  were  no  unwounded 
officers  on  the  right,  and  it  was  impossible  to  hold 
on  any  longer.  The  trenches  were  blotted  out ; 
many  of  the  brave  defenders  were  buried ; tlie 
enemy  was  all  round,  and  still  coming  on  in  over- 
whelming numbers. 

Colonel  Morris,  still  undefeated,  although  badly 
wounded  in  the  leg,  tried  to  bring  up  reinforcements, 
but,  unable  to  keep  up,  lost  his  way  and  was  chal- 
lenged by  Germans.  To  escape,  he  threw  himself 
into  a ditch,  and  knew  no  more  till  he  found  himself 
being  put  into  a stretcher  by  his  own  men. 

Major  Cassels,  who  had  been  holding  his  own 
most  gallantly  on  the  right  centre,  was  pushed  out 
by  sheer  weight  of  metal  and  numbers,  and  narrowly 
escaped  being  captm-ed.  A part  of  the  battalion 
succeeded  in  reoccupying  a section  of  their  support 


74  THE  CORPS  TAKES  OVER  THE  LINE 


trendies,  and  remained  in  them,  reinforced  by  hah 
of  the  Bedfords  and  the  whole  of  the  West  Ridmgs, 
except  those  who  reinforced  the  Devons  on  the 
right. 

So  ended  a terrible  night  and  day,  an  experience 
which,  as  an  eye-witness  testified,  would  have 
shaken  the  moral  of  any  troops,  however  seasoned. 
Much  more  trying  was  it,  then,  to  the  Gurkhas, 
newly  arrived,  fresh  to  the  worJv,  handicapped  by 
imperfect  and  unsuitable  trenches,  by  the  failure 
of  ammunition,  and,  above  all,  by  the  heavy  losses 
suffered  by  tlieh  British  officers,  on  whom  the 
Indian  soldier,  be  he  Sikh  or  Gm’kha,  Pathan  or 
Dogra,  is  dependent  (and  most  generously  owns  it) 
for  leading  and  control. 

The  casualties  of  the  2nd  Battalion  8th  Gurkha 
Rifles  on  this  occasion  were  : — 

Killed : Major  Wake,  M.V.O.,  Captains  E.  R. 
Hayes-Sadler,  Hartwell,  Wright  and  Stack  ; 2 Gurkha 
officers  ; other  ranks,  37. 

Wounded : Lt-Colonel  Morris,  Major  Barlow 
and  Lieutenant  MacLean  ; 1 Gurkha  officer  ; other 
ranks,  61. 

Missing  : Captain  Davidson,  2 Gurkha  officers, 
and  109  other  ranks,  of  whom  many  were  doubtless 
buried  by  shell  fire. 

A counter-attack  was  at  once  organized,  con- 
sisting of  the  follov/ing  troops  : — 

Half  Battalion  V\^est  Ridings  and  Bedfords 
respectively,  with  the  58th  Rifles  and  half  of  the 
107th  Pioneers  in  support,  Lt-Colonel  Griffith  of 
the  Bedfords  being  in  command. 

The  enemy  was  still  keeping  up  a heavy  fire, 
but  the  attack  pushed  steadily  through  it,  with 


COUNTER-ATTACK  BY  THE  58th  RIFLES  75 


slight  casualties,  to  within  reach  of  that  portion  of 
the  Gurkha  support  trenches  which  was  in  the  hands 
of  the  Germans.  At  this  point  it  was  necessary 
to  make  a close  reconnaissance  of  the  enemy’s 
trench — a dangerous  task  which  was  undertaken  by 
Captain  W.  Black,  Adjutant  of  the  58th  Rifles,  who 
succeeded  in  getting  up  close  to  the  trench,  but  was 
then  killed. 

Meanwhile  the  58th  were  ordered  to  move  up 
through  the  firing  Ime,  with  a view  to  retaking 
the  trenches.  At  2.30  a.m.  the  position  was 
rushed,  the  Gurkha  support  line  was  captured,  and 
two  farmhouses,  which  had  been  occupied  by  the 
enemy,  were  also  taken.  The  casualties  of  the 
58th  were  slight  during  the  assault,  as  the  enemy 
fled  without  offering  much  opposition. 

The  position  was  at  once  consolidated  against 
the  expected  counter-attack,  but  the  Germans  con- 
tented themselves  with  a heavy  shell  and  rifle  fire, 
which  speedily  increased  our  casualties.  Just  as 
day  was  breaking,  the  commanding  officer,  Lt- 
Colonel  Venom’,  was  killed,  as  was  shortly  after- 
wards Lieutenant  Craig  of  the  57th  Rifles,  who  was 
attached  to  the  58th. 

During  the  whole  of  the  31st,  and  until  the 
58th  were  relieved  at  midnight,  the  trenches  were 
deluged  with  rifle  and  shell  fire,  varied  by  mortar 
bombs  and  hand-grenades,  which  destroyed  the 
parapet  in  many  places  and  caused  a number  of 
casualties. 

These  trenches  were  striking  examples  of  what 
trenches  should  not  be.  They  were  badly  sited, 
varied  in  breadth  from  12  feet  to  25  feet,  and  were 
entirely  without  traverses.  The  result  was  that  the 


7fi  THE  CORPS  TAKES  OVER  THE  LINE 


enemy’s  shells  and  bombs  frequently  fell  into  the 
trench,  and  the  full  force  of  the  explosion  was  felt, 
owing  to  the  absence  of  traverses. 

In  spite  of  all,  the  58th  held  their  ground  until 
relieved.  Their  casualties  were  3 British  officers 
and  5 other  ranks  killed,  4-  Indian  officers  and  79 
other  ranks  wounded. 

Havildar  Karam  Singh  gained  the  2nd  Class, 
Indian  Order  of  Merit  by  his  fine  display  of  en- 
durance and  pluck  in  continuing  to  command  his 
men,  although  dangerously  wounded,  until  he  was 
removed  at  night. 

The  net  result  of  the  counter-attack  was  tliat 
wliile  the  Gurkha  support  trenches  and  two  farm- 
houses were  retakeir  by  us,  tliree  of  the  advanced 
trenches  still  remained  in  the  hands  of  the  Germans. 


CHAPTER  VI 

ATTACK  ON  2nD  BATTALION  2nD  GURKHAS 

Heavy  attack  on  trenches  held  by  2nd  Battalion  2nd  Gm-khas^ — Forced  to 
evacuate  trenches — Gallantry  of  officers  and  men — Reinforced  by 
Connaught  Rangers — Brilliant  leadership  of  Lt -Colonel  C.  Norie, 
D.S.O. — Casualties  of  2nd  Gui'khas — Honours  awarded — Losses  of 
34th  Poona  Horse — Connaughts  rush  German  trench — Four  officers 
kOled — Gmrkha  trenches  recaptined  by  two  battalions  of  the  8th 
British  Brigade — Rifle  and  hand  grenades  first  issued — German  attack 
on  1st  Battalion  Seaforth  Highlanders  repulsed  vith  loss— Raid  on 
German  trenches  by  2nd  Battalion  Shth  Garhwal  Rifles  under  Major 
Tajdor — Raid  by  2nd  Battalion  Royal  Highlanders  (Black  Watch). 

The  Germans  were  not  long  in  following  up  this 
temporary  success,  for  on  the  2nd  November  they 
tmmed  theh  attention  to  the  trenches  held  by 
the  2nd  Battalion  2iid  Gimkhas.  These  trenches 
were  situated  slightly  north-north-west  of  Neuve 
Chapelle,  and  formed  an  acute  salient  in  our  general 
line.  The  salient  was  caused  by  the  evacuation 
of  Neuve  Chapelle  by  our  troops  some  days  before, 
when  the  village  was  occupied  by  the  enemy.  The 
trenches  were  in  a very  isolated  position,  being  cut 
off  from  the  rear  by  a small  copse  and  orchard, 
and  when,  as  often  happened,  the  telephones  were 
cut,  communication  was  very  difficult. 

The  2nd  Giwkhas  had  only  moved  into  this 
position  during  the  night  of  the  29th-30th  October, 
and  were  consequently  very  imperfectly  acquainted 
with  then'  surroundings.  It  was  subsequently  ascer- 
tained that  the  enemy  was  in  occupation  of  what 


78  ATTACK  ON  2nd  BATTALION  2nd  GURKHAS 


were  either  old  trenches  or  deep  hrigation  ditches 
at  a distance  of  some  fifty  yards  from  the  Gurkha 
trenches,  towards  which  they  were  sapping  from 
the  east. 

The  trenches  in  this  part  of  the  line  were  of  the 
very  worst.  Since  the  evacuation  of  Neuve  Chapelle, 
there  had  not  been  time  to  effect  any  material 
improvements,  and  they  were  really  little  more  than 
boggy  ditches,  affording  very  imperfect  cover  from 
frontal  fire,  and  in  many  cases  open  to  enfilade. 
Unfortunately,  the  enemy  was  at  least  as  aware  of 
the  weakness  of  this  part  of  our  line  as  we  were, 
and  he  hastened  to  take  advantage  of  it. 

Early  in  the  morning  of  the  2nd  November,  the 
Germans  opened  the  attack  with  a murderous  fire 
of  high  explosives,  partly  from  heavy  guns  and 
partly  from  one  or  more  trench  mortars  in  Neuve 
Chapelle.  At  about  8 a.m.  they  concentrated  on 
No.  1 Double  Company  trench.  The  explosions 
were  followed  by  spouts  of  mud  mixed  with  every 
kind  of  object  usually  found  in  a trench  ; the  mangled 
remains  of  Gurkhas  hurtled  into  the  air,  and  the 
trench  was  almost  obliterated.  The  men  held  on 
as  long  as  the}^  could,  but  there  is  a limit  to  human 
endurance,  and  the  survivors  were  forced  into 
No.  2 Company’s  trench  on  the  left,  while  some 
took  refuge  in  a drain  about  fifty  yards  in  rear. 
One  man  alone  remained,  keeping  up  a rapid  fire 
on  the  enemy,  until  at  last  compelled  to  retire, 
when  the  trench  was  occupied  by  the  Germans.  This 
was  Naik  Padamdhoj  Gurung,  whose  unflinching 
determination  was  rewarded  with  the  2nd  Class, 
Indian  Order  of  Merit. 

The  Germans  next  tinned  their  guns  on  to 


COUNTER-ATTACKS  BY  THE  GURKHAS  79 


No.  2 Company,  and  speedily  rendered  their  trench 
untenable.  Explosion  followed  explosion  in  quick 
succession.  The  mortars  had  the  range  to  an  inch, 
and  a large  proportion  of  the  shells  fell  either  on 
the  parapet  or  in  the  trench.  Men  were  either 
bmied  or  blown  sk}’^  high.  One  shell  blew  four  men 
into  the  air  with  the  debris  of  the  parapet,  rifles  and 
a machine  gun,  and  killed  Lieutenant  Lucas  of 
No.  1 Company  while  rallying  his  men.  At  the 
same  time  Major  Becher  was  killed  while  trying  to 
get  his  men  back  to  the  cover  of  an  old  trench. 

Feeling  that,  at  all  costs,  something  must  be 
done.  Lieutenant  Innes,  the  officer  in  charge  of  the 
machine  gun  which  had  been  blown  up,  collected  as 
many  men  as  he  could  of  No.  2 Double  Company, 
and  with  Lieutenant  Walcott  headed  a most  gallant 
counter-attack  against  the  German  infantry,  who 
were  swarming  into  the  trenches.  With  them  went 
also  a party  of  ten  or  twelve  men  under  Naik  Ram- 
pershad  Thapa,  who  had  held  desperateW  on  to  a 
corner  of  the  trench.  By  sheer  dint  of  reckless 
bravery,  this  little  force  di’ove  back  the  enemy  in 
ferocious  tooth- and-nail  fighting,  but  both  the 
British  officers  were  killed,  as  well  as  Subadars 
Tekbahadur  Gurung  and  Gopal  Sing  Rawat.  The 
survivors,  forced  back  step  by  step,  had  to  retreat 
again  to  their  drain,  Subadar  Chet  Sing  being  killed 
on  the  way.  For  his  bravery,  Naik  Rampershad 
Thapa  received  the  Indian  Distinguished  Service 
Medal. 

Next,  Major  Ross,  with  Subadar-Major  Man  Sing 
Bohi'a,  collected  a few  men,  and  went  straight  at 
the  Germans,  who  had  now  occupied  the  trenches 
of  Nos.  1 and  2 Companies.  Once  more  a terrible 


80  ATTACK  ON  2nd  BATI’ALION  2nd  GURKHAS 


liaiid"tO"liaiid  struggle  took  place,  which  ended  with 
the  death  of  the  heroic  Major  Ross,  the  Suhadar- 
Major,  and  niost  of  the  men. 

The  survivors,  now  only  some  eight  or  ten  in 
number,  managed  to  gain  the  trenches  of  No.  3 
Double  Company,  where  Lieutenant  Reid  was  in 
command.  Captain  Barton  having  been  killed  early 
in  the  action.  Lieutenant  Reid  sent  off  to  the 
Connaught  Rangers  on  his  left  for  reinforcements, 
and  rallied  No.  3 Double  Company,  telling  them 
that  help  was  coming.  He  then,  under  an  appalling 
fire,  A^'ellt  back  and  guided  the  reinforcement  of  the 
Connaughts  to  the  trench,  where  he  and  the  sergeant 
in  charge  of  the  Connaught  detachment  were  both 
shot  dead. 

'There  now  only  remahied  behind  Subadars  Dal- 
bahadur  Rana,  Fateh  Sing  Newar  and  Jemadar  Suba 
Sing  Gurung,  with  some  men  of  No.  4 Company. 
These,  with  the  party  of  Connaughts,  held  on  with 
the  grimmest  determination  until,  borne  down  by 
numbers,  Subadar  Fateh  Sing  Avas  forced  to  retreat 
to  a communication  trench. 

Not  even  here  were  their  troubles  ended,  for  a 
machine  gun  Avas  turned  on  to  them,  and  the  trench 
Avas  soon  blocked  Avith  dead  and  Avounded  to  such 
an  extent  that  those  who  were  still  on  the  side  nearest 
the  enemy  could  not  pass,  and  had  to  turn  round 
and  face  it  out.  To  add  to  their  appalling  trials, 
oin  reserves,  thinking  that  the  trench  was  occupied 
by  Germans,  commenced  a counter-attack  on  it. 

Our  men  in  the  communication  trench  were 
thus  noAV  being  fired  on  from  the  rear  by  our  own 
men,  and  by  the  enem^^  from  the  orchard  and  from 
the  front.  They  held  on,  facing  outAvards,  and  kept 


LT-COLONEL  NOEIE  AND  THE  RESERVES  81 

the  enemy  at  a distance.  A company  of  the  Con- 
nanghts  now  reinforced  them,  but  in  moving  up, 
had  to  cross  an  open  space  in  a hedge  running 
parallel  to  the  front.  The  enemy  evidentl}^  had 
this  opening  marked  down,  for  a machme  gun  was 
turned  on  and  a number  of  the  Connaughts  fell, 
including  Lieutenant  Abbott. 

After  dark,  by  order  of  the  officer  in  command 
of  the  Connaught  detachment,  Subadar  Fateh  Sing 
retired  the  remnant  of  his  men,  and  fell  in  with  the 
reserves  about  a quarter  of  a mile  in  rear.  This 
officer  had  behaved  with  the  greatest  gallantry 
and  coolness  throughout,  and  thoroughly  merited 
the  Order  of  British  India,  2nd  Class,  which  was 
bestowed  on  him. 

A certain  number  of  men  who  did  not  hear 
the  order  to  retire  remained  aU  night  with  the 
Connaughts,  and  eventually  retired  with  them. 

So  far,  we  have  only  followed  the  fortunes  of 
the  companies  in  the  front  line  trenches,  but  the 
reserves  under  the  commanding  officer,  Lt-Colonel 
C.  Norie,  D.S.O.,  had  meantime  played  their  part 
nobly.  With  Colonel  Norie  were  Captain  McClevertjq 
Lieutenant  and  Adjutant  Corse-Scott,  and  Major 
Norie,  brother  of  Colonel  Norie,  who  was  attached 
as  interpreter. 

When  the  attack  commenced.  Colonel  Norie  at 
once  advanced  to  the  right  of  the  forward  trenches, 
and  succeeded  in  locating  the  German  trench 
mortar  which  was  playing  such  havoc  with  our 
men.  He  opened  fire  on  it,  and  it  was  soon 
sHenced  and  removed.  He  then  took  his  men  to 
the  left  of  the  l/9th  Gurkhas,  whence  he  kept  up 
a heavy  fire  on  the  enemy  until  his  ammunition  ran 

a 


82  ATTACK  ON  2nd  BATTALION  2nd  GURKHAS 


short,  and  he  had  to  retne  to  his  original  position 
to  refill. 

Here  he  met  a squadron  of  the  34th  Poona 
Horse,  whose  commandant,  Lt-Colonel  Swanston, 
had  just  been  killed.  Thence  he  moved  forward 
towards  the  left  trenches.  These,  however,  had  in 
the  meantime  been  occupied  by  the  enemy  in  force. 
In  spite  of  many  casualties,  Colonel  Norie  kept 
them  engaged  until  2 p.m.,  when  the  terrible  machine- 
gun  fire  forced  him  to  retire,  under  a deluge  of  high 
explosives,  to  the  reserve  trenches.  In  the  evening 
he  was  reinforced  by  a company  of  the  Royal  Scots 
Fusiliers  and  a composite  Indian  battalion,  while 
the  9th  Gurkhas  were  strengthened  by  a double 
company  of  the  6th  Jats  and  three  squadrons  of 
the  7th  Dragoon  Guards.  With  these.  Colonel  Norie 
made  a final  effort  to  recapture  the  lost  trenches. 

The  Jats  were  pushed  forward  on  the  left,  and 
the  remnant  of  the  2nd  Gurkhas  continued  their 
line  to  the  left.  Colonel  Norie  himself  took  up  a 
company  of  the  Scots  Fusiliers  with  a view  to 
reoccupying  the  right  section  of  the  Gurkha  trenches 
and  picking  up  survivors.  This  party  advanced 
under  a devastating  fire  and  found  the  enemy  in 
possession.  Led  by  Colonel  Norie,  they  made  a 
most  gallant  attempt  to  rush  the  trench,  and  actually 
got  to  within  twenty  yards,  but  were  met  with  a 
furious  machine-gmi  and  rifle  fire,  which  inflicted 
such  losses  that  the  little  party  had  to  retreat. 
Of  the  six  officers,  one  belonging  to  the  Royal  Scots 
Fusiliers  was  killed;  Major  Norie  and  Captain 
McCleverty  were  wounded,  the  former  very  severely, 
while,  by  a strange  chance,  the  remainmg  three 
escaped  untouched. 


HEAVY  LOSSES  OF  BRITISH  OFFICERS  83 


Although  this  attack  failed  in  its  objective,  it 
produced  valuable  results.  It  made  the  enemy 
nervous  about  his  position,  and  caused  him  to 
retire  to  his  own  trenches. 

The  losses  of  the  2nd  Gmkhas  were : — 7 British 
officers  killed,  1 wounded  ; 4 Gurkha  officers  killed 
3 wounded.  Other  ranks,  31  killed  and  101  wounded 
or  missing ; of  the  latter,  the  majority  were  buried 
in  the  ruins  of  the  trenches. 

Although  the  battalion  was  forced  to  evacuate 
its  trenches,  or  the  remahis  of  its  trenches,  the 
bravery  displayed  by  all  ranks  fully  sustained  the 
great  reputation  of  the  regiment.  The  heroism  of 
the  British  officer  has  seldom  been  more  brilliantly 
demonstrated  than  on  this  occasion.  Not  a single 
officer  in  the  front  trenches  returned  alive,  several 
being  killed  while  leading  forlorn  hopes  against 
overwhelming  numbers  of  the  enemy. 

Lt-Colonel  Norie,  whose  excellent  leadership 
(as  remarked  by  Sir  John  French  in  his  despatch 
dated  20th  November,  1914)  saved  the  situation, 
was  granted  the  brevet  of  Colonel. 

Major  F.  H.  Norie,  who  behaved  with  the  greatest 
gallantry  throughout,  and  who  was  severely  wounded, 
received  the  D.S.O. 

A number  of  non-commissioned  officers  and  men 
received  the  Indian  Distinguished  Service  Medal. 

Sowar  Madhu  of  the  Poona  Horse  received  the 
Indian  Order  of  Merit,  2nd  Class,  for  his  gallantry 
in  carrying  Rissaldar  Rathore  Hamir  Singh,  who  was 
wounded,  under  heavy  fire  to  a first-aid  post,  whence 
he  returned  to  the  firing  line. 

The  Poona  Horse  had  the  great  misfortune  to 
lose  their  Commandant,  Lt-Colonel  Swanston  ; the 


84  ATTACK  ON  2nd  BATTALION  2nd  GURKHAS 


interpreter,  2nd  Lieutenant  Sturdee,  was  wounded, 
and  there  were  36  casualties  in  other  ranks. 

The  Connaughts  lost  Lieutenant  Abbott  and  five 
men  killed.  Lieutenant  Hewitt  and  32  men  wounded. 

The  Irishmen  were  not  at  the  end  of  their  troubles 
with  these  trenches,  for  on  the  4th  November  it  was 
decided  to  try  and  rush  a trench  formerly  occupied 
by  A Company,  which  ran  out  on  the  right  of  the 
Connaughts’  advanced  trench,  and  to  fill  it  in. 

The  scheme  does  not  appear  to  have  been  well 
planned.  The  enemy’s  main  trench  was  only  at 
a distance  of  two  hundred  yards,  and  it  was  certain 
that  his  fuU  fire  would  fall  on  the  digging  party, 
while  the  fire  from  the  Connaughts’  main  trench 
would  be,  to  a great  extent,  masked,  for  fear  of 
hitting  our  own  diggers. 

At  midnight,  the  signal  was  given  by  the  Royal 
Scots  Fusiliers  opening  rapid  fii’e.  A Company  of 
the  Connaughts,  less  two  platoons,  commanded  by 
Captam  Hack,  with  Lieutenants  Tulloch  and  George, 
rushed  forward  under  heavy  fire  and  captured  the 
trench.  Captain  Payne  at  once  sent  on  the  digging 
])arty,  who  doubled  over  and  started  filling  in  the 
trench.  The  enemy’s  fire  steadily  increased,  while 
A Company’s  decreased,  and  it  was  afterwards 
ascertained  that  numbers  of  the  bolts  of  our  rifles 
had  jammed.  The  result  was  that,  when  the  filling 
in  was  hah  completed,  the  digging  party  had  to  go 
forward  to  keep  up  the  fire.  Eventually,  nearly  all 
the  bolts  jammed  and  the  rifies  were  useless. 

Captain  Payne  ascertained  that  no  further  filling 
in  was  possible  and  that  all  the  officers  had  been 
killed,  and  ordered  a retirement. 

Captain  Hack  was  shot  early  in  the  attack. 


ATTACK  BY  THE  CONNAUGHT  RANGERS  85 

Lieutenant  George,  the  Adjutant,  was  hit  before 
he  reached  the  enemy’s  trench,  and  fell.  Lance- 
Corporal  Kelly  at  once  went  over  the  parapet  of  the 
Connaught  trench  and  picked  him  up.  The  next 
instant  Lieutenant  George  w^as  shot  dead  in  his 
arms.  Corporal  Kelly’s  act  was  one  of  great  bravery, 
as  the  enemy’s  fire  was  very  heavy  at  the  time. 
He  well  merited  the  Distinguished  Conduct  Medal 
which  he  received. 

Lieutenant  TuUoch  was  also  w ounded  early  in 
the  fight,  but  carried  on  till  he  was  killed. 

The  retirement  was  carried  out,  the  enemy’s 
■fire  growing  worse  every  moment. 

As  A Company  was  practically  without  rifles, 
Captain  Payne  asked  for  reinforcements,  and  two 
platoons  of  the  Middlesex  w^ere  sent  up.  The 
result  was  that  the  trench  became  overcrowMed. 
A number  of  the  Connaughts  got  out  in  rear  of  the 
trench  to  clear  it,  and  tried  to  cross  to  a farmhouse 
known  as  the  “ moated  gi’ange.”  In  doing  so, 
they  came  under  wdiat  an  officer  describes  as  a 
“ hellish  fire,”  and  Lieutenant  Ovens  and  a number 
of  men  were  killed.  Towards  dawn,  Lieutenant 
Badham  collected  the  remnant  of  the  company  and 
took  them  back  to  the  support  trenches. 

Of  the  small  number  engaged  in  this  unfortunate 
enterprise,  four  officers  were  killed,  and  there  were 
36  other  casualties.  Captain  Payne,  wdio  com- 
manded this  operation,  had  distinguished  himself 
during  the  fighting  round  Messines,  and  again  when 
the  2nd  Gurkhas  were  driven  out  of  their  trenches  on 
the  2nd  November.  He  was  awarded  the  D.S.O., 
his  cool  valour  on  this  occasion  having  undoubtedly 
saved  a number  of  needless  casualties. 


86  ATTACK  ON  2nd  BATTALION  2nd  GURKHAS 


There  is  not  as  much  humour  in  a battle  as  some 
writers  would  have  us  believe  ; all  is  not  cheering 
and  hilarity,  although  sometimes  a subject  for 
mu'th  offers  itself.  On  tliis  occasion,  a man  who  was 
supposed  to  be  badly  injured  was  being  carried  off 
on  a stretcher.  Both  the  bearers  were  hit  by 
shrapnel  and  dropped  the  sufferer.  The  wounded 
hero  at  once  jumped  to  his  feet  and  ran  like  a hare 
to  the  nearest  cover,  leaving  his  bearers  to  look 
after  themselves,  and  pursued  by  the  cheers  of  his 
comrades. 

For  some  days  after  this  action  little  of  special 
note  occurred.  The  enemy  kept  up  a constant  fire 
on  our  trenches  and  the  roads  in  rear,  varied  by 
occasional  light  attacks,  which  were  easily  repulsed. 

On  the  5th  November,  battalions  of  the  Royal 
Scots  Fusiliers  and  of  the  Middlesex  Regiment, 
part  of  a British  Brigade  attached  to  the  Indian 
Corps,  retook  the  trenches  which  were  evacuated 
by  the  2nd  Gurkhas  on  the  2nd  November.  The 
trenches  were  filled  in  and  the  battalions  returned 
to  their  own  line. 

The  6th  November  marked  a new  epoch  in  the 
equipment  of  our  troops,  for  on  that  date  rifle  and 
hand  grenades  were  first  issued,  and  met  with  warm 
appreciation,  for  the  lack  of  them  had  been  very 
severelv  felt. 

On  the  7th  November,  the  enemy  made  a deter- 
mined attack  on  the  1st  Seaforths,  using,  during 
the  preliminar}^  bombardment,  a trench  mortar 
with  a range  of  600  yards.  One  of  its  shells  made 
a hole  15  feet  wide  by  8 feet  deep,  and  buried  Colour- 
Sergeant  Baker  and  several  men.  About  three 
hundred  Germans  attacked  the  right  of  the  battalion, 


RAID  BY  THE  GARHWAL  RIFLES  87 


and  two  of  them  actually  got  into  our  trench,  where 
they  were  killed.  The  attack  was  ultimately  re- 
pulsed with  considerable  loss  to  the  enemy. 

The  Seaforths  lost  Captain  Wilson  and  17 
men  kiUed,  2nd  Lieutenant  Macandrew  and  63 
men  wounded.  At  the  same  time,  Captain  B.  O. 
Duff,  son  of  the  Commander-in-Chief  in  India, 
and  several  men  of  the  2nd  Gurkhas  were  killed 
while  supporting  the  Seaforths  in  then*  trenches. 
On  the  8th  November,  patrols  found  some  40  dead 
Germans  in  front  of  the  Seaforths. 

On  the  night  of  the  9th-10th  November,  an 
enterprise  was  undertaken  by  parties  of  the  1st  and 
2nd  Battalions  39th  Garhwal  Rifles,  which  deserves 
a brief  description,  as  typical  of  the  raids  which  our 
men  were  frequently  called  upon  to  carry  out. 
The  party  consisted  of  100  rifles  all  told,  under  the 
command  of  Major  Taylor  of  the  2/39th.  The 
German  trench  was  within  50  yards  of  the  right  of 
the  2/39th,  and  as  there  was  great  danger  of  the 
enemy  sapping  up  to  our  trenches  or  mining,  it  was 
considered  necessary  to  make  an  attempt  to  fill  it  in. 

When  the  time  for  the  attack  arrived,  the  men 
were  lined  up  in  an  irrigation  ditch  in  front  of  our 
position,  a portion  of  them  having  picks  and  shovels 
to  fill  in  the  trench  when  captm’ed.  The  party  got 
safely  across  without  being  detected,  and  lay  under 
the  German  parapet  where  thej^  could  hear  the 
enemy  talking.  Major  Taylor  then  gave  the  signal 
by  firing  his  revolver  at  a German.  The  men 
cheered  and  climbed  over  the  parapet.  The  enemy 
only  stayed  to  fire  a few  rounds  and  then  bolted. 
The  Garhwalis  entered  and  searched  the  trench, 
taking  six  prisoners,  who  made  no  resistance.  The 


88  A1:TACK  on  2nd  BATTALION  2nd  GURKHAS 


work  of  filling  in  was  then  begun  and  was  found  to 
present  great  difficulties.  The  trench  was  seen  to 
be  about  8 feet  deep,  strongly  revetted  and  shrapnel- 
proof.  It  was  soon  evident  that  it  was  impossible 
to  fill  it  in  in  the  time  available  ; further,  that  even 
if  filled  in,  it  could  easily  be  re-dug. 

The  enemy,  meantime,  was  keeping  up  a heavy 
fire  on  the  party,  to  which  they  replied  with  spirit. 
Finding  that  the  trench  could  not  be  filled  in,  and 
foreseeing  a heavy  counter-attack.  Major  Taylor  and 
his  party  retired,  taking  with  them  their  prisoners. 

This  little  affair  was  extremely  well  carried  out, 
and  only  four  casualties  occurred.  For  their  good 
service  on  this  occasion,  Havildars  Ranjir  Sing  Pandir 
and  Diwan  Sing  Padhujar  received  the  Indian 
Distinguished  Service  Medal,  and  Major  Taylor  was 
mentioned  in  despatches. 

It  was  found,  however,  that  the  cheeruifr  of  tlie 
men  on  charging  was  a mistake,  as  it  gave  Avarning 
to  the  enemy  in  his  main  trench. 

Although  in  this  case  the  principal  object  of  the 
raid  could  not  be  accomplished,  there  is  no  doubt 
that  such  enterprises  had  a very  heartening  effect 
on  our  men,  while  tending  to  make  the  enemy 
nei’Amus,  and  to  keep  him  from  getting  any  rest. 
Frequently,  too,  the  information  given  by  prisoners 
proved  to  be  of  gr  eat  value. 

Dming  the  early  morning  of  the  9th  November, 
one  of  a party  of  scouts  of  the  2/39th  was  mortally 
Avounded.  Although  fulty  exposed  to  view  and  fire 
of  the  eneim^  Rifleman  Ganesh  Sing  Sajwan  stopped, 
picked  the  Avmunded  man  up,  and  carried  him  back 
to  oiu  trenches,  an  act  for  which  he  received  the 
Indian  Order  of  Merit,  2nd  Class. 


ENEMY’S  SNIPERS’  ACTIVITY 


89 


Before  dawn  on  the  same  day,  a similar  raid  on 
a smaller  scale  was  carried  out  by  the  2nd  Black 
Watch,  with  the  object  of  capturing  or  destroying 
a machine  gun  which  was  tormenting  our  men. 
Captain  Forrester  with  twenty  men  rushed  the 
German  trench,  and  had  a hand-to-hand  scrimmage 
Avith  the  enemy,  of  whom  they  killed  ten.  The 
gun,  however,  had  been  removed,  and  the  party 
were  lucky  to  get  back  to  their  own  trench  with  only 
Captain  Forrester  and  one  sergeant  wounded. 

The  casualties  amongst  British  officers  of  Indian 
units  were  observed  to  be  very  much  out  of  proportion 
to  those  amongst  other  ranks.  This  was  no  doubt 
due  to  the  fact  that  the  enemy’s  snipers  had  special 
orders  to  pay  particular  attention  to  the  British 
officers,  also,  of  course,  to  the  risks  which  the  officers 
had  necessarily  to  take  in  leading  them  men,  who, 
under  such  strange  conditions,  were  more  than  ever 
dependent  on  them.  In  order  to  reduce  the  risk 
as  much  as  possible,  British  officers  Avere  now  ordered 
to  be  dressed  and  ecpiippcd  like  their  men,  a measure 
Avhich  Avas  found  to  be  attended  by  a certain  amount 
of  success. 


CHAPTER  VII 


VISIT  AND  DEATH  OF  FIELD-MARSHAL  EARL  ROBERTS 

Lord  Roberts  arrives — His  gratitude  to  the  Army  in  India — He  inspects 
the  Corps — His  last  public  speech— His  warning  to  the  Empire  before 
the  War — His  death. 

Amid  these  scenes  of  strife  and  bloodshed,  an  incident 
must  now  be  recorded  which  produced  a deep  and 
a very  moving  impression  upon  all  ranks  of  the 
Corps. 

On  the  12th  November,  Lord  Roberts,  in  the 
course  of  a visit  to  the  front,  arrived  at  the  Corps 
Head  Quarters  in  order  to  observe  under  war  con- 
ditions those  Indians,  whom  perhaps  of  all  troops 
in  the  world  he  loved  the  best,  and  who  in  their 
turn  looked  upon  him  with  a degree  of  reverence  and 
affection  which  few  British  generals  have  been  able 
to  evoke. 

Sixty-two  years  had  passed  since  this  wonderful 
old  man,  still  trim,  erect  and  soldierly,  had  set  sail 
as  a cadet  from  Southampton  to  Calcutta.  Forty- 
one  years  of  his  career  had  been  passed  in  India. 
He  had  himself  written  in  the  closing  words  of  his 
book 

“ To  the  discipline,  bravery,  and  devotion  to 
duty  of  the  Army  in  India,  in  peace  and  war,  I felt 
that  I owed  whatever  success  it  was  my  good  fortune 
to  achieve.” 


FiEiyD-MARSHAi,  Fare  Roberts  ixspecting  the  Indian  Corps, 

i2TH  Nov.  1914. 


SYMPATHY  OP  LOPvD  ROBERTS 


91 


As  a proof  of  this  feeling,  he  chose  as  the  sup- 
porters of  his  coat-of-arms  the  figures  of  a High- 
lander and  a Gurkha. 

Lord  Roberts  took  part  in  more  than  thirty 
engagements  ; he  was  mentioned  more  than  thirty 
times  in  despatches,  and  in  1902  received  the  thanks 
of  both  Houses  of  Parliament  for  his  incomparable 
services,  to  the  Empire. 

In  India  the  profession  of  a soldier  is  often 
hereditary,  and  it  is  certain  that  among  those  he 
visited  in  1914  were  men  whose  grandfathers  had 
remained  loyal  in  the  Mutiny,  and  whose  fathers  had 
stormed,  under  his  direction,  the  last  entrenched 
position  before  Kandahar.  To  the  Indian  troops 
Lord  Roberts  stood  as  the  link  of  sympathy  between 
the  exalted  General  and  the  humble  soldier,  as 
the  Captain  who  carried  with  him  everywhere  the 
shining  talisman  of  success  ; and  above  all  as  one 
who  recalled,  amid  the  mud  and  blood  of  Flanders, 
the  radiant  sunshine,  the  spacious  range,  the  dear 
dusty  atmosphere  and  aroma  of  the  country  which 
he  loved  almost  as  much  as  they  did. 

On  the  bitterest  and  coldest  day  of  all  the  cold 
and  bitter  autumn  of  1914,  the  Corps  Staff  assembled 
outside  the  chateau  at  Hinges,  where  a few  weeks 
earlier  General  Willcocks  had  taken  over  the  line 
from  General  Smith-Dorrien.  Soon  afterwards  the 
motor  from  St  Omer  was  heard  in  the  grounds, 
and  in  a moment  the  Field-Marshal  was  recognizing 
old  friends  and  being  introduced  to  officers  hitherto 
unknown. 

One  of  the  writers  may  perhaps  be  forgiven  for 
recalling  that,  as  he  shivered  himself  in  the  half- 
hour  which  the  proceedings  occupied,  the  presage 


92  VISIT  AND  DEATH  OF  EARL  ROBERTS 


crossed  his  mind  that  long  exposure  to  the  cruel 
east  wind  must  carry  great  peril  to  one  so  old. 

The  next  visit  was  to  Divisional  Head  Quarters  at 
Locon,  where,  besides  the  Staff,  a few  selected  units 
had  been  assembled  for  inspection.  The  Field-Marshal 
walked  up  and  down  the  lines  and  then  made  a 
brief  address — the  last  of  his  life — to  the  assembled 
units.  It  was  not  possible  to  take  notes  at  the 
time,  but  the  present  writer,  on  learning  of  Lord 
Roberts’  death,  immediately  put  in  writing  his 
recollection  of  the  simple  words  he  spoke.  They 
were  substantiallv  as  follows  : — 

“ I am  greatly  moved  to  find  rnyself  again  with  the 
troops  by  whose  side  I have  fought  in  so  many  campaigns. 
Many  persons  feared  that  the  strange  surroundings  in 
which  it  is  now  your  duty  to  fight  ivould  be  too  hard 
and  too  severe  for  the  Indian  troops.  I never  shared 
that  fear.  I have  fought  ivith  them  too  often  in  every 
hind  of  climate,  and  against  every  hind  of  enemy,  not 
to  be  sure  that  there  are  no  cojiditions  so  hard,  that  they 
will  not  do  their  duty  as  soldiers.  How  well  you  are 
doing  it  I have  heard  from  your  Commanding  Officer, 
General  Sir  James  Willcochs,  and  the  account  he  has 
given  me  has  filled  me  with  emotion.  You  are  suffering 
much,  but  you  are  figlding  in  loyalty  to  your  Empire 
and  Kmg.  You  are  fighting  far  from  your  homes. 
Yet  that  for  which  you  fight  is  as  important  to  those 
■whom  you  have  left  at  home  as  it  is  important  to  those 
who  live  in  the  shattered  villages  around  us.  For  if 
public  law  and  liberty  be  destroyed  in  Europe  they 
cannot  long  survive  in  India.  You  will  then  fight  on 
as  long  as  may  be  necessary.  And  it  may  be  long. 
Do  not  think  that  the  enemy  is  already  defeated.  He  is 
strong  : he  is  still  v,ery  strong  : and  his  organization 


LAST  SPEECH  OF  LORD  ROBERTS  93 


is  very  great.  But  the  Empire  and  the  Allies  of  the 
Empire  are  strong  too,  and  they  ivill  become  stronger. 
And  they  are  even  now  only  beginning  to  organize  for 
war,  for  they  greatly  desired  peace.  Let  every  man 
then  do  his  utmost  until  the  enemy  is  defeated.  In  this 
way  you  will  do  your  duty  to  the  Empire  to  which  you 
belong,  and  the  glory  of  your  deed  will  live  for  ever  in 
India.’’ 

The  prescience  of  the  great  soldier  has  been 
justified  by  time.  At  the  moment  when  he  was 
warning  his  hearers  that  the  struggle  would  be  a long 
one,  and  that  the  enemy  was  still  wholly  undefeated, 
Staff  Officers  of  the  highest  distinction  were  boldly 
claiming  that  the  Germans  had  shot  their  bolt,  that 
the  lines  opposite  to  us  were  weakly  held,  and  that 
the  war  would  be  over  in  a few  months.  Both 
Lord  Kitchener  and  Lord  Roberts  took  the  long 
view  and  the  right  view.  The  victory  of  the 
Marne  destroyed  the  sense  of  perspective  in  the 
minds  of  some  of  the  most  distinguished  generals 
in  France,  so  that  it  became  a common  criticism  of 
Lord  Kitchener,  when  issue  was  first  joined  at  the 
Aisne,  that  he  was  wrong  to  prepare  great  armies 
for  the  future  when  the  war  would  be  over,  and  that 
he  ought  to  send  out  at  once  to  France  every  man 
fit  to  bear  arms  and  every  trained  officer.  Fortu- 
natety  for  the  Allied  cause.  Lord  Kitchener  pursued 
his  own  line,  and  his  sagacity  and  tenacity  of  purpose 
placed  at  the  disposal  of  his  critics  the  superb  armies 
which  shattered  at  the  Somme  the  illusion  of  German 
invincibility. 

If  another  digression  be  permitted,  it  may  be 
pointed  out  that  not  once  in  France,  nor  so  far  as 
it  is  known  in  England,  did  Lord  Roberts,  when 


94  VISIT  AND  DEATH  OF  EARL  ROBERTS 


war  was  once  declared,  dwell  iipon  his  own  neglected 
warnings  to  liis  countrymen.  Those  who  are  re- 
cording in  this  chapter  his  last  effort  on  behalf  of 
his  country  cannot  resist  recalling  the  solemn 
warning  which  he  uttered  to  the  Empire  at  Man- 
chester two  years  before  the  war 

“ I am  doing,  I trust,  no  wrong  to  the  memory 
of  Cobden  and  Bright  when  I point  out  that  in  the 
very  month  that  they  were  cherishing  illusions  of 
perpetual  peace,  the  mightiest  and  most  disciplined 
force  that  this  earth  has  ever  contained  was  silently 
being  drilled  from  the  Rhine  to  the  Elbe  and  the 
Oder,  and  from  the  North  Sea  to  the  Bavarian 
Frontier,  until  that  army  disclosed  itself  in  its 
unmatched  capacity  for  destruction  and  war.  And 
amid  these  dreams  of  peace,  for  what  was  that 
army  being  trained  ? Koniggratz,  Metz,  St  Privat, 
and  Sedan  are  the  answer  ...  At  the  present  day 
in  the  3mar  1912,  as  in  1866  and  in  1870,  war  will 
take  place  the  instant  the  German  forces  by  land 
and  sea  are,  by  their  superiority  at  every  point, 
as  certain  of  victor}^  as  anything  in  human  calcula- 
tion can  be  made  certain.  Germany  strikes  when 
Germany’s  hour  has  struck.  This  was  the  policy 
relentlessly  pursued  by  Bismarck  and  Moltke  in 
1866  and  1870  : it  has  been  her  policy  decade  by 
decade  since  that  date.  It  is  her  policy  to-day  . . . 
We  stand  still ; Germanj^  always  advances,  and  the 
direction  of  her  advance  is  now  most  manifest. 
It  is  towards  one  consummation — a complete  supre- 
macy by  land  and  sea  . . .” 

These  warnmgs  passed  as  unheeded  as  the 
prophecies  of  Cassandra,  and  indeed  an  Under- 
secretary apologized  to  the  German  nation  for  tlm 


GERMAN  TRIBUTE  OF  RESPECT 


95 


speech  from  which  we  have  quoted  an  extract. 
No  word  of  reproach,  so  far  as  we  know,  ever  crossed 
the  lips  of  this  far-seeing  and  modest  soldier. 

His  visit  to  the  Indian  Corps  has  been  described. 
Three  days  later,  within  the  sound  of  the  great 
guns,  felix  opportunitate  mortis,  he  was  dead.  His 
last  warning  was  uttered  : his  last  battle  fought : 
and  with  a rare  gleam  of  chivalry  a German  writer 
dismissed  him  well : — 

“ And  so  the  old  warrior  has  passed  to  Valhalla. 
God  rest  his  soul.” 


CHAPTER  VIII 


EPISODES  OF  TRENCH  WARFARE 

Raid  by  2nd  Battalion  3rd  Gnrkha  Rifles  and  2nd  Battalion  39tli  Garhwal 
Rifles — Enemy  prepared — Gallantry  of  Lt-Colonel  Brakspear  and 
others — Casualties — Honours — Enemy  sapping  up  to  our  line — 
Raid  by  6th  Jat  Light  Infantry  and  Sappers  and  Miners — Curious 
behaviour  of  German  prisoner — Casualties — Honours — Invention  of 
our  first  trench  mortars — First  used  b}^  Lieutenant  Robson,  R.E. — 
Frostbite — Comparison  of  casualties  from  sickness  in  British  and 
Indian  units — Causes  of  disparity— Visit  of  H.R.H.  the  Prince  of 
Wales — Captm’e  of  German  aeroplane  and  two  officers — Bitter  weather 
— Patrol  work  hindered  by  snow — Inactivity  of  enemy’s  artillery — 
Enemy  either  savmg  ammunition  for  a big  offensive  or  moving  guns — 
Ijilielihood  of  attack  on  Indian  Corps  front — Value  of  example  of 
British  soldier — His  never-failing  cheerfulness — Comradeship  of 
British  and  Indians — Dependence  of  Indian  soldiers  on  their  British 
officers. 

On  the  13th  November,  an  attack  was  launched  on 
a German  trench,  fifty  yards  from  the  junction  of 
the  trenches  of  the  l/39th  and  2/39th  Garhwalis. 
The  assaultmg  party  consisted  of  six  platoons  of 
the  2/3rd  Gurkhas  with  50  rifles  of  the  2/ 39th  Garh- 
walis under  Major  Taylor,  the  whole  under  the 
command  of  Lt-Colonel  W.  R.  Brakspear,  2/3rd 
Gurkhas.  With  the  detachment,  as  a working 
party,  were  two  sections  of  No.  4 Company  Sappers 
and  Miners  and  two  platoons  2/3rd  Gurkhas,  who 
were  to  follow  the  party  and  fiU  in  the  trench.  The 
assault  was  to  be  prepared  by  artillery  fire,  from  9 to 
9.15  p.m.,  on  the  main  German  support  trenches, 


ENEMV  PREPARED  97 

and  the  withdrawal  of  the  party  was  to  be  eovered 
by  artillery  from  midnight  to  12.20  a.m. 

The  operation  orders  directed  that  the  assault 
should  be  made  in  silence,  but  shortly  after  the 
advance  commenced,  cheering  Avas  started  on  the 
right.  It  Avas  impossible  to  ascertain  bj^  Avhose 
fault  this  occurred,  as  all  who  could  have  given 
information  Avere  either  killed  or  missing.  It  is 
doubtful,  however,  whether  the  cheering  had  any 
bad  effect,  as  the  enemy  was  eAudently  prepared 
for  the  attack,  and  was  firing  heavily  before  it 
commenced.  Moreover,  it  was  found  later  that, 
since  Major  Taylor’s  raid  on  the  9th  NoA^ember,  the 
enemy  had  proA^ided  against  fmther  attack  by 
throAving  back  the  trench  on  the  left  and  prolonging 
the  flank  to  meet  the  support  trench.  A search- 
light and  machme  guns  had  also  been  installed. 

On  hearing  the  cheer,  the  men  charged  and  ran 
into  a Avithering  Are,  with  the  result  that  all  the 
British  and  Gurkha  officers  in  the  centre  and  on  the 
left  were  shot  doAvn,  AAuth  the  exception  of  one 
Subadar,  and  that  part  of  the  attack  Avas  held  up. 

MeanAvhile  Lieutenant  McSwinej^  Avith  some  of 
C Company  had  got  into  the  left  of  the  German 
trench,  where  they  engaged  in  a hammer  and  tongs 
fight,  killing  about  thhtj^^  of  the  enemy  and  captm’ing 
four.  Lt-Colonel  Brakspear  had  already  been 
knocked  out  by  a fall  into  a deep  shell  hole,  but 
managed  to  reach  this  party,  and  led  them  along 
the  main  trench  until  they  Avere  pulled  up  by  Germans 
posted  behind  a traverse. 

Lieutenant  McSAviney,  Avithout  a moment’s  hesita- 
tion, jumped  on  to  the  near  slope  of  the  trench  to 
get  at  the  enemy  OA^er  the  traverse,  but  AV'as  at  once 

H 


98  EPISODES  OF  TRENCH  WARFARE 


shot  down.  Captain  Alexander  was  at  this  moment 
lying  just  outside  the  parapet  with  a shattered 
ankle,  but  still  cheering  on  his  men. 

The  position  of  this  part  of  the  attack  was  now 
critical.  Only  a small  portion  of  the  left  of  the 
trench  was  in  our  hands  ; our  main  attack  was  still 
held  up,  and  of  Lieutenant  McSwiney’s  small  party 
of  about  twenty,  two  British  officers  and  at  least 
five  men  had  been  put  out  of  action. 

Colonel  Brakspear,  although  still  in  a very  shaky 
condition  from  his  fall,  decided  to  leave  Subadar 
Dalkesar  Gimung  to  hold  the  trench,  and  himseK 
to  take  the  risk  of  returning  to  bring  up  men  to 
finish  the  Germans.  He  managed  to  get  back  in 
safety  through  the  bullet-swept  zone,  Subadar  Dal- 
kesar meantime  holding  bravely  on  to  his  position, 
in  spite  of  rapidly  increasing  odds. 

The  advance  of  the  supports  was  for  some  time 
prevented  by  the  enemy’s  use  of  their  searchlight, 
which  they  turned  on  to  our  main  trench,  keeping 
up,  with  its  aid,  a hea\^  ffie  on  any  one  who  showed 
himself. 

To  carry  on  the  assault.  Colonel  Brakspear  and 
Major  Drummond,  the  latter  of  whom  had  only 
joined  from  England  a few  hours  before,  exposing 
themselves  to  almost  certain  death,  climbed  over 
the  parapet  and  lay  down  in  fuU  view  of  the  enemy, 
calling  on  their  men  to  join  them.  Major  Drummond 
was  at  once  shot  dead,  a gallant  ending  to  a gallant 
officer. 

The  searchlight  being  occasionally  turned  off, 
the  advance  began  again,  and  was  proceeding 
favourably,  when  a number  of  high  explosive  shells 
fell  among  the  party,  leaving  only  four  men  with 


CAPT.  ALEXANDER  AND  LT.  McSWINEY  99 


Colonel  Brakspear,  who  appeared  to  bear  a charmed 
life.  Quite  undaunted,  he  returned  to  his  trench 
to  organize  another  party. 

By  this  time  it  was  12.30  a.m.  and  past  the  hour 
fixed  by  order  for  the  retirement  of  the  attack,  a fact 
which  was  emphasized  by  the  falling  round  the 
assaulted  trench  of  numerous  shells  from  our  own 
guns  which,  as  pre-arranged,  were  covering  the 
retirement  of  the  party.  Lieutenant  McSwiney, 
seeing  that  there  was  nothing  to  gain  and  everything 
to  lose  by  staying,  ordered  Subadar  Dalkesar  Gurung 
to  retire,  and  sent  a party  to  bring  in  Captain  Alex- 
ander. The  men  got  back  with  few  casualties  en 
route  to  our  trenches. 

There,  however,  news  was  received  that  Captain 
Alexander,  refusing  to  be  an  encumbrance  to  his 
men  in  their  precarious  retirement,  had  ordered  them 
to  leave  him  and  help  the  other  wounded  men. 
Lieutenant  McSwiney,  badly  wounded  as  he  was, 
at  once  took  Subadar  Dalkesar  Gurung  and  six  men 
out  as  a search  party,  and  went  back  to  the  spot 
near  the  German  trench  where  he  had  last  heard 
Captain  Alexander’s  voice,  but  failed  to  find  him, 
and  only  just  succeeded  in  getting  back  to  our  trench 
when  he  collapsed  from  loss  of  blood. 

The  devotion  of  these  two  officers,  the  one  to  his 
men,  the  other  to  his  brother  officer,  is  one  of  many 
instances  which  explain  the  intense  admiration, 
love  and  respect  felt  by  the  Indian  soldier  for  his 
British  leaders.  It  is  pleasing  to  record  that  Captain 
Alexander  survived,  being  now  a prisoner  of  war, 
while  Lieutenant  McSwiney,  for  his  great  gallantry, 
was  rewarded  with  the  Military  Cross. 

Iffie  affair  was  marked  by  many  instances  of 


100  RPT80T)ER  OF  TRENCH  WARFARE 


bravery,  but  tlie  losses  were  heavy  in  proportion  to 
the  small  number  engaged.  The  Gurkhas  lost  Major 
E.  G.  Drummond  killed,  Captain  Alexander  wounded 
and  missing,  and  Lieutenant  McSwiney  wounded, 
while  Captain  Bennett  was  missing.  Amongst  the 
Gurkha  ranks  there  were  57  casualties. 

The  small  detachment  of  the  2/39th  Garhwalis 
lost  Major  Taylor  and  Captain  Robertson-GlasgOAv 
missing,  and  had  38  casualties  in  the  ranks. 

Subadar  Dalkesar  Gurung  had  throughout  dis- 
played great  gallantry,  coolness  and  leadership, 
heading  his  company  right  down  the  German  trencli 
with  the  bayonet.  He  also  went  bade  with  Lieu- 
tenant McSwiney  to  rescue  Captain  Alexander. 
For  his  services  he  was  mentioned  in  despatches,  and 
later,  having  again  distinguished  himself  at  Neuve 
Chapelle,  where  he  was  wounded,  was  awarded  the 
Cross  of  the  Russian  Order  of  St  George,  4th  Class. 

Naik  Rupdhan  Pun,  who  had  been  to  the  fore 
throughout,  received  the  Russian  Medal  of  St 
George,  2nd  Class,  for  this  action  combined  with 
his  services  at  Neuve  Chapelle. 

For  his  conspicuous  gallantry.  Rifleman  Ganpati 
Thapa  received  the  Indiam  Distinguished  Service 
Medal. 

Three  men  of  the  l/9th  Gurkhas  displayed  great 
bravery  in  bringing  in  wounded  under  heavy  fire 
Of  these,  Lance  Naik  Jhaman  Sing  Khattri  received 
the  Indian  Order  of  Merit,  2nd  Class,  while  Rifleman 
Gajbir  Bisht  and  Ran  Bahadur  Sahi  were  awarded 
the  Indian  Distingished  Service  Medal. 

About  this  time  it  became  evident  that  the  enemy 
was  systematically  sapping  up  to  our  trenches  along 
the  whole  front.  This  proceeding  was  open  to  one 


II AID  BY  THD  6th  JATS 


101 


of  two  explanations.  Either  it  was  with  a view  to 
bringing  on  a general  engagement  as  soon  as  parallels 
had  been  established  near  enough  for  the  enemy  to 
issue  on  a sufficient!}’-  broad  front  to  offer  a pros- 
pect of  success,  or  it  may  have  been  to  guard 
agamst  an  attack  by  us.  Whatever  the  object,  it 
was  daily  becoming  more  evident  that  the  situation 
could  not  last  much  longer,  as  one  side  or  the  other 
would  shortly  be  compelled  to  take  the  offensive 
and  drive  the  other  back. 

The  Indian  Corps  had  one  Division  in  reserve, 
and  it  therefore  seemed  probable  that  it  would 
fall  to  the  lot  of  the  Corps  to  initiate  the  offensive, 
and  thus  anticipate  that  of  the  enemy.  During 
the  night  of  the  15th-16th  November,  the  Ferozepore 
and  Jullundur  Brigades  were  relieved  by  the  8th 
British  Division,  which  thus  took  over  the  northern 
portion  of  our  line  and  reduced  the  front  held  by 
the  Corps  to  about  31  miles,  extending  from  just 
north  of  Givenchy  to  the  junction  of  the  ill-famed 
Rue  du  Bois  with  the  main  La  Bassee — Estaires  road. 

During  the  night  a dashing  little  raid  was  carried 
out  by  a party  of  125  men  of  the  6th  Jat  Light 
Infantry,  under  Major  P.  H.  Dmidas,  with  Lieu- 
tenant Liptrott,  and  half  of  No.  3 Compaiiy  Sappers 
and  Miners  under  Captain  Kelly,  R.E.,  with  Lieu- 
tenant Wheeler,  R.E.  Two  German  saps  had  been 
pushed  up  to  within  a very  uncomfortable  distance 
of  the  trenches  held  by  the  107th  Pioneers,  and  it 
became  necessary  to  clear  the  enemy  out  and  fill  in 
the  saps. 

In  this,  as  in  most  of  these  rushes,  the  element 
of  surprise  was  very  essential.  It  was,  therefore, 
decided  by  Colonel  Roche,  commanding  the  6th  Jats, 


102  EPISODES  OF  TRENCH  WARFARE 


ill  consultation  with  Major  Dundas,  that  no  pre- 
liminary bombardment  was  advisable.  As  soon,  how- 
ever, as  our  men  had  got  in,  our  heavy  guns  were  to 
open  on  the  enemy’s  reserve  trenches  and,  later  on, 
our  field  guns  would  join  in.  Major  Dundas  was 
ordered  to  hold  the  trench  between  the  enemy’s  saps 
sufficiently  long  to  admit  of  the  107th  rebuilding 
a section  of  their  parapet  which  had  been  blown 
down,  and  of  the  Sappers  and  IMiners  filling  in  the 
saps. 

At  8.55  p.m.  the  attack  was  launched,  with 
orders  not  to  fire  until  the  objective  was  reached. 
As  the  men  cleared  the  wire  entanglement  in  our 
front,  some  casualties  were  caused  by  fire  from  the 
sap  on  each  flank,  but  they  pressed  on,  passing  a 
deep  drain,  and  further  on  a lire  trench,  Avhich  had 
been  abandoned  by  us  and  afterwards  used  by  the 
enemy. 

On  reaching  the  right  sap,  Major  Dundas  at  once 
set  to  work  to  clear  the  enemy  out  with  the  bayonet, 
in  order  to  cover  the  Sappers  who  were  working  just 
behind.  The  space  was  very  circumscribed,  and 
there  was  only  room  for  one  man  to  advance  at  a 
time  ; the  bullets  were  falling  fast  and  thick,  and 
men  were  dropping.  There  was  nothing  for  it  but 
to  draw  back  to  the  mouth  of  the  sap,  where  we  were 
better  protected,  our  reply  to  the  enemy’s  heavy 
fire  drav/ing  forth  many  curses  and  yells. 

In  the  hand-to-hand  fighting  some  loss  was 
inflicted  on  the  enemy,  and  one  prisoner  was  taken, 
whose  behaviour  was  a striking  illustration  of  the 
terror  then  inspired  by  the  Indians,  due  doubtless 
to  the  stories  of  theh  barbaritj^  with  Avhich  the 
Germans  had  been  regaled.  This  man,  on  being 


HAND-TO-HAND  FIGHTING 


lo:^ 

taken,  absolutely  refused  to  be  left  alone  with  the 
Indians.  He  clung  to  Major  Dundas’s  hand  and 
declmed  to  leave  him,  being  eventually  killed  by 
his  side  by  a shot  from  his  own  trenches. 

The  left  san  was  entered  without  much  difficultv 
by  Lieutenants  Liptrott  and  VvTieeler,  who  found 
the  enemy  in  full  retreat,  but  did  not  pursue  them, 
as  it  was  vitally  necessary  to  fill  in  the  sap  as  quickly 
as  possible.  The  Sappers  accomplished  this  for  a 
distance  of  about  thirty  yards,  working  with  their 
usual  devotion  under  fii’e,  and  sustaining  several 
casualties. 

Meanwhile  Captain  Kelly’s  party  in  the  right 
sap  were  having  a hand-to-hand  tussle,  during  which 
thev  bayoneted  several  of  the  enemv  and  destroyed 
as  much  as  they  could  of  the  work. 

The  whole  party  retired  shortH  before  10  p.m., 
but  unfortunately  came  under  heavy  fire  from  the 
abandoned  trench  which  they  had  passed. during  the 
advance,  into  which  some  Germans  had  apparently 
managed  to  steal.  The  result  was  that  the  casualties 
were  as  heavy  here  as  diming  the  advance,  amongst 
others  one  Indian  officer  being  killed  and  a second 
wounded,  the  German  prisoner  bemg  shot  at  this 
point,  still  constant  to  the  side  of  Major  Dundas. 

This  little  exploit  earned  the  warm  praise  of  the 
General  Officer  Commandmg  the  Meerut  Division. 
Major  Dundas  had  shown  good  leadership  throughout, 
and  was  awarded  the  D.S.O.,  while  Lieutenant  Lip- 
trott, who  was  unfortunately  killed  a few  days 
later,  was  mentioned  in  despatches.  Captain  Kelly, 
R.E.,  received  the  Military  Cross,  Lieutenant  Wheeler 
being  mentioned. 

Colour-Havildar  Chagatta,  3rd  tappers  and 


104  EPISODES  OF  TRENCK  WARFARE 


Miners,  was  awarded  the  Indian  Distinguished 
Service  Medal,  being  already  in  possession  of  the 
Indian  Order  of  Merit.  Amongst  the  6th  Jats, 
Havildar  Badlu  and  Sepoy  Risal  received  the  Indian 
Distinguished  Service  Medal,  while  Havildar  Jai  Lai 
was  awarded  the  Indian  Order  of  Merit,  2nd  Class. 
The  casualties  of  the  Jats  were  29,  of  whom  three 
were  Indian  officers,  the  Sappers  and  Miners  losing 
three  killed  and  one  wounded. 

The  next  few  days  passed  fau’ly  quietly,  in  the 
sense  that  nothing  occurred  beyond  the  usual 
shelling,  sniping,  and  bombing.  The  weather  was 
very  cold  and  frosty,  rendering  the  roads  slippery 
and  difficult  for  horse  transport. 

It  is  mteresting  to  note  that  on  the  19th  Novem- 
ber our  first  trench  mortars  were  fired.  These 
ingenious  contrivances  were  the  invention  of  Major 
Paterson,  R.F.A.,  and  were  constructed  by  No.  3 
Company  Sappers  and  Miners.  At  first  only  two 
were  made,  of  which  one  was  of  wood  and  the  other 
of  cast  non. 

The  details  of  this  early  attempt  at  the  construc- 
tion of  a weapon  which  has  since  developed  into  a most 
formidable  instrument  of  warfare,  are  too  technical 
to  recount  here.  It  is  sufficient  to  mention  that  the 
shell,  weighing  3 lbs.  12  oz.,  was  made  out  of  an 
18-pounder  shell  case  with  three  inches  cut  off  the 
end.  This  was  filled  with  meliuite  or  flaked  cotton. 
The  success  of  the  operation  depended  on  the  fuse 
lighting  from  the  flash  of  the  powder  charge  at  the 
moment  the  shell  left  the  mouth  of  the  gun.  The 
charge  consisted  of  three  ounces  of  powder  tied  up 
in  a piece  of  sacking. 

The  mortars  were  brought  mto  action  against 


OUR  FIRST  TRENCH  MORTARS  105 


the  enemy’s  saps  by  Lieutenant  Robson,  R.E., 
who  was  not  long  in  getting  to  work,  as  he  had  only 
joined  the  daj'  before.  One  or  Uvo  dnect  liits  were 
obtained  in  twenty  rounds,  which  was  encomaging 
for  a first  attempt. 

It  was  found  necessary  to  omit  the  sacking 
envelope  of  the  charge,  as  it  was  blown  from  the 
mouth  of  the  mortar  and  left  a trail  of  smoke  or 
flame  which  enabled  the  gun  to  be  located.  Still, 
everything  has  a beginning,  and  the  use  of  even 
these  primitive  Aveapons  cheered  up  oiu’  men  who  had 
suffered  seAmrely  from  the  enemy’s  mortars  Avithout 
the  power  of  replying  in  kind. 

There  Avas,  hoAA  ever,  another  side  to  the  cpiestion. 
The  usual  procedure  of  the  trench  mortar  specialist 
Avas  to  fire  as  many  rounds  as  possible,  and  then  to 
pack  up  and  remove  his  infernal  machine  Avith  the 
utmost  expedition  to  another  part  of  the  trench, 
to  avoid  the  Avrath  to  come. 

At  fu’st,  our  officers  and  men  AAatched  the  pro- 
ceedings with  the  greatest  sympathy  and  interest, 
but  when,  as  soon  happened,  they  aAvoke  to  the  fact 
that  the  firing  of  our  mortars  aaus  the  signal  for  a 
bombardment  of  that  part  of  the  trench  by  the 
enemy,  sympathy  gaA'e  place  to  intense  dislike,  and 
after  a time,  as  one  gallant  officer  testifies,  it  was 
only  a very  senior  or  a very  astute  bomb-gunner  aa’Iio 
could  obtain  a free  hand. 

The  British  soldier  iieA^er  fails  to  see  the  humorous 
side  of  even  the  blackest  day,  and  at  one  point  in 
a trench  which  had  suffered  seA^erely  through  the 
zeal  of  those  Avhom  its  occupants  kneAV  as  the  mortar 
maniacs,  a notice  Avas  put  up  Avhicli  read,  “No 
haAvkers,  organs  or  trench  mortars  permitted.” 


106  EPISODES  OF  TRENCH  WARFARE 


About  this  time  there  was  a great  increase  in 
the  number  of  cases  of  frostbite,  the  41st  Dogras 
especially  suffering  severely.  As  far  as  possible 
arrangements  were  made  to  supply  braziers  and 
charcoal  in  the  trenches,  where  the  conditions  were 
most  bitter. 

The  fighting  strength  of  the  two  Divisions  of  the 
Corps  was  then  3500  British  rifles,  9500  Indian, 
added  to  which  was  the  Secundrabad  Cavalry 
Brigade  of  four  regiments,  mustering  1700  sabres. 

The  proportion  of  sickness  in  British  and  Indian 
ranks  of  the  Corps  respectively  is  of  interest.  It 
would  natm’alR  be  imagined  that  the  Indian  troops, 
accustomed  for  the  most  part  to  the  warmth  and 
dryness  of  the  plains  of  India,  would  have  suffered 
more  severely  than  their  British  comrades  from  the 
extremely  trying  conditions  under  which  thej^  now 
existed.  The  contrary  proved  to  be  the  case,  for 
while  the  casualties  in  the  British  ranks  due  to 
sickness  amounted  to  some  400  out  of  a total  of 
3500  men,  those  in  the  Indian  units  totalled  only 
449  out  of  11,200. 

This  disparity  can  be  ascribed  to  two  main 
causes.  The  British  troops  suffered  from  the  effects 
of  a long  sojoimn  in  the  enervating  climate  of  India, 
which,  as  is  so  often  the  case,  brought  out  the  fever 
frequently  only  latent  in  Emopeans  who  have  lived 
in  the  East.  Colour  is  lent  to  this  theory  by  the  fact 
that  the  chief  sufferers  amongst  the  Indian  regiments 
were  the  2/3rd  Gurkhas,  who  had  been  delayed  for 
three  weeks  at  Kotawara  in  the  fever-laden  atmo- 
sphere of  the  Terai,  and  in  tropical  rain,  during 
their  march  from  the  hills  in  India  prior  to  embarka- 
tion. This  regiment  felt  the  effects  of  the  malaria 


HEALTH  OF  THE  INDIAN  TROOPS  107 


thus  induced  during  the  whole  period  of  their  stay 
in  France. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  evil  effects  of  the  un- 
accustomed climate  of  Northern  France  in  winter 
were  successfully  combated,  in  the  case  of  the 
Indians,  by  the  unceasing  care  and  solicitude  with 
which  they  were  watched  over  by  their  regimental 
and  medical  officers.  Other  factors  in  theh  well- 
being were  the  excellence  of  the  food  supply,  the 
sanitary  measures  adopted  b}^  the  medical  officers, 
and  the  quantities  of  extra  comforts  which  were 
showered  on  the  men  by  the  forethought  and 
kindness  of  those  at  home,  largely  through  the 
instrumentality  of  the  Indian  Soldiers’  Fund. 

On  the  21st  November,  H.R.H.  the  Prince  of 
Wades  visited  the  Corps  and  spent  some  time  in 
assuring  himself  of  the  welfare  of  the  men  to  whom 
this  visit,  so  shortly  to  be  followed  by  that  of  the 
King-Emperor,  was  a source  of  unfeigned  pleasime. 

On  the  same  date  the  enemy  commenced  a series 
of  attacks  with  heavy  trench  mortars,  directed 
chiefly  against  the  6th  Jats  in  the  left  centre  of  the 
Bareilly  Brigade,  which  occupied  the  section  of  the 
line  nearest  to  Givenchy.  These  monster  bombs 
caused  a large  number  of  casualties,  and  gave  the 
men  no  rest,  for  the  trenches  were  broken  up,  repaired 
and  broken  up  again,  repaired  and  re-occupied ; 
and  so  it  went  on  until  the  men  were  worn  out  with 
constant  strain  and  want  of  sleep. 

A novel  excitement  was  caused  by  the  descent, 
owing  to  engine  trouble,  inside  our  lines,  of  a German 
biplane,  the  two  aviators,  both  German  officers, 
being  captimed. 

At  first  it  was  very  difficult  to  stop  the  Indians 


108  EPISODES  OF  TRENCH  WARFARE 


from  firing  with  the  utmost  impartiality  at  every 
aeroplane,  Allied  or  hostile,  which  hove  in  sight. 
They  found  it  difficult  to  believe  that  such  uncanny 
monsters  could  have  any  but  malevolent  intentions. 

degrees,  however,  the  novelty  wore  oft”,  until  the 
appearance  of  an  aeroplane  hardly  excited  remark. 

The  cold  was  now  intense,  heavy  snow  having 
fallen.  Patrol  work  was  rendered  almost  impos- 
sible, as  the  snow  made  every  movement  clearly 
visible.  The  hardness  of  the  ground,  however, 
brought  its  compensations,  for  our  primitive  hand- 
grenades,  which  had  often  proved  ineffective,  now 
exploded  with  cheerful  frequency  on  striking  the 
ground. 

On  the  morning  of  the  22nd  November,  the 
Bareilly  Brigade  was  again  heavily  bombed,  as 
many  as  sixty  projectiles  falling  in  the  trenches  of 
the  58th  Rifles  ; and  the  6th  Jats  once  more  suffered 
severely.  The  news  that  Hales’  rifle  grenades  were 
on  their  way  from  England  was  therefore  very 
encouraging. 

The  proximity  of  the  enemy’s  line  hampered  us 
very  greatly,  for  not  only  did  it  enable  the  Germans 
to  throw  bombs  into  our  trenches,  but  it  prevented 
our  artillery  from  shelling  the  enem}^  on  account 
of  the  risk  to  our  men.  The  only  remedy  lay  in 
frequent  attacks  on  the  hostile  sapheads,  but  the 
effect  of  these  raids  was  pmely  temporary,  as  there 
was  seldom  time  to  allow  of  the  saps  being  effectually 
filled  in. 

It  was  noticed  at  this  junctme  that  the  enemy’s 
guns  were  inarkedR  inactive.  This  admitted  of  one 
of  two  possible  explanations  : either  he  was  saving 
up  ammunition  with  a view  to  a big  effort,  or  he  was 


BRITISH  AND  INDIAN  CAMARADHRIE  109 


removing  liis  heavy  guns  to  another  area.  The 
former  appeared  to  be  the  most  probable  hypothesis, 
as  the  natural  point  for  attack,  the  link  most  likely 
to  be  the  weakest  m the  chain,  was  at  the  point  of 
junction  of  the  Allied  forces,  m this  case  about 
opposite  Festubert  and  Givenchy.  It  seemed  pro- 
bable, therefore,  that  an  attack  on  a large  scale  was 
impending,  and  that  the  Indian  Corps  might  have 
to  bear  the  brunt  of  it. 

The  enemy  doubtless  believed  that  the  mixture  of 
British  and  Indian  troops  in  our  line  would  prove  to 
be  a source  of  weakness.  In  this,  as  in  so  many 
similar  surmises,  he  was  to  find  his  mistake. 
Throughout  the  period  during  which  our  British  and 
Indian  troops  were  so  intimately  associated,  the 
strongest  feeling  of  comradeship  prevailed.  On  the 
part  of  the  Indian  soldiers  there  existed  the  greatest 
admhation  for  the  tenacity,  the  cool  courage,  the 
unfailing  cheerfulness  under  the  heaviest  trials  of 
their  British  friends.  It  must  never  be  forgotten 
that  the  Indians  were  fighting  under  the  strangest 
and  most  unfavourable  conditions  imaginable.  Trans- 
ported many  thousand  miles  from  their  own  sunny 
land,  dumped  to  face  a cruel  winter  in  a country  of 
which  the  inhabitants,  language,  and  customs  were 
entirely  unknown  to  them,  it  is  to  their  everlasting 
credit  that  they  came  so  nobly  through  the  ordeal. 
Faced  by  the  most  treacherous  and  bloodthirsty  foe 
that  the  world  has  ever  seen,  whose  many  years  of 
preparation  gave  him  innumerable  advantages  over 
our  hasty  improvisations,  they  preserved  a degree 
of  composure  and  attained  to  a standard  of  courage 
which  no  soldiers  even  in  this  war  have  surpassed. 

It  was  here  that  the  example  of  the  British 


110  EPISODES  OF  TRENCH  WARFARE 


soldier  proved  to  be  of  such  supreme  value.  There 
was  no  question  of  the  inherent  courage  of  the 
Indian  soldier.  It  had  been  proved  in  many  a hard- 
fought  field.  The  only  doubt  was  whether  he  would 
rise  superior  to  the  appallingly  depressing  natm’e  of 
his  surroundings.  For  him,  be  it  remembered,  there 
was  no  short  leave  home  to  instil  fresh  heart  and 
spnits.  To  visit  England  was  merely  the  exchange 
of  one  unknown  country  for  another,  and  such  visits 
could  only  be  the  result  of  wounds  or  sickness. 
The  British  soldier,  on  the  other  hand,  fighting  as 
he  was  in  a country  and  climate  not  very  unlike  his 
own,  amongst  people  whose  manners  and  customs 
were  not  altogether  dissimilar  to  his,  was  not  exposed 
to  quite  the  same  depth  of  depression.  Always 
cheerful  himself,  his  cheerfulness  was  infectious  to 
all  around  him,  and  the  Indians  at  once  came  under 
the  spell. 

Instances  of  the  best  form  of  comradeship  are 
numberless.  Often,  when  it  wms  impossible  to  bring 
up  rations  to  the  trenches,  have  the  British  shared 
the  remams  of  their  supplies  with  their  Indian 
friends. 

There  are  many  instances,  too,  some  of  which 
wiU  be  found  in  these  pages,  of  British  soldiers 
risking  their  lives  to  save  Indians,  and  vice  versa. 
Camaraderie  was  there  in  its  highest  sense,  and 
without  it  the  Corps  could  not  have  existed. 

The  one  calamity  of  all  those  which  he  was 
called  on  to  face,  which  could  in  any  degree  shake 
the  moral  of  the  Indian  soldier,  was  the  loss  of  his 
beloved  British  ofihcers.  Accustomed  from  the  very 
commencement  of  his  life  as  a soldier  to  look  to  them 
at  every  turn  for  example  and  guidance,  treated  by 


HEROISM  OF  THE  BRITISH  OFFICER  111 


them  with  the  utmost  justice  tempered  by  kindness, 
regarding  them  almost  as  a child  regards  a much- 
loved father,  the  Indian  would  have  been  less  than 
human  had  he  not  felt  that  the  world  was  slipping 
away  from  him  when  he  saw,  amid  such  strange 
and  terrible  siuToundings,  the  officers  who  con- 
stituted the  one  link  between  his  native  land  and  this 
foreign  country  killed  one  after  the  other,  leaving 
him  to  the  guidance  of  the  Indian  officers  who, 
gallant  in  the  extreme  as  they  have  so  often  proved 
themselves  to  be,  were  as  much  strangers  to  the  land 
and  conditions  as  himself. 

The  heroism  of  the  British  officer  in  this  war  is 
beyond  the  power  of  the  pen  to  describe,  nor  would 
he  encourage  or  welcome  a literary  advertisement 
of  his  valour.  The  scope  of  this  history  only  permits 
of  the  description  of  a small  number  of  instances  of 
conspicuous  seK-sacrifice  and  bravery  on  the  part  of 
British  officers,  but  the  abiding  proof  of  their  loyalty 
to  them  tradition,  to  their  dut}^  and  to  their  men, 
is  to  be  found  in  the  graves  in  Flanders,  which  are 
the  only  record  of  so  much  devotion  and  so  much 
glory. 


CHAPTER  IX 


THE  ACTION  OF  FESTUBERT 

Conditions  obtaining  at  time  of  battle  of  Festubert — Indian  Corps  heavily- 
handicapped,  but  line  never  broken — Description  of  sapping  operations 
— Relief  of  Meerut  Division  by  Lahore — Heavy  attack  by  enemy 
before  relief  completed — Gallant  defence  by  Connaught  Company — 
34tli  Sikh  Pioneers,  9th  Bhopal  Infantry  and  58th  Rifles  forced  out 
of  theu’  trenches — Lt-Colonel  Southey  saves  position  on  left  flank 
— Ciaptaiu  Bull,  58th  Rifles — Corps  Commander  orders  trenches  to 
be  retaken  at  all  costs  before  dawn — Counter-attack  in  the  afternoon 
— Major  Cassels  and  2/8th  Gm-khas — Held  u^)  by  bombs — 1 /39th  Garh- 
walis  attack  under  Lt-Colonel  S\viney — Plan  suggested  by  Lieutenant 
Robson,  R.E. — Bombing  party  of  57th  Rifles  led  with  great  bravery 
by  Lieutenant  Robson  with  Captahi  Acworth — 58th  Rifles  retake 
their  trenches — Gallantry  of  foim  privates  of  the  2nd  Black  Watch — ■ 
Success  of  the  l/39th  Garhwalis — Nark  Darwan  Sing  Negi  earns  the 
Victoria  Cross. 

Before  proceeding  to  an  account  of  the  action  of 
Festubert,  it  seems  advisable  to  give  a brief  sketch 
of  the  conditions  which  obtained  at  the  moment. 

For  a month  past,  the  Indian  Corps,  numbering 
only  some  14,000  rifles  and  1700  sabres,  with  the 
usual  proportion  of  artillery,  had  been  holding 
the  line  previously  occupied  by  the  2nd  Corps 
strengthened  by  an  extra  Brigade,  its  total  numbers 
amounting  roughly  to  32,000  men. 

It  can  thus  be  easily  seen  that  the  position  was 
extremely  hazardous,  in  view  of  the  pitiful  weakness 
of  our  line  and  the  proximity  of  a daring  and 
pertinacious  enemy,  whose  numbers  greatly  exceeded 
ours,  while  his  resources  in  guns,  trench  mortars 


CAPPING  OPERATIONS 


113 


and  grenades  were  vastly  superior  to  anything  which 
we  could  oppose  to  them.  The  Corps  had  therefore 
been  pinned  down  to  a defensive  attitude,  varied 
only  by  the  necessity  for  occasional  local  attacks 
when  the  enemy’s  sapping  operations  brought  him 
into  such  dangerous  proximity  to  our  line  as  to 
threaten  to  render  our  trenches  untenable. 

In  spite  of  all  the  disadvantages  under  which  it 
laboured,  the  Corps  had  so  far  won  through  without 
relinquishing  any  material  portion  of  its  original 
line.  Wherever  the  Germans  had  succeeded  in 
making  a breach,  the  position  had  always  been 
restored.  From  the  enemy’s  contuiuous  and  deter- 
mined efforts  to  bring  his  line  up  as  close  as  possible 
to  ours,  it  was  obviously  his  intention  to  make,  at 
some  not  distant  date,  a determined  attempt  to 
break  through  our  front. 

The  term  “ sap  ” has  occm-red  very  frequently 
in  this  history,  and  its  precise  meaning  may  not  be 
clearly  understood  by  the  non-military  reader.  As 
sapping  operations  have  played,  and  continue  to 
play,  a very  important  part  in  the  general  scheme, 
a short  and  non-technical  explanation  may  be 
helpful. 

The  distance  between  the  opposing  trenches 
varied  at  different  points  in  the  line  from  between 
500  to  50  yards,  or  even  less,  being  governed  chiefly 
by  the  configuration  of  the  ground.  Everywhere 
the  ground  between  the  trenches,  known  as  “ No 
Man’s  Land,”  could  be  swept  by  machine-gun  and 
rifle  fire.  Where  the  trenches  were  divided  by  a 
sufflcient  interval,  artillery  Are  of  an  appalling 
density  could  be  brought  to  bear.  It  was  obvious, 
therefore,  that  in  order  to  give  an  attack  the  best 

I 


114  THE  ACTION  OF  FESTUBERT 


chance  of  success,  it  was  necessar}-,  as  far  as  possible, 
to  curtail  the  distance  to  be  traversed  in  the  open 
before  reaching  the  hostile  trenches.  The  closer  to 
our  trenches,  as  before  remarked,  the  less  had  the 
enemy  to  fear  from  oiu-  artillery.  Moreover,  the 
existence  of  approaches  below  surface-level  rendered 
reinforcement  of  the  front  line  a safer  operation. 

The  method  piu’sued  by  the  enemy  to  accomplish 
these  ends  was  briefly  as  follows. 

Saps,  or  winding  trenches,  were  commenced  as 
a rule  from  points  in  the  enemy’s  line  some  300  to 
400  yards  from  our  trenches.  After  progressing 
perhaps  100  ^^ards,  the  various  saps  would  be  con- 
nected by  a new  firmg  trench,  parallel  to  the 
original  trench  from  which  the  saps  proceeded.  As 
the  distance  became  less,  the  difficulties  of  course 
increased,  and  it  was  necessary  to  establish  a fire 
to  cover  the  diggers.  This  was  managed  by  making 
short  lines  of  trench,  with  loopholes  at  the  bends  or 
angles  of  the  saps  from  which  men  could  keep  up 
fire. 

At  last,  by  repeated  advances,  the  front  trench 
was  established  at  a distance  of  perhaps  fifty  yards 
from  our  line.  From  this  a further  sap  was 
frequentl}"  (in  the  days  when  we  were  scantily 
provided  with  bombs  and  grenades)  pushed  up  to 
within  a few  feet  of  our  parapet.  The  advantages 
resulting  to  the  enemy  are,  of  course,  obvious.  His 
men  could  be  massed  within  a very  short  distance 
of  their  objective.  Our  artillery  could  do  them  no 
harm  without  certam  damage  to  our  own  men.  The 
successive  lines  m rear  could  be  occupied  quietly 
by  supports  which  could  come  up  at  the  required 
moment  under  cover  of  the  zig-zag  approaches. 


TIME  FOR  ATTACK  WELL  CHOSEN  115 

Finally,  when  all  was  ready,  our  men  were 
attacked  with  bombs  and  grenades.  If  this 
succeeded,  the  sections  opposite  the  sapheads  were 
rendered  untenable,  and  the  defence  was  split  up. 
The  bombs  and  grenades  supplied  the  place  of  the 
enemy’s  artillery  which  could  not  shell  our  trenches 
without  injuring  his  owm  men. 

The  attack  commenced  on  the  23rd  November, 
and  was  preceded  by  extensive  operations  of  the 
foregoing  character  which  were  greatly  assisted  by 
the  nature  of  the  ground.  The  saps  had  been  brought 
up  to  within  a few  yards  of  om*  trenches,  wdth  the 
result  that,  by  incessant  bombing,  the  position  of 
the  34th  Pioneers  on  the  left  of  the  right  section  of 
the  defence,  and  the  9th  Bhopal  Infantry  on  the 
right,  w'as  rendered  untenable,  and  they  were  forced 
to  evacuate  their  trenches. 

The  enemy  had,  from  one  point  of  view,  chosen 
his  time  w^ell.  The  relief  of  the  Meerut  Division  bv 
Lahore  was  fixed  for  the  nights  of  the  22nd-23rd 
and  23rd-24th  November.  On  the  morning  of  the 
23rd,  half  of  the  left  section,  east  of  Richebom-g 
I’Avoue,  and  the  left  and  centre  sub-sections  of 
the  right  section  east  of  Festubert  had  been  relieved. 
The  right  section  of  our  line  was  thus  composed  of 
units  of  both  Divisions. 

From  left  to  right,  the  troops  were  in  the  following 
order  : — - 

129th  57th  1 Company  84th  9th 

Baluchis  Rifles  1st  Connaughts  Pioneers  Bhopals 

These  all  belonged  to  the  Lahore  Division,  but  to 
then  right  were  two  units  of  the  Meerut  Division, 
the  58th  Rifles  and  a hah-battalion  Black  Watch. 


rilE  ACTION  OF  FESTUBERT 


IK) 

Tlie  enemy  (ioiihtless  counted  on  this  state  ot'  affairs 
as  a likely  cause  of  confusion. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  units  of  the  Meerut  Division, 
which  had  just  been  relieved,  were  still  in  proximity 
to  our  line,  and  were  thus  readily  available  as  rein- 
forcements. Idiese  were  the  other  half  of  the  Black 
Watch,  the  41st  Dogras,  2/8th  Gurkhas  and  107th 
Bioneers,  while  the  6th  Jats  were  in  reserve  near 
Festu])crt.  Major-General  Macbean  of  the  Bareilly 
Brigade  was  still  in  command  of  this  section  of  the 
line. 

During  the  night  of  the  23rd  November,  the 
enemy  pushed  u])  his  sap  to  within  five  yards  of 
the  trenches  of  the  34th,  and  as  dawn  broke, 
he  commenced  a storm  of  hand  grenades  from 
his  nearest  sapheads,  with  especial  violence  at  . the 
junctioji  of  the  34th  and  the  com])any  of  Connaughts 
on  their  left,  where  a maxim  of  the  34th  was  in 
])ositio]i. 

Subadar  Natha  Singh  ^vas  near  the  machine  gun, 
I'ound  which  bombs  fell  fast,  killing  a number  of 
men.  He  at  once  took  cliarge  and  field  his  position 
against  the  enemy,  who  had  broken  in,  until  he 

was  eventually  forced  to  rethe.  This  officer  had 

«/ 

previously  distinguished  himself  on  several  occasions, 
and  now  received  the  Indian  Order  of  Merit,  2nd 
Class. 

Havildar  Nikka  Singh,  when  all  the  men  of  the 
machine-gun  team  had  been  killed  or  wounded, 
carried  the  gun  by  himself  under  a withering  fire 
back  to  the  support  trenches,  for  which  act  of 
bravery  he  also  received  the  2nd  Class,  Indian 
Order  of  Merit. 

Captain  Mackain  was  in  command  of  the  company 


CAPT  MACK  AIN’S  GALLANT  DEATH  117 


next  to  Subadar  Natlia  Singh,  and  was  slightly 
wounded  by  a bomb.  When  the  Germans  broke 
into  the  trench,  he  got  his  men  behind  a traverse, 
over  which  a fire  duel  took  place.  Captain  Mackain 
killed  several  of  the  enemy  with  his  revolver,  but 
was  himself  shot  through  the  head  and  died  shortly 
afterwards,  havmg  been  carried  into  safety  by  his  men, 
for  which  act  of  devotion  Sepoy  Ishar  Singh  received 
the  Indian  Distinguished  Service  Medal,  Captain 
Mackain  being  inentioned  in  despatches. 

Lance-Naik  Tota  Singh  stuck  to  Captain  Mackain 
to  the  last,  and  was  killed  by  his  side  after  giving 
every  proof  of  fidelity  and  valour.  He  received 
the  Indian  Order  of  Merit,  2nd  Class,  Jiis  widow 
being  thus  enabled  to  draw  a pension. 

During  this  atta<ck,  the  buildmg  in  which  the 
regimental  aid  post  was  established  came  under 
heavy  shell  fire,  the  house  being  repeatedly  struck. 
Sub-Assistant-Surgeon  Harnam  Singh  and  Havildar 
Pala  Singh,  who  was  the  hospital  havildar,  removed 
all  the  wounded,  the  stretcher-bearers  being  away 
near  the  firing  line,  and  carried  them  into  safety 
along  the  road,  which  was  being  shelled.  These 
two  men  showed  absolute  disregard  of  danger,  and 
were  awarded  the  Indian  Order  of  Merit,  2nd 
Class. 

The  34th  were  overpowered  by  numbers  and  by 
bombs,  and  then  left  was  pushed  out  into  the 
Connaught  trench,  while  the  Germans  continued  to 
clear  out  each  traverse  with  grenades  as  they 
advanced.  A brave  attempt  was  then  made  by 
Captain  Cruikshank  with  one  company  to  retake 
the  trench,  but  just  as  they  were  advancing,  a 
machine  gun  enfiladed  them,  and  they  were  forced 


118 


THE  ACTION  OF  FESTUBERT 


to  fall  back,  and  with  them  No.  3 Company  and  the 
9th  Bhopal s. 

This  left  the  right  of  the  Connaiights,  under 
Captain  Callaghan,  in  the  au%  and  the  enemy  with 
a machine  gun  and  bombs  were  forcing  their  way 
tlu’ough  the  communication  trench.  The  Connaughts 
fought  them  traverse  by  traverse,  but  owing  to  the 
want  of  bombs  they  suffered  considerable  loss  and 
could  do  little  injury  to  the  enemJ^  Step  by  step 
they  retreated,  until,  to  avoid  being  taken  both  in 
flank  and  rear,  they  had  to  seek  cover  in  the  trench 
on  the  right  of  the  57th  Rifles,  where  thev  erected 
a hastv  barricade  and  continued  to  hold  out. 

A counter-attack  was  immediately  organized, 
which  was  carried  out  by  the  34th  with  portions  of 
the  6th  Jats  and  9th  Bhopals,  but  they  were  at  once 
held  up  by  machine  guns.  At  9.30  a.m.,  some  of 
the  58th  Rifles  on  the  left  of  the  right  section  of 
the  defence  were  forced  out  of  their  trench,  and 
affairs  began  to  look  critical.  At  12.30 
Brigadier-General  Egerton  of  the  Ferozepore  Brigade 
was  sent  up  to  take  command  of  the  centre. 

The  position  here  was  saved  by  the  coolness  and 
grasp  of  Lt-Colonel  Southey  of  the  129th  Baluchis, 
who  sent  14  companies  to  entrench  themselves  on 
the  road  from  Festubert  to  Ligny-le-Petit  and  to 
hold  some  houses  near  there.  This  refusal  by 
Colonel  Southey  of  his  right  flank,  and  the  determina- 
tion with  which  the  position  was  held  by  his  detach- 
ment, prevented  the  enemy  from  extending  his 
operations  to  the  left. 

Before  evacuating  their  trenches,  the  68th  had 
gone  through  a trying  time.  Lieutenant  Reilly  had 
been  killed  in  a gallant  and  successful  attempt  to 


HEAVY  LOSSES  OF  THE  58th  RIFLES  119 


carry  bombs  and  ammunition  up  to  the  firing  line. 
Havildar  Hawinda  immediately  took  out  a party 
under  very  heavy  fire  and  brought  his  body  in, 
having  airead}^  rescued  a mortally  wounded  havildar. 
For  these  brave  acts  he  was  promoted  to  Jemadar 
and  received  the  Military  Cross. 

Captain  Baldwin  found  a ditch  which  enfiladed 
the  enemy’s  approach,  in  which  he  held  on  with 
great  determination,  but  he  was  killed  later  in  a 
counter-attack.  The  command  of  the  company  was 
then  taken  by  Havildar  Indar  Singh,  who  held  the 
position  against  heavy  attacks  until  relieved  next 
morning,  for  which  he  also  was  promoted  to  Jemadar 
and  received  the  Military  Cross. 

Captain  Willis,  D.S.O.,  was  wounded  in  the  head 
bv  a bomb  at  noon,  but  continued  to  command  his 
men,  and  was  finally  ordered  out  of  action  after 
taking  part  in  the  counter-attack  in  the  afternoon. 

Captain  Lind’s  company  was  heavily  bombed  and 
enfiladed  by  a machine  gun,  with  the  result  that  it 
lost  nearly  75  per  cent,  of  its  strength,  including  its 
gallant  commander. 

Captain  Bull  had  been  sent  up  to  relieve  tlie 
wounded  Captain  Willis,  who,  however,  declined  to 
be  relieved.  Captain  Bull  then  got  into  a ditch  with 
a few  men  of  the  58th  and  Black  Watch,  and  there 
they  held  out  with  grim  determination,  stopping  the 
German  advance  with  then  fire,  although  they  were 
heavily  bombed  from  a distance  of  fifteen  yards. 
The  enemy  was  dominated  at  this  point ; the 
bombing  stopped  and  the  position  was  secured. 

There  is  little  doubt  that  Colonel  Southey’s 
action  on  the  left  and  Captain  Bull’s  on  the  right 
saved  the  situation  for  us,  for  had  they  been  less 


120 


THE  AC!TTON  OF  FESTUBERT 


determined  in  holding  their  ground  at  all  costs,  the 
whole  of  this  section  of  our  line  must  have  fallen 
into  the  hands  of  the  enemy. 

The  position  at  1.30  p.m.  was  by  no  means 
satisfactory  : on  the  extreme  right  the  Black  Watch, 
under  Major  Harvey,  had  succeeded  in  keeping  their 
line  intact,  but  the  whole  line  of  the  58th  had  been 
evacuated,  except  the  small  portion  where  Captain 
Bull  and  his  devoted  little  party  of  Black  Watch  and 
58th  still  held  out.  The  entire  front  of  the  34th 
Pioneers  and  9th  Bhopals  was  in  tlie  hands  of  the 
enemy,  as  was  that  of  the  company  of  tiie  Connaughts, 
wlio  were,  liowever,  still  liolding  out  behind  tlieir 
barricade.  (3n  tire  left,  the  57th  Rides  and  129th 
Baluchis,  under  Colonel  Southey,  had  not  budged. 

At  this  juncture  uncompromising  orders  were 
received  from  Sir  James  Willcocks  that  theoriginal  line 
must  be  restored  before  dawn  and  held  at  all  costs. 

General  Egerton  had  come  to  the  conclusion 
that  a ]rreliminary  artillery  preparation  was  necessary 
to  the  success  of  a counter-attack,  and  arrangements 
were  made  for  all  our  available  guns  to  shell  the 
trenches  taken  by  the  enemy,  prior  to  the  counter- 
attack at  4.30  p.m.  On  the  right,  three  companies 
of  the  2/8th  Gurkhas,  under  Major  Cassels,  were 
ordered  to  assault  the  trenches  formerly  occupied 
by  the  Bhopals.  At  the  same  time,  the  detachment 
of  34th  Pioneers  and  6th  Jats  in  support  under 
Colonel  Roche  were  to  move  forward,  and  carrying 
with  them  the  troops  under  Major  Dundas,  which 
were  immediately  in  front  of  them,  to  reoccupy  the 
original  34th  Pioneer  trenches,  in  co-operation  with 
3 companies  2/8th  Gurkhas  and  supported  by  the 
Connaughts. 


2/8Tn  GURKHAS  RETAKE  TRENCHES  121 

The  support  trenches  vacated  by  Colonel  Roche 
were  to  be  occupied  by  the  107th  Pioneers.  At  the 
same  time  the  58th  were  to  recapture  their  own 
trenches. 

The  artillery  opened  fire  at  the  appointed  time 
and  got  the  range  at  once,  a large  number  of  dead 
and  wounded  being  found  when  the  attack  was 
pushed  home,  while  the  trenches  themselves  were 
much  battered.  At  4.30  p.m.  the  infantry  attack 
was  launched  and  at  &st  made  good  progress  on 
the  right.  By  8.30  p.m.  Major  Cassels  was  able 
to  report  that  the  2/8tli  Gurkhas  had  reoccupied  the 
right  trenches,  that  the  58tli  Rifles  had  also  got 
into  theh  old  position,  while  some  of  the  Bhopals 
had  captured  part  of  the  original  line,  taldng  some 
prisoners,  including  an  officer. 

The  movements  of  our  men  were  greatly 
hampered  by  the  snow-covered  ground,  which  showed 
them  up  distinctly  and  made  them  an  easy  mark, 
with  the  result  that  tlie  casualties,  in  face  of  heavy 
rifle  and  machine-gun  fire,  were  severe,  especially  in 
the  case  of  officers. 

Much  of  the  success  of  the  2/8th  Gurkhas  was 
due  to  the  determined  and  skilful  leading  of  Captain 
Buckland,  who  headed  a party  of  his  regiment  which 
bombed  and  bayoneted  the  enemy  out  of  traverse 
after  traverse  until  the  whole  of  the  right  trenches 
had  been  retaken. 

The  business  of  clearing  a position  at  night  is 
a most  eerie  one  under  the  best  of  cncumstances, 
but  in  this  case  it  was  rendered  doubly  difficult 
because  the  2/8th  had  been  split  into  two  parts, 
tlnee  companies  being  on  the  right  under  Major 
Cassels  and  three  on  the  left.  The  result  was  that 


122 


THE  ACTION  OF  FESTUBERT 


as  both  parties  were  working  inwards  towards  each 
other,  neither  knew  whether  the}^  would  meet  friend 
or  foe  round  the  next  traverse. 

The  difficulty  was  solved  by  the  use  of  the 
Gurkha  language.  As  Captain  Buckland  at  the 
head  of  his  party  crept  up  to  a traverse,  bombs  and 
bayonets  ready  for  whatever  might  be  round  the 
corner,  one  of  his  men  whispered  “ Koho  ? ” 
(“  Who  ? ”).  If  there  was  an  answering  grunt  of 
“ Mon  ” (“  Me  ”),  all  was  well : if  not,  the  party  at 
once  rushed  round  the  corner,  hurling  bombs  and 
stabbing  with  the  ba^/onet  anyone  they  met.  In 
this  way  Captain  Buckland  cleared  a long  stretch 
of  trench  in  the  inky  darkness,  being  wounded  in 
the  process,  and  for  his  gallantry  in  this  as  well  as 
other  actions  received  the  D.S.O. 

Havildar  tiari  Parshad  Thapa,  2/8th  Gurkhas, 
greatly  distinguished  himself  by  heading  a party 
which,  advancing  in  single  file,  rushed  traverse 
after  traverse  and  killed  a number  of  Germans. 
'J’he  Havildar,  who  was  severely  wounded  during 
the  fight,  was  awarded  the  2nd  Class,  Indian  Order 
of  Merit,  for  his  gallant  conduct. 

Lieutenant  Macpherson  having  been  severely 
wounded.  Major  Cassels  was  left  without  another 
British  officer,  but  on  being  joined  by  some  of  the 
6th  Jats,  went  on  gradually  working  towards  the 
left  of  the  line. 

The  Jats,  too,  had  suffered  severely.  Captain 
Dudley  was  killed  by  a sniper  at  about  ten  yards’ 
distance,  when  standing  by  the  side  of  Colonel  Roche. 
Major  Dundas  and  Captain  Moore  were  severely 
wounded.  Lieutenant  Cockburn,  since  killed  in 
Mesopotamia,  showed  great  gallantry  in  leading  his 


58tii  rifles  reoccupy  TRENCHES  123 


men  to  the  assault,  and  afterwards  in  heading 
bombing  parties  of  Gurkhas,  with  whom  he  drove 
the  Germans  from  traverse  to  traverse,  capturing 
some  prisoners  in  doing  so.  For  his  bravery  he 
received  the  Military  Cross. 

The  6th  Jats  lost  between  150  and  200  men,  and 
by  this  time  were  reduced  to  a total  of  300.  At  one 
point,  where  a very  heavy  machme-gun  fire  was 
making  the  men  hesitate  to  advance,  two  men  of 
the  6th  Jats  earned  the  Indian  Distinguished  Service 
Medal  by  rushing  on  and  carr3u'ng  the  company 
forward. 

Major  Cassels,  who  had  by  this  time  been  wounded, 
continued  to  work  towards  the  left  with  his  own 
Gurkhas  and  a collection  of  men  of  other  units,  until 
he  was  held  up  by  bombs,  to  which  he  had  no  means 
of  reply.  The  107th  were  then  ordered  to  hold  on 
to  the  Ime  and  to  try  to  get  into  touch  with  the  58th 
on  their  right.  At  the  same  time,  the  l/39thGarhT 
walis,  under  Lt-Colonel  Swinejy  were  sent  in  to  attack 
the  left  flank  of  the  centre  section  in  order  to  worlc 
inwards  towards  the  right. 

It  is  now  necessary  to  leave  this  part  of  the  line 
for  a time,  and  to  turn  to  the  doings  of  the  5Sth 
further  to  the  right. 

Major  Davidson-Houston,  Commanding  the  58th, 
himself  led  the  assault,  which  was  carried  through 
without  a check  and  without  firing.  Thanks  to  the 
close  and  accurate  support  of  our  artillery,  the  58th 
trenches  were  reoccupied  with  verj^  slight  casualties. 
Sergeant-Major  Kennedy  and  fifty  men  of  the  Black 
Watch  were  with  the  58tii,  and  were  among  the  first 
to  reach  the  trench. 

An  incident  occurred  here  which  showed  once 


124 


THE  ACTION  OF  FESTUBEHT 


again  tlie  spirit  of  comradeship  pervading  all  ranks, 
British  and  Indian.  Just  as  the  58th  were  about  to 
make  the  final  rush  into  the  trench,  there  was  a 
slight  momentary  hesitation.  Four  men  of  the 
Black  Watch,  Privates  Venters,  Boyd,  McIntosh, 
and  Stewart,  dashed  in  front  of  the  Dogra  Company 
and  headed  the  charge  by  the  side  of  Major  Davidson- 
Houston,  thus  helping  him  to  take  the  company  on  ; 
and  the  trench  was  carried  at  once.  Major  Houston 
then  put  the  foim  men  into  a sap  which  had  been 
cnt  right  into  our  old  line,  where  they  held  out 
against  heavy  bombing  until  relieved.  Fie  testi- 
lied  that  tlieir  sangfroid  and  clieeriness  made  a most 
marked  impression  on  the  men  of  the  58th.  For 
their  gallant  bearing  on  this  occasion  they  received 
the  Distinguished  Conduct  Medal. 

'[.’lie  losses  of  the  58th  during  the  action  were  : — 
Killed : Captain  Baldwin,  Lieutenants  Gaisford  and 
Reilly,  Jemadar  Wazh*  Singh  and  42  otlier  ranks. 
W'onnded : ( 'aptains  Lind  and  Willis,  Subadar 

Gnjar  Singh  and  61  otlier  ranks,  while  11  men  were 
missing. 

Major  Davidson-Houston  received  the  D.S.O.  in 
recognition  of  Ids  determined  leadership. 

Leaving  the  58th  firmly  re-established  in  their 
old  trenches,  we  must  retrace  our  steps  to  follow 
the  fortunes  of  the  1 /39th  Garhwalis  under  Lt- 
Colonel  Swiney,  who  had  been  ordered  to  attack  the 
left  of  the  centre  section. 

The  origmal  idea  was  to  make  a frontal  attack  on 
a length  of  300  yards  of  the  trench.  Colonel  Swiney 
saw  that  there  were  serious  objections  to  such  an 
attempt.  The  ground  in  front  was  flat  and  coverless. 
The  battalion  was  recpiired  to  advance  over  a distance 


ATTxiCK  OF  THE  1/39th  GAHHWALIS  125 


of  600  yards,  during  which  time  every  inovenient 
oil  the  snow-covered  ground  would  have  been 
clearly  visible  to  a distance  of  at  least  300  j^ards. 
It  was  ascertamed,  too,  that  the  Germans  were  in 
force  in  the  trench  with  several  machine  guns. 
Colonel  Swiney  represented  these  facts,  and  after 
discussion.  General  Egerton  directed  him  to  attack 
at  once,  using  his  own  discretion  as  to  his  method. 

At  this  moment  a very  valuable  suggestion  was 
made  by  Lieutenant  Robson,  R.E.,  who  will  be 
remembered  as  having  been  the  first  to  use  a trench 
mortar  on  our  side.  He  suggested  that  in  place  of 
any  frontal  attack,  an  attempt  should  be  made  to 
enter  the  German  trench  from  a flank,  bomb  the 
occupants  out,  and  follow  up  with  the  bayonet.  It 
is  said  that,  in  order  to  prove  the  feasibility  of  his 
plan.  Lieutenant  Robson  proceeded  to  worm  his 
way  alone  over  to  the  German  trench,  wLence  he 
safely  returned  after  bombing  a machine  gun.  The 
story,  which  is  not  without  support,  is  very  probable, 
for  this  officer  was  entirely  without  fear. 

Colonel  Swiney  decided  to  follow'  this  procedure, 
which  has  since  been  adopted  by  us  with  the  greatest 
success,  and  has  undoubtedly  prevented  much  of 
the  loss  of  life  attendant  on  frontal  attacks. 

The  left  flank  of  the  German  trench  was  selected 
for  the  operation,  and  Major  Wardell  led  with  his 
company  from  the  point  where  the  trench  of  the 
57th  Rifles  commenced.  The  attack  was  preceded 
b}^  a bombing  party,  headed  by  Lieutenant  Robson 
and  Captain  Ac  worth  of  the  55  th  Rifles,  who  was 
attached  to  the  57th.  With  them  were  eight  Afridis 
of  the  57th. 

Moving  forward  along  the  trench,  the  little  party 


126 


THE  ACTION  OF  FESTUBERT 


first  hurled  bombs  into  a house  on  the  left  flank,  which 
was  occupied  by  German  snipers,  and  then  bombed 
the  Germans,  to  their  utter  dismay,  out  of  traverse 
after  traverse,  covering  the  ground  with  dead  and 
wounded.  Many  of  the  enemy  at  once  threw  up 
then’  hands  and  surrendered,  thirty  or  forty  being 
captured  in  this  way  in  the  first  two  traverses. 

Major  Warden  and  his  men  followed  up,  bayonet- 
ing all  who  resisted.  Captain  Lumb,  not  to  be  out- 
done, and  finding  himself  blocked  by  Major  Wardell’s 
men,  jumped  with  a section  and  a half  mto  the  trench 
ahead  of  Major  Wardell  and  proceeded  to  rush  the 
traverses,  bayoneting  many  of  the  enemy  and  taking 
some  prisoners.  In  this  work  Lance-Nailv  Sankaru 
Gusain  and  Rifleman  Kalamu  Bisht  showed  great 
courage,  and  earned  the  2nd  Class,  Indian  Order  of 
Merit. 

Affairs  then  began  to  look  a little  awkward,  as 
Major  Warden’s  party  had  been  much  weakened  by 
casualties  during  this  operation,  and  could  do  no 
more  than  hold  the  portion  of  trench  afleady  taken. 
A gap  was  thus  fast  arising  between  him  and  Captain 
Lumb.  Luckily,  at  this  moment.  Lieutenant  Welch- 
man brought  up  the  remainder  of  Captain  Lumb’s 
men,  and  together  they  pushed  on  along  the  trench. 

Conspicuous  among  them,  ever  in  the  van,  was 
Naik  Darwan  Sing  Negi.  This  non-commissioned 
officer,  from  the  beginning  to  the  end,  was  either  the 
first,  or  among  the  first,  to  push  round  each  successive 
traverse,  facing  a hail  of  bombs  and  grenades. 
Although  twice  wounded  in  the  head  and  once  in  the 
arm,  he  refused  to  give  in,  and  continued  fighting 
without  even  reporting  that  he  was  wounded.  When 
the  fight  was  over  and  the  company  fell  in,  his 


N.\ik  Darwax  vSixg  Nkgi,  V.C.,  isx  Ex  39X11  Gariiwai,  Rifres. 


126.] 


GALLANTRY  OF  LIEUT.  ROBSON,  R.E.  127 


company  commander  saw  that  he  was  streaming 
with  blood  from  head  to  foot.  For  this  most  con- 
spicuous bravery  Naik  Darwan  Sing  was  awarded 
the  Victoria  Cross,  being  the  second  Indian  soldier 
to  receive  this  honour. 

The  remainder  of  the  trench  having  being  taken, 
the  39th  joined  hands  with  the  107th  just  as  dawn 
was  breaking.  While  this  was  taking  place.  Captain 
Lane  brought  up  reinforcements  of  the  l/39th,  but 
while  occupying  the  left  of  the  recaptured  trench, 
he  came  under  a murderous  enfilade  fire  which 
knocked  over  a number  of  his  men.  Equal  to  the 
occasion,  as  the  British  officer  generally  is,  Captain 
Lane  improvised  a barricade  out  of  the  debris  lying 
round,  although  exposed  all  the  time  to  the  enemy’s 
fire,  and  held  it  until  relieved,  for  which  he  received 
the  Military  Cross. 

An  outstanding  figure  of  this  action  was  un- 
doubtedly Lieutenant  R.  G.  G.  Robson,  R.E.,  who 
not  only  suggested  the  plan  of  bombing  the  Gerjnans 
from  the  flank  instead  of  making  a costly  and 
doubtful  frontal  attack,  but  carried  it  out  himself 
with  the  greatest  gallantry,  ablj^  seconded  by  Captain 
Ac  worth  who  received  the  Military  Cross,  while  Lieu- 
tenant Robson  was  mentioned  m despatches.  Sad  to 
relate,  his  valiant  and  most  promising  career  was  cut 
short,  as  he  was  killed  exactly  one  month  later  while 
carrying  out  an  almost  equally  dangerous  enterprise. 

On  the  23rd  December,  our  trenches  near  Port 
Arthur,  already  deep  in  water,  became  flooded  to 
such  a degree  and  so  rapidly  as  to  threaten  to  be- 
come untenable.  Although  our  men  did  everything 
possible  with  the  primitive  appliances  then  avail- 
able, the  water  still  gained  on  them.  The  Officer 


128 


THE  ACTION  OF  FESTUBERT 


Coiiiiiiaiidiiig  on  tlie  spot  came  to  the  conclusion  that 
the  enemy  was  deliberately  pumping  water  out  of 
his  trenches,  which  were  here  quite  close,  into  ours. 

As  usual  in  moments  of  doubt  and  difficulty,  a 
Happer  officer  was  summoned  and  arrived  in  the 
person  of  Lieutenant  Robson,  who  agreed  with  the 
Commanding  Officer’s  opinion,  and  characteristically 
at  once  took  the  danger  on  himself.  Borrowing  a 
shovel,  he  crawled  out  towards  the  German  trench 
with  the  intention  of  listening  for  the  sounds  of 
pumping  and  endeavouring  to  find  the  channel 
through  which  the  water  flowed  towards  our  trenches. 

The  enem}^  was  keeping  up  a heavy  rifle  and 
machine-gun  fire,  and  a little  later  a non-commissioned 
officer  in  our  trench,  observing  a shovel  sticking  up 
in  the  ah,  and  being  aware  that  Lieutenant  Robson 
had  not  returned,  crept  out  to  reconnoitre.  Lying 
near  the  German  trench,  he  found  the  gallant  officer 
dead,  killed  apparently  by  machine-gun  fire.  kSuch 
was  the  end  of  as  brave  an  officer  as  ever  wore  His 
Majesty’s  uniform. 

Of  the  eight  men  of  the  57tli,  four  received  the 
2nd  Class,  Indian  Order  of  Merit,  and  four  the 
Indian  Distinguished  Service  Medal. 

For  his  determined  leadership.  Captain  Lumb  of 
the  Garhwalis  received  the  Military  Cross,  which  was 
also  awarded  to  Subadar  Dhan  Sing  Negi,  while 
Subadar  Jag  at  Sing  Rawat  received  the  Order  of 
British  India,  2nd  Class.  Seven  men  received  the 
Indian  Order  of  Merit,  2nd  Class,  and  five  men  the 
Indian  Distinguished  Service  Medal. 

Lt-Colonel  Swine3'’s  valuable  services  were  re- 
cognized bj*  the  grant  of  a brevet  Colonelcy.  It 
was  greatly  owing  to  this  officer’s  careful  preparation 


THE  1/39TIL  GAUHWAL18 


120 


and  ioresiglit,  and  to  the  skiKul  inannor  in  which 
the  attack  was  carried  out,  that  the  losses  of  the 
regiment  were  comparatively  small,  Avhile  the  results 
were  large. 

The  casualties  were  : — Major  Wardell  wounded 
and  missing ; Captain  Orton  severely  Avounded ; 
1 Garhwali  officer  and  17  men  killed  ; 2 GarhAvali 

officers  and  33  men  Avounded. 

The  l/39th  Garhwalis,  having  only  been  raised  in 
1887,  had  had  little  chance  until  this  war  of  showing 
their  mettle,  but  thej^  have  most  valiantly  proved 
theh  right  to  take  place  beside  the  best  regiments  in 
the  army.  It  is  notCAVorthy  that  the  Victoria  Cross 
has  been  Avon  by  men  of  both  the  l/39th  and  2/39th 
Garhwalis. 

The  losses  of  the  2/8th  Gurkhas  Averc: — Major 
Elliott  and  Lieutenant  Maepherson,  both  attached 
from  the  7th  Gurkhas,  killed  ; Major  Cassels,  2/8th 
Gurkhas,  and  Lieutenant  Peploe,  2/6th  Gurkhas, 
wounded  ; Lieutenant  MaxAvell,  missing  ; 1 Gurkha 
officer  killed,  2 missing,  the  casualties  in  the  ranks 
being  71. 

Shortly  after  the  l/39th  Avere  sent  up  to  attack  on 
the  left,  General  Egerton  decided  to  make  a further 
attempt  on  the  right  flank,  Avhere  the  107th  Pioneers 
had  previously  been  held  up  by  bombs. 

Accordmgly,  tvvo  companies  of  the  2nd  Leicesters 
under  Major  Gordon,  and  two  companies  of  the  107th 
Pioneers  got  into  position  at  about  4 a.m.  on  the 
24th,  by  moAmig  up  a communication  trench  to  Avithin 
about  seventy  yards  of  the  Germans.  B Company 
of  the  Leicesters  Avas  on  the  right  of  one  company 
of  the  107th  in  the  front  line.  On  the  advance 
commencing,  some  confusion  was  caused  b}^  the  left 

K 


130 


THE  ACTION  OF  FESTUBERT 


company  crowding  in  on  the  right.  Captain  Grant 
of  the  Leicesters  led  his  men  through  a heavy  machine- 
gun  and  rifle  Are  into  the  enemy’s  trench,  where 
he  and  Lieutenant  Seton-Browne  were  almost  im- 
mediately killed.  Sergeant  Foister  gained  the 
Distinguished  Conduct  Medal  by  a gallant  attempt 
to  rescue  the  last-named  officer. 

After  a short  rough-and-tumble  fight,  the  enemy 
bolted,  as  was  generally  the  case  even  then  when  they 
came  to  grips  with  our  men,  and  a number  of  them 
were  killed  in  their  flight. 

With  this  party  of  the  Leicesters  a few  men  of 
tlie  107th  had  entered  the  trench,  but  the  remainder 
of  the  company  had  suffered  severely  and  were  unable 
to  advance.  On  learning  the  situation.  General 
Egerton  ordered  a rethement,  which  was  effected 
at  about  6 a.m.,  the  last  wounded  being  removed  by 
7 a.m.  In  the  meantime,  as  before  mentioned,  the 
l/39th  Garhwalis  joined  hands  with  the  I07th. 

In  this  brief  but  sharp  fight  the  Leicesters  lost 
two  British  officers  and  3 men  killed,  14  wounded 
and  12  missing.  Major  Gordon  received  the  D.S.O. 
for  his  gallant  leading  ; Captain  Grant  and  Lieutenant 
Seton-Browne  were  mentioned  in  despatches  ; and 
Privates  Chatten,  Chamberlain,  and  Taylor  were 
awarded  the  Distinguished  Conduct  Medal. 

The  107th  lost  Major  Bruce  and  17  other  ranks 
killed  ; Captains  McLaughlin,  Davis,  Turnbull,  and 
Mangin,  Lieutenant  WaUis,  one  Indian  officer  and 
39  men  wounded. 

The  services  of  Subadar-Major  Labh  Singh, 
Subadar  Hashmat  Dad  Khan  and  Havildar  Bhagat 
Singh  were  recognized  by  the  award  of  the  Indian 
Distinguished  Service  Medal. 


BLACK  WATCH  HOLD  THEIR  GROUND  131 


Little  has  hitherto  been  said  of  the  work  done  by 
the  2nd  Black  Watch  under  Major  Harvey.  This 
magnificent  regiment  had,  however,  been  true  to 
its  traditions  and  had  not  given  one  inch  of 
gTound.  The  regiment  as  a whole  was  not  called  on 
to  attack  during  the  fight,  but  a party  of  50  men, 
under  Company  Sergeant-Major  Kennedy,  as  before 
mentioned,  materially  assisted  the  58th  Rifles  in 
regaining  their  trenches,  for  which  Sergeant-Major 
Kennedy,  Sergeant  Drummond  and  Private  Swan 
received  the  Distinguished  Conduct  Medal,  while  a 
few  of  the  men  were  with  Captain  Bull  m his  gallant 
defence  of  a portion  of  the  58th  trench. 

Major  Wauchope  of  the  Black  Watch,  as  always 
when  fighting  was  forward,  was  in  the  thick  of  it, 
and  assisted  the  final  attack  by  leading  a charge  of 
about  twenty  men  under  Lieutenant  McMicking 
against  the  nearest  German  saphead.  He  then  found 
that  a gap  of  about  300  yards  existed  between  the 
left  of  the  58th  Rifles  and  the  right  of  the  2/8  th 
Gurkhas.  Calmly  occupying  tiiis  gap  were  the  fom' 
men  of  the  Black  Watch  who  had  been  posted  there 
by  Major  Davidson-Houston.  Quite  undaunted  by 
the  showers  of  bombs  and  grenades  to  which  they 
were  being  treated  by  the  Germans,  they  were 
keeping  up  a steady  and  very  effective  foe.  They 
only  retired  when  Major  Wauchope  ordered  them  to 
do  so,  taking  with  them  one  of  their  number  who  had 
been  severely  wounded. 

Throughout  this  action,  our  artillery,  under 
Lt-Colonel  Duffus,  continued  to  render  most  active 
support  to  the  infantry  ; evidence  of  the  accuracy  of 
their  fire  was  everywhere  forthcoming  when  the 
trenches  were  retaken.  The  parapets  were  much 


J32 


THE  ACTION  OE  EESTUJ3EKT 


battered  and  the  German  losses  were  fairly  heavy, 
as  in  one  place  100  corpses  were  found,  and  over  100 
prisoners  were  taken,  including  3 officers,  as  well  as 
three  machine  guns  and  a trench  mortar. 

This,  the  most  important  battle  in  which  the 
Indian  Corps  as  a wliole  had  hitherto  been  engaged, 
ended  with  our  reoccupation  of  all  the  trenches 
seized  by  the  enemy.  The  chief  lesson  learnt  from 
the  action  was  the  vital  Jiecessity  for  Jiiore  guns, 
more  high  explosives,  more  macliine  guns,  more  bombs 
and  grenades. 

However  stul)bornly  our  juen  might  figlit,  it  was 
trjdng  them  very  severely  to  ex})ect  them  to  hold 
out,  without  the  means  of  replying,  against  an  enemy 
numerically  gjeatly  superior  and  provided  in  super- 
abundance witli  the  weapons  whicli  we  lacked.  How 
well  the  Corps  did  its  duty  under  such  unequal 
conditions  was  recognized  in  a message  received  from 
iSh  John  French,  in  which  lie  congratulated  the 
troo])S  on  the  counter-attack,  and  remarked  that  the 
units  engaged  had  done  splendidly. 

On  the  23rd  November,  a detacliment  of  Hie  34th 
Poona  Horse,  under  the  command  of  Captain 
Grimshaw,  took  over  a portion  of  the  trenches  of 
the  Ferozepore  Brigade. 

On  arrival,  at  4 a.m.,  it  was  found  that  the  enemy 
had  driven  a sap  right  up  to  the  parapet  which  had 
been  blown  in,  a breach  of  some  8 feet  in  breadth 
being  created,  which  exposed  our  trench  to  fire  from 
the  sap. 

As  soon  as  it  was  daylight.  Captain  Grimshaw 
inspected  the  breach,  which  had  been  guarded  by 
a party  under  Lieutenant  F.  A.  He  Pass,  and  called 
for  a volunteer  to  reconnoitre  along  the  sa^i  towards 


i' 


J 

1 


i' 


■ t' 


[Rugby  Memorials. 

Lieut  F.  A.  De  Pass,  V.C.,  34TH  Poona  Horse. 


133.] 


LIEUTENANT  DE  PASS  GAINS  THE  V.G.  13P. 


t]ie  German  line.  Sowar  Abdulla  Khan  at  once 
came  forward  and  proceeded  to  crawl  out. 

On  his  return,  he  reported  that  the  enemy  had 
erected  a sand-bag  traverse  at  a distance  of  about 
ten  yards  from  our  trench  at  the  first  bend  in  the 
sap.  The  traverse  was  loopholed  and  a German 
was  on  guard,  a fact  which  Abdulla  Khan  ascertained 
by  bemg  fired  at  and  missed. 

At  8 a.m.,  the  enemy  began  to  throw  bombs  into 
our  trench  from  their  side  of  the  traverse.  This 
went  on  all  day  and  caused  several  casualties. 

Early  in  the  morning  of  the  24th,  Lieutenant  De 
Pass  determined  at  all  costs  to  put  an  end  to  this 
state  of  affaus,  and,  accompanied  by  Sowars  Fateh 
Khan  and  Fuman  Shah,  he  entered  the  sap  and 
crawled  along  it  until  he  reached  the  enemy’s  traverse. 
With  the  utmost  coolness,  he  proceeded  to  place  a 
charge  of  guncotton  in  the  loophole  and  fired  it, 
with  the  result  that  the  traverse  was  completely 
demolished,  and  the  bend  of  the  sap  was  rounded 
off  to  such  an  extent  as  to  expose  some  thirty  yards 
to  our  fire.  While  this  was  going  on,  the  enemy 
tluew  a bomb  at  our  little  party,  but  by  good  luck 
it  exploded  behind  Lieutenant  De  Pass  and  did  no 
damage,  the  trio  returning  to  our  trench  in  safety. 

AU  bombing  on  the  part  of  the  enemy  was  put 
a stop  to  during  the  remainder  of  the  24th,  and  there 
was  only  one  casualty,  compared  with  six  on  the 
previous  day  and  nine  on  the  25th,  by  which  time, 
under  cover  of  darkness,  the  Germans  had  managed 
to  replace  their  traverse. 

On  the  24th,  Lieutenant  De  Pass  visited  tlie 
neighbouring  trench  which  was  occupied  by  the  7th 
Dragoon  Guards.  On  his  way  he  observed  a sepo}’ 


134 


THE  ACTION  OF  FESTUBERT 


of  the  58tli  B/ifles  lying  wounded  outside  our  trench. 
Accompanied  by  Private  C.  Cook  of  the  7th,  he  at 
once  went  out  in  broad  da3dight  and  brought  the 
sepoy  in,  although  exposed  to  the  enemy’s  fire  for 
a distance  of  about  200  yards.  De  Pass  then  again 
volunteered  to  enter  the  enemy’s  sap  and  attempt 
to  blow  up  the  traverse,  but  as  this  meant  almost 
certain  death,  permission  was  refused. 

On  the  26th,  the  enemy’s  bombing  increased  in 
violence,  and  De  Pass  went  to  the  saphead  to 
superintend  the  repau*  of  our  parapet  Avhich  had 
again  been  seriously  damaged.  Observing  a sniper 
at  work  behind  the  traverse,  he  tried  to  shoot  him, 
but  was  himself  shot  through  the  head  and  killed. 

Many  brave  deeds  have  been  performed  during 
this  war,  but  there  are  few  instances  of  gallantry 
more  conspicuous  than  that  displayed  by  this  heroic 
\mung  soldier.  He  was  the  very  perfect  type  of 
the  British  officer.  He  united  to  singular  personal 
beauty  a charm  of  manner  and  a degree  of  valour 
which  made  him  the  idol  of  his  men.  He  was 
honoured  in  death  bj^  the  Victoria  Cross.  No  one 
in  the  war  earned  it  better. 

Sowars  Abdulla  Khan,  Fateh  Khan,  and  Fumian 
Shah,  who  so  gallantly  seconded  their  officer,  received 
the  Indian  Distinguished  Service  Medal,  while  Private 
Cook  was  awarded  the  Distinguished  Conduct  Medal. 

By  the  24th  November  the  Lahore  Division  had 
completed  its  relief  of  the  Meerut  Division,  and  Lt- 
General  Watkis  took  over  command  of  the  line. 

On  the  26th,  the  two  first  anti-aircraft  guns 
joined  the  Corps.  About  this  time  the  weather  was 
warmer,  but  the  sky  very  cloudy,  rendering  air 
reconnaissance  impossible. 


RAID  BY  THE  MANCHESTERS 


135 


On  the  night  of  the  27th-28th  November,  a party 
of  twenty  men  of  the  Manchesters,  under  2nd 
Lieutenant  Connell,  with  Lieutenant  Buller,  R.E., 
rushed  two  German  saps  about  40  yards  from  our 
trench.  The  enemy  were  completely  taken  by 
surprise,  and  were  still  working  when  our  men  got 
in.  A hand-to-hand  fight  took  place,  in  which  about 
ten  of  the  enemy  were  killed.  After  the  saps  had 
been  searched  and  one  partly  filled  in,  the  party 
retned.  In  doing  so,  they  were  caught  by  machine- 
gun  fire,  Lieutenant  Connell  and  2 men  being  killed  ; 
6 men  were  wounded,  and  2 were  missing.  Lieu- 
tenant Buller  got  back  safely,  but  at  once  went  out 
again  to  bring  in  a wounded  man,  and  was  himself 
wounded.  For  his  gallantry  he  received  the  Military 
Cross,  while  Lieutenant  Connell  was  mentioned  in 
despatches. 

The  remainder  of  the  month  passed  in  a manner 
which  is  known  as  “ quietly.”  The  usual  bombing 
went  on  wherever  the  trenches  were  close  enough  to 
each  other,  while  art  intervals  the  artillerv  on  each 
side  woke  into  spasmodic  activity. 

On  the  30th  November,  a party  of  the  Poona 
Horse  was  bombed  out,  the  enemy  having  pushed 
a saphead  right  into  the  trench  in  front  of  Le  Plantin. 
Sergeant  Coldwell  and  four  men  of  the  Connaughts 
rushed  into  the  gap,  ch’ove  the  Germans  out  and 
built  a “ block.”  For  his  courageous  conduct  Ser- 
geant Coldwell  received  the  Distinguished  Conduct 
Medal. 

This  non-commissioned  officer  is  described  by  an 
officer  of  the  regiment  as  “ the  bravest  of  the  brave.” 
He  subsequently  distinguished  himself  at  the  second 
battle  of  Ypres,  when  all  his  company  officers  were 


136 


THE  AdTION  OE  EERTUBERT 


hit,  and  he  received  the  4th  Class  of  the  Russian 
Cross  of  St.  George.  Unfortunately,  he  was  killed 
on  the  14th  October,  1915,  when  reconstructing  in 
front  of  our  line  a listening  post  which  had  been 
blown  in  by  an  8-inch  shell. 

The  57th  Rifles  and  129th  Baluchis  suffered  a 
great  loss  on  the  23rd  November  by  the  death  of 
their  Medical  Officers,  Captain  Indrajit  Singh  and 
Major  Atal. 

The  combined  dressing  stations  had  been 
established  at  about  1500  yards  behind  the  fire 
trench.  In  the  afternoon  the  enemy  put  several 
large  shells  into  the  house,  which  was  entirely 
demolished.  Working  parties  made  desperate  efforts 
to  clear  away  the  ruins  and  get  out  those  who  had 
been  buried  ; but  apparently  a spy  was  concealed 
somewhere  near,  for  as  soon  as  the  men  approached 
the  ruins,  heavy  shell  fhe  was  opened  on  them,  and 
the  place  was  speedily  in  a bla/e,  which  exploded 
c[uantities  of  ammunition.  Major  AtaFs  bod}^  was 
eventually  recovered,  but  Captain  Singh’s  remains 
were  not  found  till  a day  later.  Both  tliese  officers 
had  greatly  distinguished  themselves  by  their 
gallantr}^  in  attending  wounded  under  fire,  and  their 
loss  was  deeply  felt  by  their  regiments.  In  a gazette 
published  after  his  death.  Captain  Indrajit  Singh  was 
awarded  the  Military  Cross. 


CHAPTER  X 


VISIT  OF  HIS  MAJESTY  THE  KING-EMPEROR 

Visit  of  His  Majesty  to  tlie  Indian  Corps — Delight  of  the  troops — Casualties 
to  date— Arrival  of  the  Sirhind  Brigade  from  Egypt — Catapults  for 
grenades  and  searchlights  improvised  by  Sappers — Good  work  of 
Sappers  appreciated  by  Sh-  John  French — Weather  prevents  aerial 
reconnaissance — Conditions  in  trenches  very  bad — Jullundur  Brigade 
relieve  the  French  at  Givenchy — Comparison  of  British  and  F’rench 
trenches. 

On  the  1st  December,  1914,  the  Corps  had  the  honour 
of  receiving  the  King-Emperor.  The  event  was  a 
most  memorable  one,  for  this  was  the  first  occasion 
on  which  a British  Sovereign  had  appeared  in  the 
field  with  his  troops  since  George  II  headed  his 
forces  at  the  battle  of  Dettingen. 

The  secret  of  His  Majesty’s  visit  had  been  well 
kept,  and  was  only  known  to  the  troops  at  a late 
hour  on  the  previous  night,  when  officers  and  men 
detailed  from  the  various  units  were  warned  to  be  in 
readiness  to  parade  next  morning  for  inspection  b}’ 
His  Majesty.  The  troops  were  drawn  up,  lining 
both  sides  of  the  road,  when  the  King-Emperor 
arrived,  accompanied  by  the  Corps  Commander, 
Lt-General  Sir  James  Willcocks.  H.R.H.  the  Prince 
of  Wales  was  also  present. 

After  the  Staff  had  been  presented,  His  Majesty 
waffied  down  the  lines  to  inspect  the  men.  T’he 
morning  was  dull  and  the  recent  heavy  rains  had 
converted  the  roads  into  a perfect  quagmire.  Just 


138  VISIT  OF  THE  KING-EMPEROR 


before  the  King  arrived,  a German  aeroplane 
appeared,  making  straight  for  the  place  of  parade. 
Our  guns  at  once  opened  fire  on  it,  and  after  one  or 
two  ineffectual  attempts  to  approach,  it  was  driven 
off  to  the  north  and  was  seen  no  more. 

His  Majesty  paused  at  frequent  intervals  to 
converse  with  the  officers  and  men,  and  made  most 
searching  inquhies  after  then?  welfare.  The  King 
was  particularly  struck  with  the  appearance  of  the 
men  of  the  2nd  Leicesters,  who  had  come  straight 
out  of  the  trenches  and  were  caked  with  mud  from 
liead  to  foot. 

The  troops  were  delighted  at  the  sight  of  their 
Kmg.  To  many  of  the  Indians  it  recalled  the  last 
occasion  on  which  thej^  had  seen  His  Majesty,  which 
was  during  the  visit  to  India  in  1911.  Every  man 
to  whom  the  King  spoke  was  a hero  in  the  billets 
at  night,  and  the  Royal  words  were  retailed  and 
pondered  over  for  long  afterwards.  The  Oriental 
is  particularly  susceptible  to  the  personal  influence 
of  his  Sovereign,  and  His  Majesty’s  graciousness  and 
keen  solicitude  for  the  well-being  of  his  soldiers  were 
intensely  aijpreciated  by  them. 

After  the  departime  of  the  King,  General  Willcocks 
translated  His  Majesty’s  message  to  the  troops,  in 
which  he  told  them  that  he  was  extremely  pleased 
with  ali  that  he  had  seen  and  heard,  that  they  were 
always  m his  thoughts  and  those  of  the  Queen,  and 
that  he  intended  to  visit  them  again.  The  visit 
was  charming  in  its  simplicit}^  and  the  strong 
impression  left  by  it  of  His  Majesty’s  personal 
anxiety  for  the  weHare  of  his  troops  greatly 
heartened  the  men  for  the  hard  task  which  lay  before 
them. 


THE  SAPPERS  AND  MINERS 


139 


Up  to  and  including  the  1st  December,  1914,  the 
casualties  of  the  Corps  were  : — 


Killed. 

Wounded. 

Missing. 

British  officers 

. 61 

100 

26 

Indian  officers 

. 27 

58 

10 

Others,  British  . 

. 151 

609 

90 

Others,  Indian  . 

. 546 

3148 

1041 

Total 

. 785 

3915 

1167 

On  the  3rd-4th  December,  the  Lahore  Division 
was  reinforced  by  the  Meerut  Division,  and  each 
was  allotted  hah  of  the  defensive  line,  one  Brigade 
being  kept  as  Corps  reserve. 

On  the  7th  December,  the  Sirhind  Brigade,  under 
Major-General  Bruiiker,  arrived  from  Eg37Dt,  the 
Lahore  Division  being  thus  completed. 

About  this  time  the  Sappers  and  Miners  were 
very  busy  improvising  catapults  for  bomb  throwing. 
With  their  usual  skill  and  ingenuit}-,  they  evolved 
a weapon  which  could  throw  with  fah  accuracy  a 
light  grenade  to  a maximum  distance  of  300  j^ards, 
the  range  varymg  accordmg  to  the  number  of  strands 
of  elastic  used.  At  the  same  time,  the  Sappers 
contrived  a form  of  searchlight  for  use  in  the  trenches. 
Motor  headlights  fitted  with  electric  bulbs  were 
employed,  the  power  being  supplied  from  certain 
available  sources. 

Both  of  these  temporary  contrivances  were  found 
to  be  of  the  greatest  value  in  subsequent  operations. 
In  these  directions,  as  in  so  manv  others,  the  Scientific 
Corps  has  rendered  most  important  aid  to  the 
men  in  the  trenches,  and,  as  it  alwaj^s  does,  has 
fought  both  with  valour  and  with  brains.  In  his 
despatch,  dated  20th  November,  1914,  Sir  John 
French  records  the  following  appreciation  of  the 


140  VISIT  or  THE  KING-El\rPEROR 


(■orps:— “The  Corps  of  Indian  Sappers  and  Miners 
liave  long  enjoyed  a high  reputation  for  skill  and 
resource.  Without  going  into  detail,  I can 
confidently  assert  that  throughout  their  work  in  this 
campaign  they  have  fully  justified  that  reputation.” 

'riie  weather  during  this  period  was  extremeW 
trying  ; heavy  cold  rain  falling  almost  daily  made 
life  in  the  trenches  well-nigh  unbearable.  There  were 
many  cloudy  days  accompanied  by  thick  mists, 
which  rendered  aerial  reconnaissance  impossible. 

During  the  llth-12th  December,  the  Jullnndur 
Brigade  under  General  C^arnegy  relieved  the  French 
in  then’  trenches  at  Givenchy  and  at  Guinchy  across 
the  La  Bassee  Canal,  embracing  the  Bethune — 
La  Bassee  road. 

It  was  observed  that  the  French  fire  trenches 
were,  as  a rule,  not  so  deep  as  ours.  This  was  due 
partly  to  the  fact  that  then  men  are  generally  shorter 
than  ours,  and  that  they  use  few  loopholes,  firing 
mostly  over  the  parapet  The  French  communication 
and  support  trenches  were  considered  to  be  superior 
to  ours,  which  was  probably  due  to  the  fact  that  they 
employed  more  men  per  yard  of  front,  and  were 
thus  able  to  do  more  work  in  the  trenches.  In 
Givenchy,  the  French  had  practically  double  as  many 
men  as  we  had. 


CHAPTER  XI 

THE  BATTLE  OF  GIVENCHY  : THE  MEERUT  DIVISION 


All  attack  decided  on — Raid  by  129tli  Baluchis  on  Cierman  trenches — ■ 
Saps  taken,  but  evacuated — Casualties — Position  of  the  Indian  Corps 
— Orders  for  attack — Assault  by  2nd  Leicesters  and  3rd  Gurkhas — 
Enemy’s  trench  taken — German  attack  on  the  “ Orchard  ” — 2nd 
Gurkhas  bombed  out — Take  up  line  in  rear — Leicesters  withdrawn 
from  eaptm’ed  trench — Casualties. 

'J'owARDS  the  middle  of  December,  the  moment 
appeared  to  General  Head  Quarters  to  be  favoural)le 
for  an  attack  by  the  Indian  Corps,  amongst  other 
units. 

A succession  of  orders  was  issued.  On  the  14th 
December,  the  Indian  Corps  was  ordered  to  carry 
out  “ other  local  operations  with  a view  to  containing 
the  enemy  now  in  then’  front,”  in  order  to  assist 
General  iSmith-Dorrien,  who  was  then  attacking  near 
Messines. 

On  the  J bth  December,  therefore,  the  Ferozepore 
Brigade  under  Brigadier-General  Egerton  delivered 
an  attack,  in  which  the  129th  Baluchis  behaved  with 
great  gallantry.  The  Brigade  consisted  of  the  1st 
Connaughts,  57th  Rifles,  and  129th  Baluchis,  the 
142nd  French  Territorial  Battalion  being  attached 
for  the  time  being. 

The  general  idea  was  to  attack  two  German  saps 
opposite  the  trenches  of  the  15th  Sikhs,  which  lay 
slightly  to  the  west  of  Givenchy,  and,  after  carrying 
the  saps,  to  seize  as  much  of  the  enemy’s  main 


142 


THE  BATTLE  OF  GIVENCHY 


trench  as  possible.  At  5.20  a.m.  the  129th  moved 
off,  followed  by  the  57th,  and  took  up  position  ready 
to  assault  at  8.30  a.m.  The  Connaughts  remained 
in  support  with  the  French  battalion  in  reserve. 
On  the  signal  being  given.  Major  Potter  dashed  with 
his  company  of  the  129th  across  the  twenty-five 
yards  of  open  ground  which  separated  our  trench 
from  the  enemy’s  left  saphead,  while  a second 
company  attacked  the  right  sap,  which  was  about 
fifty  yards  distant. 

The  assault  was  carried  out  with  great  elan  in 
the  face  of  heavy  fire,  and  was  pushed  home  up  both 
saps  to  within  a few  yards  of  the  enemy’s  main 
trench.  In  a few  moments  nothing  was  to  be  seen 
from  our  trench  except  some  fifteen  of  our  men,  who 
were  lying  dead  or  wounded  round  the  saphead. 
A few  of  the  less  severely  wounded  tried  to  dive  into 
the  sap  or  run  back  towards  our  trench,  but  the 
fire  was  §o  heavy  that  none  got  through.  In  face 
of  the  storm  of  bullets,  it  was  impossible  to  reinforce 
until  a communication  trench  could  be  cut  to  join 
our  trench  with  the  sapheads. 

At  this  moment  it  appeared  that  the  right  attack 
had  failed.  Under  the  chcumstances,  it  seemed 
useless  for  Major  Potter  to  attempt  to  go  on  ; but 
the  difficulty  was  to  communicate  with  him. 
Eventually,  it  was  solved  by  tying  a message  to  a 
light  weight  and  throwing  it  into  Major  Potter’s 
sap.  An  horn?  later  it  tmmed  out  that,  so  far  from 
the  right  attack  having  failed,  two  platoons  had 
taken  the  sap  and  had  almost  reached  the  main 
trench. 

To  bring  up  supports  under  such  heavy  and 
concentrated  fire  was  out  of  the  question,  and  it 


THE  129th  BALUCHIS  143 

was  evident  that  the  communication  trench  could 
not  be  made  before  dark. 

Matters  grew  worse  and  worse,  and  the  men  were 
gradually  being  bombed  back  into  the  sapheads. 
Major  Potter  was  holding  his  own  with  his  usual 
bravery,  but  Lieutenant  Browning  and  the  Indian 
officers  of  the  party  in  the  right  sap  were  all  wounded. 
The  men  had  to  give  way  until  the  remnant  was 
collected  in  the  saphead,  where,  in  spite  of  aU  the 
efforts  of  the  enemy,  it  held  on  till  dark. 

Under  the  orders  of  Lt-Colonel  Hill,  the  working 
parties  of  the  15th  Sikhs,  ten  in  each  party,  had 
followed  up  the  129th,  and  had  at  once  commenced 
to  dig  a trench  back  from  the  saphead  to  the  Sikh 
trench.  It  was  necessary  to  keep  Colonel  HiU 
informed  of  events,  and  Havildar  Mastan  Singh  of 
the  15th  Sikhs  made  two  perilous  journeys  under  a 
torrent  of  lead  between  the  sap  and  our  trench. 
He  tried  to  get  across  a thud  time,  but  was  shot 
dead. 

Lieutenant  Barstow,  Adjutant  of  the  15th, 
happening  to  look  through  a loophole  when  there 
was  a sudden  burst  of  firing,  spotted  a German 
peering  over  a small  parapet  which  commanded  the 
sap,  and  firing  into  it.  He  seized  the  nearest  rifle 
and  shot  ten  Germans  m quick  succession.  This 
stopped  the  firing  into  the  sap,  but  the  enemy  now 
began  throwing  bombs  into  it.  The  sap  was  by 
this  time  crowded,  but  by  the  greatest  good  luck  the 
fuzes  of  the  bombs  were  too  long,  and  om’  men  were 
able  to  pick  them  up  and  tlnow  them  back. 

In  the  meantime,  parties  of  the  34th  Pioneers 
and  of  the  21st  Company  Sappers  and  Miners  under 
Captain  Batty e,  R.E.,  uere  hard  at  work  digging 


144 


THE  BATTLE  OF  GIVENCHY 


the  coniiiiimicatioii  trenches  towards  the  sajdieads, 
of  which  the  left  trench  was  finished  by  evening  The 
right  coinnmnication  trench  was  a more  difficult 
matter,  as  it  was  longer,  and,  being  open  to  a 
cross-fire  from  both  flanks,  a parapet  had  to  be 
tfirown  up  on  each  side,  which  made  progress  very 
slow. 

By  dusk,  only  some  12  yards  remained  to  be  dug, 
but  tlie  party  in  the  saphead  Avas  hi  extremis,  having 
been  out  all  day  without  a British  officer,  and  heavily 
l)oml)ed  witliout  the  means  to  reply.  They  were 
unable  to  hold  out  any  longer,  and  tried  to  get  back 
across  the  open  after  dark  ; but  every  one  of  them 
was  either  killed  or  wmunded  in  the  attempt.  The 
enemy  then  reoccupied  the  sa]A  and  fired  down  the 
shallow  communication  trench,  rendering  further 
work  impossible.  A barricade  was  hastily  built, 
and  o])erations  ceased  for  the  time  being  as  regards 
the  right  sap. 

Major  Potter  held  on  with  dogged  pluck  in  the 
left  sap  until  the  communication  trench  got  through 
to  him  at  about  6 p.m.,  when  he  managed  to  with- 
di  aw  his  men  to  the  Sikh  trench.  The  129th  behaved 
throughout  this  Amry  trying  affah  vAuth  the  greatest 
gallantry,  but  their  losses  Avere  heavy.  Captain 
Ussher,  Subadar  Adam  Khan,  and  53  men  were 
killed ; Captam  C.  A.  G.  Money,  Lieutenant  G. 
BroAvning,  Jemadars  Nawab  Khan  and  Imamdar, 
and  67  men  Avere  Avounded. 

The  splendid  leading  of  Major  Potter  was  very 
conspicuous  throughout.  During  the  whole  day, 
Avhen  heavily  bombed  and  cut  off  from  all  assistance, 
he  Avas  perfeetK  cool  and  self-possessed.  It  was 
greatly  due  to  his  gallant  examx)le  and  bearing  that 


ORDERS  EOR  ATTACK 


145 


the  sap  was  held  for  so  long.  It  is  sad  to  record 
that  this  brave  officer  was  missing  during  the  opera- 
tions of  the  20th  December,  and  it  is  now  certain  that 
he  was  killed. 

On  the  17th  December,  the  Corps  was  directed, 
in  conjunction  with  the  2nd,  3rd,  and  4th  Corps, 

“ to  attack  all  along  the  front  on  the  18th  December.” 
This  was  followed  by  a further  order  which  was 
received  after  10  p.m.  on  the  17th.  To  assist  the 
French  in  then*  operations  near  Arras,  the  3rd,  4th, 
and  Indian  Corps  “ will  demonstrate  and  seize  any 
favourable  opportunity  which  may  offer  to  capture 
an^'  enemy  trenches  in  their  front.”  'fhese  last 
two  orders  were  conflicting,  and  the  first  was  also 
vague. 

A demonstration  is  a totally  different  matter  to 
an  attack  all  along  the  line  ; the  one  is  incompatible 
with  the  other.  But  even  after  this  rapid  succession 
of  orders,  a modification  was  issued,  according  to 
which  the  Indian  Corps  was  “ to  demonstrate  along 
the  whole  front,  and  to  seize  ever}?^  favourable 
opportunity  which  ma}"  offer  to  capture  any  of  the 
enemy’s  trenches.” 

This  final  order  was  received  at  5.30  p.m.  on 
the  18th  December,  and  is  open  to  the  criticism 
that  it  was  somewhat  vague,  in  the  absence  of  any 
indication  that  Sir  James  Willcocks  considered  the 
moment  to  be  favourable  for  an  attack. 

Sir  John  French,  in  his  despatch  of  the  2nd 
Februar}^  1915,  remarks  : — 

“ In  his  desire  to  act  with  energy  up  to  his 
instructions  to  demonstrate  and  occupy  the  enemy, 
the  General  Officer  Commanding  the  Indian  Corps 
decided  to  take  advantage  of  what  appeared  to  him 

L 


140 


THE  BATTLE  OF  GIVENCHY 


a favourable  opportunity  to  launch  attacks  against 
the  advanced  trenches  in  his  front  on  the  18th  and 
19th  Deceniber.” 

Unless  some  explanation  were  offered,  the  in- 
ference might  be  drawn  from  this  passage  that 
Sir  James  Willcocks’  judgment  was  at  fault  in  con- 
sidering the  opportunity  to  be  favourable. 

To  remove  this  impression,  it  is  perhaps  sufficient 
to  mention,  that  so  far  from  considering  the 
opportunity  to  be  favourable  for  an  attack  by  the 
Indian  Corps,  General  Willcocks  had  a short  time 
]3reviousty  reported  that,  owing  to  tlie  strain  of  the 
preceding  seven  weeks  of  incessant  trench  warfare, 
practically  without  any  relief,  the  Corps  was  urgently 
in  need  of  rest,  and  had  recpiested  that  it  might  be 
relieved.  With  this  view^  Sir  John  French  fully  agreed, 
but'  owing  to  the  exigencies  of  the  moment,  in  place 
of  rest  the  Corps  was  directed  to  extend  its  already 
thinly  held  line  and  to  take  in  the  village  of  Givenchy, 
that  hotbed  of  trouble. 

From  this  it  is  evident  that  Sir  James  Willcocks 
did  not  consider  the  moment  to  be  favourable  for 
an  attack  by  the  Indian  Corps,  which,  as  he  had 
reported,  was  not  in  a condition  to  take  the 
offensive. 

However,  it  was  of  course  necessary  to  obey 
orders,  and  the  operations  of  which  the  story  is  now 
to  be  given  were  the  result. 

That  Sir  John  French  approved  of  the  work 
performed  on  the  18th  is  shown  by  the  orders 
received  at  7 p.m.  on  the  19th  December  : — 

“ The  operations  undertaken  yesterday  were 
attended  in  several  cases  with  marked  success. 
Although  the  ground  gained  has  not  in  all  cases  been 


POSITION  OF  THE  INDIAN  CORPS  147 


maintained,  the  balance  of  advantage  rests  with  us 
and  promises  well  for  further  progress. 

“ The  2nd,  3rd,  4th,  and  Indian  Corps  should 
continue  until  further  orders  to  prosecute  similar 
enterprises  under  Corps  arrangements,  taking  every 
possible  measure  to  consolidate  and  extend  all 
successes  achieved.” 

Moreover,  at  midday  on  the  1 8th  December,  an 
order  was  received  from  Sir  John  French  to  this 
effect — “ The  efforts  of  the  3rd,  4th,  and  Indian  Corps 
should  be  concentrated  only  on  such  objectives  as 
are  reasonably  favourable.” 

It  was  subsequent  to  this  order  that  Sir  John 
French,  by  his  approval  of  Sir  James  Willcocks’ 
action,  stam^Ded  it  as  reasonable. 

At  this  juncture  the  Indian  Corps  was  disposed 
as  follows : — 

The  Meerut  Division,  under  Lt-General  C.  A. 
Anderson,  held  the  left  half  of  the  defensive  line, 
the  Garhwal  Brigade  occupying  the  section  from  the 
cross-roads  south  of  Neuve  Chapelle  to  the  cross- 
roads on  the  Rue  du  Bois. 

Thence  the  Dehra  Dun  Brigade  continued  through 
the  “ Orchard,”  north-east  of  the  cross-roads  at  La 
Quinque  Rue,  to  the  cross-roads  half  a mile  south, 
near  which  point,  on  the  extreme  right  of  the  Brigade, 
was  the  “ Picquet  House,”  held  bj^  the  1st  Seaforths. 

Hence  the  Lahore  Division,  under  Lt-General 
H.  B.  Watkis,  continued  the  line  with  the  newly 
arrived  Sirhind  Brigade,  running,  with  an  indentation 
on  the  west,  more  or  less  parallel  to  the  Festuberfc 
road,  to  near  the  north-east  exit  of  the  village  of 
Givenchy. 

The  left  of  the  Ferozepore  Brigade  lay  just  cast 


148 


THE  BATTLE  OF  GIVENCHY 


of  the  eastern  extremity  of  Givenchy,  and  continned 
south  to  the  La  Bassee  Canal.  Further  south, 
across  tlie  Canal  and  slightly  to  the  front  of  Givenchy, 
were  tlie  1st  Connaughts.  The  point  of  junction  be- 
tween the  Lahore  Division  and  the  French  was  on 
tlie  Bethune — La  Bassee  road. 

On  the  left,  it  was  intended  that  the  Meerut 
Division  should  take  surprise  the  portion  of  the 
German  line  opposite  the  left  of  the  Dehra  Dun 
Brigade,  i.e.  near  the  “ Orchard,”  during  the  night 
of  the  18th-19th,  and  consolidate  the  captured 
position.  This  attack  was  to  be  carried  out  by  one 
and  a half  battalions  of  the  Garhwal  Brigade,  which 
joined  with  the  loft  of  the  Dehra  Dun  Brigade, 
and  was  to  be  supported  by  artillery  fire,  by  activity 
in  other  parts  of  the  Divisional  line,  and  further,  by 
an  attack  in  the  neighbourliood  of  the  “ Orchard  ” 
by  the  Dehra  Dun  Brigade,  in  the  event  of  the  effort 
of  the  Garhwal  Brigade  being  successful. 

On  the  right,  the  Lahore  Division  was  to  attack 
the  enemy’s  trenches  opposite  the  point  of  junction 
of  the  Sirhind  and  Ferozepore  Brigades,  on  a front  of 
300  yards.  This  attack  was  to  be  undertaken  by  one 
battalion  from  each  Brigade,  supported  by  Sappers 
and  Pioneers  to  consolidate  the  ground  gained. 

The  assault  was  to  be  preceded  by  a short  but 
heavy  artillery  preparation,  the  47th  Sikhs  from  the 
Corps  reserve  being  attached  to  the  Lahore  Division, 
with  a view  to  following  up  any  success  which  might 
result. 

To  simplify  the  account  of  the  operations,  it  is 
as  well  to  divide  the  action  into  three  phases. 

1.  Operations  under  the  orders  of  Sir  James 
Willcocks. 


ATTACK  -BY  2nd  LEICESTER^ 


149 


2.  The  enemy’s  counter-attack. 

3.  Operations  of  the  1st  Division,  1st  Corps, 
under  Sir  Douglas  Haig. 

The  orders  were  clear  enough  as  regards  the 
first  phase,  but  the  action  which  followed  as  a 
result  of  the  German  counter-attack  was  both 
obscure  and  complicated. 

The  night  of  the  18th-19th  December  was 
stormy,  with  a high  cold  wind,  and  rain  which  chilled 
the  men  to  the  bone,  so  the  order  to  move  silently 
out  in  front  of  our  trenches  was  a welcome  break 
in  the  dreariness  of  waiting  under  such  conditions. 

At  3.15  a.m.  on  the  19th  December,  the  2nd 
Leicesters,  under  Lt-Colonel  Blackader,  crept  out 
with  scarcely  a sound  until  they  had  cleared  the  front 
of  our  trenches,  and  at  3.30  a.m.  advanced  with  two 
companies  in  the  front  line  and  two  in  support,  each 
accompanied  by  a bombing  part}^  The  left  company 
under  Captain  Romilly  had  barely  advanced  twenty 
yards  when  a machine  gun  opened  on  them  from 
the  right,  but  tliej^  pressed  on,  men  beginning  to 
fall,  until  a few  yards  further  on  they  were  stopped 
by  a hedge  with  a ditch  m front  of  it  protected  by 
barbed  wire.  This  held  them  up  for  a few  minutes, 
but  they  eventually  got  through,  only  to  find  them- 
selves harassed  by  a second  machine  gun. 

With  the  dash  which  has  distinguished  this 
splendid  regiment  throughout  the  campaign,  they 
rushed  the  trench  with  the  machine  guns  playing  on 
them.  The  guns  were  captured,  but  the  enemy 
had  fled  while  our  men  were  climbing  over  the  para- 
pet. Captain  Romilly  came  to  the  conclusion  that 
there  must  be  another  trench  close  in  rear,  and  got 
his  men  out  for  a second  advance.  Machine  guns 


150 


THE  BATTLE  OF  GIVENCHY 


immediately  opened  on  liini  from  both  flanks.  He 
at  once  charged,  but  arrived  in  the  ditch  from  which 
the  left  gun  had  been  firing  only  to  find  it  gone. 

The  company  then  reformed  to  attack  the  other 
gun,  but  at  this  moment  our  artillery  began  firing, 
and  tiieir  shells  were  bursting  over  the  Leicesters  in 
the  German  trench.  Thinking  he  had  got  too  far  on, 
Captain  Romilly  retired  to  the  first  trench,  where  he 
found  the  supporting  company.  As  dawn  was 
breaking,  the  trench  was  consolidated,  and  Captain 
Romilly  held  on  where  he  was. 

In  the  meantime,  two  double  eompanies  of  the 
2/3rd  Gurkhas,  under  Major  Young,  with  Major  W. 
L.  Dundas,  had  been  Avorking  in  support  of  the 
Leicesters.  The  party  under  Major  Dundas  followed 
up  the  rear  company  of  the  Leicesters  until  a gap 
occurred  on  the  right,  which  the  Gurkhas,  rushing 
across  the  open  ground,  quickly  filled  up.  Having 
joined  hands  with  the  party  of  Leicesters  which  had 
become  detached.  Major  Dundas  tried  to  extend 
along  the  trench  to  his  left,  to  link  up  with  the  rest 
of  the  Leicesters,  but  found  that  this  section  of  the 
trench  was  still  held  by  the  Germans,  whom  he  at 
once  attacked,  driving  them  with  some  loss  out  of 
the  nearest  portion.  He  then  tried  to  get  along  the 
German  communication  trench,  but  found  that  it 
had  not  been  completed.  Not  to  be  denied,  he  tried 
again  to  advance  along  the  main  trench,  but  was  at 
once  met  by  enfilade  fire,  at  a range  of  about  ninety 
yards,  which  caused  heavy  casualties,  Major  Dundas 
himself  being  slightly  wounded.  Lie  quickly  im- 
proved a traverse  into  a barricade  with  sandbags, 
and  thus  to  a certain  extent  kept  off  the  enfilading 
fii-e.  The  bombing  party  Avas  sent  for  to  clear  the 


THE  LEICESTERS  HOLD  ON 


151 


enemy  out,  but  was  found  to  have  "one  on  with 
another  detachment. 

As  soon  as  it  was  light  enough  Colonel  Blackader 
took  stock  of  the  position. 

The  compaii}^  of  the  107th  Pioneers  set  to  work 
to  convert  the  communication  into  a fire  trench  with 
traverses.  The  captured  trench  on  the  right  was 
found  to  be  commanded  and  enfiladed  by  the  enemy’s 
main  trench.  Being  narrow  and  without  traverses, 
it  was  very  difficult  to  work  in  it. 

Shortly  afterwards,  the  enemy  began  to  bomb 
this  trench,  and,  pushing  up  a machine  gun,  blew  the 
barricade  down.  Om'  small  party  was  steadily 
pushed  back  until  it  only  held  some  thhty  yards  of 
the  trench.  At  this  point  Captain  Bamberger,  R.E., 
was  killed  while  dhecting  with  the  utmost  coolness 
the  building  of  a new  barricade.  Two  machine  guns 
now  opened  in  front  to  enfilade  the  communication 
trench,  and  the  parapet  had  to  be  rebuilt  again  and 
again.  As  fast  as  it  was  put  up,  the  stream  of  bullets 
brought  it  down. 

It  now  became  evident  to  Major  Dundas  that 
he  could  not  push  on  further  to  his  left,  and  at 
that  moment  the  platoons  of  the  Leicesters  who  were 
with  him  received  orders  to  rejoin  their  company. 
This  so  weakened  his  small  party  that  he  was  forced 
to  retire,  taking  with  him  his  casualties,  which 
amounted  to  26  out  of  the  55  men  engaged. 

The  remainder  of  the  Leicesters,  although  heavily 
bombed  and  suffering  under  enfilade  fire,  clung 
throughout  the  day  to  the  three  hundred  yards  of 
trench  which  they  had  captured. 

The  enemy,  having  failed  to  turn  our  men  out  by 
fair  means,  attempted  one  of  the  many  ruses  peculiar 


152 


n-lE  r3A1'TLE  OF  OIVENCHY 


to  the  children  of  “ Kultur.”  A party  of  Germans 
advanced  up  a communication  trench  with  their 
hands  up  in  token  of  surrender.  As  they  got  nearer, 
we  discovered  that  behind  them  were  machine  guns 
ready  to  hre  on  aii}^  of  our  men  who  might  show 
themselves.  This  enterprising  party  met  with  a 
suitable  reception. 

At  about  10  a.m.  aviators  and  artillerv  observers 
reported  tliat  the  enemy  was  massing  in  considerable 
strength  to  the  south  of  the  “ Orchard  ” and  east 
of  La  Quincpie  Rue,  evidently  with  the  intention  of 
making  a formidable  counter-attack.  The  41st 
Dogras  were  at  once  ordered  up  from  the  Divisional 
reserve  to  support  the  line  near  the  captmred 
trench. 

It  soon  became  clear  that  unless  pressure  was 
brought  to  boar  upon  the  enemy,  the  Leicesters  would 
1)0  unable  to  hold  out  in  the  trench  which  they  had 
taken  so  gallantly.  An  attack  by  the  Dohra  Dun 
Brigade  was  accordingly  ordered  to  take  place  from 
the  front  held  by  the  6th  Jats  and  2/2nd  Gurkhas, 
'riie  enemy,  however,  anticipated  this  move,  and  from 
sliortl}^  after  noon  the  “ Orchard  ” was  subjected 
to  very  heavy  trench-mortar  bombing. 

The  first  intimation  of  the  enemy’s  intentions 
was  received  when  two  monstrous  bombs  dropped 
in  the  “ Orchard,”  and  the  shattered  bodies  of 
several  Gurkhas  were  hurled  high  into  the  air  amidst 
the  debris  of  the  parapet.  These  were  closely 
followed  by  about  twentj^  more  bombs.  A number 
of  the  Gurkhas  were  killed  and  wounded,  and  the 
eastern  face  of  the  “ Orchard  ” position  was 
completely  obliterated,  the  south  face  also  being 
badly  knocked  about.  The  Gurkhas  were  very 


THE  “ORCHAKD”  EVACUATED  153 


severely  lianclled,  and,  in  view  of  the  evident  strength 
of  the  German  counter-attack,  it  became  necessary 
to  retne  to  a new  line  slightly  in  rear  of  the 
“ Orchard.” 

This  unfortunately  rendered  it  imperative  to 
abandon  the  proposed  attack  and  to  withdraw  the 
Leicesters  from  their  exposed  position.  The  retire- 
ment was  successfullv  carried  out  after  dark  with- 
out  a single  casualty,  but  the  evacuation  of  the 
“ Orchard  ” caused  a dent  in  the  front  of  the  Dehra 
Dun  Brigade  which  could  not  be  filled  uj)  during 
the  current  oj)erations. 

The  enemy,  unaware  that  the  trench  had  been 
evacuated  by  the  Leicesters,  wasted  much  good 
ammunition  on  it  in  a bombardment  which  lasted 
throughout  the  next  day. 

The  right  of  the  6th  Jats,  who  wore  on  the  left  of 
the  Gurkhas,  was  now  completely  in  the  air,  but 
the  riglit  company  of  the  Jats,  under  Captain  Ross, 
at  once  set  to  work,  and  under  a heavv  fire  succeeded 
in  eonsolidating  a new  right  flank,  and  effectually 
barred  the  German  advance,  if  any  such  movement 
was  really  intended  at  the  time,  which  seems  doubtf  ul. 
The  arrival  of  the  l/9th  Gurkhas,  under  Lt-Colonel 
G.  Widdicombe,  shortly  afterwards  rendered  the 
position  reasonably  secure. 

So  ended  the  fii’st  phase  of  the  attack  by  the 
Meerut  Division,  a marked  feature  of  which  was  the 
gallantry  of  the  detachment  of  the  2nd  Leicesters, 
a quality  of  which  this  splendid  regiment  has  through- 
out shown  itseff  to  be  possessed  in  the  highest 
degree.  The  2/3rd  Gurkhas  also  distinguished  them- 
selves by  the  tenacity  with  which  they  held  on  to 
the  section  of  trench  which  was  captured. 


154  THE  BATTLE  OF  GIVENCHY 


The  Corps  Commander  showed  his  appreciation 
of  the  work  done  by  the  following  message  to  the 
Division  : — 

“ I congratulate  you  on  the  good  work  done  last 
night,  which  shows  what  can  be  done  by  enterprise 
and  care.  Please  send  my  hearty  congratulations  to 
Major-General  Keary,  the  Leicesters,  and  the  2/3rd 
Gurkhas,  for  their  gallant  behaviour.” 

The  casualties  were  comparatively  small,  owing 
to  the  skill  with  which  the  operation  was  planned 
and  carried  out. 

Killed  : Captain  Bamberger,  R.E. 

2nd  Leicesters; — Wounded:  Major  Knatchbull, 
D.S.O.,  Lieutenant  J.  E.  Harris,  and  44  men. 
Missing  : Lieutenant  H.  A.  Tooley  and  6 men. 

2/3rd  Gurkhas — Wounded:  Major  Dundas  and 
16  men.  Missing  ; 10  men. 


CHAPTER  Xn 

THE  BATTLE  OF  GIVENCHY;  THE  LAHORE  DIVISION 

Attack  by  Highland  Light  Lifantry  and  4th  Gurkhas — Simultaneous 
attack  by  59th  Rifles — Enemy’s  trench  taken — Captain  Cramer- 
Roberts,  4th  Gurkhas — Gallantry  of  Sappers  and  Miners  and  34th 
Pioneers — Retirement  of  Highland  Light  Infantry  and  Gui'khas — 
Difficulties  of  59th  Rifles  over  unknown  ground  at  night — Trench 
taken  and  held — Net  result  of  attack — Casualties— Mmor  attack 
b}'  1st  Giu'khas — German  attack  on  20th  December — Highland  Light 
Infantry  and  4th  Gurkhas — Rifles  jamming  as  usual — Our  trenches 
evacuated — Casualties. 

We  must  now  turn  to  the  operations  of  the  Lahore 
Division,  under  Lt-General  Watkis. 

The  objective  was  the  main  line  of  German 
trenches  in  front  and  to  the  north-east  of  Givenchy. 
The  left  section  of  the  attack  was  entrusted  to  two 
companies  each  of  the  1st  Battalion  Highland 
Infantry  and  1st  Battalion  4th  Gurkha  Rifles,  both 
belonging  to  the  Sirhind  Brigade  lately  arrived  from 
Egypt.  The  whole  operation  was  under  the 
command  of  Lt-Colonel  R.  W.  H.  Ronaldson, 
Highland  Light  Infantry. 

The  right  section  of  the  attack  was  to  be  delivered 
by  the  59th  Scinde  Rifles  of  the  Jullundur  Brigade, 
specially  lent  for  the  purpose,  simultaneously  with 
the  left. 

The  left  section  was  divided  into  four  lines — 
the  first  under  Major  B.  U.  Nicolay,  l/4th  Gurkhas, 
with  whom  was  Lieutenant  Anderson,  Highland 
Light  Infantry  ; the  second  under  Captain  Pringle, 
Highland  Light  Infantry.  Major  Brodhurst,  who 
was  seriously  ill,  but  with  characteristic  courage 
had  begged  to  be  allowed  to  join  in,  accompanied 


150 


THE  BATIHE  OF  GIVENCHY 


Captain  Pringle,  and  was  of  great  service.  The  third 
line  was  commanded  Captain  Cramer-Roberts, 
l/4th  Gurkhas,  with  Lieutenant  Kerr,  Highland 
Light  Infantry ; the  fourth  being  under  Captain 
G.  M.  Knight,  Highland  Light  Infantry. 

Captain  Inglis,  Adjutant  of  the  I/4th  Gurkhas, 
was  detailed  to  guide  the  attacking  force  to  its 
correct  position  during  the  night,  a difficult  duty 
which  he  performed  admirabty.  He  then  volunteered 
to  accompany  the  assault,  but  in  the  course  of  it  he 
was  unfortunately  killed. 

At  5.30  a.m.,  the  18th  Brigade  Royal  Field 
Artillery  and  one  section  57th  Howitzer  Battery 
0])ened  a rapid  and  most  accurate  fire  for  the  brief 
space  of  four  minutes,  during  which  time,  in  pouring 
rain  and  inky  darkness,  the  first  line  went  over  the 
})arapet.  As  soon  as  the  hre  ceased,  they  rushed 
over  the  o))cn,  a distance  of  about  180  yards,  followed 
shortly  afterwards  by  the  second  line.  The  advance 
was  at  first  completely  successful,  the  casualties  in 
the  rush  being  small,  but  later  events  tended  to 
show  that  the  enemy  had  been  put  thoroughly  on 
the  alert  by  the  earlier  attack  of  the  Meerut  Division 
and  the  subsequent  bombardment. 

Owing  to  the  German  system  of  holding  the  front 
trenches  lightly,  the  enemy’s  losses  here  were  small. 
About  80  prisoners  were  taken,  and  some  dead  and 
wounded  were  found  in  the  trench  ; others  were 
discovered  in  the  open,  evidently  caught  by  our 
shrapnel. 

Lieutenant  Anderson  at  once  pushed  on  with  the 
utmost  dash  and  spirit,  and  took  the  eneimT^’s  reserve 
trench.  He  was  then  heard,  Rupert-like,  to  shout 
that  he  was  going  on  to  take  the  village  of  Chapelle 


POSITION  CONSOLIDATED  ir,7 

St  Roch,  but  this  dashing  young  otticer  and  his 
party  were  never  heard  of  again,  and  were  doubtless 
cut  down  by  the  Germans. 

» Any  fm’ther  advance  was  stopped  by  heavy 
fighting  on  the  right  of  the  59th,  who  were  meeting 
with  the  difficulties  inseparable  from  night  operations 
over  totally  unknown  ground. 

Major  Nicolay  at  once  set  about  consolidating 
the  position.  As  tlie  light  improved,  it  was  found 
to  consist  of  about  200  yards  of  trench,  in  which  was 


approximate 
SCALE  UP  YARDS 
lUO 


^ wi'llOws 

I- 


o 

VIllAbL 


included  a sap  running  out  from  the  centre  towards 
the  British  line.  (See  Map.)  The  trench  Avas  narrow 
and  had  very  few  traverses. 

By  this  time  the  third  line,  under  Captain  Cramer- 
Roberts,  had  arrived  on  the  scene.  Shortly  after- 
wards Lieutenant  Kerr  and  most  of  his  platoon 
were  killed  by  machine-gun  fire.  The  trench  was 
already  crammed  with  the  1st  and  2nd  lines,  and 
there  was  no  room  for  the  3rd  line,  which  had  to  lie 
down  in  the  mud  in  rear  of  the  trench,  where  thev 
were  not  only  useless,  but  exposed  to  fire  wliicli  soon 


158 


THE  BATTLE  OF  GIVENCHY 


began  to  cause  casualties.  They  were  therefore  sent 
back,  Captain  Cranier-Roberts  remaining  with  Major 
Nicolay. 

In  the  meantime  our  Sappers  and  Miners  were 
hard  at  work,  under  Captain  Hunt,  34th  Pioneers, 
at  the  dangerous  task  of  trying  to  connect  the 
saphead  by  a shallow  communication  trench  with 
our  original  line  ; but  the  enemy’s  foe  swept  them 
awav,  and  all  were  killed.  Needless  to  remark, 
with  then*  usual  bravery,  the  Sappers  renewed  the 
attempt  aga-iii  and  again. 

The  German  fire  now  became  heavy  and  general 
from  both  flanks  and  front,  and  when  daylight  broke 
fully.  Colonel  Ronaldson  was  in  great  uncertainty 
as  to  the  real  situation,  since  it  was  found  impossible 
to  connect  the  German  sap  with  our  line  of  entrench- 
ment. His  only  information  from  the  front  consisted 
of  a report,  brought  back  at  great  risk  by  Major 
Brodhurst,  to  the  effect  that  the  front  trench  was 
over-crowded.  About  9 a.m.  Major  Nicolay  received 
a report  which  led  him  to  believe  that  his  men  were 
suffering  from  the  fire  of  our  own  main  trenches. 
Communication  had  not  been  established,  and  the 
fire  was  so  heavy  that  it  seemed  impossible  to  send 
a message  through. 

At  about  10  a.m.  Captain  Inglis  was  killed.  An 
eye-witness  gives  a stirring  picture  of  this  gallant 
officer,  who  met  his  death  through  his  keenness  in 
volunteering  to  accompany  the  attack.  Captain 
Inglis  had  seized  hold  of  a German  rifle  and  bayonet, 
and  was  firing  away  in  the  full  joy  of  battle,  when  he 
fell,  shot  through  the  head.  At  first  it  was  feared 
that  he  had  been  shot  by  accident  from  the  rear,  but 
this  idea  was  afterwards  disproved. 


GERMAN  TRICKERY 


159 


Captain  Cramer-Roberts  set  to  work  to  explore 
the  sap  running  towards  our  main  trench,  and 
found  that  the  Germans  were  working  in  towards 
it.  Our  men  were  being  driven  in  by  bombing 
from  both  flanks  and  the  sap  was  becoming  over- 
crowded. 

The  truth  of  the  position,  as  later  discovered, 
was  that  on  the  right  of  the  trench  taken  by  us,  and 
running  at  right  angles  towards  our  main  trench, 
there  was  a bank.  From  behind  this  the  Germans 
were  throwing  bombs  from  a trench  which  had  been 
overlooked  in  the  darkness  of  the  advance,  and  were 
taking  our  men  in  rear  with  rifle  fire.  It  was  from 
this  dhection  that  Captain  Inglis  was  shot,  and  there 
is  no  doubt  that  the  bullet  came  from  a German 
rifle.  Captain  Inglis  is  described  by  Major  Nicolay 
as  a very  gallant  officer,  whose  assistance  and  example 
had  been  invaluable. 

At  this  moment  the  enemy  tried  another  dis- 
creditable trick.  A party  of  Germans  carrying  a 
dirty-looking  flag  appeared  in  front  of  the  High- 
land Light  Infantry  section  on  the  left,  from 
which  firing  had  practically  ceased,  partly  owing  to 
the  number  of  casualties  and  partly  because  the 
majority  of  the  rifles  had  become  clogged  with  mud. 
Rapid  fire  was  opened  from  the  other  sections  of 
the  trench,  which  was  the  signal  for  the  enemy  to 
put  on  Balaclava  caps  evidently  taken  from  our 
dead ; by  this  means  apparently  they  hoped  to 
deceive  us  into  believing  that  they  were  British. 
Fire  was  continued,  and  some  of  the  enemv  were 
knocked  over.  The  remainder  disappeared  after 
capturing  the  few  men  of  the  Highland  Light  Infantry 
who  were  still  alive  in  that  section. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  GTVENCITY 


IfiO 

It  was  now  evident  that  something  must  be 
done  to  re-establish  commnnieation  with  the  main 
trencli.  To  atte]npt  to  cross  the  bnllet-stricken, 
shell-tormented  interval  was  to  court  death,  bnt 
Captain  Cramer-Eobcrts,  knowing  the  vital  necessity, 
determined,  whatever  the  risk,  to  make  the  attempt. 
No  advantage  was  to  be  gained  by  waiting  for  a lull, 
for  tliere  were  no  hills. 

Nearly  two  hundi-ed  yards  of  open  ground  wliich 
was  swept  liy  liissing  bullets  and  churned  up  by 
heavy  liombs  had  to  be  crossed.  CYptain  Cramer- 
Boberts  started,  alternately  running  and  crawling, 
followed  by  an  Indian  oflicer  of  the  59th  Rifles. 
All  went  well  for  a short  time,  both  officers  seeming 
to  possess  charmed  lives,  bnt  when  nearly  halfway 
across,  the  1 ndian  officer,  of  whose  presence  Captain 
Roberts  was  unaware,  was  badly  hit  and  could  go 
no  further.  Captain  Roberts,  however,  got  on 
unharmed  until,  just  as  he  was  nearing  our  parapet 
and  a few  feet  more  would  have  put  him  in  safety, 
he  was  severely  wounded  in  three  places  by  machine- 
gun  lire,  and  was  hauled  into  the  trench,  more  dead 
than  alive,  by  the  Highland  Light  Infantry.  Before 
he  collapsed  he  was  able  to  give  Colonel  Ronaldson 
news  of  what  was  taking  place  in  front.  For  his 
great  devotion  and  gallantry  Captain  Cramer-Roberts 
received  the  D.S.O. 

Meanwhile  the  men  of  the  20th  Company  Sappers 
and  Miners  under  Major  Gardiner,  R.E.,  and  the 
34th  Pioneers  were  continuing  their  efforts  to 
connect  our  trench  with  the  saphead,  but  little 
progress  could  be  made,  owing  to  the  proximity 
of  the  enemy’s  fire  trench  and  the  want  of  sand- 
bags. 


MAJOR  NICOLA  FORCED  TO  RETIRE  161 


The  position  in  the  front  trench  was  rapidly 
becoming  critical.  As  the  day  wore  on,  Major 
Nicolay  discovered  that  the  enemy  had  a fire  position 
in  his  right  rear,  on  high  ground  in  front  of  Givencliy 
village,  from  which  his  position  w^as  enfiladed.  By 
the  early  afternoon  he  had  only  about  eighty  effectives 
left,  and  had  been  driven  by  rifle  fire  and  bombs  out 
of  the  trench  into  the  sa<p. 

By  a lucky  chance  at  this  moment,  having  long 
since  run  out  of  his  own,  he  found  three  German 
bombs.  He  explained  their  use  to  his  bombing 
party,  who  immediately  used  them  with  great 
effect,  stopping  the  enemy’s  boml^ing  entirely.  Had 
it  not  been  for  tliis  lucky  find.  Major  Nicolay  could 
not  have  held  on  much  longer. 

As  dusk  came  on,  finding  that  there  were  no 
signs  of  the  completion  of  the  connecting  trench, 
and  as  many  of  the  wounded  men  were  in  gveat  need 
of  treatment.  Major  Nicolay  was  forced  to  decide  on 
evacuating  the  position  which  he  had  held  so  long 
and  so  gallantly,  before  the  enemy,  under  cover  of 
darkness,  could  make  a determined  effort  to  capture 
his  party.  The  retirement  was  carried  out  with 
the  utmost  steadiness  between  4.30  and  5 p.m., 
the  unwounded  helping  the  wounded  across  the  open. 

Thus  ended  an  anxious  day,  during  which  all 
ranks  had  done  their  duty  nobty.  They  failed, 
but  they  failed  splendidly. 

The  casualties  were  heavy.  The  Highland  Light 
Infantry  lost  Lieutenant  Kerr  killed,  Captain  Pringle 
and  Lieutenant  Anderson  missing.  In  the  l/4th 
Gmkhas  Captain  Inglis  was  killed,  Captain  Cramer- 
Roberts  severely  wounded.  Owing  to  the  con- 
tinuous fighting  during  this  period,  it  was  impossible 

M 


162 


THE  BATTLE  OF  GIVENCHY 


to  ascertain  the  casualties  of  each  day  amongst  the 
rank  and  file. 

In  the  meantime  the  59th  Rifles  had  been  going 
tliroiigh  a very  trying  experience. 

The  original  intention  was  that  the  left  of  the 
Ferozepore  Brigade  should  co-operate  with  the 
right  of  Sirhind,  the  129th  Baluchis  being  detailed 
for  this  purpose,  as  the  position  to  be  assaulted  lay 
in  front  of  then  trench  and  they  knew  the  ground 
well,  having  attacked  over  it  so  recentty  as  the  16th 
December.  The  129th  had,  however,  on  that 
occasion  lost  heavily  and  were  not  in  a condition 
to  take  part  in  aii};^  immediate  attack. 

The  59th  Rifles  of  the  Jullundur  Brigade  were 
therefore  placed  at  the  disposal  of  Ferozepore. 
The  Battalion  suffered  under  the  very  serious 
handicap  of  having  had  no  opportunity  of  recon- 
noitring the  ground,  and  they  had  to  take  up  their 
position  for  attack  in  the  dark. 

The  59th  moved  up  into  the  trenches  of  the 
129th  Baluchis,  and  as  soon  as  our  four  minutes’ 
bombardment  ceased,  No.  1 Company  under  Captain 
J.  D.  Scale,  and  No.  4 under  Captain  B.  E.  Anderson, 
climbed  out  and  advanced.  One  platoon  of  No.  1 
Com|)any,  under  Jemadar  Mangal  Singh  of  the 
52nd  Sikhs,  was  ordered  to  take  the  German  sap  on 
the  right,  which  they  accomplished  with  a rush. 
They  continued  to  hold  this  sap  against  every 
effort  of  the  enemy,  for  18  hours,  until  the  Sappers 
and  Miners,  commg  to  the  rescue  as  usual,  managed 
to  dig  through,  and  thus  enabled  a party  of  the 
129th  Baluchis  to  relieve  them. 

Meanwhile  Jemadar  Mangal  Singh’s  party,  in 
spite  of  heavy  losses,  had  killed  a number  of  Germans 


ATTACK  BY  THE  59Tn  RIFLES  1G3 


and  captured  a wounded  officer.  For  his  gallantry 
the  Jemadar  received  the  Indian  Distinguished 
Service  Medal. 

The  confusion  in  the  pitch  darkness  was  inde- 
scribable. One  companjy  on  getting  out  of  our 
trench,  was  unable  to  find  the  sap  which  was  their 
objective.  Even  the  real  direction  of  the  German 
trenches  was  uncertain.  As  an  officer  tersely  put 
it,  “ they  advanced  towards  the  German  fire,”  which 
led  them  to  a trench  in  which  they  found  British 
soldiers,  Gurkhas  and  Germans  hopelessly  mixed  up. 

The  confusion  was  rendered  even  worse  by  the 
fact  that  the  German  regiments  in  front  of  the 
59th  had  very  similar  numbers,  and  when  officers 
of  the  59th  tried  to  collect  their  men,  Germans 
frequently  answered. 

Captain  Anderson’s  party  got  up  to  a trench, 
and  in  order  to  avoid  a possible  fight  with  our  own 
men,  he  asked  the  occupants  who  they  were.  They 
replied,  “ Highland  Light  Infantry  and  Gurkhas,” 
and  promptly  opened  fire.  Captain  Anderson  then 
saw  by  their  bayonets  that  they  were  Germans, 
so  he  and  his  men  went  at  them,  on  which  they  at 
once  ran,  and  Captain  Anderson  occupied  the  trench. 
A support  of  another  regiment  now  came  up,  and  with 
the  greatest  difficulty  they  were  persuaded  not  to 
attack  our  men  with  the  bayonet,  thinking  them 
to  be  the  enemj^ 

Germans  were  continually  being  pulled  out  of 
dug-outs  and  made  prisoners,  which  only  added  to 
the  confusion.  An  officer  relates  that  almost  every 
other  officer  who  met  him  put  a revolver  to  his 
head  and  threatened  to  blow  his  German  brains  out. 

Meanwhile  Lieutenant  W.  Bruce  with  a nlatoon 


104 


THE  BATTLE  OE  GIVENCHY 


liad  lost  dircctioii,  but  eventually  got  into  the 
German  trench  further  to  the  left.  He  was  the  first 
man  into  the  trench,  and  was  immediately  killed. 
Captain  Anderson  was  carrying  a rifle  and  was  hit 
by  a bullet  on  the  revolver  in  his  belt,  at  close 
range.  He  was  completely  knocked  out,  but  soon 
returned  to  the  fight.  Lieutenant  Atkinson  was 
killed  actually  lying  on  the  German  parapet  and 
firing  with  the  utmost  coolness  into  the  trench. 

A portion  of  the  two  companies  in  support  in 
our  main  trench  now  pushed  up  into  the  left  sap, 
under  Captains  Lee  and  Gilchrist,  with  whom  went 
Lieutenant  Kisch,  R.E.,  always  to  be  found  where 
the  fight  was  thickest.  The  two  former  were  shortly 
afterwards  hit  through  the  head,  and  C'ajotain  Ander- 
son found  Lieutenant  Scobie  in  the  midst  of  the 
turmoil,  malcing  attempts  to  get  the  two  officers  away 
under  a heavy  fire  from  three  sides,  while  Havildar 
Abdul  Wahab  with  a few  men  was  pluckily  holding 
the  head  of  the  trench  close  up  to  the  Germans. 
This  non-commissioned  officer  distinguished  himself 
throughout  tlie  action,  and  was  awarded  the  Indian 
Order  of  Merit,  2nd  Class,  receiving  later  the  Russian 
Medal  of  St  George,  2nd  Class. 

Cool  as  ever.  Lieutenant  Kisch  was  sketching 

O 

the  plan  of  a barricade  which  he  proposed  to  erect. 
Captain  Lee  was  dead ; Captain  Gilchrist  was 
brought  back  by  Lieutenant  Scobie  behind  our 
barricade,  but  died  very  shortly  afterwards.  It 
could  be  seen  that  the  Germans  were  in  strong  force, 
for  their  heads  were  silhouetted  against  the  dawn 
at  about  two  feet  interval  along  the  parapet,  over 
which  they  were  keeping  up  rapid  fire.  Most  of 
our  rifles  had  by  this  time  jammed  with  the  mud. 


GALLANTRY  OF  DOST  JVIAHOMED  165 


and  were  being  passed  back  and  others  passed  np 
in  their  place.  Lieutenant  Scobie’s  example  was 
invaluable  at  such  a time,  and  he  well  earned  the 
Military  Cross  which  he  received. 

There  Avere  many  instances  of  individual  gallantry. 
Numbers  of  wounded  men  were  brought  in  under  a 
murderous  fire,  but  tlie  turmoil  and  darkness  pre- 
vented the  rescuers  from  being  identified.  Lieu- 
tenant Bruce,  whose  death  has  already  been  men- 
tioned, was  shot  under  the  following  circumstances. 
As  he  and  his  party  got  up  to  the  German  trench, 
the  enemy  called  out  that  they  would  surrender, 
and  held  up  then  rifles.  As  soon,  liOAvever,  as  our 
men  put  their  heads  over  the  parajAet,  they  Avere 
shot.  Lieutenant  Bruce  charged  the  trench,  and  AA^as 
first  shot  in  the  neck  and  then  killed.  llavildar 
Dost  Mahomed  took  command,  chased  the  enemy 
out,  and  held  on  all  day,  a large  number  of  dead 
Germans  being  found  in  front  of  his  position.  Here 
again  the  rifles  jammed,  and  eventualiy  our  fire 
Availed. 

Finally  the  enemy  brought  up  a trench  mortar, 
and,  after  a number  of  his  men  had  been  killed, 
Havildar  Dost  Mahomed  ordered  the  remainder  to 
retire.  This  they  absolutely  refused  to  do,  saying 
their  Sahib,  Lieutenant  Bruce,  had  ordered  them  to 
hold  on  to  the  end.  Faithful  to  their  dead  officer, 
the  proudest  tribute  any  man  could  Avish,  the}^ 
held  on  until  all  but  Dost  Mahomed  and  another 
Avounded  man  had  been  killed  by  bombs.  The 
two  survivors  then  crawled  out,  and  eventually 
got  back,  guided  by  the  bursting  of  German  shells, 
to  our  trench,  Avhere  they  were  promptly  fired  on 
by  our  men,  but  on  their  shouting  that  tlie^^  Avere 


166 


THE  BATTLE  OF  GIVENCHY 


“ men  from  India,”  they  were  let  in.  For  his 
bravery  and  devotion,  Havildar  Dost  Mahomed 
received  tlie  Indian  Order  of  Merit,  2nd  Class. 

By  this  time  the  shallow  commnnication  trench 
was  blocked  with  dead  and  rvoimded,  and  with  the 
dawn  it  became  evident  that,  as  no  bombs  were 
available,  the  only  thing  left  to  do  was  to  make  a 
“ block  ” in  the  commnnication  trench  and  hold 
the  small  portion  of  the  front  trench  which  we 
had  captured.  This  “ block  ” was  made  as  quickly 
as  possible,  under  heavy  fire,  by  Lieutenant  Kisch, 
and  a short  description  will  serve  to  show  the  kind 
of  worlc  which  our  Sappers  were  continually  called 
on  to  carry  out  under  most  dangerous  circumstances. 

The  first  step  was  to  make  a temporar}^  block 
at  the  most  forward  point  held  by  us.  This  con- 
sisted of  sandbags  or  anything  which  would  afford 
some  shelter  to  those  working  on  the  real  block 
further  back.  Behind  this  advanced  block  the 
zigzags  of  the  trench  were  straightened  out  for  a 
distance  of  at  least  25  yards — 40  yards,  if  possible — 
so  as  to  give  immimity  against  hand-bombing.  The 
object  of  straightening  the  trench  was  to  give  our 
men  a clear  field  of  fire  from  behind  the  main  block. 
At  the  near  end  of  the  straight  portion,  a substantial 
barricade  of  sandbags  was , made,  in  which  was 
fitted  a steel  loophole  taken  from  a German  trench. 
The  straight  portion  of  the  trench  was  then  cleared 
of  dead  and  wounded,  and  a double  sentry  posted 
behind  the  loopholed  main  barricade.  The  term 
and  svsteni  “ double  block  ” were,  it  is  believed, 
invented  by  Captain  B.  C.  Batty e,  R.E.,  and  have 
since  been  generally  adopted. 

The  rest  of  the  day  was  spent  in  consolidating  the 


LOSSES  OF  THE  59tii  RIFLES 


167 


captured  trench  and  getting  ready  for  the  inevitable 
counter-attack.  In  the  evening,  the  enemy  made 
an  attack  for  the  purjDoses  of  reconnaissance,  which 
was  repulsed,  and  after  dark  the  59th  were  relieved. 

So  ended  the  assault  delivered  by  the  59th.  It 
was  carried  out  most  gallantly,  but  the  Germans  were 
in  great  strength,  their  wire  was  intact,  and  las(fc, 
but  not  least,  they  had  unlimited  bombs,  of  which 
we  possessed  but  few,  and  those  of  a very  inferior 
type  improvised  in  the  field. 

The  net  result  was  that  one  platoon  succeeded 
in  holding  about  90  yards  of  the  enemy’s  sap  on  the 
left,  while  another  platoon  on  the  right,  with  some  of 
the  129th  Baluchis,  kept  its  grip  on  a sap  in  front 
of  that  battalion.  With  these  exceptions,  the  night 
of  the  19th  December  fell  with  all  the  ground  lost 
which  at  bloody  price  we  had  gained  during  the 
day.  The  Brigades  were  holding  their  original 
line,  except  for  the  indentation  at  the  “ Orchard,” 
where  the  2nd  Gurkhas,  having  been  driven  back, 
were  occupying  a retrenched  line,  previously  prepared. 

The  losses  of  the  59th  in  this  very  gallant  attack 
were  heavj^  Captains  Lee  and  Gilchrist,  Lieu- 
tenants Atkinson  and  Bruce,  with  22  men,  were 
killed ; and  Captain  J.  D.  Scale  and  85  other  ranks 
wounded. 

In  co-operation  with  this  attack,  an  assault  on 
a German  saphead  on  the  left  of  the  Shliind  Brigade 
by  two  platoons  of  the  1st  Battalion  1st  Gurkhas, 
under  Captain  Burke  and  Lieutenant  Rundall, 
was  timed  for  5.30  a.m.  Owing  partly  to  the  terrible 
condition  of  the  trenches,  an  unfortunate  delay 
occurred,  and  the  attack  was  delivered  in  broad 
daylight,  starting  at  10  a.m. 


168 


THE  BATTLE  OE  GIVENCHY 


Although  under  such  circuinstances  the  attempt 
n'as  foredoomed  to  failure,  t]ie  two  officers  led  the 
assaidt  with  the  greatest  determination  and  dash. 
They  Avere  met  by  a deluge  of  machine-gim  and 
rifle  fire,  but  it  Av^as  not  until  both  British  officers 
Avere  killed  that  the  attacking  party  recoiled,  only  a 
small  remnant  regaining  our  trenches.  In  addition 
to  Claptain  Burke  and  Lieutenant  Bundall,  24  men 
Avcre  Ivilled  or  wounded,  representing  over  50  per  cent, 
of  the  number  engaged. 

The  night  of  the  19th-20th  December  passed 
without  any  marked  incident,  but  with  the  first 
streak  of  daAvn  the  enemy  opened  a heavy  fire  from 
artillery  and  trench  mortars  upon  the  Avhole  front 
of  the  Indian  Corps.  This  Avas  folloAAmd  up  by 
infantry  attacks  in  especial  force  against  Givenchy 
and  the  line  betAveen  Givenchy  and  La  Quinque  Rue. 

'Ihe  elements  AAere  Avarring  on  the  side  of  the 
ejiemy,  for  torrential  rain  during  the  night  had 
made  tlie  trenches  almost  untenable.  In  many 
})laces  the  fire-step  liad  been  Acashed  aAva}^  and  the 
men  Avere  consequently  unable  to  stand  high  enough 
to  lire  OAmr  the  parapet.  The  trenches  were  knee- 
and  in  some  places  even  Avaist-deep  in  mud  and  icy 
AA  ater,  Avhich  clogged  a large  number  of  rifles  and 
rendered  them  useless. 

At  about  9 a.m.  a series  of  ear-splitting  ex- 
plosions took  place  along  the  Avhole  front  of  the 
Sirhind  Brigade  round  the  village  of  Ghmnchy,  and 
it  was  evident  that  the  enem}^  had,  unknown  to  us, 
succeeded  in  mining  under  our  parapet  from  the 
numerous  saplieads  along  our  front. 

In  the  right  sub-section  were  one  compaii}’ 
Highland  Light  Infantry  and  tAvo  double  companies 


Indian  Troops  in  tup;  Trench]<;s  ; Winter,  191.4. 


TERRIBLE  EFFECT  OF  ENEMY’S  MINES  169 


of  the  l/4tli  Gorkhas.  Of  these,  one  double  company 
of  the  Gurkhas  and  half  a company  of  the  Highland 
Light  Infantry  were  either  blown  to  bits  or  buried 
under  the  ruins  of  the  trench.  There  were  few 
simvivors,  but  these  included  Lieutenant  Barry, 
Highland  Light  Infantry,  wdth  Colour-Sergeant 
Brisbane  and.  a small  party  on  the  extreme  right, 
who  held  out  until  overwhelmed  and  captured. 
Lieutenant  J.  R.  Cowman,  Highland  Light  Infantry, 
also  survived,  and  a few'  men  w'ho,  being  on  the 
extreme  left,  missed  the  full  force  of  the  explosion. 
Lieutenant  Cowman  and  Captaui  Mone^',  J /lst  Gurkhas 
(killed),  continued  to  bomb  the  enemy  to  the  last, 
until  the  former  was  forced  to  retire  into  the  G urklia 
trench. 

Private  Black,  Highland  Light  Infantiy,  stuck 
to  his  post  and  went  on  serving  his  trench  mortar 
until  the  ammunition  was  exhausted,  and  wTien  a 
rethement  took  place  he  refused  to  leave  a wounded 
comrade  until  he  had  taken  him  to  a place  of  safety. 
He  received  the  Distinguished  Conduct  Medal  for 
his  bravery. 

Immediately  after  the  explosions,  the  enemy 
advanced  in  heavy  masses,  but  met  w ith  a stubborn 
resistance  by  the  remaining  double  compaii}^  of  the 
4th  Gurkhas,  wdio  inflicted  considerable  loss.  TTie 
rifles  w^ere  jamming  as  usual,  and  in  spite  of  all  our 
men  could  do,  the  Germans  gained  a footing  in  the 
trench  at  several  points,  w'here  ferocious  hand-to- 
hand  fighting  took  place,  and  the  enemy  had  an 
opportunify  of  appreciating  to  the  full  the  skill  with 
wdiich  the  Gurkhas  can  use  their  beloved  kukris  in 
a circumscribed  space. 

Our  men  w'cre  outnumbered  and  oiitbombed 


170 


THE  BATTLE  OF  GIVENCHY 


from  the  start.  Our  bombs,  hoAvever  gallantly 
and  skilfully  handled,  were  limited  in  number, 
aud  technically  u ere  no  match  for  the  scientifically 
devised  German  missiles.  The  greatest  difficulty 
was  experienced  in  getting  them  to  light,  and  many 
failed  to  explode. 

CAptain  Rundall  of  the  Gurkhas  was  here  killed 
while  leading  a Immbing  party,  after  killing  two 
Germans  with  his  revolver.  At  tliis  period  the 
Gurkhas  lost  heavily,  but  left  their  mark  deep  in 
the  enemy. 

No  amount  of  gallantry  could  prevail  against 
such  odds.  I'he  position  was  enfiladed,  and  the 
few  remaining  rifles  were  rapidly  being  put  out  of 
action  by  the  mud.  H’o  remain  meant  annihilation, 
without  serving  any  useful  purpose. 

A retirement  was  ordered  at  1 p.m.,  under 
Major  Travers,  who  succeeded  in  getting  the  remains 
of  No.  4 Double  Company  through  Givenchy 
village,  which  vas  then  being  heavily  shelled. 
'J'he  retirement  was  most  gallantly  covered  by  the 
Gurkha  machine-gun  detachment,  under  Captain 
Wylie,  and  the  machine  guns  manned  by  a party 
of  the  125th  Napier’s  Rifles  ; but  in  the  midst  of 
their  devoted  work  another  terrible  explosion  took 
place,  and  of  this  noble  little  band  not  a man  re- 
turned. 

'idle  extent  to  which  luck  determines  the  incidents 
of  war  is  illustrated  by  the  fact  that  Captain  Phayre, 
who  was  in  charge  of  the  Gurkha  machine  guns, 
was  relieved  by  Captain  Wylie  only  a few  minutes 
before  the  mine  was  exploded.  It  was  afterwards 
ascertained  that  by  some  freak  of  fortune  Captain 
Wylie  escaped  death  and  was  taken  prisoner.  Of 


DESPERATE  DEFENCE  OF  THE  H.L.I.  171 


E Compan}^,  under  Captain  Yates,  not  a trace  has 
ever  been  found. 

Cn  the  firing  line  of  the  left  sub-section  were  one 
company  Highland  Light  Infantry,  under  Major 
Murray,  vrith  two  machine  guns,  and  two  double 
companies  1/lst  Gurkhas  with  two  machine  guns, 
under  Major  Bliss,  C.I.E.  As  in  the  case  of  the  right 
section,  frightful  explosions  took  place  here,  de- 
stroying several  lengths  of  trench  with  their  defenders. 
At  the  same  time,  it  is  reported,  an  aeroplane  dropped 
bombs  on  the  line. 

The  enemy  advanced  in  great  numbers  up  their 
saps  and  across  the  open.  It  seemed  that  the 
majority  of  the  Germans  were  armed  with  bombs. 
A large  number  were  killed  by  rifle  and  machine-gun 
fire,  but  they  still  came  on  in  waves  and  forced 
their  way  over  the  parapet,  where  their  superiority 
in  bombs  at  once  told  heavily  in  their  favour.  After 
a short  but  sanguinarj^  fight  the  remains  of  the 
trenches  passed  into  the  hands  of  the  enemy. 

Of  the  Highland  Light  Infantry,  Lieutenant 
Guthrie-Smith  was  blowm  up  near  the  Picquet 
House  ; Major  Murray  and  Captain  Cameron  with 
their  men  held  on  to  the  very  last,  and  are  all  believed 
to  have  been  killed.  Lieutenant  Pitts-Tucker  made 
a desperate  attempt  to  take  reinforcements  up  to 
Captain  Cameron,  but  he  and  all  his  party  were 
mown  down  by  machine-gun  fire.  Seeing  their 
officer  fall,  Lance-Corporal  Barr  and  Private  Car- 
michael rushed  out  and  managed  to  bring  Lieu- 
tenant Pitts-Tucker  back  some  way  under  a terrible 
fire,  but  he  was  killed  by  another  bullet  as  they  were 
carrying  him.  For  then  gallant  conduct  they  re- 
ceived the  Distinguished  Conduct  Medal. 


172 


THE  BATTLE  OF  GIVENCHY 


Meantime  lieutenant  Stewart,  Higlilancl  Light 
Infantry,  wlio  was  in  the  support  trench  with  80 
men  and  two  machine  guns,  Ijarricaded  himself  in, 
and  held  out  against  all  attacks,  although  he  was 
practically  isolated.  A small  reinforcement  of  30 
men  succeeded  in  reaching  him  just  before  dark, 
and  with  this  assistance  Lieutenant  Stew^art  fought 
on,  with  splendid  pluck  and  tenacity,  till  relieved 
by  the  South  Wales  Borderers  on  the  evening 
of  the  21st  December.  His  gallant  conduct  very 
jiiaterially  hcl])ed  to  stay  the  further  advance  of 
the  enemy,  and  gave  us  time  to  bring  up  fresh  troops. 

This  achievement  was  the  more  ]ioteworthy 
because  the  meii  of  the  Highland  Light  Infantry 
w'ho  were  with  him  had  been  for  over  72  hours  in 
the  trenches  without  a moment’s  rest.  When  re- 
lieved, they  w'cre  utterty  w orn  out,  but  still  remained 
to  buiy  Lieutenant  Pitts-'l’ucker  and  many  of  our 
dead,  and  brought  away  with  them  their  two  machine 
guns. 

After  sejiding  the  30  men  to  Lieutenant  Stewart, 
only  60  remained  to  hold  tlie  left  of  the  reserve 
trenches  in  rear  of  him.  Nevertheless,  the  position 
was  retained  by  Colonel  Bonaldson  until  the  3rd 
Brigade  reached  him  on  the  afternoon  of  the  21st 
December.  This  was  only  rendered  possible  by  the 
action  of  our  artillery,  which  maintained  an  un- 
ceasing tire  by  night  and  day  on  the  enemy’s  trenches, 
and  thereby  deceived  them  as  to  our  strength  in 
rear,  and  kept  them  from  advancing. 

Meanw'hile  the  Gurkhas,  under  Major  Bliss  and 
Captain  Kennedy,  were  putting  up  a very  stubborn 
fight  against  heavy  odds ; and  the  enemy  only 
succeeded  in  getting  a footing  at  one  spot,  being 


OUR  TROOPS  COMPELLED  TO  RETIRE  173 


driven  back  everywhere  else.  C^aptain  Kennedy 
organized  and  led  bombing  parties,  which  prevented 
the  enemy  from  emerging  from  newly  constructed 
saps. 

Major  Bliss,  in  the  meantime,  headed  a desperate 
bayonet  charge,  driving  the  Germans  back  some 
distance  along  their  sap,  but  he  lost  his  life  in  this 
gallant  effort. 

Captain  Tarrant,  Highland  Light  Infantr^y  then 
took  command,  and  tried  to  establish  communication 
with  the  Gurkha  Head  Quarters,  but  the  telephone 
wires  had  been  cut  by  shell  fire,  and  all  attempts 
to  repair  them  failed. 

It  was  then  found  that  the  Germans  had  managed 
to  get  into  botli  flanks  of  the  trencli,  and  had  bombed 
us  out  of  two  traverses  near  the  centre,  Ivilling  or 
wounding  the  whole  of  our  bombing  party  in  doing 
so,  and  destroying  one  of  our  machine  guns.  3'he 
other  gun  was  still  working,  although  its  water 
jacket  had  been  ripped  open.  It  was  therefore 
only  a question  of  how  many  rounds  it  could  fire 
before  becoming  overheated. 

The  position  was  now  hopeless,  and  retirement 
was  imperative.  This  movement  was  carried  out  in 
good  order  to  the  support  trenches,  where,  however, 
there  was  no  rest,  for  the  enemy  had  bombed  our 
men  out  of  the  left  of  the  trench,  and  we  had  run  out 
of  bombs.  A further  retirement  was  therefore  made 
to  Festubert,  under  cover  of  a small  rearguard,  armed 
with  the  few  serviceable  rifles  remaining. 

This  rethement  was  carried  out  very  steadily. 
The  conduct  of  the  troops  had  throughout  been 
admirable  in  the  face  of  overpowering  numbers  and 
every  conceivable  disadvantage. 


174 


THE  BATTLE  OF  GIVENCHY 


Tlie  trenches,  owing  to  the  thick  and  holding 
mud,  became  veritable  death-traps.  Only  the 
slowest  movement  was  possible ; men  had  their 
boots,  and  even  their  clcJthes,  pulled  off  by  the  mud. 
Most  of  the  rifles  jammed,  and  bombs  gave  out. 

As  soon  as  the  retirement  was  fairly  under  way, 
our  artillery  opened  a heavy  fire  on  the  trenches 
taken  by  the  enemy,  which  prevented  him  from 
making  any  further  advance,  and  in  some  places 
even  forced  him  back. 

The  casualties  on  the  19th  and  20th  were  verj^ 
serious,  as  may  be  gathered  from  those  of  the  l/4th 
Gurkhas,  who  lost  302  of  all  ranks,  including  7 
British  and  10  Gurkha  officers.  On  the  20th 
December  alone,  the  1/lst  Gurkhas  lost  2 British 
officers  killed  and  had  over  200  casualties  amongst 
the  other  ranks,  including  the  Subadar-Major  and 
three  other  Gurkha  officers. 

From  the  19th  to  the  22nd,  the  1st  Highland 
Light  Infantry  had  2 officers  and  55  men  killed, 
63  men  wounded,  and  8 officers  and  276  men  missing. 
Of  the  8 officers  returned  as  missing,  all  have  since 
been  ascertained  to  have  been  killed,  as  were  also 
the  great  majority  of  the  men. 

ShortH  afterwards.  Sir  John  French  inspected 
the  battalion,  and  warmly  congTatulated  it  on  having 
upheld  tlie  famous  traditions  of  the  regiment. 

Colonel  Ronaldson,  who  had  shown  marked 
qualities  of  leadership  in  a very  difficult  position, 
was  awarded  the  C.B.,  while  Lieutenant  Stewart 
received  the  D.S.O.  in  appreciation  of  his  gallant 
conduct. 


CHAPTER  XIll 


GERMAN  COENTER-ATTACK 

German  attack  on  Givenchy— Sirhind  Brigade  lose  trenches— Givenchy 
taken  by  the  enemy — Counter -attack  by  1st  Manchesters — Counter- 
attack forced  back — Heavy  casualties — Arrival  of  1st  Brigade.  1st 
Division — Operatioas  of  the  Secnndrabad  Cavalry  Brigade  under 
Brigadier-General  Macbean — First  attack  unsuccessful — Second  attack 
takes  trenches,  but  forced  to  retire — Casualties — Causes  of  failure. 

We  must  now  turn  to  the  rest  of  the  Lahore  Division 
front. 

At  12.30  p.m.  it  was  reported  that  the  situation 
in  the  left  section  of  the  Sirhind  Brigade  was  very 
serious,  and  that  a counter-attack  by  at  least  a 
Brigade  was  necessary  if  the  line  was  to  be  re- 
established. General  Watkis  was  at  the  end  of  his 
resources  in  troops,  having  none  left  except  the 
34th  Pioneers  and  the  59th  Rifles,  which  latter 
battalion  had  on  the  previous  day  suffered  heavy 
losses.  The  CJorps  Commander  therefore  placed  the 
Secnndrabad  Cavalry  Brigade,  under  Brigadier- 
General  F.  W.  Wadeson,  and  the  2/ 8th  Gurkha 
Rifles  at  General  Watkis’  disposal,  the  whole  being 
under  the  command  of  Major-General  Macbean. 
To  these  General  Watkis  added  the  47th  Sikhs 
under  Lt-Colonel  Gunning. 

Shortly  after  1 p.m.  on  the  20th  December, 
news  was  received  that  the  left  battalion  of  the 
Ferozepore  Brigade,  the  129th  Baluchis,  had  fallen 


176 


GERMAN  COUNTER-ATTACK 


back,  and  that  Givenchj'^  was  being  heavily  attacked. 
The  retention  of  Givenclij^  was  vitally  necessary, 
as  near  this  point  the  right  of  Lahore  connected  with 
the  French  left.  General  Carnegy,  Commanding  the 
Jnllundur  Brigade,  was  accordingly  directed  to  tmm 
his  ijnmediate  attention  to  securing  Givenchy  and 
re-establishing  the  situation  there.  At  the  same 
time  the  General  Officer  Commanding  the  10th 
French  Army  Corps  placed  two  battalions  at  General 
Watkis’  disposal.  The  1st  Manchesters  and  4th 
Battalion  Sufi'olks  (Territorials),  the  latter  of  which 
had  recently  joined  the  Corps,  were  moved  up  to 
Pont  Fixe  on  the  La  Bassee  Canal  near  Cuinchy. 

''riie  main  object  was  to  get  into  touch  with  the 
right  and  left  sub-sections  of  the  Sirhind  Brigade, 
and  to  counter-attack,  as  circumstances  permitted, 
with  a view  to  retaking  our  lost  trenches.  On 
arrival.  General  ttarnegy  found  the  position  to  be  as 
follows  : — 

The  Germans  had  occupied  the  whole  of  the 
Sirhind  Brigade  front,  and  the  Brigade  had  fallen 
back  to  the  Festubert  road.  The  enemy  had  also 
occupied  the  left  or  northern  part  of  the  line  held 
by  the  Ferozepore  Brigade,  while  Givenchy  village 
was  itself  also  in  the  hands  of  the  Germans.  East 
of  Givenchy,  the  57th  Rifles  with  one  company  of 
the  9th  Bhopals  were  still  holding  their  position, 
while  south  of  the  La  Bassee  Canal  the  1st  Connaughts 
and  4th  Suffolk  Territorials  had  also  not  moved. 

The  1st  Manchesters  under  Lt-Colonel  Strick- 
land, with  one  company  4th  Suffolks,  were  ordered 
to  attack  Givenchy,  and,  pushing  on  through  the 
village,  to  reoccupy  the  trenches  vacated  by  the 
129th  Baluchis.  The  French  Territorials  on  arrival 


iVIANCHESTERS  CAPTURE  GIVENCHY  177 


were  to  retake  the  trenches  forinerl}^  held  by  the 
right  of  the  Sirhiiid  Brigade. 

The  Manchesters  began  then  attack  shortly 
after  3 p.ni.,  and  found  on  reaching  the  village  that 
it  was  held  in  unexpected  strength  bj^  the  enem3\ 
Rough  and  tumble  hand-to-hand  fighting  of  the 
fiercest  description  took  place  in  the  village,  the 
Germans  holding  their  position  house  by  house, 
and  the}^  were  not  cleared  out  until  it  had  become 
too  dark  to  distinguish  the  features  of  the  country, 
or  to  locate  the  position  of  the  hostile  trenches, 
which  were  the  next  objective.  3 'he  further  attack 
was  therefore  dela}  ed  until  the  following  morning. 

The  desperate  nature  of  the  lighting  can  be 
gauged  from  the  fact  that  only  twelve  prisoners 
were  taken.  ^ 

A curious  incident  marked  the  recapture  of  the 
village.  Three  of  our  Artillery  observing  officers 
had  been  cut  off  when  the  enemy  took  Givenchy, 
and  had  only  escaped  death  or  capture  by  hiding  in 
a cellar.  When  our  men  entered,  they  emerged, 
none  the  Avorse  for  their  exciting  experience. 

The  village  was  held  by  us  during  the  night,  and 
another  company  of  the  Suffolks  and  French  'irerri- 
torials  respectiAmly  was  sent  up  to  Colonel  Strickland. 
Before  dawn  AAe  made  an  attempt  to  locate  the 
enemy’s  trenches,  but  were  met  by  a very  heavy  fire, 
and  sustained  severe  losses. 

i\.t  6.80  a.m.  on  the  21st,  Colonel  Strickland 
launched  his  attack,  but  immediately  came  under  a 
withering  fire  from  rifles  and  machine  guns,  which 
proved  particularly  deadly,  as  everj^  movement  of 
our  men  Avas  clearly  shoAA-n  up  by  the  blaze  of  tAvn 
haystacks  Avhich  AAcre  burning  furiously  behind  us. 


178 


GERMAN  COUNTER-ATTACK 


The  Manchesters,  however,  are  a regiment  which 
takes  a good  deal  of  stopping,  as  the  enemy  to  his 
cost  has  learnt  on  many  occasions  in  this  campaign. 
For  over  an  hour  they  made  desperate  efforts  to 
reach  the  German  trenches,  but  against  the  torrent 
of  bullets  and  shells  little  progress  could  be  effected, 
and  men  were  everywhere  falling  fast. 

It  was  becoming  evident  that  the  attempt  could 
not  succeed,  when  at  11  a.m.,  after  the  village  and 
our  trenches  had  been  vigorously  shelled  for  45 
minutes,  the  enemy  made  a strong  attack.  The 
Manchesters  held  firm,  and  the  attack  was  on  the 
verge  of  being  repulsed,  when  the  French  on  the  left 
were  forced  out  of  then  position,  leaving  our  flank 
in  the  air. 

The  enemy  seized  his  advantage,  and  began  to 
work  round  the  Manchesters’  left,  wdiich  was 
compelled  to  retire  through  the  village  on  to  the 
road.  At  the  same  moment  the  Germans  heavily 
attacked  the  centre  and  right.  The  situation 
appeared  to  be  rapidly  becoming  untenable,  and  it 
was  decided  to  retire  the  left  supports  to  a position 
in  rear,  in  order  to  cover  the  withdrawal  of  the  centre 
and  right. 

The  gallant  Manchesters,  a regiment  of  Iron- 
sides, had,  how^ever,  not  yet  shot  their  bolt.  They 
held  on  so  tenaciously  that  Colonel  Strickland 
decided  on  a further  attempt.  By  a splendid  rush, 
the  original  trenches  were  reoccupied,  the  enemy 
being  driven  back  on  the  left  at  about  2 p.m.  ; but 
this  vcas  our  last  expirmg  effort. 

Soon  after  3 p.m.  the  Germans  delivered  a sharp 
attack  from  the  front,  wFile  large  bodies  appeared 
on  the  right  flank  and  in  rear.  At  the  same  moment 


HEAVY  LOSSES  OF  THE  MANCHESTERS  170 

machine  gims  opened  on  us,  enfilading  our  line  from 
the  right. 

There  was  now  nothing  for  it  but  to  retire  ; the 
casualties  had  been  very  heavy,  and  the  men  were 
utterly  done.  There  were  only  three  officers  left 
with  the  companies,  and  in  some  companies  there 
were  hardly  any  non-commissioned  officers. 

The  centre  and  right  again  held  on  with  the 
utmost  obstinacy,  while  the  remainder,  with  whom 
were  Colonel  Strickland,  the  Adjutant,  and  a few 
non-commissioned  officers,  took  up  a position  in 
rear,  the  firing  line  then  falling  back  after  a furious 
hand-to-hand  fight  on  the  road. 

The  retirement  to  Pont  Fixe  was  conducted  with 
the  greatest  steadiness,  a quality  for  which,  under 
all  circumstances,  this  splendid  regiment  has  always 
been  known.  Many  wounded  men  were  carried 
back  under  heavy  shrapnel  and  machine-gun  fire. 
By  their  wonderful  staunchness  the  Manchesters 
had  given  time  for  reinforcements  to  be  brought  up, 
and  the  arrival  of  the  Cameron  Highlanders  of  the 
1st  Brigade,  1st  British  Division,  righted  the  situation 
at  this  point. 

The  losses  of  the  Manchesters  were  heavy. 
Captain  Creagh,  Lieutenant  Norman,  and  64  men 
were  killed ; Major  Hitchins,  Captain  Rose, 
Lieutenant  Lynch,  and  123  men  were  wounded; 
while  46  men  were  missing.  There  was,  however, 
the  satisfaction  of  knowing  that  our  mark  had  been 
left  still  more  deeply  on  the  enemy.  Of  this 
regiment  it  may  be  said  once  for  all  that  none  more 
devoted  and  none  more  valiant  has  passed  in  this 
war  through  the  Valley  of  the  Shadow  of  Death. 

We  must  now  hark  back  to  the  operations  of 


180 


GERMAN  COUNTER-ATl’ACK 


tlie  force  under  Major-Greiieral  Macbean,  which 
consisted  of  the  Secundi'abad  Cavalry  Brigade 
(dismounted)  under  Brigadier-General  Wadeson, 
to  wdiich  were  added  the  47th  Sikhs  and  the  2/8th 
Gurkhas. 

At  2 p.in.  General  Macbean  moved  up  from 
Marais  to  the  2nd  line  trenches  to  the  north,  in 
readiness  to  counter-attack  vigorously  if  opportunity 
offered.  At  5 p.m.  arrangements  were  made  for 
a counter-attack  by  the  7th  Dragoon  Guards  and 
47th  Sikhs  under  the  command  of  Lt-Colonel 
Lemprime,  D.S.O.,  of  the  7th.  These  regiments 
moved  up  to  the  riglit  of  the  Sirhind  Brigade  and 
established  touch  with  the  left  of  Jullundur. 

For  various  reasons,  considerable  delay  occurred 
in  launching  the  attack,  and  at  11.45  p.m.  General 
Macbean  was  ordered  to  advance  at  once  with  all 
the  troops  at  his  disposal  and  to  support  Colonel 
Lempriere,  if,  as  was  expected,  that  officer  had 
alread}^  started.  Colonel  Lempriere  attacked  at 
1 a.m.  in  tw^o  lines,  the  first  consisting  of  A and 
D Squadrons  7tli  Dragoon  Guards  and  half  of  the 
47th  Sikhs,  the  second  line  of  C Squadron  and  the 
remainder  of  the  47th. 

The  attack  moved  steadily  over  the  open  ground, 
but  met  with  heavy  rifle  and  machine-gun  fire, 
wdiich  caused  a number  of  casualties.  Both  lines 
reached  the  support  trenches  about  600  yards  east 
of  Le  Plantin,  the  47th  occupying  an  old  com- 
munication trench  on  the  left.  The  night  was 
pitch  dark,  the  ground  in  many  places  knee-deep  in 
glue-like  mud,  and  the  whole  country  w'as  intersected 
by  trenches  and  ditches,  which  rendered  it  almost 
impossible  to  recognize  the  real  objective.  Colonel 


GALLANTRY  OF  CAPTAIN  A.  C.  ROSS  181 


Lempriere  went  forward  with  his  Adjutant  to  try 
and  locate  the  front  line  trench  which  he  had  to 
attach* 

During  this  period  the  enemy  was  keeping  up 
a heavy  fire  from  the  left,  under  which  men  were 
dropping  fast.  As  Colonel  Lempriere  was  return- 
ing, he  was  shot  dead.  Colonel  Gunning,  47th  Sikhs, 
then  took  command. 

The  prospects  of  a successful  assault  were  hope- 
less. The  position  of  the  enemy’s  trench  could  only 
be  inferred  from  the  flash  of  rifles  ; we  were  enfiladed 
by  rifle  and  machine-gun  fire  from  both  flanks; 
while  to  add  to  the  difficulties,  our  own  guns  were 
plastering  our  probable  line  of  advance  with  their 
shells,  in  their  endeavour  to  wreck  the  German 
trenches. 

Captain  A.  C.  Ross,  of  the  20th  Deccan  Horse, 
who  had  throughout  distinguished  himself  by  his 
gallant  leading,  went  out  under  heavy  fire,  with 
Duffadars  Sardar  Singh  and  Shanka  Rao  of  the  same 
regiment,  and  at  great  risk  managed  to  carry  in 
Risaldar  Amir  Mahomed,  who  was  badly  wounded. 
For  this  signal  act  of  bravery  and  devotion  Captain 
Ross  received  the  D.S.O.,  and  tlie  Duffadars  the 
Indian  Order  of  Merit,  2nd  Class. 

Risaldar  Badan  Singh,  of  the  Poona  Horse,  was 
very  prominent  during  the  attack,  in  which  he  led 
his  party  with  great  dash,  receiving  tlie  Indian 
Distinguished  Service  Medal. 

Colonel  Gunning,  recognizing  the  futility  of  any 
further  attempt,  decided  to  retire  on  Festubert,  whicli 
was  reached  at  about  4 a.m.,  and  the  force  awaited 
further  orders. 

General  Macbean  then  directed  a second  attack 


182 


GERMAN  COUNTER-ATTACK 


to  be  made,  tiie  2/8tli  Gurkhas  on  the  left  with  the 
47th  Sikhs  and  7th  Dragoon  Guards  prolonging  to 
the  right,  with  a view  to  getting  into  touch  with 
the  Jullundur  Brigade.  As  soon  as  the  trenches 
were  captiwed,  the  7th  and  47th  were  to  work 
along  to  their  right  and  the  remainder  to  the  left. 
As  usual  in  those  bad  days,  artillery  ammunition 
was  scarce,  and  our  guns  could  only  bombard  for 
seven  minutes. 

Just  as  the  attack  started,  the  Ambala  Cavalry 
Brigade  arrived,  and  orders  were  given  for  them  to 
link  up  the  line  with  the  Jullundur  Brigade,  but  in 
the  darkness  the  8th  Hussars  lost  their  way,  and 
the  remainder  of  the  Brigade  was  not  collected  until 
after  the  main  attack  had  failed.  The  dawn  was 
then  approaching,  and  it  was  useless  to  send 
them  in. 

This  second  attack,  under  the  command  of  Lt- 
Colonel  Grant,  2/ 8th  Gurkhas,  started  at  about 
5 a.m.  on  the  21st  December,  in  two  lines.  In  the 
first  line  were  half  of  the  2/ 8th  Gurkhas  and  47th 
Sikhs.  In  the  second  line  were  the  remainder  of 
the  Gurkhas,  three  squadrons  7th  Dragoon  Guards, 
and  the  Jodhpur  Lancers.  The  rain  was  coming 
down  in  torrents.  In  the  inky  darkness  it  was 
impossible  to  keep  any  sense  of  direction,  and  the 
front  line  first  went  off  too  much  to  the  left  and  then 
too  much  to  the  right. 

The  Germans  kept  up  a moderately  heavy  fire 
from  the  front,  but  that  of  then  machine  guns  on 
both  flanks  was  incessant  and  of  extreme  intensity. 
The  ground  was  pitted  with  shell  holes  full  of  water, 
into  which  officers  and  men  were  continually  falling, 
and  was  cut  up  bj^  ditches  and  the  remains  of  old 


SECOND  ATTACK  FAILS  183 

trendies.  Seldom  lias  an  assault  been  launched 
under  more  unfavourable  circumstances. 

On  reaching  the  support  trenches,  a cheer  was 
raised ; the  whole  line  charged  the  fire  trench,  which 
was  occupied  without  much  trouble,  and  as  soon  as 
things  were  sorted  out,  patrols  were  sent  down  the 
flanks  to  ascertain  the  position  of  the  eiienij'.  The 
right  patrol  speedily  reported  the  trench  to  be  held 
by  Germans,  who  met  them  with  a vigorous  machine- 
gun  fire. 

During  the  advance,  D Squadron  7th  Dragoon 
Guards,  under  Captain  Mansel,  became  detached, 
and,  attempting  to  charge  machine  guns  on  the  left, 
lost  heavily.  Shortly  afterwards  Major  Edwards, 
2/8th  Gurkhas,  reported  that  500  yards  of  the  trench 
on  the  left  were  unoccupied,  for  the  simple  reason  that 
it  was  so  full  of  water  as  to  be  untenable,  two  of  his 
Gurkhas  having  alread}^  been  drowned  in  it,  and  that 
it  was  enfiladed  by  machine  guns  from  both  flanks. 

Captain  Padday,  47th  Sikhs,  with  a bombing 
party  of  his  regiment,  then  made  a gallant  attempt 
to  clear  the  enemy  out,  but  the  machine  guns  were 
merciless,  and  many  of  the  party  were  killed,  in- 
cluding their  brave  leader. 

Day  was  now  breaking  ; the  position  was  un- 
tenable. To  remain  spelt  certain  disaster.  A re- 
tirement of  the  whole  line  to  Festubert  was  ordered, 
which  was  effected  under  a searching  fire,  the  troops 
only  reaching  Festubert  after  daylight. 

The  casualties  dmdng  this  gallant  but  fruitless 
attack  were  as  follows  : — 

The  7th  Dragoon  Guards  lost  their  Commanding 
Officer,  Lt-Colonel  Lempriere,  D.S.O.,  and  Captain 
Mansel ; Lieutenant  Mann  and  2nd  Lieutenant 


1S4 


GERMAN  COUNTER-ATTACK 


Bryce  were  wounded  and  missing ; their  total  casual- 
ties being  43. 

In  the  Poona  Horse,  Major  Loring,  37th  Lancers, 
Avho  was  attached,  was  killed,  adding  one  more  to 
the  sacrifices  which  this  soldier-family  has  made  in 
the  war  ; Captain  Grimshaw  and  2 Indian  officers 
were  wounded ; the  total  being  49, 

The  20th  Deccan  Horse  had  Major  Tennant, 
Captain  Jarvis,  and  Lieutenant  Tinley  wounded; 
Captains  McEuen  and  Mackenzie  missing;  with  a 
total  casualty  list  of  81. 

Tlie  2/8th  Gurkhas  lost  one  Gurkha  officer 
killed,  with  22  casualties  in  other  ranks. 

In  the  47th  Sikhs,  Captain  Padday  and  7 men 
were  killed ; Major  Van  Someren  and  Captain  Brown 
wounded ; v hile  1 20  of  other  ranks  were  wounded 
or  missing. 

The  Jodhpur  Lancers  had  11  casualties. 

Amongst  the  causes  which  militated  against 
the  success  of  this  attack,  the  following  are  note- 
worthy : — 

1.  The  trooj)s  employed  (except  the  2/8th 
Gurkhas)  had  no  Imowledge  of  the  ground. 

2.  The  weakness  of  the  force  and  the  length  of 
front  of  the  objective,  about  one  mile,  precluded  an 
attack  in  sufficient  depth  to  pusli  home  and  remain 
there, 

3.  The  extreme  difficulty  of  attacking  by  night 
over  water-logged  ground,  cut  up  by  water  channels 
and  trenches. 

4.  Insufficient  artillery  support,  due  to  want  of 
ammunition. 

For  his  services  on  this  occasion  Brigadier- 
General  Wadeson  received  the  C.B. 


CHAPTER  XIV 

GEEMAisr  COUNTER-ATTACK — Continued 

The  “ Orchard  ” — Attack  on  2nd  Seaforths— Loss  of  trenches  by  2nd 
Gui’khas — Gallantry  of  Seaforths — -1st  Division,  1st  Corps  brought 
up  to  relieve  pressure— Givenchy  retaken  by  1st  Brigade — Seaforths 
and  58th  Rifles  relieved — Heavy  casualties — Indian  Corps  relieved — 
Sir  Douglas  Haig  takes  over  command  of  the  line — Successful  stand 
of  57th  Rifles — Appreciation  of  Indian  Corps  by  Sir  John  French  in 
despatches. 

It  is  now  necessary  to  retrace  our  steps  to  the 
neighbourhood  of  the  “ Orchard.” 

On  the  night  of  the  19th,  the  attack  contem- 
plated by  the  Dehra  Dun  Brigade  had  perforce  to 
be  abandoned,  and  the  2/2nd  Gurkhas  were  com- 
pelled to  retire  to  a retrenched  position  slightly  to 
the  west.  By  this  retirement  the  left  hank  of  the 
1st  Seaforths,  under  Lt-Colonel  Ritchie,  who  were 
on  the  extreme  right  of  the  Meerut  Division,  was 
much  exposed. 

At  about  9 a.in.  on  tlie  20th,  there  were  heavy 
attacks  on  the  Seaforths  and  Gurkhas,  and  about 
the  same  time  the  right  of  the  Seaforths  and  the  left 
of  the  Sirhind  Brigade  were  for  the  moment  separated 
by  the  explosion  of  the  enemy’s  mines. 

The  first  portion  of  the  Seaforths  to  be  attacked 
was  B Company,  which  was  having  a frugal  breakfast 
when  the  onslaught  began.  Taken  by  surprise,  the 
Company  made  two  determined  stands  and  killed 
about  fiftv  Germans  before  thev  lost  the  trench. 

V w 


186 


GERMAN  COUNTER-ATTACK 


The  enemy  rushed  down  the  lire  trench,  hiding 
their  advmnce  under  smoke  ])alls,  and  bombing  as 
they  came.  At  the  same  time  the  Germans  bombed 
from  the  saphead  in  front  of  our  trench,  while 
snipers  were  piciving  off  our  men  from  the  Festubert 
road. 

Captain  the  Hon.  C.  St  Clah,  who  was  m com- 
mand of  B Company,  threw  back  his  men  into  the 
communication  trench,  wliich  he  lined,  facing  to  the 
riglrt,  but  was  himself  shortly  afterwards  shot  dead. 

Meanwhile  the  2nd  Gurkhas  had  been  faring 
badly.  At  about  9 a.m.  there  was  a terrific  ex- 
plosion, which  shook  the  whole  neighbourhood. 
The  Germans  had  evidently  exploded  a mine  under 
the  parapet  of  the  “ Orchcurd.”  This  was  followed 
for  a few  minutes  by  a perfect  tornado  of  shrapnel, 
high-explosive  and  machine-gun  fire,  the  crescendo 
ending  in  a rush  b}^  the  enemy  from  his  trenches  into 
the  “ Orchard.” 

Captain  Bethell  with  No.  1 Company  was  in 
the  right  trench,  but  immediately  got  his  men  out 
oi  it  into  a trench  in  rear,  in  order  to  avoid  being 
overwhelmed  by  numbers.  Here,  as  usual  where 
danger  was,  the  Sapper  was  found  in  the  person  of 
Lieutenant  Bird,  R.E.,  with  a few  of  his  men.  The 
second  trench  was  too  deep  to  hold,  and  Captain 
Bethell  with  about  half  of  his  men  got  out  of  it  into 
a communication  trench  known  as  “ the  Strand.” 
The  remainder  of  his  men  were  overpowered,  and  the 
survivors  captured  by  the  enemy,  who  were  pressing 
on  in  ever-increasing  numbers. 

In  “ the  Strand  ” Major  Boileau  was  met,  and 
a small  rearguard  action  was  fought  until  a third 
trench  was  found,  in  which  a final  position  was 


TIMELY  REINFORCEMENTS 


187 


taken  up  by  Majors  Boiieau  and  Watt,  Lieutenant 
Bird  managing  to  get  tlirougli  to  the  Seafortli 
trenches  to  see  if  he  coidd  help  there,  'i’he  attack 
was  stayed  at  this  point,  but  a considerable  portion 
of  the  trenches  had  been  lost. 

At  this  juncture  the  58th  Rifles  came  up  in 
support  of  the  Seaf orths’  left,  and  filled  the  gap  caused 
by  the  retirement  of  the  Gurkhas.  At  the  same 
moment  the  l/9th  Gurkhas  under  Lt-Colonel  Widdi- 
combe  reported  their  arrival  as  further  supports, 
and  half  of  them  were  sent  up  to  Major  Boiieau, 
the  rest  remaining  with  the  6th  Jats  on  the  left. 

The  senior  officer  on  the  spot  was  now  Lt-Colonel 
Roche,  of  the  6th  Jats,  who  at  once  set  to  work  to 
retrieve,  as  best  he  could,  a desperate  situation, 
and  with  the  aid  of  reinforcements  which  streamed 
up  during  the  20th  and  21st,  in  the  shape  of  the 
Black  Watch,  4th  Seaforths  (Territorials),  41st 
Dogras  and  30th  Lancers,  he  succeeded  in  establish- 
ing a fairl}^  formidable  hedge  of  steel  facing  the 
captured  trenches. 

Meantime  the  enemv  had  been  busy  with  “hair- 
brush  ” bombs,  and  had  driven  the  Seaforths  out 
of  about  100  yards  of  trench  as  far  as  “ Piccadilly,” 
wounding  Lieutenant  Baker  and  a number  of  men 
in  the  process.  Here,  however,  they  were  held  up 
until  a fresh  supply  of  bombs  reached  the  Seaforths. 

At  this  moment  about  forty  Germans  appeared 
in  rear,  and  Captain  Laing  promptly  went  for  them 
with  a bombing  party,  succeeding,  after  a grim 
struggle,  in  clearing  them  out  and  retaking  ten 
traverses  in  the  Gurkha  trench.  Here  the  dashing 
little  party  had  to  pull  up,  as  they  were  not  reall}^ 
strong  enough  to  hold  the  c aptured  section.  However, 


188 


GERMAN  COUNTER-ATTACK 


once  there,  they  built  a barricade  and  stayed 
there.  In  this  trench  alone,  22  dead  Germans  were 
counted,  while  oiir  small  party  had  13  casualties. 

In  the  evening  the  Seaforths,  worthy  comrades 
of  the  Manchesters  and  the  Black  Watch,  v/ere 
heartened  by  messages  of  congratulation  from  the 
Brigade  and  Divisional  Commanders  on  the  splendid 
behaviour  of  the  battalion  under  such  trying  circum- 
stances. 

By  6 p.m.  the  58th  Rifles  were  supporting  the 
Seaforths  on  their  left,  as  well  as  in  their  fire  and 
support  trenches.  It  was  again  the  old  tale,  how- 
ever— shortage  of  bombs  against  an  enemy  abun- 
dantly supplied  with  them. 

Nevertheless,  heavily  attacked  as  they  were  by 
lire  and  bombs,  their  trenches  battered  to  bits,  the 
Dehra  Dun  Brigade  kept  their  front  intact,  main- 
taining connection  with  the  bth  Jats  on  their  left. 
Major  Wauchope,  commanding  half  the  Black  Watch 
on  the  Seaforths’  right,  succeeded  in  establishing 
communication  witli  that  battalion  during  the  after- 
noon, and  before  midnight  with  the  Suliind  Brigade 
on  his  right.  A continuous  line  thus  existed  through- 
out the  Meerut  Division  front,  although  it  was  badly 
indented  at  the  “ Orchard.” 

The  Indian  Corps,  which,  at  the  end  of  October, 
had  in  the  nick  of  time  come  to  the  relief  of  the 
2nd  Corps  under  General  Smith-Dorrien,  had  now 
for  two  terrible  months  held  with  indomitable 
tenacity  and  never-failing  courage  the  long  line 
which  had  fallen  to  its  share.  During  this  period  it 
had  been  constantly  subjected  to  shell  fire  of  a type 
quite  novel  to  it.  It  had  been  assailed  by  a ferocious 
enemy  by  day  and  by  night,  with  weapons  such  as 


ARRIVAL  OF  1st  DIVISION,  1st  CORPS  189 


bombs  and  hand  grenades,  with  which  onr  troops 
were  not  then  provided.  The  weather  conditions 
had  been  terrible  enough  to  damp  the  courage  of 
the  stoutest  heart.  As  a final  test,  the  Corps  had 
noAV  for  over  thirty  hours  of  most  sanguinary  fighting 
been  confronted  by  an  ever-increasing  concentration 
of  the  enemy. 

The  men  were  rapidly  becoming  worn  out,  and 
it  was  evident  that  an  immediate  and  substantial 
reinforcement  was  imperative,  if  the  situation  was 
to  be  restored  and  the  future  assured.  The  1st 
Army  Corps,  under  Sir  Douglas  Haig,  was  in  Arm}- 
reserve  and  available  for  this  purpose. 

During  the  night  of  the  20th-2Ist  December, 
the  1st  Division,  1st  Corps,  under  General  Making, 
arrived  on  the  scene.  The  1st  Brigade,  after  a 
short  rest,  was  sent  on  to  Givenchy.  The  2nd 
Brigade  w^as  sent  to  support  the  Dehra  Dun  Brigade, 
while  the  3rd  Brigade  moved  up  to  the  trenches 
evacuated  by  the  Sirhind  Brigade. 

A detailed  account  of  the  operations  of  the  1st 
British  Division  does  not  come  within  the  scope  of 
this  history,  but  a brief  sketch  is  necessary  for 
proper  understanding  of  the  operations  as  a whole. 

The  attack  of  the  1st  Brigade  on  Givenchy,  so 
latety  the  scene  of  the  gallant  exploits  of  the  1st 
Manchesters,  and  the  assault  of  the  3rd  Brigade  on 
the  Sirhind  trenches  commenced  about  3 p.m.  on 
the  21st  December.  The  1st  Brigade  succeeded  in 
consolidating  their  position  round  Givenchy  and  on 
the  left  of  the  Ferozepore  Brigade,  but  were  unable  to 
keep  touch  with  the  attack  of  the  3rd  Brigade  on 
their  left.  The  3rd  Brigade  advanced  through  a 
line  held  by  detachments  of  the  Sirhind,  Bareill}^ 


190 


GERMAN  COUNTER-ATTACK 


and  Julliindur  Brigades,  as  well  as  by  the  Secundrabad 
and  Ainbala  Brigades. 

By  nightfall,  however,  the  Brigade  had  not 
succeeded  in  reaching  the  Sirhind  trenches,  nor  had 
it  established  permanent  connection  with  the  right 
of  the  Meerut  Division,  to  which  we  must  now 
return. 

At  about  3 a.in.  on  the  21st,  the  Germans  were 
reported  to  be  massing  in  front  of  the  Dehra  Dun 
Brigade.  By  8 a.m.  it  was  evident  that  the  attack 
by  the  left  Brigade  of  the  Lahore  Division  had  failed, 
and  that  the  enemy  were  in  considerable  strength. 
The  Seaforths  were  now  in  a perilous  position,  and 
half  of  the  107th  Pioneers  were  sent  up  to  support 
their  flank. 

All  other  reserve  troops  available,  i.e.  the  rest  of 
the  107th  and  the  4th  Cavalry,  were  brought  up  to 
a position  in  the  Rue  du  Bois,  from  which  they  could 
act,  in  the  event  of  the  situation  changing  for  the 
Averse  before  the  2nd  British  Brigade  could  arrive. 
This  Brigade  was  intended  to  attack  about  noon, 
on  the  arrival  of  General  West  mac  ott,  but  two  of 
its  battalions  were  delayed  en  route,  and  the  assault 
was  not  launched  till  about  7 p.m. 

The  Loyal  North  Lancashires  were  ordered  to 
attack  with  their  left  on  the  “ Orchard,”  the  North- 
amptons  prolonging  to  their  left  with  the  2/60th 
Rifles  in  reserve.  The  2nd  Royal  Sussex  were 
detailed  to  relieve  the  Seaforths  in  the  trenches. 

By  10  p.m.  the  support  trenches  of  the 
“ Orchard  ” had  been  carried,  and  preparations 
were  made  to  advance  on  the  original  fire  trenches, 
but  these  had  been  so  completely  destroyed  by 
bombs  that  they  could  not  be  reoccupied,  a fact 


1st  SEAFORTHS  and  58th  RIFLES  191 


grimly  eloquent  of  the  gruelling  to  which  the  2nd 
Gurkhas  had  been  subjected.  The  support  trenches 
were  therefore  held. 

At  9 a.m.  on  the  22nd  December,  the  enemy 
suddenly  attacked  the  centre  section,  and  the  Loyal 
North  Lancashires  were  bombed  out,  vacating  several 
of  the  trenches  which  they  had  taken  during  the 
previous  evening. 

Lieutenant  Macandrew  of  the  Seaforths  on  the 
left  of  his  support  trench,  finding  his  left  unprotected 
and  the  Germans  advancing  up  the  trench,  rallied 
some  of  the  North  Lancashires,  and  with  them  bombed 
the  Germans  back.  He  then  found  that,  having  only 
eleven  men  with  him,  he  could  not  occupy  such  a 
length  of  trench.  He  dug  himself  in  along  the  Brewery 
road  facing  north,  and  went  back  for  more  men. 
While  returning,  he  and  eight  men  were  killed  by 
machine-gun  fire. 

The  41st  Dogras  and  hah  of  the  2nd  Black  Watch 
were  now  brought  up,  as  also  were  the  remainder 
of  the  Northamptons  from  the  reserve.  By  1 p.m. 
the  line  was  again  continuously  held  throughout. 

By  3 p.m.  the  Seaforths  and  part  of  the  58th 
Rifles  had  been  relieved.  They  had  been  fighting 
practically  without  a break  in  heavy  mud  and  rain 
since  the  earlj^  hours  of  the  19th,  and  were  utterly 
worn  out.  Faced  by  a most  determined  enemy  in 
greatly  superior  numbers,  hampered  by  a constant 
shortage  of  bombs  and  grenades,  with  both  flanks 
in  the  air  for  a great  part  of  the  time,  the  1st  Sea- 
forths had  not  only  succeeded  in  holding  out  in 
spite  of  heavy  casualties,  but  they  had  also  retaken 
a portion  of  the  trenches  lost  by  the  Gurkhas.  For 
the  Seaforths  no  higher  praise  can  be  accorded  than 


192  GERMAN  CO  UNTER^ATTACK , 

that  the  regiment  sustained  and  even  added  to  a 
glorious  reputation. 

The  casualties  of  the  battalion  from  the  16th 
to  the  22iid  December  amounted  to  174,  of  whom 
8 were  officers.  For  their  distinguished  services 
Lt-Colonel  Ritchie  received  the  C.M.G.,  Captain 
Wicks  the  D.S.O.,  Lieutenant  Macandrew  was 
mentioned  in  despatches,  and  Captain  Laing  was 
awarded  the  Military  Cross. 

Lt~General  C.  Anderson,  Commanding  the  Meerut 
Division,  reported  that  in  his  opinion  the  action  of 
the  Seaforths  and  bSth  Rifles,  sustained  over  a period 
of  three  days  and  nights,  under  extremely  difficult 
conditions,  was  worthy  of  the  highest  possible 
commendation,  and  reflected  the  greatest  credit  on 
officers,  non-commissioned  officers  and  men  of  both 
regiments. 

Tlie  losses  of  the  58th  Rifles  were : Captain  Bell, 
51th  Sikhs,  Jemadar  Mardan  Ali  and  24  other  ranks 
Ivilled,  Avith  32  other  ranks  AAmunded. 

Shortly  after  1 p.m.  on  the  22]id  December,  Sir 
Douglas  Haig  took  over  command  of  the  whole  line 
which  Jiad  been  hold  by  the  Indian  Corps. 

JJie  position  was  then  as  follows  : — 

South  of  tlic  La  Bassee  Canal,  the  Connaught 
Rangers  had  not  been  attacked.  J ust  north  of  the 
Canal,  the  57th  Rifles  with  one  company  9th  Bhopals, 
although  attacked,  still  held  their  original  trenches. 
The  1st  British  Brigade,  holding  Givenchy  and  its 
northern  and  eastern  approaches,  connected  north- 
wards Avith  the  Ferozepore  Brigade,  and  on  its  left 
again  came  the  3rd  British  Brigade,  although  touch 
lietween  the  tAvo  Brigades  had  been  lost.  The  3rd 
Brigade  held  a line  along  the  east  of  the  Festubert 


THE  57tii  rifles 


193 


road,  its  left  being  in  toueli  witli  the  right  of  the 
Meerut  Division,  wliere  a battalion  of  the  Royal 
Sussex  Regiment  had  just  relieved  the  1st  Sea- 
forths. 

Further  north  the  2nd  British  Brigade  held  the 
line  west  of  the  “ Orchard,”  and  connected  with  half 
of  the  Black  ^Vatch  and  the  l/9th  Gurkhas.  From 
this  point  northwards,  the  6th  Jats  and  the  whole 
of  the  Garhwal  Brigade  occupied  the  line  which  they 
had  hold  since  the  beginning. 

Bhe  relief  b}'  the  1st  Corps  of  the  southern  section 
was  effected  on  the  night  of  the  22nd  December,  but 
the  Meerut  Division  remained  under  the  orders  of 
the  1st  Corps,  and  was  not  completely  withdrawn 
till  the  27th  December. 

Very  little  has  hitherto  been  said  about  the  work 
of  the  57th  Rifles  and  one  company  9th  Bhopals, 
beyond  mentioning  the  fact  that  the}"  held  their 
portion  of  the  line  throughout. 

The  share  taken  by  them  deserves  more  detailed 
mention,  as  it  was  owing  to  their  determination  and 
tenacious  grip  of  their  trenches  that  communication 
with  the  Connaughts  on  the  south  side  of  the  La 
Bassee  Canal,  and  through  the  Connaughts  with 
the  French  on  their  right,  was  maintained,  and  that 
our  line  was  kept  intact  in  this  sector  of  the  defence. 

The  57th  Rifles,  under  Lt-Colonel  Gray,  D.S.O., 
with  one  company  of  the  9th  Bhopal  Infantry,  held 
the  centre  section  of  the  Ferozepore  line.  In  the 
firing  line  on  the  right  was  the  Sikh  Company  of 
the  57th,  under  Major  Willans,  with  Captain  Leith- 
Ross  attached  from  the  55th  Rifles,  and  Lieutenant 
Taylor  with  45  rifles,  9th  Bhopals.  In  the  centre  was 
the  Afridi  Company,  57th,  under  Major  Jarrett. 

o 


194 


GERMAN  COUNTER-ATTACK 


On  the  left  were  the  Punjabi-Mahomedan  Company, 
57th,  and  75  rifles  9th  Bhopals,  under  Captains 
Jar  dine  and  Shepherd,  with  Lieutenant  Deedes, 
31st  Punjabis,  as  machine-gun  officer. 

9flie  local  reserve  consisted  of  the  Dogra  Company, 
57th,  and  75  rifles,  9th  Bhopals.  One  machine  gun 
was  on  the  right  and  one  in  the  centre. 

On  the  19th  December,  the  parapet,  owing  to 
heav}^  rain  and  the  enemy’s  fire,  was  in  a very 
dilapidated  condition.  On  the  left  a number  of 
casualties  were  caused  by  shots  tlu'ough  the  loop- 
holes from  the  German  saps,  only  70  yards  away. 
Captain  Mahon  with  35  Dogras  was  brought  up  to 
reinforce  this  section. 

At  about  10  a.m.  on  the  20th,  the  enemy  succeeded 
in  occupying  the  trenches  on  the  left  flank  of  the 
57th,  which  was  thus  in  the  air,  and  the  Germans 
were  able  to  enfilade  the  left  company,  with  the 
result  that  Captain  Shepherd  was  mortally  wounded. 
Captain  Mahon  then  taking  over  command  of  the 
compan}^  The  enemy  also  took  advantage  of  the 
retirement  of  the  129th  Baluchis  on  the  left  to 
work  round  to  some  scattered  houses  in  rear  of 
the  57th.  This  forced  Captain  Mahon  to  fall  back 
to  avoid  being  cut  off.  The  retirement  was  carried 
out  with  the  utmost  coolness,  two  or  three  men 
engaging  the  Germans  from  behind  each  traverse 
as  they  fell  back. 

Lieutenant  Deedes  remained  behind  at  great 
risk,  and  helped  to  bring  away  Captain  Shepherd’s 
body.  By  his  gallant  conduct  in  this  and  other 
actions  he  gained  the  Military  Cross. 

In  the  meantime.  Captain  Jardine  was  busy 
making  a barricade  across  the  trench,  near  the 


SIRHIND  LINE  BROKEN 


195 


junction  of  the  left  and  centre  companies,  which  he 
held  with  the  men  of  the  9th  Bhopals.  Captain 
Mahon  with  Subadar  Arsla  Khan  held  an  old  com- 
munication trench  facing  north  in  continuation  of 
the  line  of  the  barricade.  Apparently  the  enemy 
was  not  sure  of  the  strength  of  the  position,  as  he 
only  made  weak  attacks,  which  were  easity  beaten 
off,  the  men  even  climbing  up  on  the  parapet  to  get 
a better  view  of  the  enem}^ 

Shortty  afterwards  a company  of  the  142nd 
French  Territorials  came  up  and  was  put  in  support 
of  the  left.  Pressure  was  relieved  about  this  time 
by  the  retaking  of  Givench}^  by  the  Maiichestcrs, 
as  already  related. 

The  left  section  of  ti’cnch  which  the  57th  had 
vacated  remained  empty,  as  the  Germans  built  a 
barricade  across  it  at  the  far  end.  Subadar  Arsla 
Khan  and  some  of  his  Afridis  reconnoitred  along  this 
portion  and  brought  back  valuable  information  as  to 
the  whereabouts  of  the  enemy. 

During  the  night,  the  French  Territorials  occupied 
the  empty  section  of  the  trench  and  built  a barricade 
at  a distance  of  about  40  yards  from  that  of  the 
Germans.  The  French  are  described  by  an  officer 
as  having  behaved  with  the  utmost  sangfroid  and 
contempt  of  the  enemy.  They  remained  in  this 
very  uncomfortable  position  until  the  57th  were 
reheved. 

During  the  20th,  the  Germans  broke  through 
the  Sirhind  Brigade  on  the  left,  and  matters  looked 
so  bad  that  the  Transport  was  taken  out  of  billets 
and  kept  in  constant  readiness  to  move  at  a moment’s 
notice.  Idiis,  as  it  turned  out,  was  very  lucky,  foi' 
the  billets  were  shortly  afterwards  shelled  and  burnt. 


196 


GERMAN  COUNTER-ATTACK 


Duiiiig  the  day,  a small  body  of  Germans 
attempted  to  creep  np  from  the  eastern  side,  but 
were  all  shot  down  before  they  had  advanced  fifty 
3'ards. 

At  daybreak  on  the  21st,  Subadar  Arsla  Khan 
went  out  with  two  men  and  reconnoitred  the  enemy’s 
position.  He  ascertained  that  they  were  still  in 
a section  of  the  left  trench,  and  succeeded  in  shooting 
several  of  them  at  their  barricade. 

At  about  3 p.m.  Givenchy  was  evacuated  by  the 
Manchesters,  and  pressure  on  the  57th  left  was 
greatly  increased.  The  enemy  again  occupied  the 
houses  in  the  left  rear,  and  were  with  difficulty  pre- 
vented from  moving  further  south  and  thus  cutting 
off  the  battalion.  'Three  separate  attacks  on  our 
left  were  then  repulsed,  but  matters  began  to  look 
serious,  as  the  reserve  was  being  employed  in  bring- 
ing up  ammunition,  leaving  no  reinforcements  in 
the  event  of  a serious  attack.  8iibadar  Fateh  Jang 
gained  the  Imliaii  Distinguished  Service  Medal  by 
his  coolness  and  leadership  at  this  time. 

At  4 p.m.,  Iuckil3y  the  pressure  was  again  relieved 
b}^  the  attack  of  the  1st  British  Brigade  on  Givenchy, 
and  at  about  8 p.m.  they  got  into  touch  with  the 
57th  left,  the  Scots  Guards  occupying  a trench  facing 
north  at  about  200  yards’  distance. 

Early  on  the  22nd,  a body  of  about  seventy 
Germans  made  a determined  attack  on  the  trench 
which  had  been  thrown  back  on  the  left,  but  Subadar 
Arsla  Khan  collected  all  his  men  and  charged  the 
enemy,  who  fled  without  waiting  for  the  assault, 
leaving  about  thirty  of  their  number,  including  two 
officers,  killed  or  wounded  on  the  ground. 

Subadar  Arsla  Khan  is  one  of  the  finest  specimens 


SUBADAR  ARSLA  KHAN 


197 


of  the  Indian  officer  imaginable.  During  the  IMoh- 
mand  Expedition  of  1908,  he  was  granted  the  2nd 
Class  of  the  Indian  Order  of  Merit  for  gallantry 
during  a hand-to-hand  fight  in  which  he  killed  two 
of  the  enemy  with  his  Mauser  pistol,  and  rendered 
an  important  “ Sangar  ” untenable.  In  the  pre- 
sent war  he  was  granted  the  2nd  Class  of  the 
Order  of  British  India  for  his  good  services  at  Mes- 
sines,  and  at  the  second  battle  of  Ypres  in  April, 
1915,  he  won  the  Military  Cross  for  his  gallantry. 
Subadar  Arsla  Khan  is  a Mahkdin  Khel  Afridi,  and 
a man  of  considerable  importance  in  Ids  tribe. 
The  57th  Rifles  liave  every  reason  to  be  proud 
of  him. 

A company  of  the  59th  Rifles  now  came  up  to 
reinforce,  and  were  sent  to  the  right,  where  Major 
Willans  was  in  difficulties,  as  his  men  had  been 
standing  deep  in  mud  and  water  since  the  19th, 
and  it  was  impossible,  owing  to  the  absence  of 
reserves,  to  evacuate  the  sick  and  wounded.  ; 

On  the  night  of  the  22nd  December,  the  57th 
were  relieved  by  the  South  Staffords,  having  been 
for  three  days  and  nights  absolutely  without  rest 
and  wet  through  the  whole  time,  in  consequence  of 
which  many  men  suffered  from  frostbite.  Their 
staunchness  earned  the  liearty  congratulations  of  tlie 
Corps  Commander. 

This  concluded  the  operations  of  the  Indian 
Army  Corps  round  Clivenchy  in  1914. 

Sir  John  French,  in  his  despatcli  dated  the  2nd 
February,  1915,  sums  up  his  opinion  of  the  work  of 
the  Corps  during  this  very  trying  period  in  the 
following  words  : — 

“ The  Indian  troo])s  have  fought  with  the  utmost 


198 


GERMAN  COUNTER-ATTACK 


steadfastness  and  gallantly  whenever  tlic^^  have  been 
called  upon.” 

'Idiese  words,  springing  from  the  full  knowdedge 
of  detailed  operations  wdiicli  the  foregoing  pages 
have  attempted  to  provide,  are  a sufficient  reply  to 
much  ill-informed  contemporaiy  criticism. 


CHAPTER  XV 

NEW  FRONT  TAKEN  OVER  AFTER  A SHORT  REST 

Short  period  of  rest — Changes  in  commands — Preparations  for  the  future 
— Territorial  Battalions — Trying  weather— Strength  of  the  Indian 
Corps — New  front  taken  over. 

After  two  months  of  constant  combat  with  the 
enemy  and  the  elements,  the  troops  were  greatly 
in  need  of  a rest.  Death,  wounds,  and  sickness  had 
taken  a grievous  toll,  and  a period  of  at  least  com- 
parative quiet  was  necessary  to  enable  the  Corps  to 
recuperate  its  strength  and  to  overhaul  its  equip- 
ment. 

The  extent  to  which  the  Corps  had  suffered  in 
the  short  space  of  two  months  can  be  seen  from  the 
following  table  of  casualties  up  to  the  31st  December, 
1914 


Killed. 

Wounded. 

Missing. 

British  ofiScers  . 

. 104 

148 

40 

Indian  officers  . 

. 39 

96 

31 

Other  ranks,  British 

. 349 

1246 

566 

Other  ranks,  Indian . 

. 905 

4370 

1685 

Total 

. 1397 

5860 

2322 

The  orders  which  were  issued  towards  the  end  of 
December  for  the  troops  to  move  into  billets  were 
therefore  very  w^elcome,  but  the  period  of  rest  was 
not  to  be  as  long  as  then  seemed  likely. 

At  the  beginning  of  January,  1915,  a number 


200 


NEW  FRONT  TAKEN  OVER 


of  clianges  were  made  in  Divisional  and  Brigade 
Commands. 

Major-General  H.  D’U.  Keary,  C,B.,  D.S.O., 
succeeded  Lt-General  Watkis  in  the  command  of 
the  Lahore  Division,  the  latter  being  subsequently 
appointed  a Knight  Commander  of  the  Bath. 

Lt-Colonel  C.  G.  Blackader,  D.S.O.,  2nd 
Leicester’s,  took  over  the  Garhwal  Brigade  from 
Major-General  Kear^u 

Lt-Colonel  E.  P.  Strickland,  C.M.G.,  D.S.O., 
Lst  Manchesters,  relieved  Major-General  Carnegy, 
who  was  invalided,  in  tlie  Jullundur  Brigade. 

Colonel  W.  G.  Walker,  V.C.,  C.B.,  ]/4th  Gurkhas, 
took  over  tlie  Sirhind  Brigade  from  Major-General 
Brunker,  and  Lt-Colonel  W.  M.  Southey  the  Bareilly 
Br  igade  from  Brigadier-Gerreral  Macbearr. 

(Jolonel  C.  W.  Jacob  succeeded  Brigadier-General 
Johnsorr  m the  Dehra  Durr  Brigade. 

Although  tire  Corps  was  resthrg  in  billets,  it  will 
not  be  srrpposed  that  it  was  idle.  The  past  irronths 
of  fierce  fighting,  of  a description  irovel  to  all  en- 
gaged, had  revealed  many  flaws  irr  orrr  harness, 
nrairy  superfluities  and  nrany  deficiencies  in  our 
equipmerrt,  arrd  every  use  was  made  of  the  present 
opporturrity  to  rectify  omissions  arrd  to  guard  against 
futm-e  defects.  The  troops  were  constantly  exercised 
in  operations  conrrected  with  trerrch  warfare,  such  as 
firing  trench  mortars  arrd  rifle  grerrades,  the  use  of 
bombs,  and  the  advarrce  on  arrd  occrrpation  of 
hostile  trenches. 

Day  after  day,  withorrt  a pause,  the  work  went 
orr,  while  at  the  same  tinre  gaps  irr  the  ranks  were 
being  closed  by  the  reinforcerrrents  which  arrived 
in  a steady  flow.  Sir  James  Willcocks,  according  to 


TERRITORIALS  ARRIVE 


201 


his  usual  practice,  devoted  his  leisure  to  making 
the  acquaintance  of  the  officers  and  men  under  his 
command. 

During  December,  1914,  the  2nd  Battalion  Con- 
naught Rangers,  the  4th  Battalion  London  Regiment, 
the  4th  Battalion  Sutfolks,  the  4th  Battalion  Sea- 
forths  (the  last  three  being  Territorials)  had  joined 
the  Corps.  The  interlude  gave  the  Corps  Com- 
mander a chance  of  making  a thorough  inspection 
of  these  Territorial  units.  He  formed  at  once  an 
opinion  of  their  military  value  which  later  ex])eri- 
ence  most  fully  justified. 

It  must  be  borne  in  mind  that  when  in  future  we 
speak  of  the  Indian  Corps,  reference  is  made  (a)  to 
the  British  and  Indian  battalions,  artillery,  etc., 
which  constituted  the  Corps  on  arrival  in  France ; 
and  (b)  to  the  Territorial  and  other  units  which 
joined  later. 

The  effect  of  the  withdrawal  from  the  trenches 
and  the  consequent  stocktaking  was  very  striking. 
The  constant  strain  and  exposure  of  the  past  months 
had  found  out  the  weaklings,  and  had  tended  to 
harden  those  who  had  won  through,  but  the  lack 
of  active  exercise,  so  long  continued,  had  unavoidably 
impaired  to  a serious  degree  the  marching  powers, 
and  therefore  the  efficiency,  of  the  men  in  the  event 
of  a prolonged  advance.  For  weeks  they  had  been 
soaking  in  the  mud  and  water  of  the  trenches,  and 
their  feet  had  suffered  to  such  an  extent  as  to  render 
hard  marching  an  impossibility  for  a large  proportion 
of  the  troops. 

To  remeciv  this  evil,  route  marching  was  now 
practised  several  times  a week,  with  the  result  that 
after  a short  time  the  feet  began  to  harden  again. 


202 


NEW  FRONT  TAKEN  OVER 


the  number  of  men  falling  out  became  less  and  less, 
and  by  the  end  of  its  rest  the  Corps  as  a whole  was 
once  more  in  sound  fighting  condition. 

At  the  same  time  the  refitting  of  the  troops  pro- 
ceeded apace.  Trench  warfare  is  particularly  de- 
structive of  materiel,  and  the  constant  exposure  to 
rain,  snow,  and  mud  had  worn  out  many  articles 
of  clothing  and  equipment.  These  were  now  re- 
placed, while  advantage  was  taken  of  the  opportunity 
to  provide  new  forms  of  arms  and  equipment  which 
past  experience,  gained  in  a cruel  school,  had  shown  to 
bo  necessary. 

During  the  actual  progress  of  operations  it  is 
difficult,  if  not  impossible,  to  enforce  modifications, 
of  existing  practice,  or  to  inculcate  improved  methods 
in  such  a manner  as  to  secime  the  requisite  degree 
of  uniformity,  and  at  the  same  time  to  render  the 
changes  intelligible  to  every  grade  of  intellect. 
To  this  end  conferences  and  demonstrations  are 
necessary,  and  the  period  of  rest  was  utilized  to  the 
full.  Instruction  was  given  to  all  officers  of  the 
Corps  in  day  and  night  attacks,  the  construction  of 
trenches,  supply  of  ammunition  in  the  field,  and  the 
use  of  bombs.  The  future  was  to  show  that  the 
time  available  had  been  well  employed. 

On  the  15th  January,  1915,  the  Jullundur  and 
Sir  hind  Brigades  relieved  a portion  of  the  2nd 
Division,  1st  Corps,  in  the  trenches,  the  last-named 
Brigade  being  in  the  front  line  with  the  Jullundur 
Brigade  in  reserve.  The  weather  during  January 
continued  to  be  of  a very  trying  nature.  Heavy 
rain  fell,  accompanied  by  high,  cutting  winds,  and 
in  severe  alternation,  snowstorms  were  frequent. 
The  whole  country  was  a wilderness  of  mud,  and 


HAVILDAR  SUCHA  SINGH  203 

offensive  operations  became  impossible  for  both 
sides. 

During  this  month  we  were  very  active  in  our 
mining  operations,  borrowing  many  ideas  from  the 
enemjds  initiative.  On  one  occasion  a parW  of 
the  1st  King  George’s  Own  Sappers  and  Miners  were 
employed,  under  the  command  of  Captain  C.  A.  Bird, 
R.E.,  in  making  a mine  gallery  towards  a German 
saphead  which  was  about  30  j^ards  away.  A charge 
had  been  placed  in  position  and  was  being  tamped, 
when  the  enemy  began  bombarding  the  place  with 
a medium  trench  mortar  which  was  then  new  to  us. 
A number  of  the  men  in  the  trench  were  killed  or 
buried  in  debris. 

Havildar  Sucha  Singh  of  the  Sappers  was  in 
charge  of  the  work  in  the  mine  shaft.  He  temporarily 
withdrew  his  party  to  assist  in  getting  out  those  who 
had  been  buried.  Having  done  this,  he  again  went 
down  the  shaft  to  finish  off  the  tamping  and  complete 
the  preparations  for  blowing  up  the  mine,  in  spite  of 
the  fact  that  twm  trench-mortar  bombs  had  fallen 
dhectly  on  the  roof  of  the  gallery,  breaking  two  of 
the  supporting  frames,  and  that  his  party  w^as  isolated 
as  our  trench  had  been  evacuated.  Havildar  Sucha 
Singh  finished  his  work  with  the  utmost  coolness 
and  withchew  his  men,  afterwards  receiving  the 
Indian  Distinguished  Service  Medal  for  his  con- 
spicuous gallantry. 

On  the  24th  January,  the  two  Lahore  Brigades 
were  relieved  by  two  Brigades  of  the  Meerut  Division. 
The  fighting  strength  of  the  Corps  on  the  28th 
January  amounted  to  20,736  rifles ; 880  sabres  ; 
114  guns  ; 4000  artillery  personnel. 


204 


NEW  FRONT  TAKEN  OVER 


Oasiialtios  up  to  the  1st  Felfruary,  1915:— 


Killed. 

Wounded. 

Missing. 

British  officers  . 

. lor 

157 

40 

Indian  officers  . 

. 42 

97 

32 

Otlier  ranks,  British  . 

. 358 

1293 

576 

Other  ranks,  Indian  . 

. 925 

4442 

1687 

Total 

. 1429 

5989 

2335 

On  the  2nd  February,  the  front  already  held  by 
tlie  Meerut  Division,  together  with  the  left  portion  of 
the  line  occupied  by  the  1st  Corps  as  far  south  as  the 
Rue  de  Cailloux — La  Quincpie  Rue,  was  taken  over 
by  tlie  Indian  C’orps,  the  Meerut  Division  being  in 
the  front  line  witli  Lahore  in  reserve. 

February  ])assed  without  any  special  incident  on 
tlie  Indian  Corps  front.  The  artillery  on  both  sides 
was  fairly  active,  the  enemy’s  guns  frequently 
shelling  Richebourg  St  Vaast  and  Rue  du  Bois,  but 
the  casualties  caused  were  insignihcant  in  number. 


CHAPTER  XVJ 


THE  BATTLE  OE  NEUVE  CHAPELLE 


Success  of  the  French  in  Champagne  in  January,  1915 — German  troops 
diverted  from  other  fronts — Situation  at  commencement  of  March — 
French  methods  of  offensive — Value  of  surprise — Operations  round 
A'euve  Chapelle  decided  on — Splendid  services  of  the  Flying  Corps — ■ 
Operation  orders — Strength  of  Meerut  Division — Description  of 
ground — Preparations  for  attack — Special  order  by  Sir  Douglas  Haig 
before  the  battle — Preparatory  bomljardment  by  480  guns — Activity 
of  our  aviators  on  hostile  communications — Attack  by  Garhwal 
Brigade — Gallantry  of  2/39th  Garhwalis — Rifleman  Gobar  Sing  Negi 
gains  the  V.C. — Dashing  attack  of  the  2/3rd  Gm’khas — Major 
Tillard,  D.S.O. — Rifleman  Gane  Gmmng  captures  eight  Germans — 
The  2/3rd  Gurkhas  the  fu’st  regiment  to  enter  Neuve  Chapelle — 
The  i/39th  Garhwalis  find  German  wire  uncut — Splendid  behaviour 
of  the  battalion — Bravery  of  Lieutenant  Cammell,  R.F.A. — 200 
yards  of  trench  taken,  b\it  attack  isolated — All  British  officers 
killed — Colonel  Swhiey  wounded,  but  continues  to  command — 
2nd  Lcicesters  attack  with  thek  usual  gallantry — Trench  captured 
— Captain  Romilly  leads  bombing  party  to  assist  l/39th  Garliwali; — 
Captain  Hobart,  R.E. — Private  William  Buckmgham  gains  the  V.C. 
— Attack  by  1st  Scaforths  and  l/3rd  Londons  to  help  1^9th  Garhwalis 
—Splendid  charge  by  Londons — Trencli  taken — Gallant  conduct  of 
Captain  Taylor,  I.M.S. — Heavy  losses  of  l/39th  Garhwalis- — Position 
on  the  night  of  10th  March. 

During  the  months  of  January  and  February,  1915, 
the  French  under  General  Langle  de  Carv  were 
heavily  and  successfully  engaged  in  Champagne, 
where  they  carried  the  town  of  Perthes  with  an 
important  hill  in  the  neighbourhood,  and  towmrds 
the  end  of  February  captured  a very  strong  position 
north  of  Beau  Sejour. 

The  value  of  these  operations  lay,  not  only  in 


206  BATTLE  OF  NEUVE  CHAPELLE 

the  moral  and  material  effects  of  the  recapture  of 
ground  from  the  enemy,  but  also  in  the  fact  that  the 
Germans  were  compelled  to  divert  large  bodies  of 
troops  from  the  Eastern  front,  as  well  as  from  other 
portions  of  their  line  in  the  West,  in  order  to  stay 
the  progress  of  the  French.  Amongst  these  troops 
were  the  6th  Corps  from  Silesia,  the  8th  Corps  from 
the  Crown  Prince’s  army  in  the  Argonne,  and  six 
battalions  of  Prussian  Guards  from  the  neighbour- 
hood of  Ypres.  It  was  also  believed  that  for  the 
same  purpose  the  enemy’s  line  opposite  La  Bassee 
and  Lille  had  been  considerably  depleted,  and  that 
the  onl}^  immediately  available  reinforcements  con- 
sisted of  a body  of  troops,  principally  Bavarian  and 
Saxon,  which  was  in  billets  at  Roubaix  on  relief  from 
the  trenches  round  Ypres. 

The  position  at  the  commencement  of  March  was 
as  follows  ; — 

The  line  from  Dixmude  southwards  to  the  apex 
of  the  Ypres  salient  was  held  by  French  troops, 
interspersed  amongst  whom  were  British  cavalry. 
To  the  south  again  was  the  5th  Corps  commanded 
bv  General  Plumer,  in  touch  with  which  was  the  2nd 
Corps.  The  3rd  Corps  under  General  Pulteney 
occupied  its  old  position  opposite  Armentieres, 
whence  the  line  was  continued  southwards  from 
Estaires  to  the  west  of  Neuve  Chapelle  by  the  4th 
Corps  under  General  Rawlinson.  Thence  the  Indian 
Corps  under  General  Willcocks  held  the  line  as  far 
as  Givenchy,  where  it  linked  up  with  the  1st  Corps, 
which  was  in  touch  with  General  Maud’huy’s  10th 
(French)  Army  across  the  La  Bassee  Canal. 

The  conditions  created  by  the  success  of  the 
French  in  Champagne  were  thought  to  be  favourable 


REASONS  FOR  OFFENSIVE 


207 


to  otiensive  operations  by  the  British,  and  a decision 
to  this  effect  had  been  arrived  at  by  the  end  of 
February,  To  quote  Sn  John  French’s  words  in 
his  despatch  of  the  5th  April,  1915  : — 

“ About  the  end  of  February  many  vital  con- 
siderations induced  me  to  believe  that  a vigorous 
offensive  movement  by  the  forces  under  my  com- 
mand should  be  planned  and  carried  out  at  the 
earliest  possible  moment. 

“ i^mongst  the  more  important  reasons  Avhich 
convinced  me  of  the  necessity  were — 

“The  general  aspect  of  the  Allied  situation  through- 
out Europe,  and  particularly  the  marked  success  of 
the  Russian  Army  in  repelling  the  violent  onslaughts 
of  Marshal  Von  Hindenburg  ; the  apparent  weaken- 
ing of  the  enemy  in  my  front,  and  the  necessity  for 
assisting  our  Russian  Allies  to  the  utmost  by  holding 
as  many  hostile  troops  as  possible  in  the  Western 
theatre  ; the  efforts  to  this  end  which  were  being 
made  by  the  French  Forces  at  Arras  and  Cham- 
pagne ; and  perhaps  the  most  weighty  consideration 
of  all,  the  need  of  fostering  the  offensive  spirit  in  the 
troops  under  my  command,  after  the  trying  and 
possibly  enervating  experiences  which  they  had  gone 
through  of  a severe  winter  in  the  trenches.” 

The  chief  lesson  learned  from  the  Champagne 
offensive  was  that,  given  a sufficient  concentration 
of  artillery  on  any  section  of  front,  and  the  employ- 
ment of  an  adequate  force  of  infantry,  an  attack  on 
the  section  bombarded  was  practically  certain  to 
succeed. 

The  method  employed  by  the  French  (to  whose 
intuition  and  originality  the  debt  of  om-  Staff  is  as 
evident  as  it  has  been  continuous)  was  to  batter  the 


208  BATTLE  OF  NEUVE  CHAPELLE 


iiostile  trenches  and  obstacles  out  of  existence,  then 
to  lift  the  guns  and  to  establish  such  a curtain  or 
barrage  of  hre  as  to  render  the  arrival  of  reinforce- 
ments impossible.  Under  cover  of  this  hre,  the 
infantry  could  advance  and  occup}/  the  position  with 
comparatively  small  loss.  The  only  danger  of  failure 
lay  in  the  possibility  that  the  enemy,  by  means  of 
aerial  I’econnaissance  or  the  operations  of  spies,  might 
become  aware  of  the  plan  and  defeat  it  by  massing 
guns  on  the  sector  selected  for  attack. 

The  portion  of  the  enemy’s  line  chosen  for  the 
British  offensive  was  that  covering  the  Aullage  of 
Neuve  Cfiapelle,  in  rear  of  which  lay  the  Aubers 
ridge  anti  the  city  of  Lille.  We  have  alread3^  seen  that 
on  the  16th  October,  1914,  the  2nd  Corps  under 
General  Smith-Dorrien  took  the  village,  and  on  the 
17th  reached  Aubers  and  Herlies,  one  ])attalion, 
the  Royal  Irish,  even  capturing  Le  Pilly,  three  and 
a half  miles  to  the  east  of  Neuve  Chapelle.  The 
Germans  then  developed  a counter-offensive,  which 
})ushed  us  back  until  our  line  ran  just  east  of  Neuve 
C'hapelle,  which  village  was  cajitured  by  the  enemy 
on  the  27th  October.  On  the  28th  it  was  retaken 
by  the  Indian  Corps,  after  a most  gallant  action, 
but  owing  to  the  lack  of  support,  we  were  again 
driven  out,  and  from  the  commencement  of  Novem- 
ber our  line  ran  well  to  the  west  of  the  village  ; and 
so  it  remained  throughout  the  winter. 

A glance  at  the  map  will  show  that  Neuve  Chapelle 
formed  an  enemy  salient  which  it  was  eminently 
desirable  to  straighten  out,  if  this  object  could  be 
achieved  without  excessive  loss.  Moreover,  during 
January  and  February,  1915,  there  had  been  a com- 
plete lull  on  this  section  of  the  line,  and  there  was 


OUR  AVIATORS 


209 


reason  to  hope  that  the  Germans  might  here  be 
caught  off  their  guard.  As  before  remarked,  the 
one  condition  absolutely  necessary  to  success  was 
secrecy. 

The  task  of  a commander  in  the  field  has  been 
rendered  infinitely  more  difficult  in  recent  years  by 
the  introduction  of  aerial  reconnaissance.  From  the 
eye  of  the  bird-men  who  hover  over  the  scene  of 
operations  little  can  be  concealed.  Pliotographs  are 
taken  by  them  which  reveal  the  smallest  changes  in 
the  disposition  of  the  hostile  forces.  Bodies  of 
troops  on  the  march,  the  movements  of  batteries 
or  supply  columns,  the  presence  of  any  unusual 
amount  of  rolling  stock  at  a railw^ay  station  are  at 
once  detected  and  reported,  and  inferences  are 
drawn  which  may  be  fatal  to  the  enterprise.  In 
fact,  if  the  aviators  obtam  free  range,  surprise  on  an 
important  scale  is  impossible.  The  operations  of 
the  flying  men  can  only  be  prevented  by  the  opposing 
air  squadrons  or  by  the  occurrence  of  fogs  or  of 
clouds  lying  at  such  a low  altitude  as  to  force  scout- 
ing machines  to  within  close  range  of  the  hostile 
anti-aircraft  guns. 

Such  success  (and  it  was  not  in  perspective 
very  considerable)  as  attended  the  operations  of 
March,  1915,  round  Neuve  Chapelle  was  rendered 
possible  by  the  gallantry  and  zeal  of  our  Flying 
Corps.  To  appreciate  this  fact,  it  is  only  necessary 
to  consider  that  our  attack  on  the  10th  March,  on 
which  date  the  surprise  of  the  enemy  was  complete, 
succeeded  to  the  full.  Had  we  then  been  able  to 
push  on,  it  is  possible,  though  far  from  certain,  that 
our  more  distant  objectives  would  have  been  reached, 
but  owing  to  unforeseen  delays,  the  enemy  obtained 


210  BATTLE  OF  NEUVE  CHAPELLE 


siifficioiit  breathing  time  to  enable  him  to  overtake 
the  advantage  which  the  element  of  surprise  had 
conferred  upon  us,  with  the  result  that  oim  sub- 
secpient  operations  were  hnalty  checked  and  at  last 
perforce  abandoned. 

For  weeks  previous  to  the  battle,  our  airmen  had 
made  a deliberate  and  in  the  main  a successful 
challenge  to  the  German  planes,  with  the  result  that 
they  liad  obtained  such  a degree  of  ascendancy  as 
rendered  it  impossible  for  their  rivals  to  carry  any 
constant  or  relial^le  information. 

The  scope  of  the  operations  was  defined  in  an 
order  issued  on  the  9th  March.  The  attack  on 
Neuve  Chapelle  was  to  be  undertaken  by  the  4th  and 
Indian  Corps,  the  8th  Division  of  tlie  former  and  the 
Meerut  Division  of  tlie  latter  Corps  suppling  the 
assaulting  troops. 

The  strength  of  the  Meerut  Division  on  the  lOth 
March  was  as  follows  : — 

British  officers,  250  ; Indian  officers,  148 ; British, 
other  ranks,  4915;  Indian,  other  ranks,  6369;  total, 
11,682  all  ranks,  exclusive  of  Staff,  Cavalry,  Artillery, 
and  Engineers. 

Composition  of  Brigades  on  the  10th  March, 
1915 

Lahore  Divisioisr. 

JullundiiT  Brigade. 

Commander ; Brigadier-General  E.  P.  Strickland, 
C.M.G.,  D.S.O. 

1st  Manchesters. 

4th  Suffolks  (Territorials). 

47th  Sikhs. 

59th  Rifles. 


REORGANIZATION  211 

Sirhind  Brigade. 

Commander  : Brigadier- General  W.  G.  Walker,  V.C., 

C. B. 

1st  Highland  Light  Infantry. 

4th  King’s  (Liverpool)  Regiment  (Special  Reserve). 
15th  Silchs. 

1/lst  Gurkha  Rifles. 
l/4th  Gurkha  Rifles. 

Ferozepore  Brigade. 

Commander  : Brigadier-General  R.  M.  Egerton,  C.B. 
Connaught  Rangers. 

4th  London  Regiment  (Territorials). 

57th  Rifles. 

129th  Baluchis. 

Divisional  Battalion,  9th  Bhopal  Infantr}^ 

Meerut  Division. 

Dehra  Dun  Brigade. 

Commander  : Brigadier-General  C.  W.  Jacob. 

1st  Seaforths. 

4th  Seaforths  (Territorials). 

2/ 2nd  Gurkha  Rifles. 
l/9th  Gurkha  Rifles. 

Garhwal  Brigade. 

Commander : Brigadier-General  C.  G.  Blackader, 

D. S.O. 

2nd  Leic  esters. 

3rd  London  Regiment  (Territorials). 
l/39th  Garhwal  Rifles. 

2/ 39th  Garhwal  Rifles. 

2/3rd  Gurkha  Rifles. 


212  BATTLE  OF  NEUVE  CHAPELLE 


Bareilly  Brigade. 

Commander  : Brigadier- General  W.  M.  Southey. 

2nd  Black  Watch. 

4th  Black  Watch  (Territorials). 

6th  Jats. 

41st  Dogras. 

58th  Rifles. 

Divisional  Battalion,  2/8th  Gurkha  Rifles. 

The  125th  Rifles  were  lent  to  the  4th  (hrps  for 
work  on  communications. 

fldie  immediate  ol)jective  was  the  enem3ds  trenches 
west  of  Neuve  Chapelle,  and  the  occupation  of  a line 
to  the  east  of  the  diamond-shaped  figure  formed  by 
the  main  road  from  Estaires  to  La  Bassee,  the  road 

Fleurbaix  to  Armentieres,  and  that  which  con- 
nects the  two.  In  the  northern  angle  of  this  diamond 
lies  the  village  of  Neuve  Chapelle.  The  general 
object  of  tlie  attaclc  was  to  enable  the  4th  and  Indian 
Corps  to  establish  themselves  on  a more  forward  line 
to  the  east,  the  ultimate  objective  being  the  high 
ground  on  which  are  situated  the  villages  of  Aubers 
and  Ligny-le-Grand,  with  the  intention  finally  of 
cutting  off  that  portion  of  the  enemy’s  troops  which 
held  the  line  between  Neuve  Chapelle  and  La 
Bassee. 

The  artillerv  of  the  Meerut  Division,  reinforced 
by  that  of  the  Lahore  Division  and  heavy  guns,  was 
to  carry  out  a preliminary  bombardment,  com- 
mencing at  7.30  a.m.  on  the  10th  March,  and  lasting 
for  35  minutes.  The  objects  of  this  bombardment 
were — 

{a)  to  demolish  the  enemy’s  obstacles  ; 

[h]  to  destro}^  the  enemy  in  his  trenches  ; 


DESCRIPTION  OF  THE  GROUND  213 


(c)  to  put  up  a curtain  of  fire  in  rear  of  the 
hostile  trenches  in  order  to  prevent  the 
arrival  of  reserves  ; 

{d)  to  cover  the  southern  section,  which  was  not 
attacking  ; 

(e)  to  engage  the  enemy’s  batteries. 

A short  description  of  the  ground  will  enal)le  the 
reader  to  follow  the  course  of  the  action  with  greater 
ease  and  clearness.  Eastward  from  our  front  lay 
the  village  of  Neuve  Chapelle,  in  pre-war  times  a 
typical  French  townlet,  with  its  centre  street  lined 
by  estaminets,  small  shops  and  neat  dwelling-houses, 
while  on  the  outskirts  were  the  villas  of  the  better- 
to-do  residents.  The  most  prominent  buildings  were 
the  white  church  on  the  left  of  the  main  street,  the 
brewery  in  the  south-east  corner  of  the  village,  and 
a small  chateau  to  the  north-east  of  the  church. 
The  village  was  already  in  a half-ruined  condition 
as  the  effect  of  the  previous  sanguinaiy  fighting  in 
October,  1914,  but  as  compared  with  the  state  in 
which  it  was  left  by  the  bombardment  and  counter- 
bombardments of  the  10th  March,  1915,  and  follow- 
ing da3^s,  it  might  almost  bo  described  as  in  good 
repair. 

Between  our  line  and  the  village  lay  fields,  inter- 
sected by  deep  ditches  and  cut  up  by  hedges.  The 
going  was  terrible,  as  the  recent  heavy  rains  had 
converted  the  plough  into  holding  bog.  Further 
to  the  east,  at  a distance  of  about  two  miles  south- 
west of  Lille,  commences  a ridge  which,  running  in 
a horse-shoe  shape,  connects  the  villages  of  lilies 
and  Aubers,  both  of  which  were  occupied  by  the 
enenn^  Between  the  two  villages  is  a plateau,  the 
importance  of  which  to  us  lay  in  the  fact  that  its 


214  BATTLE  OF  NEUVE  CHAPELLE 


capture,  while  depriving  the  enemj;^  of  the  great 
advantages  accruing  from  his  possession  of  the  high 
ground,  would  give  us  command  of  the  approaches 
to  the  three  great  manufacturing  centres  of  Lille, 
Roubaix,  and  Tourcoing. 

Between  Neuve  Chapelle  and  the  Anbers  ridge 
runs  the  stream  known  as  the  river  Des  Layes,  a 
tributary  of  the  Lys,  with  a width  of  6 to  10  feet, 
and  a depth  at  that  season  of  3 to  44  feet.  The 
enemy  had  constructed  a second  line  of  defence 
along  the  eastern  side  of  the  stream,  with  strong 
bridge  heads. 

A large  wood,  consisting  mainly  of  3mung  trees 
Avith  a thick  undergrowth,  called  the  Bois  du  Biez, 
lies  to  the  south-east  of  Neuve  Chapelle,  while 
further  east  is  the  Bois  de  Pommereau  on  the  ridge 
south  of  Aubers. 

The  preparations  for  the  attack  in  that  section 
which  was  committed  to  the  Indian  Corps,  large- 
scaled  as  they  were,  were  of  the  most  minute  descrip- 
tion, eliminating,  as  far  as  human  foresight  could, 
the  element  of  chance.  Two  lines  of  breastworks 
Avere  constructed  in  rear  of  our  trenches  along  the 
Estaires — La  Bassee  road,  from  Port  Arthur  to  the 
Rue  des  Berceaux,  to  afford  cover  to  the  troops 
Avhen  forming  up  for  the  assault.  Strong  com- 
munication breastworks  Avere  completed  to  the  front 
line.  Drains  and  water-courses  were  bridged,  as 
many  as  105  such  bridges  being  put  into  position 
over  the  ditch  in  rear  of  our  trenches  on  the  La 
Bassee  road.  Numbers  of  step  ladders  were  pro- 
vided to  enable  the  infantry  to  get  over  the  parapets. 
Barricades  and  screens  were  everywhere  strengthened. 
Bombs,  rations,  ammunition,  spare  bridges,  planks. 


TROOPS  DETAILED  FOR  THE  ASSAULT  215 


hurdles,  pickets,  sandbags,  plain  and  barbed  ’wire, 
■were  stocked  at  various  advauiced  depots. 

From  the  7th  March  onwards,  all  the  artillery 
of  the  Lahore  and  Meerut  Divisions  and  No.  1 Group 
G.H.Q.  Heavy  xMAillery  was  brought  into  position 
and  carried  out  registration  of  targets.  During  the 
lirst  week  of  March  several  conferences  took  place 
between  the  Corps  and  Divisional  Staffs,  following 
on  which,  instructions  outlining  the  operations  were 
issued,  details  being  worked  out  by  the  Divisional 
and  Brigade  Staffs.  On  the  8th  March,  a final 
general  conference  was  held,  when  full  details  were 
considered  and  settled. 

The  GarhAval  Brigade  under  Brigadier- General 
Blackader  was  detailed  for  the  assault,  the  Dehra 
Dun  Brigade  under  Brigadier-General  Jacob  being 
in  support,  while  the  Bareilly  Brigade  under 
Brigadier- General  Southey  was  to  hold  our  line 
during  the  attack.  The  wire  in  front  of  our  trenches 
was  to  be  cut,  and  bridges  were  to  be  x^ut  in  position 
over  the  ditches  between  our  line  and  that  of  the 
enemy  by  the  Bareilly  Brigade,  under  cover  of 
darkness,  on  the  night  of  the  9th-10th  March. 
Finally,  aU  troops  were  to  be  in  position  by  4.30  a.m. 
on  the  10th. 

On  the  9th  March  the  following  special  order  by 
General  Sir  Douglas  Haig  was  published  : — 

“ To  THE  1st  Army. 

“ We  are  about  to  engage  the  enemy  under  very 
favourable  conditions.  Until  now  in  the  present 
campaign,  the  British  Army  has,  by  its  pluck  and 
determination,  gained  victories  against  an  enemy 
greatly  superior  in  men  and  guns. 


216  BATTLE  OF  NEUVE  CHAPELLE 


“ Kcinforcenieiits  have  made  us  stronger  than 
the  enemy  in  our  front.  .Our  guns  are  now  both 
more  numerous  than  the  enem3ds  are, , and  are  also 
larger  than  any  hitherto  used  by  any  army  in  the 
held. 

“ Our  Flying  Corps  has  driven  the  enemy  from 
the  air. 

“ On  the  Eastern  front,  aiid  to  south  of  us,  our 
Allies  have  made  marked  progress  and  caused 
enormous  losses  to  the  Germans,  wdio  are,  moreover, 
harassed  by  internal  troubles  and  shortage  of  supplies, 
so  that  there  is  little  prospect  at  present  of  big  re- 
inforcements being  sent  against  us  here. 

“In  froiit  of  us  w-e  have  only  one  German  Corps, 
spread  out  on  a front  as  large  as  that  occupied  by 
the  whiole  of  our  Army  (the  First). 

“ We  are  now  about  to  attack  with  about  48 
battalions  a locality  in  that  front  wdiich  is  held  by 
some  three  German  battalions.  It  seems  probable, 
also,  that  for  the  first  day  of  the  operations  the 
Germans  will  not  have  more  than  four  battalions 
available  for  the  counter-attack. 

“ Quickness  of  movement  is  therefore  of  fust 
importance  to  enable  us  to  forestall  the  enemy,  and 
thereby  gain  success  without  severe  loss. 

“ At  no  time  in  the  Avar  has  there  been  a more 
favourable  moment  for  us,  and  I feel  confident  of 
success.  The  extent  of  that  success  must  depend 
on  the  rapidity  and  determination  with  which  we 
advance. 

“ Although  fighting  in  France,  let  us  remember 
that  Ave  are  fighting  to  preserve  the  British  Empire, 
and  to  protect  our  homes  against  the  organized 
savagery  of  the  German  Arnn'. 


UNFAVOURABLE  WEATHER 


217 


“ To  ensure  success  each  one  of  ns  must  pla}’^  his 
part,  and  fight  like  men  for  the  Honour  of  Old 
England.” 

The  spirit  and  vigour  of  these  admonitions  Avere 
alike  admirable.  Their  summary  of  th-e  military 
situation  was  perhaps  a little  upon  the  optimistic 
side. 

After  dark  on  the  9th  March,  the  movement  of 
troops  to  their  appointed  positions  commenced,  and 
continued  throughout  the  night,  until  by  the  early 
morning  of  the  10th,  the  GarliAval  Brigade  was 
formed  for  attack  in  Port  Arthur  and  in  trenches  and 
breasUrorks  along  the  La  Bassee — Estaires  road, 
vdiile  the  Dehra.  Dun  Brigade  was  assembled  in 
position  to  support,  the  Avhole  defensNe  line  of  the 
Indian  Corps  being  occupied  by  the  Bo.reilly  Brigade. 

The  night  of  the  9th  March  was  cheerless  in  the 
extreme,  the  cold  was  intense  and  snow  fell  at 
intervals.  Later,  the  Aveather  improA'ed  and  a fi'ost 
set  in,  Avhich  to  some  extent  assisted  the  advance. 

The  morning  of  the  10th  March  broke  cold  and 
misty,  loAv-lying  clouds  rendering  aerial  recon- 
naissance both  difficult  and  dangerous.  At  the  first 
streak  of  daAvn  our  guns  began  a final  registration  on 
their  objectives,  and  although  there  Avas  nothing  to 
differentiate  the  fire  of  that  morning  from  the  usual 
“ morning  hate,”  the  suspicions  of  the  enemy  appear 
to  liaAm  been  aroused. 

It  Avas  subsequently  ascertained  that  German 
patrols  had  reported  that  our  trenches  AAnre  packed 
Avith  men,  and  that  requests  for  artiller}'  hro  were 
sent  back  from  the  enemy’s  front  line,  but  the 
Aviser  heads  in  rear  apparently  considered  it  to  be  a 


218  BATTLE  OF  NEUVE  CHAPELLE 


false  alarm,  and  the  steps  which  might  have  had  a 
far-reaching  effect  on  the  operations  were  not 
taken. 

At  7 a.m.  a German  aeroplane,  greatly  daring, 
suddenly  appeared  over  Port  Arthur,  flying  at  a 
lieight  of  three  to  four  hundred  feet  only.  The  fact 
that  our  line  was  crammed  with  troops  could  not 
escape  the  notice  of  the  observer,  and  very  sliortly 
after  the  machine  had  flown  away  to  the  north  the 
enemy  commenced  a heavy  bombardment  of  the 
position,  which,  in  the  crowded  state  of  the  trenches, 
caused  a large  number  of  casualties  among  the 
2nd  Leicesters  and  l/39th  Garhwalis  who  were 
assembled  at  that  spot.  At  7.30  a.m.  our  bombard- 
ment broke  out  in  all  its  fury.  The  experience 
gained  from  the  French  operations  round  Perthes 
had  been  utilized  to  good  purpose  by  Sir  John 
French.  The  length  of  the  front  to  be  attacked  was 
little  more  than  tv^o  miles,  and  against  this  the 
British  had  massed  nearly  480  guns  and  howitzers, 
while  the  supply  of  amniunition  for  a 35  minutes’ 
bombardment  was  said  to  have  been  greater  than 
the  amount  used  by  the  French  at  Perthes  in  a week. 

Many  attempts  have  been  made  to  describe  the 
sound  of  a great  bombardment,  but  exuberant  and 
lioAving  as  has  been  the  language  in  many  cases 
employed,  every  description  has  failed  to  convey 
a true  sense  of  the  reality.  To  obtain  a,  slight  idea 
of  vrhat  such  a bombardment  means  to  the  enemy, 
one  need  go  no  further  them  to  our  own  troops. 
An  officer  who  was  in  the  front  line  describes  his  own 
sensation  as  the  shells  passed  overhead  as  one  of 
semi-stupefaction,  coupled  with  an  intense  desire 
to  hold  on  to  something  in  order  to  keep  on  his  feet. 


EFFECT  OF  THE  BOMBARDMENT  219 


It  was  quite  impossible  to  hear  one’s  self  speak,  for 
it  must  be  remembered  that  while  the  shells  from 
the  heaviest  guns  firing  far  in  rear  ascend  to  the 
height  of  Mont  Blanc,  those  of  the  18-pounders  of 
the  field  batteries,  firing  with  very  low  trajectorj^, 
pass  at  a height  of  only  a few  feet  above  the  heads  of 
the  troops  in  the  trenches,  with  a screech  and  a 
whuT  which  are  peculiarly  nerve-shaking,  for  there 
is  always  the  chance  that  a short  burst  may  land  a 
shell  in  one’s  own  trench  instead  of  in  that  of  the 
enemy. 

If  the  bombardment  was  so  disconcerting  for  our 
own  men,  what  must  it  have  been  for  the  Germans  ? 
The  18-pounders  kept  up  an  intense  fire  on  the 
enemy’s  wire,  the  15-inch,  9*2  and  6-inch  howitzers 
plunged  their  high  explosives  into  the  entrenchments 
in  front  of  the  village. 

The  line  of  the  German  trenches  could  be  clearl}^ 
traced  from  a distance  by  the  constant  terrific 
explosions  which  hurled  masses  of  earth,  stones,  and 
bricks  high  into  the  air,  mingled  with  the  shattered 
remains  of  the  defenders,  while  over  all  hung  a dense 
pall  of  dust  and  smoke,  through  which  the  flames  of 
the  bursting  shells  constantly  stabbed  a lurid  path. 
The  rapidity  of  fire  was  so  great  that  it  seemed 
impossible  that  it  could  proceed  from  single-loading 
guns  ; it  sounded  rather  as  if  leviathan  machine 
guns  were  at  work. 

So  utterly  was  the  enemy  surprised  and  domi- 
nated, that  later  on,  in  some  places,  our  men  were 
able  to  climb  out  and  walk  about  unharmed  in  the 
open.  At  one  spot,  the  upper  half  of  a German 
officer,  with  his  cap  still  firmty  fixed  on  his  head,  was 
bloAvn  into  our  trench. 


220  BATTLE  OF  NEUVE  CHAPELLE 


While  our  guns  were  thus  preparing  the  way  for 
the  infantry,  our  gallant  airmen  were  busy  on  other 
errands.  In  order  to  prevent  the  enemy  from 
bringing  up  reinforcements  from  a distance,  our 
fastest  machines  were  sent  on  a mission  to  destroy 
his  communications.  The  railway  bridge  at  Menin, 
over  which  reinforcements  might  have  been  sent  by 
the  Duke  of  Wiirtemburg,  was  attacked,  as  also 
was  the  junction  at  Courtrai,  on  the  principal 
route  from  Belgium  to  this  part  of  the  front.  One 
of  our  airincn  dropped  a bomb  on  Menin  bridge  from 
a height  of  only  120  feet,  destroying  a pier,  while 
Courtrai  Station,  and  the  Don  and  Douai  Junctions 
were  also  damaged  ; a troop  train  was  hit  by  a 
bomb;  a wireless  installation  at  Lille  was  believed 
to  have  been  destroyed;  and  one  of  the  enemy’s 
head- quarters  was  set  on  lire.  In  another  case,  as 
Sir  John  French  mentions  in  his  despatch  of  the  5th 
Api'il,  1915,  a pilot  descended  to  about  50  feet  above 
the  point  he  was  attacking.  ^ 

Our  bombardment  continued  without  a second’s 
pause  until  live  minutes  past  eight,  when  the  guns 
lifted  on  to  Neuve  Chapelle  itself,  and  put  the  finish- 
ing touches  to  the  devastation  commenced  at  the  end 
of  October,  1914. 

The  attack  of  the  Garhwal  Brigade  was  arranged 
as  follows: — 

Right  attack,  l/39th  Garhwal  Rifles. 

Right  centre,  2nd  Leicester's. 

Left  centre,  2/3rd  Gurkhas. 

Left  attack,  2/39th  Garhwal  Rifles. 

The  3rd  London  Regiment  (Territorials)  were  in 
support. 

In  order  to  protect  the  flanks,  the  l/'39th  Garhwalis 


Pietre 

fe  Milkr- 


Orchard 
8.  Farm  ^ 


NEUVE;:, 

CHAJ^LLE 


Chafead 


GERMAN 

STRONGHOLDS 


Brewery 


Richeboui 
S’Vaast , 


:;_>^Pomme7’eau 


Herlies 


PORT 


ARTHUR 


Armentleres  I key  MAPI 

.^^Isurbaix 


Lorgies 


Aubers  ^ 


NeuveChapelle 

o 

Richebourg^ 
S'y^ast  \ 


Givenchy 


Sce/c  of  MHc9 


Adapted  ty  permission  of  the  Daily  Mail 


BATTLE  OF  NEUVE  CHAPELLE  10-12  MARCH,  1915. 


GERMAN  TRENCHES  OBLITERATED  221 

were  to  send  parties,  after  the  capture  of  the 
first  objective,  to  clear  the  German  trenches  to  the 
right,  while  the  2/39th  were  to  act  in  the  same  way 
on  the  left,  and  to  establish  touch  with  the  25th 
Brigade,  8th  Division. 

The  moment  the  guns  lifted,  the  Brigade  swarmed 
over  the  parapet,  and  moving  at  a steady  double  over 
the  intervening  space  of  from  100  to  200  3^ards, 
reached  (except  as  regards  one  battalion)  their  first 
objective  without  a check.  The  effect  of  the  accurate 
and  intense  fire  of  our  artillery  was  at  once  evident. 
The  German  wire  had  in  nearly  every  place  simply 
ceased  to  exist,  while  the  trenches  were  practically 
blotted  out,  burying  in  their  ruins  numbers  of  the 
defenders.  Such  of  the  enemy  as  were  still  unhurt 
were  either  in  a state  of  stupefaction  or  half  delirious, 
while  ever^^where  lay  the  mangled  bodies  of  the  dead 
and  wounded.  The  2/39th  Garhwalis  met  with  some 
rifle  and  machine-gun  fire  from  trenches  fmdher  in 
rear,  but  pressed  on  through  the  first  trench  and 
took  the  second  with  a rush,  capturing  a machine 
gun  and  some  prisoners. 

Subadar-Major  Nain  Sing  Cliinwarh,  who  had 
won  the  Military  Cross  in  the  earlier  days  of  the  war, 
here  earned  the  2nd  Class,  Order  of  British  India,  by 
his  gallant  leading  of  his  compan}^  which  he  con- 
tinued to  command  although  he  had  been  wounded 
by  a shell  splinter. 

Jemadar  Sangram  Sing  Negi  charged  a machine 
gun  in  the  face  of  a German  officer  who  was  aiming 
at  him  with  his  revolver,  and  with  his  company 
captured  the  officer,  the  gun,  and  its  detachment. 
For  his  conspicuous  bravery  the  Jemadar  was 
rewarded  with  the  Military  Cross. 


222  BATTLE  OF  NEUVE  CHAPELLE 


Havildar  Butlia  Sing  Negi  gained  the  2nd  Class 
of  the  Indian  Order  of  Merit  by  heading  his  section 
into  a German  trench,  where  he  rounded  up  and 
captured  a number  of  prisoners. 

Still  pushing  on,  the  2/39th  took  the  thud  trench 
with  few  casualties,  and  then  made  for  their  first 
main  objective,  the  fourth  line.  During  their  pas- 
sage between  the  third  and  fourth  trenches,  they  came 
under  heavy  fire,  and  lost  many  men  from  a party 
of  the  enemy  on  the  left  flank.  These  were  engaged 
b}^  the  left  company  of  the  2/39th,  which  had  carried 
through  the  advance  with  ecpial  success. 

Naik  Jaman  Sing  Bisht  liere  distinguislred  him- 
self and  gained  the  2nd  Class,  Indian  Order  of 
Merit,  by  leading  his  section  up  the  trench  and  driving 
the  occupants  into  the  hands  of  the  right  company, 
a large  number  being  captured. 

During  the  advance.  Captain  Parkin,  113th 
Infantry,  attached  2/39th,  was  severely  wounded, 
when  acting  as  Brigade  bomb-gun  officer,  through 
the  bursting  of  one  of  his  guns. 

The  two  assaulting  companies  of  the  2/39th 
established  themselves  in  their  first  objective,  and 
the  enemy  found  himself  under  fire  from  two  direc- 
tions, with  the  result  that  he  began  to  surrender, 
but,  as  usual,  great  care  had  to  be  exercised  in  taking 
prisoners  when  dealing  with  such  a treacherous  foe. 
One  party  of  Germans  in  the  main  trench  beckoned 
to  our  men  to  come  over  and  take  them  prisoners. 
A close  scrutiny  of  the  ground  revealed  the  fact  that 
in  crossing  they  would  come  under  machine-gun 
fire  from  a trench  which  was  not  marked  on  the  map. 
Fortunately,  our  men  were  not  taken  in  ; the  trench 
was  rushed,  and  the  machine  gun  captured. 


RIFLEMAN  GOBAR  SING  NEGI 


223 


During  the  assault  on  the  main  trench,  Rifleman 
Gobar  Sing  Negi  iDehaved  with  very  distinguished 
courage.  He  was  one  of  the  bayonet  party 
accompanying  the  bombers,  and  w^as  the  first  man 
to  go  round  each  traverse  in  face  of  a most  deter- 
mined resistance  by  the  enemy,  of  whom  he  killed 
several,  driving  the  remainder  back  until  they 
surrendered.  This  brave  soldier  was  afterwards 
unfortunately  killed,  but  for  his  most  conspicuous 
gpJlantry  he  was  posthumously  aw^arded  the  Victoria 
Cross. 

Jemadar  Pancham  Sing  Mahar  won  the  Mili- 
tary Cross  by  his  dashing  leading  of  a party  wdiich 
advanced  across  the  open  in  face  of  a severe  fire, 
capturing  a machine  gun  and  a number  of 
prisoners. 

The  Garhwalis,  having  accomplished  all  they  were 
asked  to  do,  now  consolidated  the  position,  and 
parties  proceeded  to  search  the  houses  for  snipers. 
Here  the  Berkshires  were  seen  on  the  left  working 
through  the  village,  and  shortly  afteiuvards  touch 
was  established  with  the  2nd  Rifle  Brigade  on  the 
east.  There  they  remained,  and  by  evening  the 
position  had  been  made  defensible,  so  as  to  support 
the  2/3rd  Gurkhas  and  face  the  Bois  du  Biez. 

In  consolidating  the  line  we  w^ere  greatly  assisted 
by  a lucficy  find  of  a large  quantity  of  sandbags, 
hurdles  and  entrenching  tools  in  a house  w hich  had 
evidently  been  used  by  the  Germans  as  a depot. 

On  the  whole,  there  was  little  hostile  fire  during 
the  progress  of  the  wmrk,  beyond  a few'  shells  and  an 
occasional  burst  of  machine-gun  fire.  Jemadar  Ghantu 
Sing  being  killed  at  this  time.  In  this  first  phase, 
the  2/39th  Garhwalis  lost  1 Garliwali  officer  and 


224  BATTLE  OF  NEUVE  CfHAPELLE 


26  other  ranks  killed,  2 Garhwali  officers  and  71 
others  wounded,  and  31  missing. 

The  battalion  carried  out  its  task  with  the 
greatest  dash  and  bravery.  The  comparatively 
small  casualty  list  was  greatly  due  to  the  foresight 
of  Lt-Colonel  Drake-Brockman,  who  made  use  of 
slight  cover  in  front  of  his  parapet  to  get  his  men  out 
during  the  j^reliminary  bombardment,  thus  obtaining 
to  the  full  the  advantage  of  sm’prise. 

The  2/3rd  Gurkhas,  under  Lt-Colonel  V.  A. 
Ormsby,  on  the  signal  being  given,  crossed  to  the 
first  German  trench  with  very  slight  losses,  as  the 
enemy  appeared  to  be  utterly  overcome  by  the 
violence  and  accuracy  of  our  bombardment. 

A company  of  the  3rd  Londons  and  one  of  the 
2/39th  Garhwalis  took  up  the  work  of  consolidating 
the  position,  the  Gurkhas  sweeping  on  over  the  second 
trench  with  little  opposition  and  crossing  the  road 
with  the  second  line  close  up  in  support.  Here  they 
were  met  by  rifle  and  machine-gun  fire  from  parties 
of  the  enemy  still  occupying  houses  in  the  south 
end  of  the  village  near  the  Brewery,  which  caused 
considerable  trouble  to  the  Leicesters,  who  were 
making  a frontal  attack. 

Seeing  that  there  was  great  danger  of  the  enemy 
rallying  at  this  point.  Major  Tillard,  D.S.O.,  at 
once  determined  to  take  the  responsibility  of  ex- 
ceeding his  orders,  and  pushed  straight  on  for  the 
Brewery,  driving  the  Germans,  after  a sharp  struggle, 
out  of  the  houses  and  capturing  a large  number. 
Major  Tillard’s  determined  action  undoubtedly  had 
a great  effect  at  a critical  moment,  and  gained  for 
him  a mention  in  despatches. 

Havildar  Bahadur  Thapa  distinguished  himself 


PRIMUS  IN  NEUVE  CIIAPELLE 


225 


at  this  juncture  by  heading  a bombing  party,  which 
entered  a house  held  by  the  enemy  and  stormed  a 
barricade,  killing  16  Germans  andcaptming  2 machine 
guns.  For  his  conspicuous  bravery  the  havildar 
was  awarded  the  2nd  Class,  Indian  Order  of 
Merit. 

A dramatic  incident  occurred  at  this  time. 
Rifleman  Gane  Gurung,  observing  that  heavy  fire 
was  being  kept  up  from  a particular  house,  most 
gallantly  entered  it  by  himself,  cowed  into  surrender- 
ing and  brought  out  smgle-handed  eight  Germans  at 
the  point  of  his  bayonet.  At  this  moment  the  2nd 
Rifle  Brigade  came  on  the  scene,  and  on  seeing 
the  little  Gurkha  shepherding  eight  burly  Germans 
out  of  the  house,  gave  him  three  hearty  cheers. 
This  rifleman  had  previously  shown  great  bravery, 
and  for  his  daring  on  this  occasion  was  awarded 
the  2nd  Class  of  the  Indian  Order  of  Merit.  In  the 
course  of  a speech  eulogizing  the  services  of  the 
battalion.  Sir  James  Willcocks  subsequently  re- 
marked that  there  was  probably  no  other  instance 
in  English  history  of  an  individual  Indian  soldier 
being  cheered  for  his  bravery  by  a British  battalion 
in  the  midst  of  a battle. 

The  question  as  to  which  battalion,  British  or 
Indian,  was  the  first  to  enter  Neuve  Chapelle  on  this 
occasion  has  been  much  argued.  The  honour  would 
appear  to  belong  to  the  2/3rd  Gurkhas,  who  attacked 
half  an  hour  before  the  8th  Division  ; moreover,  it 
was  only  after  the  Gurkhas  had  reached  the  Brewery 
and  were  fighting  among  the  houses  that  the  Rifle 
Brigade  came  up  and  witnessed  the  incident  just 
described.  During  their  advance,  the  Gurkhas  cap- 
tured a large  number  of  Germans,  but  the  total 

Q 


22G  BATTLE  OF  NEUVE  CHAPELLE 


cannot  be  stated,  as  the  prisoners  were  handed  over 
to  other  regiments  to  send  back. 

Lt-Colonel  Ormsby,  who  had  throughout  the 
campaign,  and  especially  in  this  battle,  shown  great 
qualities  of  leadership,  was  appointed  a Companion 
of  the  Bath. 

Subadar-Major  Gambhir  Sing  Gurung  displayed 
great  gallantry  during  the  assault,  and  did  excellent 
work  throughout  the  battle.  For  his  services  he 
received  the  2nd  Class  of  the  Indian  Order  of  Merit, 
and  later,  that  of  the  Order  of  British  India. 

Captain  H.  H.  Grigg,  though  wounded  early  in 
the  action,  continued  to  command  his  double  com- 
pany, and  gave  an  inspiring  example  to  his  men,  for 
which  he  w^as  mentioned  in  despatches. 

Subadar  Bhim  Sing  Thapa  performed  repeated 
acts  of  pluck,  especially  distinguishing  himself  by 
his  coolness  in  leading  his  men,  thus  gaining  the 
2nd  Class,  Indian  Order  of  Merit. 

Lance-Naik  Harak  Sing  Gharti,  a signaller,  showed 
great  devotion  in  continuously  carrjdng  messages 
under  heavy  fire.  He  subsequently  commanded 
his  section  when  his  senior  was  shot,  and  here  again 
showed  conspicuous  gallantry.  He  was  awarded 
the  2nd  Class,  Indian  Order  of  Merit. 

Jemadar  Puran  Sing  Thapa  received  the  Indian 
Distinguished  Service  Medal  for  having,  after  being 
wounded  at  the  start,  continued  to  command  his 
section  till  the  following  evening,  when,  after  getting 
his  wounds  dressed,  he  returned  to  the  firing  line,  and 
was  again  wounded. 

Rifleman  Kharakbir  Pun,  who  behaved  with 
great  bravery  on  several  occasions,  was  wounded  at 
the  commencement  of  the  battle,  remained  throughout 


1/39TH  GARHWALIS  HELD  UP  227 

the  day’s  fighting,  and  was  finally  ordered  to  hospital 
in  a state  of  collapse.  He  received  the  Russian 
Medal  of  St.  George,  3rd  Class. 

During  the  attack  a very  gallant  act  was  per- 
formed by  Naik  Khan  Zaman,  of  the  32nd  Lahore 
Divisional  Signal  Company.  The  cable  line  from 
the  front  to  Divisional  Head  Quarters  was  continually 
being  cut.  Naik  Khan  Zaman  w^ent  back  along  the 
line,  repairing  it  in  many  places.  He  was  out  for 
3|  hours  under  very  heav}^  shell  fire,  and  had  twice 
to  cross  a zone  of  400  yards  which  was  swept  by 
rifle  fire  as  well.  By  a miracle  he  escaped  unwmunded, 
and  was  awarded  the  Indian  Distinguished  Service 
Medal. 

So  far  all  had  gone  well  with  the  attack,  but  the 
l/39th  Garb  walls  under  Colonel  Swiney,  whose 
advance  we  shall  now  follow,  were  fated  to  meet 
with  misfortune,  against  which  they  fought  heroically, 
eventually  whining  tlirough,  but  with  terrible  losses, 
especially  in  British  officers. 

On  our  bombardment  lifting.  Nos.  2 and  4 
Companies,  the  former  under  Captains  Clarke  and 
Owen,  the  latter  under  Captain  Kenny  and  Lieu- 
tenant Welchman,  went  over  the  parapet.  Captain 
Clarke,  who  w^as  on  the  left,  w’as  ordered  to  keep 
touch  with  the  Leicesters,  but  from  the  start  No.  2 
Company  bore  too  much  to  the  right,  thus  forcing 
No.  4 Company  out  of  its  direction.  Pushing  on, 
with  the  bravery  which  has  always  marked  the  wmrk 
of  this  battalion,  they  got  up  close  to  the  German 
trench  in  the  face  of  a murderous  machine-gun  and 
rifle  fire.  But  here  a check  was  caused,  as  it  was 
found  that  the  German  wire  had  hardly  been  touched 
by  our  guns,  and  the  trench  was  practically  intact. 


228  BA^I  TLE  OF  NEUVE  CHAPELLE 

This  was,  of  course,  only  to  be  expected,  as,  owing  to 
the  wrong  direction  taken,  the  assault  was  being 
delivered  on  a section  of  trench  outside  the  radius 
of  the  bombardment. 

'^ITie  casualties  during  this  pause  were  very 
heavv,  both  amongst  the  British  officers  and  the 
rank-and-hle.  Seeing  what  had  occurred.  Colonel 
Swiney  ordered  Captains  Murray  and  Sparrow  to 
reinforce  the  leading  companies,  and  the  whole  line 
together  carried  the  enemy’s  trench  after  a sanguinary 
struggle,  in  spite  of  the  terrific  fire  and  the  losses 
already  sustained  ; but  Captain  Kenny  and  Lieu- 
tenant Welchman  were  the  only  British  officers  to 
reach  the  trench  alive,  and  were  then  themselves 
killed  almost  immediately. 

Captains  CTarke,  Miu’ray,  Sparrow,  and  Owen 
were  Ivilled  during  the  check  and  subsequent  rush. 
Captain  Kenny,  before  being  killed  in  the  enemy’s 
trench,  had  already  been  twice  wounded,  but  held 
on  witli  superb  coinage. 

During  the  advance  of  the  second  line.  Lieu- 
tenant G.  A.  Cammell,  B.F.A.,  who  was  observing 
in  tlie  Garhwalis’  trench  for  his  battery,  saw  that  the 
Britisli  officers  had  been  shot  down,  and  that  the 
line  was  inclined  to  hesitate.  As  his  telephone  wire 
had  been  cut,  and  his  occupation  was  gone.  Lieu- 
tenant Cammell  rushed  out  of  the  trench,  and  put- 
ting himseh  at  the  head  of  the  2nd  line,  led  them 
on,  four  men  keeping  abreast  of  him.  He  had  hardly 
gone  twenty  yards  under  the  appalling  fire,  when  he 
and  three  of  the  four  men  by  his  side  were  wounded. 

Seeing  the  officer  fall,  Lance-Corporal  V.  Thomp- 
son, of  the  2nd  Black  Watch,  at  once  ran  out  and 
brought  Lieutenant  Cammell  in,  being  himself 


GAP  IN  OUR  ATTACK 


229 


vvoiiiided  ill  doing  so.  For  liis  bravery  Lieutenant 
Caminell  received  the  D.S.O.,  and  Lance-Corporal 
'J’hoinpson  the  Distinguished  Conduct  Medal. 

The  net  result  of  this  attack  was  that  some 
200  yards  of  trench  were  carried,  but  a gap  of  about 
the  same  extent  existed  between  the  left  of  the 
Garhwalis  and  the  right  of  the  Leieesters.  This 
space  was  packed  with  Germans,  practically  unto  uched 
by  our  bombardment,  and  still  full  of  fight.  The 
survivors  of  the  assaulting  party  of  the  Garhwalis 
were  thus  completely  isolated,  and,  what  was  worse, 
were  without  a single  British  officer.  Repeated 
attempts  were  made  by  small  parties  to  reach  them, 
but  the  result  was  invariably  the  same.  All  who 
tried  to  cross  were  killed  or  put  out  of  action. 

It  speaks  volumes  for  the  courage  and  training 
of  the  men  that  under  the  command  of  their  Gar  hwali 
officers,  headed  by  Subadar  Kedar  Sing  Rawat, 
Avho  received  the  Indian  Distinguished  Service  Medal 
for  his  gallantry,  the}^  hold  on  with  the  greatest 
determination  throughout  the  day,  in  spite  of  fre- 
quent attacks  by  the  enemy,  and  the  fact  that  they 
had  run  short  of  bombs  and  ammunition. 

At  about  9.30  a.m.  Colonel  Swiney  telephoned 
for  reinforcements,  and  at  about  10  a.m.  he  was 
severely  wounded  in  the  thigh  by  a shell  fragment, 
but,  plucky  as  ever,  he  had  a field  dressing  put  on, 
and  held  out  till  after  midnight,  when  he  was  so 
reduced  by  pain  and  loss  of  blood  that  he  had  to  be 
removed  to  hospital.  At  about  the  same  time  as 
Colonel  Swiney  was  wounded.  Lieutenant  Lemon, 
who  was  Avith  him  in  Port  Arthur,  was  hit  in  the 
throat.  Short!}'  after  this,  two  companies  of  the 
I /3rd  Londons  were  sent  to  Colonel  Swiney ’s  aid. 


230  BATTLE  OF  NEUVE  CHAPELLE 


To  bring  the  attack  into  line,  it  is  now  necessary 
to  follow  the  2nd  Leicesters.  At  the  appointed  time 
B Company  under  Captain  Morgan,  M.C.,  and 
C Company  under  Captain  Weir,  went  over  the 
parapet,  and  advancing  at  a steady  double,  jumped 
the  enemy’s  trench,  or  so  much  of  it  as  remained, 
forced  then-  wa}^  through  the  many  obstacles  and 
debris,  and  gained  theu:  first  objective  in  about 
twenty  minutes.  Captain  Morgan  was  wounded  by 
shrapnel  in  no  less  than  six  places  just  as  the  assault 
was  launched.  In  spite  of  the  terrible  inj  uries,  from 
which  he  has  even  now  not  recovered,  he  attempted 
to  lead  his  company  to  the  attack,  but  collapsed 
before  he  had  gone  many  yards. 

The  second  line,  consisting  of  A Company  under 
Lieutenant  Buxton,  followed  at  a distance  of  about 
thirty  yards,  succeeded  by  Captain  Romilly  with 
D Company  as  reserve,  and  dealt  with  small  parties 
of  the  enemy  in  outlying  trenches  and  houses  which 
had  not  been  touched  by  the  first  line.  The  whole 
front  of  the  battalion  was  thus  cleared,  and  the  men 
began  to  dig  themselves  in.  It  was  then  found,  as 
previously  related,  that  a gap,  full  of  the  enemy, 
existed  between  the  Leicester  right  and  the  left  of 
the  l/39th  Garhwalis. 

'Idle  problem  of  dealing  with  the  situation  was  a 
difficult  one,  as  the  wire  in  front  of  the  Germans  was 
practically  undamaged,  and  a frontal  attack,  whether 
successful  or  not,  was  certain  to  entail  very  heavy 
losses. 

Captain  Romilly  of  the  Leicesters  at  once  led 
a platoon  of  the  reserve  company  at  the  enemjy  and 
with  great  skill  and  courage  bombed  them  back 
about  100  yards  along  their  trench,  shooting  five 


PRIVATE  BUCKINGHAM,  V.C.  231 

of  them  with  his  revolver.  For  this  conspicuous 
bravery  Captain  Romilly  was  awarded  the  D.S.O. 
He  then  sent  back  for  Sappers,  who  arrived  under 
Captain  Hobart,  R.E.,  and  found  a lively  hand- 
grenade  fight  going  on  between  the  Leicester’s  and 
the  Germans. 

The  Sappers  went  up  to  the  furthest  point  occu- 
pied by  the  Leicester’s,  arrd  thence  Sapper  Shaikh 
Abdul  Rahman  and  two  others  went  back  arrd  brought 
up  rrrore  bonrbs,  urrder  hre,  with  which  Captain 
Hobart,  Colour-Havildar  Chagatta  and  some  Sappers, 
with  the  Leicesters,  advanced  another  20  yards  along 
the  trench,  and  there  succeeded  in  building  a sandbag 
barricade  to  a height  of  feet,  when  their  work 
was  interrupted  by  our  owrr  mortar  bombs  falling 
on  a house  occupied  by  the  enemy  a short  distance 
away. 

Captain  Hobart  was  then  ordered  to  retire, 
which  he  did  without  a single  casualty.  For  the 
great  gallantry  displayed  drrring  this  work.  Captain 
Hobart  received  the  Military  Cross,  while  Colour- 
Havildar  Chagatta,  who  already  possessed  the  Indian 
Order  of  Merit  and  the  Indian  Distinguished  Service 
Medal,  was  later  awarded  the  Russian  Cross  of  the 
Order  of  St.  George,  4th  Class. 

Sapper  Shaikh  Abdul  Rahman  received  the  2nd 
Class,  Indian  Order  of  Merit. 

Captain  Weir,  2nd  Leicesters,  received  the  Mili- 
tary Cross  for  the  gallantry  displayed  by  him  during 
the  battle. 

During  this  attack,  and  again  on  the  12th  March, 
Private  William  Buckingham,  2nd  Leicesters,  on 
several  occasions  displayed  the  greatest  bravery  and 
devotion  in  rescuing  and  aiding  wounded  men. 


232  BATTLE  OF  NEUVE  CHAPELLE 


Time  after  time  he  went  out  under  the  heaviest  fire 
and  brought  in  those  who  would  otherwise  almost 
certainly  have  perished.  In  the  performance  of 
this  noble  work,  Private  Buckingham  was  severely 
wounded  in  the  chest  and  arm.  For  his  con- 
spicuous valour  he  was  awarded  the  Victoria  Cross. 
This  very  valiant  soldier  was  killed  during  the 
fighting  on  the  Somme  in  September,  1916. 

The  story  of  the  2nd  Leicester's  throughout  the 
campaign  is  full  of  instances  of  bravery  and  seK- 
devotion,  of  which  it  is  unfortunately  impossible, 
within  the  scope  of  this  history,  to  mention  more  than 
a few.  Amongst  others  of  the  battalion  who  re- 
ceived the  Distinguished  Coirduct  Medal  for  services 
in  this  battle  was  Private  G.  Hill,  who,  during  the 
attack  of  the  10th  March,  showed  a supreme  contempt 
for  danger  by  continually  carrying  messages  across 
the  ojren  under  very  heavy  lire,  the  enemy  being 
oidy  100  yards  away.  Later  in  the  day  he  was 
wounded  Iry  a bomb  while  engaged  in  clearing  the 
Germans  out  of  a trench. 

Corporal  R.  Keitley  was  granted  the  same  decora- 
tion for  displaying  great  courage  and  the  utmost 
devotion  to  duty  in  removing  the  wounded  from 
the  firing  line  to  the  aid  post  during  tlmee  whole 
days,  without  rest  and  with  hardly  any  food. 
Throughout  he  was  under  very  heavy  fire.  In  this 
work  he  w'as  assisted  by  Private  C.  Oakes,  who 
also  received  the  Distinguished  Conduct  Medal. 

Sergeant  H.  E.  Ruckledge  dressed  the  wounds  of 
several  men  after  being  himself  wounded  in  the  leg. 
He  then  collected  sandbags  and  took  them  to  the 
firing  line,  being  wounded  in  the  wrist  in  the  act. 
Next,  he  went  to  the  aid  of  a seriously  wounded 


[Ciuital  Press. 


PrIVATK  WIIJJAJI  BrCKIXGHAM,  2ND  Bx  I.KICESTERSIIIRIC 

Regiment. 


3^-] 


1 


OUK  ATTACK  RENEWED 


233 


officer.  All  these  gallant  actions  were  perl’orinccl 
under  lieav}^  tire.  Private  J.  Steeples  voluntarily 
went  out  into  the  open  with  another  man  under 
severe  close-range  fire  and  carried  a wounded  officer 
under  cover.  In  both  cases  the  Distinguished  Con- 
duct Medal  was  awarded. 

These  are  a few  instances  of  the  spudt  which 
inspned  this  splendid  battalion  to  the  deeds  which 
it  performed. 

To  resume  the  story.  After  the  barricade  had 
been  built,  it  was  held  by  two  platoons  of  the  Leicesters 
until,  at  about  5 p.m.,  the  preparations  to  deal  with 
the  situation  were  complete.  It  was  arranged  that 
two  companies  of  the  1st  Seafoiths  should  assault 
the  trench  from  the  left  in  co-ojieration  with  a frontal 
attack.  Accordingly,  the  Seaforths  took  up  their 
position  among  some  ruined  houses  on  the  left  flank, 
while  two  companies  of  the  I /3rd  Londons  (Terri- 
torials) with  a party  of  the  l/39th  Garhwalis  were 
to  make  a frontal  attack,  issuing  frojn  the  same 
point  in  the  trenches  from  which  Captain  Clarke 
had  led  the  assault  in  the  morning. 

As  soon  as  Colonel  Swiney  saw  that  the  Sea- 
forths  had  advanced,  and  that  their  bombing  party 
was  making  progress,  he  launched  the  attack  of  the 
3rd  Londons  and  Garhwalis.  C Compaii}'  of  the 
Seaforths  under  Captain  Baillie-Hamilton  and  D 
Company  under  Captain  Wicks  had  to  move  under 
rifle  and  machine-gun  fire  over  difficult  and  inter- 
sected ground,  and  were  for  a time  held  up  by  our 
heavj^  artillery,  which  began  to  shell  the  neighbour- 
hood. 

The  enemy  then  brought  u])  a trench  mortar, 
which  caused  several  casualties.  Captain  VVhcks 


234  BATTLE  OF  NEUVE  CHAPELLE 


being  wounded  amongst  others.  This  officer  had 
shown  marked  courage  and  ability  on  many  occasions 
in  face  of  the  enemy,  and  on  this  day  he  again  led 
his  company  with  equal  dash  and  judgment,  in  recog- 
nition of  which  he  was  awarded  the  D.S.O. 

A Company  under  Lieutenant  the  Hon.  D.  Bruce 
and  B Company  under  Captain  Murray,  were  then 
ordered  to  co-operate  in  the  attack,  as  it  was  getting 
late  (4  p.m.),  and  the  advance  of  the  Dehra  Dun 
Brigade  on  the  Bois  du  Biez  was  being  retarded  by 
this  unfortunate  situation.  B Company  at  once  set 
to  work  to  bomb  the  Germans  along  the  trench 
from  the  left,  and  at  this  point  Captain  R.  Mmu’ay 
was  wounded,  dying  the  next  day.  A number  of 
men  distinguished  themselves  during  the  attack. 

Corporal  A.  Hunter  outdistanced  the  remainder 
of  his  company,  and  got  in  ahead  of  them  in  the 
charge. 

Lance-Corporal  J.  Muh  showed  great  bravery 
in  leading  the  bombing  party  and  driving  the  enemy 
out  of  traverse  after  traverse. 

Sergeant  J.  Porter  performed  a valuable  service 
b}^  taking  a portion  of  his  platoon  under  fire  to  a 
position  well  in  rear  of  the  German  trench,  whence  he 
brought  a very  effective  fire  to  bear  on  the  enemy. 

The  services  of  these  non-commissioned  officers 
and  men  were  recognized  by  the  award  of  the  Dis- 
tinguished Conduct  Medal. 

While  the  trench  was  being  cleared  of  the  enemy, 
2nd  Lieutenant  Kirkaldy  was  killed. 

The  Seaforths  pushed  on  still  further,  but  by  this 
time  the  enemy  was  thoroughly  cowed,  and  about 
120  Germans  surrendered.  The  casualties  of  the 
Seaforths  during  this  brief  but  sharp  action  amounted 


THE  1/3rd  LONDON  REGIMENT  235 

to  2 officers  and  17  men  killed,  7 officers  and  49  men 
wounded. 

The  Londons,  on  receiving  the  order  to  assault, 
swarmed  over  the  parapet  of  Port  Arthur,  and 
rushed  across  the  open  ground  under  very  heavy 
fire.  Losing  heavily  as  they  went,  and  splendidly 
led  by  their  officers,  they  never  hesitated  for  a 
moment,  and  got  into  the  trench  side  by  side  with 
the  party  of  the  l/39th  Garhwalis. 

The  Distinguished  Conduct  Medal  was  awarded 
to  the  following  for  marked  bravery  during  the 
charge  : — Lance-Corporal  Brewster,  Company  Ser- 
geant-Major Murray,  and  Sergeant  Newman. 

On  getting  into  the  trench,  the  Germans  put  up 
a half-hearted  fight,  which  ended  in  a number 
being  killed  and  about  20  surrendering. 

The  assaulting  companies  were  commanded  by 
Captains  Moore  and  Livingstone.  Captain  Moore 
was  awarded  the  Military  Cross  for  his  conspicuous 
ability  and  gallantry  in  handling  the  two  companies 
during  this  attack  and  the  remaining  days  of  the 
battle.  This  fine  battalion,  whose  first  real  baptism 
of  fire  it  was,  showed  on  this  occasion  what  good 
work  might  be  expected  from  our  Territorial  troops. 
Their  casualties  in  the  battle  amounted  to  8 officers 
and  160  other  ranks. 

During  this  period  Colonel  Swiney  had  con- 
tinued to  direct  operations  from  Port  Arthur,  in 
spite  of  the  suffering  and  weakness  caused  by  his 
severe  lacerated  wound,  but  towards  10  p.m.  Major 
MacTier  of  the  2/39th  was  sent  up  to  relieve  him, 
and  at  about  midnight  Colonel  Swiney  was  carried 
to  hospital.  He  testified  to  the  great  gallantry 
and  devotion  to  duty  shown  by  Captain  J.  Taylor, 


236  BA1"JXE  OF  NEUVE  CHAPELLE 


I.M.S,,  the  medical  officer  of  the  ]/39th,  who  con- 
tinued without  ceasing  to  attend  to  the  wounded 
throughout  the  day  and  most  of  the  night,  although 
himself  wounded,  and  under  shell  fire  for  the  greater 
part  of  the  time.  CJaptain  Taylor  was  awarded 
the  D.S.O.  for  his  services  during  this  trying 
period. 

Colonel  Swiney  survived  his  wound  and  eventu- 
ally retmmed  to  France,  but  lost  his  life  on  his  way 
to  India,  when  the  P.  & 0.  s.s.  Persia  was  torpedoed 
in  the  Mediterranean  on  the  30th  December,  1915. 
13y  his  death  the  l/39th  were  deprived  of  a most 
gallant  and  much  beloved  Commanding  Officer. 

'J’he  l/39thwere  now  fidly  installed  in  the  section 
of  trench  which  it  had  been  intended  that  they  should 
take  in  the  morning,  but  their  casualties  had  been 
very  serious,  and  by  the  night  of  the  12th  March 
they  had  lost  7 British  officers  killed,  Major  MacTier, 
Cajjtains  Sparrow,  Clarke,  Kenny,  Owen,  Murray, 
and  Lieutenant  Welchman,  as  well  as  3 Garhwali 
officers  and  98  rank-and-file ; while  5 British  officers, 
Colonel  Swiney,  Captain  Main  waring.  Lieutenants 
Mankelow  and  Lemon,  and  Captain  Ta3dor,  I.M.S., 
with  2 Garhwali  officers  and  190  men,  were  wounded. 
In  addition  to  this,  22  men  were  missing,  of  whom 
the  majority  w^ere  probably  killed. 

The  position  on  the  night  of  the  10th  March, 
from  left  to  right,  was  as  follows,  the  line  being 
divided  into  three  sections  : — 

Section  1 : 2/3rd  Gurkhas,  under  Lt-Colonel 
V.  Ormsb}^ 

Section  2:  2nd  Leicesters,  under  Lt-Colonel 
Gordon. 

Section  3 : 1st  Seaforths,  l/3rd  Londons,  and 


POSITION  CONSOLIDATED  237 

l/39tli  Garhwalis,  all  under  Lt-Colonel  Ritchie  of 
the  Seaforths. 

On  the  left  of  the  2/3rd  Gurkhas  touch  was 
established  with  the  2nd  Rifle  Brigade,  25th  Brigade, 
8th  Division. 

Dining  the  whole  of  the  11th  and  night  of  the 
llth-12th  March  the  process  of  consolidating  the 
position  was  continued,  and  was  not  to  any  great 
extent  interfered  with  by  the  fire  of  the  enemy. 


CHAPTER  XVII 

BATTLE  OF  NEUVE  CHAPELLE — Continued 

Neuve  Chapelle  cleared  of  the  enemy — Condition  of  the  village — Work  of 
the  Sappers  and  Miners — Activity  of  hostile  snipers — Camaraderie 
between  British  and  Indian  soldiers — Attack  of  23rd  Brigade  held 
up — Gallantry  of  Middlesex  Regiment  and  Scottish  Rifles — Delay 
in  bringing  up  reserves  of  4th  Corps — Attack  by  the  Dehra  Dun 
Brigade  held  up — 8th  Division  fails  to  advance — General  Jacob 
in  consequence  has  to  retire — l/4th  Seaforth  Highlanders — Further 
attack  delayed  by  inability  of  8th  Division  to  advance — Dehra  Dun 
Brigade  relieved  by  Sirhind — General  Jacob’s  appreciation  of  2/2nd 
and  l/9th  Gurkhas — Attack  by  Suhind  and  Jullundur  Brigades — • 
Anticipated  by  heavy  German  attacks — Completely  repulsed — 
Enemy’s  heavy  losses — Gallantry  of  Captain  Lodwick  and  Lieutenant 
Mankelow — Work  of  Signallers — Captain  Collins,  l/4th  Gurkhas,  wins 
the  D.S.O. — Our  attack  held  up  Giving  to  failure  of  25th  Brigade  to 
advance — Heavy  losses  of  1st  Highland  Light  Infantry — Failure 
of  om  second  attack — Third  attack  countermanded  by  Sir  James 
Willcocks — Further  active  operations  suspended  by  Sir  Douglas 
Haig — Losses  of  British  forces  in  the  battle — Losses  of  Indian  Corps 
— Material  and  moral  results  of  the  battle — ^Appreciation  of  Indian 
Corps  by  Sir  John  French — Sir  Douglas  Haig’s  special  order — 
Telegram  from  Sir  John  French  to  the  Viceroy  of  India — Curtailment 
of  ammunition  for  our  artillery — Improvements  in  enemy’s  defences 
after  Neuve  Chapelle. 

The  Indian  Corps  was  now  firmly  established  in 
a line  of  trenches  running  down  the  eastern  side  of 
Neuve  Chapelle  and  facing  the  Bois  du  Biez,  the 
assault  on  which  was  to  form  the  second  phase  of 
the  operations. 

The  task  of  clearing  the  village  of  such  of  the 
enemy  as  had  survived  the  bombardment  was 
necessaril}’'  a grim  proceeding.  The  houses  had  for 


WORK  OF  THE  SAPPERS 


239 


the  most  part  been  blown  to  bits,  but  isolated  parties 
of  the  bolder  spirits  amongst  the  Germans  still 
lurked  in  the  cellars,  or  held  the  upper  floors  of 
disroofed  houses,  while  machine  guns  did  their 
deadly  work  from  the  shelter  of  piles  of  ruins.  Our 
men  went  systematically  through  the  village,  house 
by  house,  bombing  or  bayoneting  such  as  resisted, 
and  taking  a large  number  of  prisoners,  so  that  by 
11  a.m.  the  village  was  completely  cleared. 

The  effect  of  our  bombardment  resembled  that  of 
a very  violent  earthquake.  The  church  had  been 
completely  shattered,  and  the  churchyard  was  pitted 
from  end  to  end  with  yawning  shell  holes,  the  graves 
in  many  cases  being  burst  open,  exposing  in  a very 
terrible  fashion  long-buried  bodies  to  view.  Many 
trees  had  been  blown  up  by  the  roots,  and  over  all 
was  the  stain  and  pungent  reek  of  lyddite. 

The  role  of  the  Sappers  and  Miners  in  an  action 
is  to  follow  up  the  infantry  as  closely  as  possible,  and 
to  wire  and  consolidate  captured  positions.  This, 
as  can  be  imagined,  is  no  light  task,  entailing  as  it 
does  heavy  labour  under  constant  fire.  The  party 
of  Sappers  who  were  entrusted  with  the  work  on 
the  new  line  in  front  of  Neuve  Chapelle,  made  their 
head  quarters  in  the  cellars  of  the  Brewery,  on  the 
walls  of  which  the  late  occupants  had  written  many 
times  the  benevolent  phrase,  “ Gott  strafe  England.” 
By  day  the  company  rested,  spending  the  whole 
night  in  consolidating  the  line. 

The  Brewery,  formerly  a substantial  three- 
storied erection,  was  a favourite  target  of  the  German 
gunners,  who  pounded  it  persistently  with  every 
kind  of  shell.  Gradually  the  remaining  walls  and 
floors  were  demolished,  but  the  gallant  Sappers  still 


240  BATTLE  OE  NEUVE  CHAPELLE 


held  on  in  their  nndergronnd  fastness.  The  climax 
came  on  the  third  day,  when  the  cellar  roof  was 
split,  and  a “ crump  ” bursting  outside  extinguished 
the  solitary  candle  at  the  far  end,  and  other  arrange- 
ments had  to  be  made. 

The  Sappers  and  the  107th  Pioneers  laboured 
with  such  a will  that  our  new  line  was  consolidated 
before  that  of  the  enemy,  and  we  were  thus  enabled 
to  bring  fire  to  bear  on  the  German  working  parties, 
and  to  break  them  up.  To  have  done  so  before 
would  have  been  to  di*aw  the  enemy’s  fire  on  our 
men,  a proceeding  always  to  be  avoided. 

The  German  snipers  were  particularly  active  and 
bold  at  this  period.  On  the  14th  March  two  men  of 
the  4th  King’s  (Liverpools)  were  shot  through  the 
head  soon  after  daylight,  evidently  by  a sniper. 
There  appeared  to  be  no  very  suitable  positions  for 
these  gentry  in  the  neighbourhood,  but  a close 
scrutiny  of  the  ground  in  front  revealed  a slight 
movement  among  some  dead  Germans  lying  just 
beyond  our  wire,  and  a further  examination  dis- 
closed the  presence  among  the  corpses  of  a sniper, 
who  was  greeted  with  a volley  which  put  a stop  to 
his  further  operations. 

As  an  instance  of  the  different  ways  in  which 
our  men  meet  misfortune  when  it  comes,  the  case 
of  Havildar  Ismail  Khan  of  the  21st  Company, 
.‘Ird  Sappers  and  Miners,  may  be  quoted.  This 
havildar,  while  working  in  front  of  the  line,  was 
shot  through  both  legs,  one  being  smashed.  His 
first  expression  of  opinion  was  one  of  admiration  for 
the  German  sniper,  who,  he  considered,  had  carefully 
waited  until  his  legs  were  in  line,  so  as  to  damage 
botli  with  one  shot  ! The  havildar,  who  expressed 


SCOTTISH  IHFLES  AND  MIDDLESEX  241 


his  view  with  grave  and  measured  approval,  evi- 
dently looked  upon  this  feat  as  a hue  examj^le  of 
war  economy. 

The  camaraderie  existing  between  the  British 
and  Indian  soldiers  was  very  marked  during  the 
battle.  Cigarettes  were  freety  exchanged  as  well  as 
friendly  gi’eetings,  the  latter  evidently  unintelligible, 
but  apparently  eminently  satisfactory  to  both 
parties.  Often  when  a detachment  of  Sappers  was 
returning  from  work,  the  British  would  give  them 
cigarettes  and  insist  on  then’  warming  themselves 
at  their  fire  buckets,  generally  heralding  their 
arrival  by  the  cry  of  “ Gangway  for  the  Suffering 
Miners.” 

The  attack  of  the  23rd  Brigade  on  the  left  had 
not  met  with  the  same  success  as  that  of  the  Indian 
Corps,  but  through  no  fault  of  their  own.  The 
2nd  Scottish  Rifles  and  the  2nd  Middlesex  advanced 
with  splendid  determination  against  a hail  of  bullets 
from  rifles  and  machine  guns,  only  to  find  that  the 
enemy’s  wire  had  been  but  little  damaged  by  our  guns. 

Both  battalions  fought  magnificently,  tearing 
at  the  wire  with  their  hands  and  breaking  it  with 
the  butts  of  their  rifles,  but  nothing  could  live 
against  such  fire  as  was  brought  to  bear  on  them  at 
a range  of  a few  yards,  and  the}^  were  .compelled  to 
fall  back  and  to  lie  in  the  open,  scraping  up  such 
cover  as  they  could.  Further  to  their  right  the 
25th  Brigade  had  met  with  little  difficulty,  as  the 
wire  in  their  front  had  been  completely  destroj^ed, 
and  they  were  enabled  to  turn  the  southern  flank 
of  the  enemy’s  defence  in  front  of  the  23rd  Brigade, 
which  then  succeeded  in  getting  through  to  the 
north-east  corner  of  the  village,  where  they  linked 

R 


242  BATTLE  OF  NEUVE  CHAPELLE 

up  with  the  25th  Brigade  on  their  right  and  the 
24th  Brigade  on  their  left. 

The  losses  of  the  Middlesex  and  Scottish  Bifles 
were  fearful ; the  latter  regiment  came  out  about 
150  strong,  under  the  command  of  a second  lieu- 
tenant, having  lost  15  officers,  including  the  colonel. 

This  would  have  been  the  opportunity  to  push  on 
with  the  utmost  possible  speed,  while  the  element 
of  surprise  still  existed  and  the  enemy  was  demoral- 
ized by  the  bombardment,  but  the  check  sustained 
by  the  23rd  Brigade  had  thrown  the  machinery  out 
of  gear,  and  our  front  had  to  be  reorganized. 

An  unexplained  delay  also  occurred  in  bringing 
up  the  reserves  of  the  4th  Corps.  Sir  John  French, 
in  his  despatch  dated  the  5th  April,  1915,  remarked, 
“ I am  of  opinion  that  this  delay  would  not  have 
occurred  had  the  clearly  expressed  orders  of  the 
General  Officer  Commanding  Fu’st  Army  been  more 
carefully  observed.  The  difficulties  above  enumerated 
might  have  been  overcome  at  an  earlier  period  of  the 
day  if  the  General  Officer  Commanding  4th  Corps 
had  been  able  to  bring  his  reserve  Brigade  more 
speedily  into  action.  As  it  was,  the  further  advance 
did  not  commence  before  3.30  p.m.” 

It  is  no  part  of  the  duty  of  those  who  are  only 
concerned  with  the  fortunes  of  the  Indian  Corps 
to  examine  the  reasons  which  prevented  the  prompt 
employment  of  the  reserve  Brigade  of  the  4th  Corps. 
The  results,  however,  of  this  failure  did  much  to 
neutralize  the  splendid  efforts  of  the  Indian  Corps 
in  this  great  battle. 

It  will  be  seen  later  that  the  successive  assaults 
were  held  up  by  the  enfilade  fire  of  the  enemy,  the 
left  flank  of  the  Indian  attack  being  in  each  case  in 


THE  DEHRA  DUN  BRIGADE  243 

the  ah,  owing  to  the  inability  of  the  8th  Division 
to  advance. 

At  about  4 p.in.  on  the  10th  March,  the  Dehra 
Dun  Brigade,  under  the  command  of  Brigadier- 
General  C.  W.  Jacob,  which  had  hitherto  been  in 
support  of  the  Garhwal  Brigade,  moved  up  and 
deployed  along  the  road  running  south-west  of 
Neuve  Chapelle,  towards  Port  Arthur  and  facing 
the  Bois  du  Biez.  The  Brigade,  which  had  been 
weakened  by  the  detachment  of  the  1st  Seaforths 
to  assist  the  Garhwal  Brigade,  was  supported  by  the 
1st  Manchesters  and  47th  Sikhs  of  the  Jullundur 
Brigade,  Lahore  Division. 

At  5.30  p.m.,  by  which  time  it  was  almost  dark, 
the  assaulting  troops  advanced  towards  their  ob- 
jective, the  Bois  du  Biez,  the  2/2nd  Gimkhas  on  the 
right,  the  l/9th  Gurkhas  on  the  left,  with  the  l/4th 
Seaforths  in  close  support.  The  front  line  of  the  2nd 
Gurkhas  was  composed  of  No.  3 Double  Company 
under  Major  Nicolay,  wdth  2nd  Lieutenant  Clifford 
on  the  left,  and  No.  4 Double  Company  under 
Major  Watt,  with  Captain  Dallas  Smith  on  the  right. 
No.  1 Double  Company  under  Major  Sweet  and 
Captain  McCleverty  was  in  support  on  the  right,  and 
No.  2 under  Captain  Mullaly  on  the  left.  Leading 
the  l/9th  Gurkhas  were  Nos.  1 and  2 Companies, 
with  3 and  4 in  support. 

The  attack  at  once  came  under  fire  from  both 
flanks,  a machine  gun  on  the  left  being  particularly 
active,  and  as  each  line  deployed  into  the  open, 
casualties  occurred.  Captain  McCleverty  w'as  here 
shot  through  the  arm  and  put  out  of  action. 

Luckily,  the  River  Layes,  an  obstacle  which  it 
was  feared  would  cause  much  trouble,  w as  to  a great 


244  BATTLE  OF  NEUVE  OHAPELLE 

extent  in  dead  ground,  i.e.  not  exposed  to  the  dhect 
lire  of  the  enemy,  and  did  not  seriously  impede  the 
advance,  as  eight  portable  bridges  had  been  brought 
up,  over  which  the  troops  crossed  rapidly. 

Major  Watt  and  Captain  Dallas  Smith  led  the 
assault  with  great  dash,  and  reached  the  edge  of  the 
wood  with  few  casualties.  No.  3 Double  Company, 
in  attempting  to  keep  touch  with  the  9th  Gurkhas 
on  the  left,  lost  connection  with  No.  4 Company, 
and  some  confusion  arose,  which  ended  in  a portion 
of  No.  3 being  held  up  by  machine-gun  lire.  Nos.  1 
and  2 Double  Companies  then  closed  up  in  rear,  and 
the  whole  battalion  began  to  dig  itself  in  at  the  edge  of 
the  wood,  sending  out  scouts  to  search  the  adjoining 
houses,  from  which  snipers  were  giving  much  trouble. 

Major  Watt  subsequently  received  the  D.S.O. 
for  the  conspicuous  bravery  and  ability  shown  by 
him  in  leading  his  company  during  this  attack.  On 
the  following  day  he  was  wounded,  but  contmued  to 
command  his  double  company  until  he  collapsed. 

Captain  Dallas  Smith  and  Lieutenant  and  Adju- 
tant Corse-Scott  were  awarded  the  Military  Cross  for 
their  services  in  the  battle. 

Here  four  Germans  were  captured  by  No.  4 
Company,  and  another,  Avho  had  lost  his  way,  walked 
into  the  middle  of  No.  2 Company  and  was  made 
prisoner.  At  about  this  time  Major  Nicolay  was 
missing,  and  it  was  believed  that  he  had  been  cap- 
tm-ed  by  the  Germans,  but  subsequently  it  was 
ascertained  that  he  had  been  killed  in  an  attempt 
to  establish  touch  between  his  position  and  that  of 
No.  4 Company. 

Our  scouts  could  find  no  enemy  or  hostile  trench 
in  oiu-  immediate  front,  but  a prisoner  stated  that 


245 


LTEUT  MlIERAY,  M.O. 

tliere  wore  1200  Germans  on  onr  left.  While 
exploring  the  neighbourhood,  a searchlight  was  dis- 
covered mounted  on  a limber,  and  as  it  could  not  be 
withdrawn  it  was  rendered  unserviceable  before  the 
subsequent  retirement. 

In  the  darkness  touch  had  been  lost  with  the 
l/9th  Gurkhas,  and  the  position  of  No.  4 Double 
Company  being  very  precarious,  it  was  withdrawn 
to  the  support  line  outside  the  wood.  Several  German 
scouts  were  there  captured,  and  it  was  found  that 
a strongly  traversed  trench  lay  at  a short  distance 
from  our  front. 

The  l/9th  Gurkhas  on  the  left  had  reached  tlie 
River  Layes  with  very  slight  casualties.  Nos.  2 and 
4 Companies  moving  up  to  try  to  establish  connection 
with  the  2nd  Gurkhas.  They  arrived  at  the  edge  of 
the  wood  after  a brief  but  sharp  tussle,  in  which  five 
Germans  were  killed  and  seven  taken  prisoners. 

Subadar  Mehar  Sing  Khattri  was  very  prominent 
in  this  episode.  He  saw  some  Germans  in  the 
trench  and  sent  a bomber  to  attack  them,  covering 
his  advance  with  fire.  The  Subadar  then  rushed  the 
trench,  and  by  his  gallant  leading  gained  the  2nd 
Class,  Indian  Order  of  Merit. 

In  this  position  both  battalions  remained  until 
about  8 p.m.,  the  enemy  continually  making  strenuous 
efforts  to  work  round  the  flank  of  the  l/9th  Gurklias, 
but  every  attempt  was  frustrated  by  the  fire  of  our 
inachine  guns  under  Lieutenant  R.  G.  H.  Murray, 
who  met  all  onslaughts  with  such  vigour  that  the 
enemy  Avas  compelled,  after  considerable  losses,  to 
desist.  Lieutenant  Murray  was  awarded  the  Military 
Cross  for  conspicuous  gallanti’y  and  marked  ability 
on  this  and  the  succeeding  day. 


246  BATTLE  OF  NEUVE  OHAPELLE 


The  advance  had  now  been  broiisfht  to  a standstill, 
and  General  Jacob  had  at  once  to  decide  whether 
it  was  advisable  to  hold  on  where  he  was,  or  to 
retire  to  a stronger  line.  In  coming  to  a con- 
clusion, he  had  to  take  into  consideration  several 
points.  He  had  been  led  to  expect  co-operation  by 
the  8th  Division  on  his  left,  but  one  Brigade  had  been 
stopped  by  a strongly  held  bridgehead  ; another  could 
make  no  headway  against  machine-gun  fire  from  the 
cross-roads  near  the  village  of  Pietre.  The  7th 
Division  also  was  held  up  at  the  River  Layes,  and  by 
the  strength  of  the  hostile  position  at  the  Moulin  du 
Pietre  ; the  1st  Brigade,  which  was  brought  up  in 
support  from  the  1st  Corps,  arrived  after  dark, 
when  it  was  not  considered  advisable  to  put  it  in. 
The  result  was  that  both  flanks  of  the  Dehra  Dun 
Brigade  were  in  the  air,  the  left  flank  especially 
being  heavily  enfiladed  by  machine  guns.  In  fact, 
the  Brigade  was  isolated. 

Information  obtained  from  prisoners  and  by 
our  scouts  showed  that  the  enem^^  had  rushed  up 
reinforcements,  and  that  the  wood  was  strongly 
lield,  two  German  regiments  being  known  to  have 
assembled  there. 

The  absence  of  the  1st  Seaforths  with  the  Garhwal 
Brigade  had  seriously  weakened  General  Jacob’s 
command,  but  in  spite  of  this,  he  was  confident 
that,  had  the  8th  Division  been  able  to  co-operate, 
he  could  have  maintained  his  position  on  the  edge 
of  the  wood.  As  it  was,  he  was  forced  to  the  con- 
clusion that  a retirement  to  the  line  of  the  River 
Layes  was  imperative,  in  which  opinion  General 
Anderson  commanding  the  Meerut  Division,  as  well 
as  Sir  James  Willcocks,  subsequently  concurred. 


GALLANT  GURKHAS 


247 


The  force  then  withdrew  in  good  order  under 
continual  fire,  but  without  further  casualties,  thanks 
to  General  Jacob’s  skill,  to  the  western  bank  of  the 
River  Layes,  all  wounded  who  could  be  found  being 
collected  and  removed.  In  the  absence  of  any  signs 
of  activity  on  the  part  of  the  enemy,  the  troops  spent 
the  night  in  digging  themselves  in. 

During  the  retirement  Riflemen  Manjit  Gurung, 
Partiman  Gurung  and  Ujir  Sing  Gurung,  2/ 2nd 
Gurkhas,  gained  the  2nd  Class,  Indian  Order  of 
Merit  by  attending  to  wounded  men  under  fire  and 
carrying  them  back,  as  did  also  Rifleman  Jagtea  Pun 
for  a similar  act  of  bravery.  Rifleman  Hastobir  Roka 
earned  the  same  distinction  by  bringing  up  machine- 
gun  ammunition  across  ground  swept  by  fire,  although 
already  wounded  in  the  arm. 

Meanwhile,  operation  orders  were  issued  for  an 
attack  to  be  made  at  7 a.m.  on  the  11th  March  by 
the  Meerut  Division,  with  the  Bois  du  Biez  as  its 
first  objective,  the  Jullundur  Brigade  being  lent 
as  a support,  while  the  Divisional  Artillery  was 
strengthened  by  that  of  the  Lahore  Division  with 
No.  1 Group  of  G.H.Q.  Artillery. 

Early  in  the  morning  Lt-Colonel  MacFarlane 
commanding  the  4th  Seaforths  was  wounded,  and 
Major  Cuthbert  took  over  command.  Throughout 
the  da}^  this  officer  led  his  battalion  with  great 
courage  and  ability,  although  ho  was  suffering  severely 
from  a wound  in  the  head.  For  their  services  during 
this  battle  Lt-Colonel  MacFarlane  and  Major  Cuthbert 
were  awarded  the  C.M.G.  and  the  D.S.O.  respectively. 

General  Jacob,  in  his  report  on  the  part  taken  by 
his  Brigade  in  the  battle,  speaks  in  the  following 
terms  of  high  praise  of  this  splendid  battalion  : — 


248  BATTLE  OF  NEUVE  CHAPELLE 


“ Tlie  4th  Scafortlis,  a Territorial  battalion, 
showed  itself  to  be  the  equal  of  any  Regular  regi- 
ment. They  worked  with  a will,  and  with  such 
regidarity  that  it  was  a pleasure  to  see  this  battalion 
advance  to  attack  with  confidence  and  seH-reliance 
that  left  little  to  be  desired,” 

As  showing  the  feeling  of  comradeship  which 
existed  between  the  British  and  Indian  soldiers, 
the  winning  of  the  Distinguished  Conduct  Medal  by 
Private  A,  McLeod,  l/4th  Seaforths,  may  be  in- 
stanced. This  soldier  voluntarily  left  his  trench  on 
tlie  1 1th  March  and  spent  a quarter  of  an  hour  under 
very  hea\w  machine-gun  and  rifle  fire  in  bandaging 
a seriously  wounded  Gurkha. 

In  addition  to  the  attack  on  the  Bois  du  Biez, 
the  Meerut  Di^  ision  was  ordered  to  seize  any  oppor- 
tu]iity  of  advancing  southwards  from  the  Rue  du 
Bois  to  co-operate  with  the  1st  Corps,  which  was 
continuing  its  attack  east  of  Givench^x  The  as- 
saulting troops  were  supplied  again  by  the  Dehra 
Dun  Brigade,  the  2/39th  Garhwalis  taking  the  place 
of  the  1st  Seaforths,  who  had  not  yet  rejoined. 

Seven  o’clock  on  the  morning  of  the  llth  arrived, 
but  the  attack  of  the  8th  Division  was  held  up,  and 
the  Division  was  consequently  unable  to  get  into  line 
w ith  the  Dehra  Dun  Brigade,  wfiiose  advance,  in  tmm, 
was  prevented  by  a thick  fog  and  by  heavy  frontal 
fire  from  the  Bois  du  Biez,  as  well  as  on  the  left  front 
and  rear  from  points  w hich  coidd  not  be  located. 

At  9 a.m.  the  Jullundiir  Brigade  was  moved  up 
to  Neuve  Chapelle  in  readiness  to  support.  This 
situation  continued  till  10  a.m.,  there  being  still 
no  signs  of  any  advance  by  the  8th  Division. 

Meanwhile  our  guns  w^ere  shelling  the  wmod 


ENEMY  MASSING 


249 


heavily,  the  only  response  from  the  enemy  ])eing  in 
the  shape  of  machine-gnn  and  rifle  tire  ; but  a con- 
siderable amount  of  movement  among  the  Germans 
was  observed,  especially  opposite  the  2/39th,  and 
it  was  evident  that  they  were  collecting  in  large 
numbers. 

Our  men  were  by  this  time  in  a very  exhausted 
condition,  many  of  them  having  had  no  food,  except 
what  they  carried  in  their  haversacks,  since  they 
left  Richebourg  St.  Vaast  on  the  night  before  the 
attack.  The  appearance  of  the  2/8th  Gurkhas 
with  rations  was  therefore  very  welcome.  The 
battalion  was  employed  to  a great  extent  during  the 
action  in  bringing  up  stores  and  ammunition  to  the 
firing  line.  General  Anderson  records  that  tliis 
duty  was  steadily  carried  out  under  heavy  shell  lire, 
with  considerable  casualties,  and  that  the  behaviour 
of  all  ranks  reflected  much  credit  on  the  regiment, 
the  work  being  arduous,  dangerous,  and  not  very 
inspiring. 

Diu-ing  the  operations  of  the  11th  March,  the 
ration  party  of  the  ]/9th  Gurkhas  came  under 
machine-gun  fire,  which  caused  a number  of  casualties. 
Jemadar  Shibdhoj  Mai  saw  one  of  the  wounded  men 
lying  out  under  lire.  Accompanied  by  Havildar 
Gambhir  Sing  Bohra  and  four  men  of  the  1 /9th,  he 
went  out  and  brought  in  several  wounded  men,  the 
enemy  keeping  up  intense  machine-gun  fii-e  all  the 
time.  The  Jemadar  received  the  2nd  Class,  Indian 
Order  of  Merit  and  the  Havildar  and  Riflemen  the 
Indian  Distinguished  Service  Medal. 

At  11.30  a.m.  the  Skhind  Brigade  was  moved  up 
to  Richebourg  St.  Yaast  in  case  of  emergency. 

Meanwhile  it  was  ascertained  b>'  General  Jacob 


250  BATTLE  OE'NEUVE  CHAPELLE 


personally,  from  the  nearest  battalion  of  the  8th 
Division,  that  the  cause  of  the  delay  in  their  advance 
was  that  the  left  of  the  25th  Brigade  was  heavity 
engaged,  and  that  the  right  had  strict  orders  not  to 
move  forward  till  the  situation  was  adjusted.  Still 
more  delay,  until  at  12.45  p.m.  orders  were  received 
for  the  infantry  attack  from  the  line  of  the  River 
Layes  to  take  place  at  2.15  p.m.,  provided  that 
the  8th  Division  had  come  up ; the  Dehra  Dun 
Brigade  to  assault  the  Bois  du  Biez,  supported  by 
the  Jullundur  Brigade. 

From  thenceforward  until  dark  the  enemy  kept 
up  a constant  bombardment  of  our  trenches,  and  the 
slightest  movement  at  once  drew  heavy  enfilade 
machine-gun  fire  on  our  front  line,  which,  hastily 
dug  as  it  had  been,  afforded  very  incomplete  shelter, 
so  that  the  casualties  were  numerous. 

When  2.15  p.m.,  the  appointed  time  for  the 
attack,  arrived,  there  were  again  no  signs  of  any 
advance  on  the  part  of  the  8th  Division.  The  two 
leading  battalions  of  the  Dehra  Dun  Brigade  were 
therefore  precluded  by  operation  orders  from  moving, 
but  some  platoons  of  the  4th  Seaforths,  out  of  sheer 
eagerness,  left  their  support  trenches  and  doubled 
forward.  They  came  at  once  under  heavy  machine- 
gun  fire,  and,  after  losing  a number  of  men,  were 
forced  to  crowd  into  the  Gurkha  trenches. 

It  was  felt  that  this  unsatisfactory  situation  should 
not  be  allowed  to  continue,  and  inquiry  was  again 
made  by  General  Jacob  of  the  nearest  battalion  of 
the  25th  Brigade  as  to  the  reason  of  the  delay  in  the 
advance.  The  re'ply  was  that  nothing  was  Tcnown 
of  any  intended  attack  at  2.15  p.m.  This  was  reported 
to  General  Anderson,  who  at  6 p.m.  informed  General 


CASUALTIES  251 

Jacob  that  his  Brigade  would  be  relieved  by  the 
Sirhind  Brigade. 

At  1.20  a.m.  on  the  12th  the  Sirhind  Brigade 
arrived,  and  Dehra  Dun  moved  off  in  the  pitch 
darkness,  losing  a few  men  on  the  way  from  shell  fire. 

The  casualties  of  the  various  units  of  the  Brigade 
diu’ing  the  fighting  from  the  10th  to  the  12th  March 
were  as  follows 

1st  Seaforths : 1 officer  and  34  men  killed ; 
9 officers  and  117  men  wounded  ; 5 men  missing. 

4th  Seaforths : 2 officers  and  34  men  killed ; 

6 officers  and  136  men  wounded  ; 3 missing. 

l/9th  Gurkhas  : 1 British,  3 Gurkha  officers  and 
50  other  ranks  killed  ; 2 Gurkha  officers  and  76 
others  wounded ; 1 Gurkha  officer  and  1 man 
missmg. 

2/2nd  Gurkhas  : 2 Gurkha  officers  and  17  others 
killed ; . 2 British,  1 Gimklia  officer  and  44  men 
wounded  ; 1 British  officer  and  28  men  missing. 

General  Jacob  speaks  in  these  words  of  the  work 
of  the  Gurkhas  : — 

“ The  Gurkha  battalions  (2/2nd  and  l/9th)  had 
an  opportunity  of  making  up  for  the  terrible  ordeals 
they  had  been  through  in  the  earlier  days  of  the  war, 
and  they  took  full  advantage  of  it.  Then  spirits 
were  high,  and  nothing  could  stop  their  dash.” 

Brigadier-General  Jacob,  who  has  since  risen  to 
the  command  of  an  Army  Corps,  was  appointed 
a Companion  of  the  Order  of  the  Bath  in  recognition 
of  the  ability  shown  by  him  during  the  battle, 
Lt-Colonel  G.  T.  Widdicombe,  l/9th  Gurkhas,  re- 
ceiving the  same  distinction,  while  Major  E.  P.  R. 
Boileau,  2/ 2nd  Ginkhas,  was  promoted  to  brevet 
Lt-Colonel. 


252  BATTLE  OF  NEUVE  CHAPELLE 


On  the  relief  of  the  Dehra  Dun  Brigade,  the  Jul- 
liiiidur  Brigade  moved  up  to  Neuve  Chapelle.  This 
Brigade  had  gone  through  a very  trying  experience 
during  the  previous  day,  as  it  had  been  lying  out  in 
the  open,  exposed  for  the  greater  part  of  the  time 
to  severe  shell  and  rifle  fire,  by  which  286  casualties 
were  caused.  During  the  march  to  Neuve  Chapelle, 
it  was  subjected  to  continued  shelling  by  heavy 
artillery  and  field  guns,  which  broke  up  the  formation 
and  forced  units  to  disperse  in  search  of  any  cover 
they  could  find ; 300  casualties  occimred  during 

this  short  march,  and  some  units  were  much  dis- 
organized. 

The  Sirhind  Brigade,  while  marching  up  to  relieve 
Dehra  Dun,  also  came  under  shell  fire,  but  luckily 
with  few  casualties. 

The  general  plan  of  operations  on  the  12th  March 
was  as  follows  ; — 

Artillery  fire  was  to  be  concentrated  from  10  to 
10.30  a.m.  on  the  enemy’s  positions  and  on  houses 
in  front  of  the  8th  Division,  which,  as  soon  as  the 
bombardment  ceased,  was  to  assault  and  then  to 
continue  its  advance  in  conjunction  with  the  Indian 
Corps.  The  attack  of  the  latter  was  timed  for 
11  a.m.,  to  be  preceded  by  concentrated  artillery  fire 
on  the  hostile  positions  along  the  road  on  the  north- 
east edge  of  the  Bois  du  Biez  to  the  road  junction 
600  yards  south-east  of  Port  Arthur,  also  on  redoubts 
and  houses  on  the  La  Bassee  road. 

The  Sirhind  and  Jullundur  Brigades  were  to 
carry  out  the  attack  under  Brigadier-General  Walker, 
on  a two-Brigade  front. 

The  second  objective  was  the  eastern  edge  of  the 
Bois  du  Biez ; the  tliird  objective  being  a line  through 


THE  1/4th  HLACK  WATCH  . 253 

La  Hue  and  Ligny-le-Crand  to  La  Clitxueterie  in- 
clusive. 

The  time  of  attack  was  subsequently  jDostponed 
for  two  hours,  i.e.  to  12.30  p.in.  for  the  8th  Division 
and  1 p.in.  for  the  Indian  Corps,  as  a heavy  morning 
mist  made  it  almost  impossible  to  carry  out  adequate 
registration. 

At  5.45  a.  111.  the  Bareilly  Brigade,  which  was  still 
holding  our  original  trenches,  rexiorted  that  the 
Germans  were  assaulting  from  a jioint  slightly  south 
of  Port  Ai-thiu’  uj)  to  oui’  extreme  left  in  front  of 
Neuve  Chajielle.  The  Bareilly  Brigade,  although 
it  did  not  take  jiart  in  the  attack,  had  been  going 
through  a very  trying  time,  as  the  enemy’s  artillery 
had  kejit  u^i  an  almost  continual  bombardment  of 
varying  intensity.  During  the  action  on  the  10th 
March,  the  Brigade  assisted  by  bui'sts  of  machine- 
gun  and  rifle  fire,  with  a view  to  subduing  any 
counter-attack  on  the  right  of  our  assault. 

At  11  a.m.  the  4th  Black  Watch  was  ordered  u^i 
from  Brigade  reserve  to  take  over  from  the  Garhwal 
Brigade  two  strong  ^loiiits  which  were  to  be  estab- 
lished in  the  captiu’ed  trenches.  This  oxieration  the 
battalion  carried  out  with  great  dash  and  determi- 
nation. 

Lieutenant  S.  H.  Steven  charged  at  the  head  of 
the  leading  platoon,  and  gained  his  objective  with 
hue  courage,  in  spite  of  the  heavy  enfilade  fire  to 
which  the  attack  was  exposed.  He  was  awarded  the 
Military  Cross  for  his  conspicuous  gallantry.  By  its 
behaviour  on  this  its  first  appearance  in  the  front 
line,  the  battalion  gave  xnoniise  of  the  reputation 
which  it  has  since  acquired. 

The  enemy’s  attack  on  the  12th  was  heralded  by 


254  BATTLE  OF  NEUVE  CHAPELLE 


a heavy  bombardment  of  Boome’s  trench,  Port 
Arthur  and  the  “ Crescent,”  which  commenced  at 
5.20  a.m.  At  5.45  a.m.  dense  masses  of  Germans 
appeared,  coming  on  at  their  usual  jog-trot.  In 
the  uncertain  light  they  resembled  Highlanders, 
their  overcoats  giving  the  appearance  of  kilts,  but 
when  they  arrived  within  100  yards  of  our  line,  the 
spikes  of  their  helmets  could  be  discerned. 

It  seemed  at  first  as  if  no  fire  could  stop  them, 
so  impressive  was  the  sight  of  this  great  multitude 
of  men.  The  effect  of  concentrated  machine-gun 
and  rifie  fire  must,  however,  be  witnessed  to  be 
fully  appreciated.  The  surging  mass  came  on  much 
as  a heavy  swell  rolls  towards  the  seashore.  At 
one  moment  the  very  earth  seemed  to  be  advancing 
towards  our  line,  and  nothing  apparently  could  save 
us  from  being  overwhelmed.  The  next  moment  a 
furious  fusillade  broke  from  our  trenches.  It  ceased 
just  as  daylight  appeared,  and  where  before  were 
swellmg  lines  of  men  moving  on  in  their  awe-com- 
pelling progress,  now,  as  an  officer  relates,  nothing 
was  to  be  seen  but  heaps  of  dead  and  wounded 
Germans. 

Piles  of  wriggling,  heaving  bodies  lay  on  the 
ground,  and  the  air  resounded  with  shrieks,  groans, 
and  curses.  The  wounded  tried  to  shelter  them- 
selves behind  parapets  formed  of  the  bodies  of  their 
dead  comrades,  while  some  attempted  to  dig  them- 
selves in.  For  hours  afterwards  wounded  Germans 
continued  to  crawl  into  our  line,  where  they  received 
medical  attention  and  were  sent  off  in  ambulances 
as  soon  as  possible. 

The  slaughter  Avas  prodigious.  In  front  of  the 
Leicesters,  1st  Seaforths,  and  2/3rd  Gurkhas,  some 


GERMAN  ATTACKS  REPULSED 


255 


600  dead  were  counted,  and  General  Anderson  in  his 
report  calculated,  as  a minimum,  that  the  enemy’s 
losses  in  dead  alone  on  the  front  captured  by  the 
Meerut  Division  amounted  to  2000,  to  which  must  be 
added  heavy  casualties  caused  by  our  bombardment 
of  the  Bois  du  Biez.  One  of  the  writers  himself, 
on  a careful  estimate,  counted  1200  Germans  lying 
dead  or  wounded  in  front  of  a portion  of  our 
line. 

The  repelling  of  a massed  attack  such  as  this 
gives  the  machine-gun  officer  his  own  peculiar 
opportunity,  and,  as  usual,  he  was  not  slow  to  seize 
it.  Captain  Lodwick,  2/3rd  Gurkhas,  gained  the 
D.S.O.  by  his  courage  and  skill  in  the  performance 
of  his  duties  as  machine-gun  officer  of  the  Garhwal 
Brigade  during  the  battle.  In  order  to  ascertain 
the  best  positions  for  his  guns,  he  reconnoitred  at 
great  risk  the  whole  of  the  captured  trenches,  and  by 
his  masterly  disposition  of  20  guns  he  was  very 
largely  responsible  for  the  overthrow  of  this  heavy 
attack.  Unfortunately,  this  brave  officer,  like 
Colonel  Swiney,  lost  his  life  when  the  Persia  was 
torpedoed  on  the  30th  December,  1915. 

At  9 a.m.  the  enemy  made  a second  attempt,  which 
fared  no  better  than  the  first.  Similar  destructive 
scenes  were  enacted,  and  in  no  place  did  the  attack 
reach  our  trenches. 

On  the  right  of  the  l/39th  Garhwalis  the  Germans 
repeatedly  endeavoured  to  work  up  the  trench 
against  the  flank  of  the  battalion,  and  even  came 
into  the  open  in  rear,  but  each  attempt  was  thwarted, 
largely  through  the  instrumentality  of  Lieutenant 
A.  H.  Mankelow,  in  charge  of  the  regimental  machine 
guns,  who  had  throughout  the  action  shown  the 


250  BATTLE  OF  NEUVE  CHAPELLE 


greatest  deteniiiiiation  and  ability,  remaining  at  duty, 
altbougli  lie  had  been  wounded  on  the  10th  March. 
For  his  services  Lieutenant  Mankelow  received  the 
Military  Cross.  This  gallant  young  ofticer  was  killed 
on  the  14th  Maj^,  1915. 

Jemadar  Guman  fSing  Negi,  who  was  with  the 
guns  under  Lieutenant  Mankelow,  showed  great 
devotion  to  duty.  The  enemj^  were  using  trench 
mortars  with  much  effect,  and  only  one  man  of  a gun 
team  was  still  unwounded.  The  Jemadar  continued 
himseff  to  lire  the  gun,  and  although  wounded  and 
shaken  by  a bomb,  he  remained  at  his  post  till 
relieved  on  the  night  of  the  13th  March,  receiving 
the  Indian  Distinguished  Service  Medal  for  his 
bravery,  as  did  also  Lance-Naik  Dangwa  Pamola, 
one  of  the  team  of  another  gun,  who  was  twice  shot 
in  the  head,  but  still  went  on  trying  to  fire. 

Rifleman  Jawarihu  Negi  (l/39th)  and  Sepoy 
Balffam  (30th  Punjabis  attached)  won  the  same 
reward  by  their  bravery  during  the  attack  in  getting 
out  in  the  open  and  throwing  hand  grenades  at  the 
enemy.  The  former  also  threw  an  unexploded 
bomb,  which  had  fallen  in  his  trench,  over  the  parapet, 
lie  thus  saved  a number  of  casualties.  The  latter 
was  killed  while  bombing  the  enemy. 

At  this  period  our  artiller^^  kept  up  a terrific  fire 
on  the  Bois  du  Biez,  causing,  there  is  every  reason 
to  believe,  very  heavy  casualties,  as  for  days  after- 
wards the  enemy  was  observed  to  be  removing  bodies 
from  the  wood  for  burial  in  the  fields  behind  it. 

As  always,  the  work  of  the  Signallers  at  this 
arduous  time  was  carried  on  with  the  utmost  coolness 
and  skill.  During  an  action,  the  ground  in  rear  of 
attack  and  defence  alike  is  subjected  to  a tremendous 


GALLAxXT  «1GNALLER8 


257 


artillery  lire,  which  ploughs  up  the  earth  and  destroys 
the  telephone  wires  connecting  the  front  line  with 
Brigade  and  Divisional  Head  Quarters.  It  is  the  duty 
of  the  Signallers  to  repah  the  lines  at  all  costs,  and 
what  such  work  means  can  easily  be  imagined.  In 
the  midst  of  a tornado  of  every  description  of  fire 
a few  men  are  seen  in  the  open,  calmly  attending  to 
their  task,  repahing  the  Avires  with  as  much  coolness 
as  if  the  scene  of  the  breakage  were  in  a London 
house  instead  of  on  a bullet-swept  battlelield.  A man 
falls  ; another  takes  his  place  ; and  the  v ork  goes  on, 
whatever  inaA'  be  the  toll  of  life  involved. 

v' 

Amongst  those  who  specially  distinguished  them- 
selves was  Captain  C.  J.  Torrie,  30th  Punjabis,  com- 
manding No.  35  Signal  Company,  of  whom  it  is 
recorded  that  the  successful  work  of  the  Division 
at  NeuAm  Chapelle  A\  as  to  a verj^  great  extent  depen- 
dent on  the  efficiency  of  the  communications  estab- 
lished  and  maintained  by  him  under  very  heavy  fire. 
The  Amluc  of  Captain  Torrie’s  services  Avas  recognized 
by  the  award  of  the  D.S.O. 

It  is  only  possible  to  mention  a feAv  of  the  non- 
commissioned officers  and  men  avIio  gained  the  Dis- 
tinguished Conduct  Medal  by  then'  gallantly  on 
signal  Avork. 

Corporal  W.  Giuclon,  a motor  cyclist  of  the 
.Meerut  Signal  Company  and  a member  of  the  2nd 
Presidency  Volunteer  Rifles,  shoAved  conspicuous 
bravery  from  the  10th  to  13th  March  in  constantly 
carrying  important  messages  under  fire  bj’  day  and 
night,  ahvays  with  success. 

Pi’Rate  P.  E.  Sones,  4th  Suffolks,  attached  Lahore 
Signal  Company,  receAed  the  Medal  for  great 
coinage  on  the  12th  and  13th  March,  Avhen  he 

s 


258  BATTLE  OF  NEUVE  CHAPELLE 


carried  messages  for  48  successive  liours  under  very 
heavy  rifle  and  machine-gun  fire. 

Corporal  Chadwick,  R.E.,  attached  to  the  same 
Signal  Company,  carried  messages  on  three  occasions 
for  a distance  of  1|-  miles  over  ground  swept  by  very 
heavy  and  continuous  shell  fire, 

A volume  could  be  filled  with  the  deeds  of  these 
men,  but  the  few  instances  cited  above  will  suffice 
to  show  the  nature  of  their  work. 

On  the  12th  March  the  enemy  made  frequent  use  of 
handkerchiefs  tied  to  rifles,  as  white  flags,  often  even 
at  a distance  of  800  to  1000  yards,  and  officers  were 
seen  in  the  background  trying,  b}^  the  persuasion  of 
their  revolvers,  to  induce  their  men  to  advance. 

During  the  whole  of  the  12th  and  13th  March  the 
Garhwal  Brigade  went  through  the  terrible  test  of 
holding  a line  under  continual  heavy  bombardment. 
An  officer  describes  this  experience  as  a foretaste 
of  hell,  an  opinion  with  which  others  who  have 
suffered  in  a like  manner  will  asree.  The  enemv 

o «/ 

also  kept  up  a heavy  fire  on  Neuve  ChapeUe  and 
Port  Arthur,  it  being  estimated  that  3000  shells  fell 
in  the  latter  section  during  the  12th  alone. 

The  Sirhind  and  Jullundur  Brigades  had  been 
brought  up  during  the  night  of  the  llth-12th, 
Sirhind  relieving  Dehra  Dun  in  the  trenches,  with 
the  1st  Highland  Light  Infantry  and  l/4th  Gurkhas 
in  rear  of  the  portion  of  the  line  held  by  the  2/3rd 
Gurkhas,  wliile  Jullundur  occupied  a position  in 
rear  of  Shdiind. 

At  about  11.30  a.m.  on  the  12th,  it  was  reported 
that  the  Germans  in  front  of  the  right  of  the  l/4th 
Gurkhas  were  showing  signs  of  wishing  to  surrender. 
In  dealing  with  a foe  so  given  to  treachery,  it  was 


CAPTAIN  COLLINS  GAINS  THE  D.S.O.  259 


always  necessary  to  be  on  one’s  guard.  Captain 
L,  P.  Collins,  l/4tli  Gurkhas,  who  was  in  command  at 
that  point,  considered  that  the  opportunity  should 
at  once  be  seized  to  attack,  as  the  occupation  of  that 
portion  of  the  enemy’s  trench  was  in  conformity 
with  the  general  plans,  and  would  facilitate  the 
extension  of  the  l/4th  Gurkhas  to  the  right. 

Acting  on  his  own  responsibility,  Captain  Collins 
at  once  assaulted  and  took  150  yards  of  the  trench 
with  very  slight  loss.  He  then  saw  that  a number 
of  Germans  were  holding  the  trench  further  to  the 
left.  These  he  attacked,  when  about  100  surrendered 
and  some  50  were  shot  as  they  bolted.  Captain 
CoUins’s  losses  were  slight,  but  they  included  Subadar 
Durgia  Gurung,  who  could  ill  be  spared,  as  his  work 
both  in  and  out  of  action  had  been  of  great  value  to 
the  regiment.  For  his  conspicuous  gallantry  in 
this  affair,  and  for  the  initiative  displayed  by  him. 
Captain  Collins  was  awarded  the  D.S.O. 

The  attack  timed  for  1 p.m.  was  organized  on 
a two-Brigade  front,  the  Sirhind  Brigade  being  on 
the  right  with  two  battalions,  the  1st  Highland 
Light  Infantry  and  l/4th  Gurkhas  in  the  front  line, 
the  15th  Sikhs  and  1/lst  Gurkhas  in  support.  The 
two  Brigades  were  under  Brigadier- General  Walker, 
Lt-Colonel  Anderson,  1/lst  Giu-khas,  commanding 
the  Sirhind  Brigade  in  his  place. 

Originally  it  was  intended  that  the  Jullundur 
Brigade  should  attack  on  a front  of  three  battalions, 
i.e.  the  1st  Manchesters  on  the  left  in  touch  with  the 
25th  Brigcide,  8th  Division,  the  47th  Sikhs  in  the 
centre,  and  the  4th  Suffolks  on  the  right,  with  the 
59th  Rifles  in  Brigade  reserve.  During  the  morning, 
however,  it  was  reported  that  the  Suffolks  now 


260  BAl’TLE  OE  NEUVE  CHAPELLE 


consisted  of  about  140  rank-and-Hle,  wliilc  the  59th 
Pities  numbered  only  some  125  men. 

'Idle  cause  of  this  very  serious  diminution  of 
numbers  was  that  the  Brigade  had  suffered  heavy 
casualties  while  lying  in  the  open  on  the  previous 
day,  coming  also  under  very  severe  shelling  on  the 
march  to  Neuve  Chapelle.  Great  confusion  arose 
ill  the  darkness,  and  in  addition  to  casualties,  a large 
number  of  men  of  the  Suffolks  and  59th  were  unable 
to  rejoin  tlieh  units.  The  result  was  that  in  order 
to  occupy  the  length  of  front  allotted  to  the  Brigade, 
the  59th  Rifles  had  to  be  added  to  the  Huffolks  in 
the  front  line,  thus  leaving  no  Brigade  reserve. 

At  noon  the  bombardment  on  the  8th  Division 
front  began,  but  the  attack  had  only  progressed  about 
a hundred  3^ards  by  1 p.m.  Shortly  before  our  guns 
opened  on  the  Indian  Corps’  front,  about  100  Germans 
came  over  and  gave  themselves  up.  They  w^ere  a 
miserable-looking  lot  of  men,  and  appeared  to  be 
more  or  less  starving,  as  they  eagerly  devoured  the 
chupatties  given  to  them  by  the  Indians. 

At  12.30  p.m.  our  artillery  poured  a very  heavy 
shrapnel  fire  into  the  Bois  du  Biez,  and  at  1 p.m.  the 
infantry  attack  commenced. 

TTie  ManchOsters,  heroes  of  Givenchy,  advanced 
with  their  accustomed  determination  and  steadiness, 
but  the  moment  the  first  line  of  two  companies 
appeared,  the  enemy  opened  a staggering  fire,  and 
Captain  Browne,  commanding  No.  1 Company,  was 
wounded,  while  men  were  falling  fast.  By  1.30  p.m. 
the  leading  companies  of  the  battalion  had  succeeded 
in  reaching  the  front  line  trenches  held  by  the 
Garhwal  Brigade,  but  here  they  became  mixed  up 
with  the  2/3rd  Gurkhas,  wdiile  the  first  and  second 


HEAVY  OEETCER  EARUALTTES  2G1 


linos  and  tlic  comniiinication  ti’cnclies  had  become 
completely  blocked  by  troops. 

The  remainder  of  the  battalion  was  held  up  for 
some  time,  owing  to  the  necessity  of  crossing  gaps  in 
the  trenches  where  roads  and  ditches  intersected 
them.  These  gaps  were  marked  down  by  the  enemy 
and  swept  by  machine-gun  fire,  all  attempts  to  pass 
them  ending  only  in  heavy  casualties.  The  Man- 
chesters,  however,  are  hard  to  beat,  as  the  enemy 
has  so  often  found  to  his  cost,  and  Nos.  3 and  4 Com- 
panies eventually  made  a most  gallant  rush  and 
reached  the  front  line,  but  with  much-diminished 
ranks. 

The  47th  Sikhs,  who  had  so  greatly  distinguished 
themselves  at  Neuve  Chapelle  in  October,  1914, 
fared  little  better.  Scarcely  had  their  advance 
commenced,  when  Captain  Combe  was  wounded, 
as  well  as  several  Indian  officers.  Captain  Hogge 
then  took  command,  but  was  hit  shortly  afterwards, 
being  succeeded  by  Captain  Talbot,  who  was  himself 
slightly  wounded,  as  were  also  Captains  Abbay  and 
Cormack,  but  all  remained  at  duty, 

Subadar  Harnam  Singh  was  killed  while  leading 
his  half-company.  His  bravery  had  been  most 
conspicuous  throughout  the  campaign,  and  had  won 
for  him  the  Indian  Order  of  Merit  at  Eestubert  in 
December,  1914,  in  which  action  his  only  son  was 
killed.  The  Subadar,  after  his  death,  was  granted 
the  Order  of  British  India,  2nd  Class. 

Shortly  after  this  Captain  Brown  was  Icilled 
and  Captain  Story  wounded,  the  casualties  in  the 
ranks  being  also  very  heavy,  and  when  the  front  line 
trenches  were  reached,  it  was  found  to  be  impossible 
to  make  any  further  progress  in  face  of  tlie  terrific  fire. 


262  BATTLE  OF  NEUVE  CHAPELLE 


During  the  advance,  a wounded  man  was  seen 
to  be  lying  out  exposed  to  heavy  machine-gun  fire. 
Havildar  Gajjan  Singh  and  Sepoy  Bur  Singh  volun- 
teered to  attempt  to  bring  him  in,  and  went  over  the 
parapet.  The  Havildar  was  at  once  wounded,  but 
Rm’  Singh  managed  to  drag  him  back  under  cover, 
and  went  out  again  to  rescue  the  wounded  man  bj^ 
himself,  but  was  unable  to  move.  him.  Lieutenant 
Allardice  (14th,  attached  47th  Sikhs)  then  went  out, 
and  with  Rur  Singh  succeeded  in  getting  the  man 
into  our  trench.  He  had,  hoAvever,  been  wounded  in 
so  many  places  while  lying  in  the  open  that  he 
succumbed.  This  conspicuous  act  of  bravery  was 
performed  in  a most  exposed  position,  when  any 
movement  drew  heavy  machine-gun  fire  from  both 
flanks.  Sepoy  Rur  Singh  received  the  2nd  Glass, 
Indian  Order  of  Merit. 

For  his  services  during  the  campaign,  in  whicli 
he  was  twice  wounded,  Lt-Colonel  Richardson  was 
promoted  to  Brevet-Colonel,  while  Lt-Colonel  Gun- 
ning (.35th  Siklis  attached)  received  the  C.M.G. 

The  4th  Suft'olks,  who  on  the  11th  had  lost 
Lieutenant  Row  and  19  men  killed.  Lieutenant 
Turner  and  100  men  being  wounded,  now  again 
suffered  severely.  Captain  Garrett  and  7 men  being 
killed.  Captains  Cockburn  and  Mason,  Lieutenant 
Hoyland  and  74  men  bemg  wounded. 

The  59th  Rifles  were  even  more  unfortunate. 
On  the  preceding  day  they  had  lost  1 British  officer 
killed,  2 wounded,  as  well  as  2 Indian  officers 
They  went  into  this  attack  v^^ith  onty  5 British  and 
the  same  number  of  Indian  officers. 

During  the  advance  to  the  support  trenches,  Lt- 
Colonel  P.  C.  Eliot t-I^ockhart,  of  the  Guides,  a most 


JUI.LUNDUE.  ATTACK  FAILS 


2G3 


gallant  and  able  Commanding  Officer,  was  wounded, 
and  died  shortly  afterw^ards.  A little  later  Captain 
Here  was  killed  at  the  head  of  his  company,  as  w^as 
Captain  Reed  of  the  machme  guns,  and  Captam 
Burn  w^as  severely  wounded. 

For  some  time  after  this  quick  succession  of 
casualties  the  regiment  was  left  without  a British 
officer,  as  Captain  Inskip,  the  last  left,  was  badly 
shell-shocked  and  could  not  rejoin  till  later.  The 
losses  of  the  59th  in  British  officers,  up  to  date,  had 
been  very  heavy,  amounting  to  10  killed  and  19 
wounded  out  of  an  average  war  strength  of  13  officers. 

Sepoy  Zarif  KTian,  throughout  the  11th  and  12th 
March,  behaved  wTth  the  greatest  gallantry  in  con- 
tinually carrying  messages  under  very  heavy  fire. 
He  was  killed  on  the  12th  March,  while  performing 
this  duty,  but  was  posthumously  granted  the  1st 
Class  of  the  Indian  Order  of  Merit.  This  brave 
soldier  had  akeady  won  the  2nd  Class  of  the  Order 
during  the  early  days  of  the  w^ar. 

The  failure  of  the  Jullundur  and  Sirhind  Brigades 
to  reach  their  objectives,  in  spite  of  the  great  dash 
and  bravery  with  which  their  advance  was  carried 
out,  was  due  to  the  fact  that  the  25th  Brigade  on 
their  left  was  unable  to  advance,  the  Brigades  on 
its  left  again  havmg  been  held  up.  This  enabled 
the  enemy  to  bring  heavy  enfilade  fire  to  bear  on 
the  Indian  attack  from  the  left,  while  at  the  same  time 
pouring  in  oblique  fire  from  a redoubt  at  the  north- 
west extremity  of  the  Bois  du  Biez. 

The  Sirhmd  Brigade  met  with  more  success  in 
its  attack.  In  the  front  line  w^ere  the  1st  High- 
land Light  Infantry  under  lit-Colonel  E.  R.  Hill  on 
the  left,  and  the  l/4th  Gurkhas  under  Major  D.  G. 


2C4  BATTLE  OF  NEUVE  CHAPELLE 


Young  on  the  right,  the  15th  Sikhs  being  in  rear  of 
the  l/4th  Gurkhas,  the  1/lst  Gurkhas  in  reserve, 
and  the  4th  King’s  (Liverpools)  were  further  back, 
for  it  was  only  intended  to  use  this  battalion,  which 
had  recently  arrived  from  England,  in  case  of 
emergency. 

Before  the  attack  on  the  first  main  objective, 
the  Bois  du  Biez,  could  be  developed,  two  hostile 
advanced  positions  had  to  be  captured : (a)  a line 
of  trench  parallel  to  and  just  north-west  of  the 
River  Lajms  ; (6)  a trench  parallel  to  and  200  yards 
south-east  of  the  river. 

As  soon  as  the  bombardment  ceased,  the  Highland 
Light  Infantry  advanced  with  A Company  on  the 
riglit  in  the  firing  line,  under  Capte,in  Halswelle, 
and  B Company  on  the  left  under  Captain  Knight, 
with  C and  D Companies  in  reserve. 

The  Sirhind  Brigade,  having  relieved  Dehra  Dun 
during  the  early  morning,  was  already  some  distance 
in  advance,  and  the  Jullundur  Brigade  having  been 
held  up,  the  left  flank  of  the  Highland  Light  Infantry 
was  exposed  to  a very  heavy  oblique  as  well  as  frontal 
fire  from  the  enemy’s  trench  at  a range  of  about 
500  yards.  This  caught  the  battalion  the  moment 
it  began  to  advance,  and  a number  of  men  fell  at 
the  start,  as  well  as  at  each  successive  rush. 

Captains  Knight  and  Halswelle  led  their  men 
with  great  dash,  nobly  seconded  by  their  subalterns, 
2nd  Lieutenants  Gibbs,  Machan  (killed),  Knox  and 
W ornham. 

The  advance  lay  over  absolutely  bare  ground, 
without  a vestige  of  cover,  but  the  men  swept 
on  in  spite  of  the  heavy  losses  caused  by  the  enemy’s 
accurate  fire.  With  the  last  rush  the  line  of  trench 


MANY  r.RAVE  DEEDS  OF  THE  H.L.T.  205 


(a)  was  carried,  after  a haiid-to-liand  figlit,  in  whicli 
a large  number  of  Germans  were  killed  and  about 
200  captmed.  A few  men  of  A Company  under 
Captain  Halswelle  succeeded  in  crossing  the  river, 
and  held  on  there  until  dark. 

Colonel  Hill  then  ordered  his  advanced  com- 
panies not  to  attempt  to  proceed  further  until  the 
Jullundur  Brigade  could  come  up  on  the  left,  as  that 
flank  was  in  the  ah. 

An  attack  by  the  25th  Brigade  on  the  left,  which 
was  timed  for  5 p.m.,  did  not  develope,  and  as 
darkness  was  rapidly  coming  on,  the  ground  won  was 
consolidated. 

During  the  action.  Private  Brooks,  seeing 
Corporal  Hawke  lying  badly  wounded  in  the  open 
at  a distance  of  about  30  yards  from  our  trench, 
went  over  the  parapet  and  carried  him  in  under 
extremely  heavy  Are,  for  which  act  of  bravery  he 
received  the  Distinguished  Conduct  Medal. 

Lance-Corporal  Stewart  and  Private  Clifford  won 
the  same  decoration  by  theh  gallantry  in  going  out 
under  very  severe  fire  and  relaying  a telephone  wire 
which  had  been  cut  by  shells,  after  two  men  had 
been  killed  in  the  attempt. 

Sergeant-Major  House  also  received  the  Dis- 
tinguished Conduct  Medal  for  his  gallant  and  valuable 
services  in  keeping  up  the  supply  of  ammunition 
by  day  and  organizing  stretcher  parties  at  night. 

Brave  deeds  were  man}''  on  this  trying  day. 
Amongst  others  may  be  mentioned  that  of  Private 
Duffy,  Highland  Light  Infantry,  who  voluntarily 
went  out  from  his  trench  and  brought  in  eight 
wounded  men  under  heavy  fire,  for  which  he  was 
rewarded  with,  the  Distinguished  Conduct  Medal. 


260  BATTLE  OF  NEUVE  CHAPELLE 


Of  the  officers,  whose  gallantry  and  leading  had 
been  of  the  highest  order  throughout,  Lt-Colonel 
Hill,  Captains  Halswelle,  Knight,  Tarrant,  Stewart, 
and  Lieutenant  Cowan  were  mentioned  in  des- 
patches. 

The  losses  of  the  battalion  during  the  action  were 
very  heavy,  8 officers  having  been  killed  and  5 
wounded,  while  there  were  nearly  250  casualties 
amongst  other  ranks. 

The  right  hah-battalion  of  the  l/4th  Gurkhas, 
which  had  captured  a section  of  the  enemy’s  trench 
under  Captain  Collins  earlier  in  the  day,  had  reformed 
with  then*  right  in  touch  with  the  Leicesters,  the  left 
hah-battalion  coming  up  shortly  afterwards. 

At  about  2 p.m.  a number  of  casualties  occurred 
among  the  British  officers  of  this  battalion  in  their 
endeavour  to  rescue  a wounded  private  of  the 
Leicesters,  who  was  lying  about  20  yards  in  front 
of  the  Gurkha  parapet.  Major  Young,  Jemadar 
Gangabir  Gmung  and  Bifleman  Wazir  Sing  Bura- 
thoki  went  out  together  to  try  to  bring  the  wounded 
man  in.  In  doing  so.  Major  Young  was  mortally, 
and  the  rifleman  severely,  wounded.  Captains  Hogg 
and  McGann,  without  a moment’s  hesitation,  rushed 
out  to  help,  but  both  were  at  once  hit.  Captain 
McGann  managed  to  crawl  back  unaided,  and  Jemadar 
Gangabir-  with  the  help  of  some  Gurkhas  eventually 
succeeded  in  bringing  Captain  Hogg  back.  For 
their  gallantry  and  devotion,  the  Jemadar  and 
Bifleman  Wazir  Sing  Burathoki  received  the  2nd 
Class  of  the  Indian  Order  of  Merit ; the  latter  was 
also  subsequently  awarded  the  Bussian  Medal  of 
St.  George,  3rd  Class. 

It  is  typical  of  the  sphit  of  the  Corps,  and  indeed 


OUR  SECOND  ATTACK  SMOTHERED  2G7 


of  the  British  Army,  that  three  British  officers  and 
a number  of  Indian  soldiers  should  have  risked  their 
lives  to  bring  to  safety  a single  private  soldier  of 
the  Leicesters. 

The  battalion  remained  in  readiness  to  attack, 
but  as  the  left  of  the  line  was  still  held  up,  the  assault 
was  not  delivered. 

The  15th  Sikhs  in  support  got  up  close  behind 
the  Garhwal  trenches,  where  they  lay  down  under 
cover.  Captain  Waterfield  was  wounded  in  getting 
out  of  the  trench  at  the  very  commencement  of  the 
advance  ; Subadar  Gajjan  Singh  was  killed  and  one 
Gurkha  officer  was  wounded,  there  being  60  casualties 
amongst  other  ranks. 

The  1/lst  Gurkhas,  moving  up  in  close  support, 
escaped  with  Captain  and  Adjutant  G.  S.  Kennedy, 
one  Gurkha  officer  and  15  other  ranks  killed,  and 
51  wounded. 

Insistent  orders  were  now  received  from  the 
1st  Army  to  press  on  the  attack  on  the  Bois  du 
Biez.  In  consequence,  the  Delma  Dun  Brigade, 
which  had  just  got  back  to  well-earned  biUets,  was 
recalled  to  Richebourg  St  Vaast,  and  the  whole 
Lahore  Division,  now  placed  under  its  own  Com- 
mander, General  Keary,  wms  ordered  to  push  on  to 
the  wood  at  aU  costs. 

At  5.50  p.m.  our  guns  bombarded  for  15  minutes, 
when  a second  attack  was  attempted  ; this,  however, 
could  not  debouch  from  the  trenches,  being  smothered 
by  the  enemy’s  frontal  and  enfilade  fire. 

In  view  of  the  urgency  of  the  orders  from  Sir 
Douglas  Haig,  General  Kearj"  arranged  for  an 
attack  by  the  whole  of  the  Lahore  Division  to  take 
place  at  10.45  p.m.,  preceded  again  by  15  minutes’ 


2r„s  r,/\T1’LF.  OF  NFUVF  FTTAPET.LE 


boinbarchnent.  This  operation  was  vetoed  by  Sir 
James  Willcocks,  as  not  being  feasible  in  pitch 
darkness,  over  unknown  ground,  and  with  such  a 
large  body  of  troops.  No  competent  critic  who  has 
studied  the  facts  will  question  the  wisdom  of  this 
decision. 

At  10.5  p.m.  on  the  12th,  orders  were  received 
from  Sir  Douglas  Haig,  to  suspend  further  active 
operations  and  to  consolidate  all  positions  gained. 
The  Sirhind  Brigade  was  then  placed  at  the  disposal 
of  the  Meerut  Division,  the  Jullundur  and  Ferozepore 
Brigades  being  withdrawn. 

So  ended  the  battle  of  Neuve  Chapelle,  the  first 
action  on  a large  scale  during  the  war  in  which  the 
British  liad  a predominance  in  artillery  as  well  as 
in  men. 

The  losses  of  the  British  forces  engaged  were: 
190  officers  and  2337  other  ranks  killed  ; 359  officers 
and  8174  other  ranks  wounded;  23  officers  and 
1728  other  ranks  missing;  making  a total  of  12,811 
casualties. 


Included  in 

these 

losses 

were 

the  followin 

casualties  of  the 

Indian  Corps  : 

British 

Indian 

Otlier  ranks 

other  ranks 

odicers. 

officers. 

(British). 

(Indian). 

Killed 

. 41 

22 

364 

408 

Wonndefl 

. 01 

36 

1401 

140.5 

IMlssing  . 

] 

2 

87 

225 

Total  . 

. 133 

00 

1012 

2128 

The  question  as  to  wliether  the  success  achieved 
was  worth  the  losses  involved  has  lieen  much 
argued. 

The  material  gain  consisted  of  an  advance  of  our 
line  on  a front  of  two  miles  to  a depth  of  1000  yards. 


BALANCE  IN  OUB  EAVOUB  2GU 

B^^  this  advance  the  dangerous  salient  known  as 
Port  Arthur  was  straightened  out,  thus,  in  Sir 
James  Willcocks’  words,  removing  a considerable 
soiu'ce  of  anxiety  to  the  various  Corps  which  had 
been  responsible  for  its  safe  custody. 

To  this  gain  in  ground  must  be  added  the  losses 
of  the  enemy  in  men  and  in  moral.  On  the  front 
captured  by  the  Indian  Corps  alone  the  German 
dead  numbered  at  least  2000,  while  many  men  were 
buried  by  the  enemy  behind  the  Bois  du  Biez.  In 
addition  to  these.  Sir  John  French  mentions,  in  his 
despatch  before  quoted,  that  he  was  in  possession 
of  positive  information  that  upwards  of  12,000 
German  Avounded  were  removed  to  the  north-east 
and  east  by  train.  It  is  possible  that  this  estimate 
was  exaggerated,  but  it  is  certain  that  30  officers 
and  1657  other  ranks  of  the  enemy  were  eaptined, 
the  share  of  the  Indian  Corps  being  12  officers  and 
617  men.  It  is  not  improbable  that  the  German 
losses  approached  the  number  of  18,000,  leaving  a 
balance  in  our  favour. 

As  regards  the  question  of  loss  of  moral  b,y  the 
enemy,  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  this  sudden  turning 
of  the  tables  by  the  employment  of  overwhelming 
masses  of  artillery  had  a most  demoralizing  effect 
on  the  Germans,  who,  accustomed  to  vieAv  with 
exultation  the  eflbcts  of  then  superior  concentrations 
of  guns,  were  loud  in  their  denunciations  of  similar 
practices  by  us. 

The  effect  was  felt  far  behind  the  hostile  line, 
for  it  is  known  that  at  Lille  the  state  of  affairs  was 
much  akin  to  a panic.  The  principal  hospital  was 
removed  to  Tournai,  to  which  place  went  many 
officers  and  the  paraphernalia  of  the  German  Head 


270  BATTLE  OF  NEUVE  CHAPELLE 


Quarters,  while  the  inhabitants  of  Lille  openly  ex- 
pressed their  joy  at  the  prospect  of  the  arrival  of 
the  British. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  change  from  the  un- 
utterable weariness  of  the  winter  months  in  trenches 
to  the  activity  of  a vigorous  offensive  put  new  life 
into  our  men.  They  were  cheered  too  by  the  thought 
that  the  old,  bad  time  had  come  to  an  end,  and  that 
in  future  the  adequate  support  of  our  guns  would 
enable  them  to  give  as  much  as  they  got.  How  far 
this  belief  was  justified  will  be  seen,  but  at  least  it 
was  beneficial. 

On  the  whole,  then,  the  battle  of  Neuve  Chapelle, 
on  a strict  balancing  of  accounts,  was  not  entirely 
a failui’e.  We  attained  our  first  objective  at  a cost 
which  might  well  have  gained  us  a further  goal. 

The  mistakes  which  occurred  were,  perhaps,  to 
be  looked  for  in  a first  attempt  at  the  adoption  of 
the  French  methods  of  attack.  The  artillery  pre- 
paration, almost  perfect  on  the  Indian  front,  was  not 
everywhere  so  efficacious,  as  witness  the  effect  of 
the  bombardment  on  the  23rd  Brigade  front.  In 
some  cases,  mostly  due  to  the  cloudy  and  foggy 
weather,  artillery  observation  could  not  be  adequately 
carried  out,  with  the  result  that  our  guns  sometimes 
shelled  our  own  troops,  leaving  the  enemy’s  line 
untouched. 

Still,  the  reference  to  the  behaviour  of  the  Corps 
made  by  Sir  John  French,  in  his  despatch  dated  the 
5th  April,  1915,  shows  that,  whatever  mistakes  may 
have  occurred  in  other  parts  of  the  field,  the  Indian 
Corps  had  every  reason  to  be  satisfied  with  its  share 
in  this  battle.  He  remarks  : — 

“ While  the  success  attained  was  due  to  the 


SIR  JOHN  FRENCH’S  REMARKS  271 


magnificent  bearing  and  indomitable  courage  dis- 
played by  the  troops  of  the  4th  and  Indian  Corps, 
I consider  that  the  able  and  skihul  dispositions 
which  were  made  b}^  the  General  Officer  Commanding 
Fhst  Army  contributed  largely  to  the  defeat  of  the 
enemy  and  to  the  capture  of  his  position.” 

In  the  same  despatch  Sir  John  French  con- 
tinues : — 

“ I can  best  express  my  estimate  of  this  battle 
by  quoting  an  extract  from  a Special  Order  of  the 
Day  which  I addressed  to  Sir  Douglas  Haig  and  the 
First  Army  at  its  conclusion ; ‘ I am  anxious  to 
express  to  you  personally  my  warmest  appreciation 
of  the  skihul  manner  in  which  you  have  carried  out 
your  orders,  and  my  fervent  and  most  heartfelt 
appreciation  of  the  magnificent  gallantry  and  de- 
voted, tenacious  courage  displayed  by  all  ranks 
whom  you  have  ably  led  to  success  and  victory. 
My  warmest  thanks  to  you  all.’  ” 

In  publishing  this  order  of  the  day,  Sir  Douglas 
Haig  added  the  following  apj)reciatory  remarks  : — 

“ I desire  to  express  to  all  ranks  of  the  1st  Army 
my  great  appreciation  of  the  task  accomplished  by 
them  in  the  past  four  days  of  severe  fighting.  The 
1st  Army  has  captured  the  German  trenches  on  a 
front  of  two  mhes,  including  the  whole  village  of 
Neuve  Chapelle,  and  some  strongly  defended  works. 
Very  serious  loss  has  been  inflicted  on  the  enemy, 
nearly  2000  prisoners  are  in  our  hands,  and  his  casual- 
ties in  killed  and  wounded  are  estimated  at  about 
16,000.  I wish  also  to  thank  aU  concerned  for  the 
careful  preparation  made  for  the  assault.  Much 
depended  on  this  thoroughness  and  secrecy.  The 
attack  was  such  a complete  surprise  to  the  enemy 


272  BATTLE  OF  NEUVE  CHAPELLE 

that  ho  had  neither  a Corps  nor  an  Army  Reserve 
at  hand,  and  had  to  draw  on  the  adjoining  armj^ 
for  help. 

“ The  absolute  success  of  the  operation  of  break- 
ing through  the  German  lines  on  the  first  day  is  not 
only  a tribute  to  the  careful  forethought  and  attention 
to  detail  on  the  part  of  the  leaders,  but  it  has  proved 
beyond  question  that  our  forces  can  defeat  the 
Germans  where  and  when  they  choose,  no  matter 
what  mechanical  contrivances  or  elaborate  defences 
are  opposed  to  their  advance. 

“ The  results  of  the  successful  action  just  fought 
are  not,  however,  confined  to  the  material  losses 
sustained  by  the  enemy.  The  organization  of  the 
German  forces  from  Ypres  to  far  south  of  the  La 
Bassee  Canal  has  been  thrown  into  a state  of  con- 
fusion. Reinforcements  available  to  oppose  the 
hrench  in  the  battle  which  is  taking  ])lace  at  Notre 
Dame  de  Lorette  or  destined  for  other  pa-rts  of  the 
line  have  been  drawn  into  the  fight  opposite  the  1st 
Army,  and,  in  many  cases,  very  severely  handled. 

“ 'Jdie  losses  sustained  by  the  1st  Aiany,  though 
lieav^q  are  fully  compensated  for  by  the  results 
achieved,  which  have  brought  us  one  step  forward 
in  our  efforts  to  end  the  war  ; and  the  British  soldier 
has  once  more  given  the  Germans  a proof  of  his 
superiority  in  a fight,  as  well  as  of  his  pluck  and 
determination  to  conquer.  The  spirit  and  energy 
shown  by  all  ranks  augur  well  for  the  future,  and  I 
feel  confident  that  the  success  achieved  by  the 
1st  Army  at  Neuve  Chapelle  is  the  forerunner  of 
still  greater  victories  which  must  be  gained  in  order 
to  bring  the  war  to  a successful  conclusion.” 

In  an  order  of  the  day  dated  the  14th  March, 


TELEGRAM  TO  TTTE  VTGEROY  270 

1915,  the  following  telegram,  received  from  Field- 
Marshal  Sir  John  French,  was  published  by  Sir 
James  Willcocks  : — 

“ I have  cabled  following  to  Viceroy,  India. 
Begins:  I am  glad  to  be  ableto inf ormyour  Excellency 
that  the  Indian  troops  under  Sir  James  Willcocks 
fought  with  great  gallantry  and  marked  success  in 
the  captme  of  Neuve  Chapelle  and  subsequent 
fighting  which  took  place  on  the  10th,  11th,  12th, 
and  13th  of  this  month.  The  fighting  was  very 
severe  and  the  losses  heavy,  but  nothing  daunted 
them  ; their  tenacity,  courage,  and  endurance  were 
admirable,  and  worthy  of  the  best  traditions  of  the 
soldiers  of  India.  Message  ends.  Please  make  this 
known  to  the  C!orps  under  your  command.  Accept 
yourself  and  repeat  to  all  Troops  my  warm  and 
hearty  appreciation  of  their  services,  and  my  grati- 
tude for  the  help  they  have  rendered,  which  has  so 
much  conduced  to  the  success  of  the  operations.” 

In  common,  then,  with  the  other  troops  engaged 
in  this  memorable  battle,  the  Indian  Corps  had 
every  reason  to  be  proud  of  itself.  The  general 
recognition  of  their  valiant  efforts  encouraged 
officers  and  men  to  further  deeds  of  courage  and 
endurance.  Moreover,  fresh  heart  was  put  into  the 
troops,  so  long  accustomed  to  possess  their  souls 
in  such  patience  as  they  might  under  the  constant 
torment  of  an  overpowering  hostile  artillerjq  by 
the  exhibition  of  the  power  of  our  own  guns  so 
strikingly  given  at  Neuve  Chapelle.  They  felt  that 
at  last  they  had  come  into  their  own,  and  that  the 
nightmare  of  the  past  months  could  not  be  repeated. 

Their  hopes  were  doomed  to  disappointment, 
for  within  a few  days  of  the  end  of  the  battle,  the  state 

T 


274  BATTLE  OF  NEUVE  CHAPELLE 


of  affairs  was  as  bad  as  ever.  The  German  guns 
again  kept  up  their  never-ceasing  hideous  din  ; again 
were  our  parapets  battered  down  ; once  more  our 
guns  were  almost  silent ; and  this  was  to  continue 
for  months,  save  for  our  partially  successful  but 
costly  attacks  of  May,  1915. 

At  the  cause  of  this  disheartenmg  state  of  thmgs 
the  ordinary  officers  and  men  could  only  guess ; 
presumably  the  supply  of  ammunition  was  in- 
sufficient. How  far  this  was  the  case  can  be  gathered 
from  an  order  dated  the  16th  March,  1915.  By  this 
order  the  only  guns  for  which  the  expenditure  of 
ammunition  was  unrestricted  were  the  2*75,  60- 
pounder,  and  6-inch  ; but  even  in  regard  to  these  the 
greatest  economy  was  enjoined.  The  3-pounders 
were  put  on  a miserable  ration  of  2 rounds  per  day  ; 
15-pounders  were  absolutely  to  hold  their  peace  ; 
18-]30unders,  the  ordinary  field  guns,  were  allowed 
to  speak  three  times  in  the  24  hours  ; but  no  high 
explosive  was  available  ; and  so  on  up  to  “ Mother  ” 
and  “ Grandmother,”  the  9*2  and  15-inch  howitzers, 
whose  venerable  mouths  were  on  no  account  to  be 
filled. 

It  is  not  strange  that  the  troops  began  to  doubt 
whether  the  nation  was  aware  that  it  was  at  war  with 
German}^  and  not  with  some  small  tribe  on  the 
Indian  Frontier. 

A further  result  of  our  lavish  expenditure  of  big- 
gun  ammunition  at  Neuve  Chapelle  was  the  enormous 
improvement  and  strengthening  of  the  enemy’s 
defences.  The  trenches  captured  by  us  from  the 
Germans  in  March,  1915,  were  on  the  whole  hardly 
as  good  as  our  own.  The  enemy,  however,  never 
slow  to  learn,  at  once  set  about  rendering  his 


OTHER  RESULTS  OF  THE  BATTLE  275 

defences,  as  far  as  possible,  safe  against  artillery 
fire. 

In  May  and  September,  1915,  the  positions  taken 
at  the  battles  of  Festubert  and  Loos  were  very 
different  from  those  of  Neuve  Chapelle.  Every  art 
of  the  military  engineer  had  now  been  called  into 
play.  Heavily  armoured  machine-gun  emplace- 
ments had  been  made  ; the  dug-outs  were  no  longer 
the  old  simple  affairs,  but  elaborate  underground 
systems,  strengthened  in  every  conceivable  way 
with  concrete  and  steel  girders.  It  has  therefore 
sometimes  been  doubted  whether  the  battle  of  Neuve 
Chapelle  was  an  unmixed  blessing,  or  whether  it 
would  not  have  been  wiser  to  have  left  the  Germans 
in  their  innocence  until  we  were  prepared  in  every 
way  for  a violent  and  sustained  effort.  Further, 
had  we  succeeded  in  our  aim  of  occupying  the  high 
ground  commanding  the  approaches  to  Lille,  Tur- 
coing,  and  Roubaix,  the  enemy  would  have  been 
compelled  to  run  grave  risks  in  order  to  readjust  the 
situation. 

Could  we,  in  face  of  the  serious  shortage  of 
artillery  ammunition,  have  held  the  captured 
positions  ? 

To  reply  to  this  question  it  is  necessary  to  await 
the  fuller  information  which  mav  be  available  at 

t/ 

the  close  of  the  war ; but  it  is  permissible  to  doubt 
whether  we  could  have  clung  to  om’  success. 

Casualties  up  to  the  1st  April,  1915 : — 


British  officers  . 

Killed. 

147 

Wounded. 

265 

Missing. 

42 

Indian  officers  . 

66 

144 

35 

Other  ranks,  British  . 

726 

2876 

662 

Other  ranks,  Indian  . 

1364 

6253 

1936 

Total 

2303 

9538 

2675 

CHAPTER  XVIII 


THE  SECOND  BATTLE  OF  YPRES 

New  front  taken  over  by  the  Indian  Corps- — ^Establishment  of  bombing 
schools — Arrival  of  40th  Pathans — Lahore  Division  leaves  for  Ypres 
— Attack  by  Jullundur  and  Ferozepore  Brigades  under  disad  vantageous 
conditions — Corporal  Lssy  Smith,  1st  Manchesters,  wins  the  V.C. — 
Severe  casualties  of  the  Manchesters — Death  of  Colonel  llemiick, 
40th  Pathans — Heavy  losses  of  the  Patlians  and  47th  Sikhs — Gallantry 
of  officers  and  men  of  the  57th  Pities  and  Connaught  Ra.ngers — 
]<'i-cneh  Colonial  trooijs  driven  back  by  gas,  carrying  with  them  a 
great  part  of  the  Lahore  Division — Parties  of  Connaughts,  Manchesters, 
and  Indians  liold  on  under  Major  Deacon — Captain  Ingham's  D.S.O. 
— Major  Deacon’s  D.S.O.  and  Legion  of  Honour — Jemadar  Mir  Dast’s 
V.C.- — Bravery  of  officers  and  men  of  the  Lahore  Signal  Company  and 
Army  Service  Corps — Jullundur  and  Ferozepore  Brigades  withdrawn 
on  relief  by  Sii’hmd — C.Pu.E.’s  experiences  in  Poperinghe. 

The  battle  of  Neuve  Cliapelle  may  be  considered  to 
liave  ended  at  10  p.m.  on  the  12th  March,  when 
orders  were  received  from  General  Sir  Douglas  Haig 
to  suspend  further  operations  and  consolidate  the 
positions  gained. 

The  Meerut  Division  continued  to  hold  the  line, 
Bareilly  being  on  the  right,  Garhwal  on  the  left,  -watli 
Sirhind  supporting  Garhwal  from  Neuve  Chapelle. 

The  night  of  the  12th-13th  passed  quietly,  and 
the  Jullundur  and  Ferozepore  Brigades  were  with- 
drawn. During  the  13th  the  enemy  several  times 
threatened  to  attack  in  front  of  the  left  of  the  Indian 
Corps  from  north-west  of  the  Bois  du  Biez,  but  the 
attacks  could  not  develope  in  face  of  the  heavy 


KEOKaANlZATiON  OE  BRIGADES  277 


shrapnel  fire  which  we  brought  to  bear  on  likely 
points  of  debouchement. 

The  remainder  of  March  passed  without  special 
incident  beyond  frequent  heavy  shelling  by  the 
enemy  of  Neuve  Chapelle,  Port  Arthur,  and  Riche- 
bourg  St  Vaast.  The  weather  continued  to  improve, 
and,  the  ground  drying  up,  life  became  more  bearable 
in  the  trenches.  On  the  19th  March,  however,  a 
faU  of  snow  served  to  remind  the  troops  that  winter 
had  not  yet  struck  its  last  blow. 

On  the  21st  March  orders  were  received  for  the 
Indian  Corps  to  take  over  a new  front  line  of  trenches 
from  the  cross-roads  just  north-north-east  of  Neuve 
Chapelle  to  a point  near  Chapigny,  relieving  the 
4th  Corps  and  handing  over  its  former  front  to  the 
1st  Corps.  The  Bareilly  and  Dehra  Dun  Brigades 
accordingly  relieved  the  Brigades  of  the  8th  Division 
during  the  night  of  the  23rd-24th  March,  and  on 
the  31st  March  the  Lahore  Division  relieved  Meerut 
in  the  front  line. 

On  the  28th  March  a reorganizatio]i  of  Brigades 
was  effected,  of  which  a complete  detail  is  here  given. 

Lahore  Division. 

Commander  : Major-General  H.  D’U.  Keary,  C.B., 

D.S.O. 

Jullundur  Brigade. 

Commander : Brigadier-General  E.  P.  Strickland, 
C.M.G.,  D.S.O. 

1st  Manchesters. 

4th  Suffolks  (Territorials). 

40th  Pathans  (arrived  8th  April). 

47th  Sikhs. 

59th  Rifles. 


278 


SECOND  BATTLE  OF  YPRES 


Sirhind  Brigade. 

Commander  : Brigadier-General  W.  G,  Walker,  V.C., 

C. B. 

1st  Highland  Light  Infantry. 

4th  King’s  (Liverpools)  (Special  Reserve). 

15th  Sikhs. 

1/lst  Gurkhas. 

1/4 th  Gurkhas. 

Ferozepore  Brigade. 

Commander  : Brigadier-General  R.  M.  Egertoii,  C.B. 
Connaught  Rangers. 

4th  London  Regiment  (Territorials). 

9th  Bhopals. 

57th  Rifles. 

129th  Baluchis. 

Divisional  Cavalry. 

15th  Lancers. 

Divisional  Battalion. 

34th  Sikh  Pioneers. 

C.R.A. : Brigadier- General  F.  E.  Johnson,  C.M.G., 

D. S.O.,  R.A. 

C.R.E. : Lt-Colonel  C.  Coffin,  R.E. 

Meerut  Division. 

Commander  : Lt- General  C.  A.  Anderson,  C.B. 

Dehra  Dun  Brigade. 

Commander  ; Brigadier-General  C.  W.  Jacob. 

] st  Seaforths. 

4th  Seaforths  (Territorials). 

6th  Jats. 

2/2nd  Gurkhas. 
l/9th  Gurkhas. 


REORGANIZATION 


279 


GarJiival  Brigade. 

Conii’iaiider : Brigadier-General  C.  G.  Blackader, 

D.S.O. 

2nd  Leicesters. 

3rd  London  Regiment  (Territorials). 

The  Garliwal  Rifles. 

2/3rd  Gurkhas. 

2/ 8th  Gurkhas. 

Bareilly  Brigade. 

Commander  : Brigadier-General  W.  M.  Southe}^ 

2nd  Black  Watch. 

4th  Black  Watch  (Territorials). 

4Ist  Dogras. 

58th  Rifles. 

125th  Rifles. 

Divisional  Cavalry. 

4th  Cavalry. 

Divisional  Battalion. 

107th  Pioneers. 

C.R.A.  : Brigadier-General  R.  St  C.  Lecky,  R.A. 
C.R.E.  : Lt-Colonel  G.  A.  J.  Leslie,  R.E. 

C.R.A.  with  Corps  Head  quarters  : Brigadier-General 
A.  B.  Scott,  C.B.,  D.S.O.,  R.A. 

C.R.E.  ; Brigadier- General  H.  C.  Nanton,  C.B.,  R.E. 

By  this  time  the  importance  of  the  part  played 
by  bombs  in  the  war  had  been  fully  recognized. 
Divisional  schools  for  instruction  in  bombing  were 
established,  each  class  lasting  three  da3^s,  and  con- 
sisting of  one  officer  per  regiment,  one  sergeant  or 
havildar  per  company,  and  two  men  per  platoon. 
These  schools  did  extremely  good  work,  and  our 


280 


SECOND  BATTLE  OF  YPRES 


bombing,  which  had  hitherto  not  been  organized  on 
a scientific  basis,  soon  showed  marked  signs  of  im- 
provement. 

On  the  8th  Aywil  the  40th  Pathans,  under 
Lt-Colonel  F.  Rennick,  joined  the  Corps  on  arrival 
from  China,  and  Avere  posted  to  the  Jnllundur 
Brigade.  On  the  J 2th  April  the  Meerut  Division 
relieved  Lahore  in  the  front  line. 

Daring  the  first  three  Aveeks  of  April,  no  events 
of  special  importance  took  place  on  the  Indian 
front,  but  the  lull  Av^as  not  destined  to  continue 
much  longer.  On  the  23rd  orders  Avere  received 
from  the  1st  Army  for  the  Lahore  Division  to  hold 
itself  in  readiness  to  move  at  short  notice  to  an 
unknown  destination,  and  on  the  24th  the  Division 
marched  in  tAVo  columns,  via  Merville  and  La  Gorgue, 
under  the  command  of  Major-General  Keary,  with 
orders  to  establish  its  head  cjuarters  at  Godewaers- 
velde  on  the  main  road  from  Hazebrouck  to  Poper- 
inghe. 

After  a very  trying  marcli,  the  Division  arrived 
at  its  halting-place,  Boeschepe,  during  the  evening 
and  night.  The  Transport  had  an  especially  harassing 
time,  becoming  involved  in  the  hdly  country  round 
the  Mont  des  Cats,  and  only  arriving  at  dawn  at 
Boeschepe,  whence  it  had  again  to  push  on  after  a 
very  short  rest.  The  head  of  the  Division  arrived 
at  the  hutments  near  Ouderdom,  about  four  miles 
north- Avest  of  Ypres,  at  10  a.m.  on  the  25th,  the 
men  footsore  and  thed  after  a plodding  march  of 
about  thirty  miles  over  the  unyielding  surface  of 
cobble-paved  roads,  slippery  Avith  the  rain  Avhich 
fell  during  the  march. 

It  was  eA'ident  to  all  that  the  Division  was  about 


GRAVITY  OF  ITIE  BATTLE 


281 


to  take  part  in  a great  battle,  for  the  booming  of 
guns  was  continuous,  and  heavy  shells  could  be  seen 
bursting  in  and  around  Ypres. 

To  enable  some  estimate  to  be  formed  of  the 
importance  of  the  part  taken  by  the  Lahore  Division 
in  the  second  battle  of  Ypres,  it  is  necessary  to 
review  very  briefly  the  chain  of  circumstances 
which  had  rendered  it  necessary  to  summon  the 
Division  so  hastily  to  the  scene  of  conflict,  leaving 
the  front  of  the  Indian  Corps,  already  sparsely  held, 
to  the  care  of  only  one  Division.  This,  it  will  be 
remembered,  was  the  third  occasion  on  which  the 
Corps  had  been  called  upon,  under  circumstances  of 
urgent  necessity,  to  step  into  the  breach,  the  earliest 
occasion  being  diming  the  first  battle  of  Ypres  in 
October,  1914  ; the  second  in  the  same  month,  when 
the  Corps,  newly  arrived  and  not  yet  complete,  was 
rushed  to  the  front  just  in  time  to  relieve  the  hard- 
pressed  2nd  Corps  opposite  La  Bassee. 

The  second  battle  of  Ypres,  reviewed  dispassion- 
ately in  the  light  of  subsequent  events,  may  bo 
considered  as  the  result  of  our  operations  at  Hill  60, 
in  themselves  merely  an  heroic  episode  in  such  a 
war,  but  destined  to  be  fraught  with  tremendous 
consequences. 

Sir  John  French  has  informed  one  of  the  writers 
(and  permits  him  to  mention  the  circumstance)  that 
in  his  judgment  the  Second  Battle  of  Ypres  was  not 
less  grave  and  critical  than  the  First  Battle. 

On  the  night  of  the  17th  April  we  exploded  seven 
mines  under  a point  known  as  Hill  60,  our  troops 
then  rushing  the  position  and  occupying  it.  The 
importance  of  this  so-called  hill — in  reality  merely 
a mound  formed  chiefly  by  the  earth  excavated  in 


282 


SECOND  BATTLE  OF  YPBES 


making  a cutting  through  an  undulation  for  the 
Ypres — Lille  railway — la}^  in  the  fact  that  it  afforded 
the  Germans  an  excellent  position  for  artillery  obser- 
vation towards  the  west  and  north-west. 

From  the  17th  April  to  the  5th  May  the  struggle 
for  possession  of  the  hill  continued.  On  the  latter 
date,  as  the  result  of  a furious  effort  by  the  enemy, 
supported  by  volumes  of  gas,  the  position  passed 
out  of  our  hands,  but  the  hill,  for  so  many  terrible 
days  and  nights  the  scene  of  astounding  deeds  of 
heroism,  no  longer  presented  the  same  advantages 
to  the  possessor,  almost  demolished  as  it  was  by  the 
furious  cannonades  which  had  been  dhectedagainst  it. 

The  question  as  to  whether  the  battle  which  fol- 
lowed our  captm’e  of  Hill  60  formed  part  of  the 
German  plan  to  force  a way  to  Calais  has  been  much 
argued,  and  for  the  most  part  without  any  definite 
conclusion  having  been  reached.  The  more  probable 
view  is  that  a local  offensive  met  with  unexpected 
success,  and  that  the  enemy  thereupon  developed 
his  activities  into  an  important  battle  which  might 
easily  have  produced  strategic  results  of  the  first 
consequence. 

The  main  difference  between  the  first  and  second 
battles  of  Ypres  lies  in  the  fact  that  on  the  former 
occasion  the  enemy  had  concentrated  at  least  half 
a milHon  men  against  a force  which  never  exceeded 
150,000  ; on  the  latter  occasion  there  seems  to  have 
been  at  the  outset  no  formidable  massing  of  troops, 
which  would  at  once  have  been  detected  by  the 
weakening  of  the  German  line  elsewhere.  At  the 
second  battle,,  such  reinforcements  as  were  brought 
up  appear  to  have  been  taken  from  the  ordinary 
local  reserves. 


GAS  FIRST  EMPLOYED 


283 


In  the  absence,  then,  of  strong  evidence  to  the 
contrary,  it  is  permissible  to  believe  that  the  original 
object  of  the  enemy  was  the  capture  of  Ypres,  with 
attendant  loss  of  prestige  for  us  and  corresponding 
gain  by  the  Germans. 

The  actual  commencement  of  the  second  battle 
of  Ypres  would  appear  to  date  from  the  evening 
of  the  22nd  April,  when,  at  about  5 p.m.,  after  a 
terrific  bombardment,  the  enemy  attacked  the  French 
Colonial  Division  holding  the  line  from  Steenstraate 
to  the  east  of  Langemarck.  Previous  to  the  assault, 
it  was  reported  that  thick  yellow  smoke  was  issuing 
from  the  German  trenches.  The  meaning  of  this 
phenomenon  was  not  at  once  grasped,  but  the 
smoke  was  rapidly  borne  down  ujDon  the  French  line 
by  the  north-easterly  breeze,  and  in  a short  time 
hundreds  of  men  were  writhing  in  agony  from  the 
effects  of  the  poisonous  fumes  of  asphyxiating  gas, 
now  employed  for  the  first  time.  Within  an  hour 
the  strain  had  become  too  much  for  human  nature 
to  bear,  and  the  whole  position  was  abandoned  by 
the  French  Colonials,  who  were  totally  unprovided 
with  any  means  of  protection  against  such  an 
attack. 

Sir  John  French,  in  his  despatch  of  the  15th  June, 
1915,  lays  emphasis  on  the  fact  that  no  blame  could 
attach  to  the  French,  and  expresses  his  conviction 
that  if  any  troops  in  the  wmrld  had  been  able  to  hold 
their  trenches  in  the  face  of  such  a treacherous  and 
altogether  unexpected  onslaught,  the  French  Division 
would  have  stood  firm. 

By  the  retirement  of  the  French,  the  left  flank 
of  the  Canadian  Division  on  them  right  was  exposed, 
and  there  appeared  to  be  serious  danger  of  the 


SECOND  BATTLE  OE  YPKES 


Canadians  being  overwhelmed,  and  of  the  British 
troops  in  the  east  of  the  salient  being  cnt  off.  To 
protect  their  flank,  the  Canadians  retired  on  St 
Jiilien,  with  their  left  thrown  back,  fighting  hard  as 
they  went,  with  the  wonderful  gallantry  which  did  so 
much  to  save  the  situation.^ 

The  Germans  followed  up  the  gas,  and  swept  on 
then'  way  over  the  French  trenches,  bayoneting 
numbers  of  men  whom  they  found  dying  in  horrible 
torture. 

lieavy  fighting  went  on  all  night  with  alternating 
success.  Early  on  the  23rd  we  counter-attacked 
northwards  in  co-operation  with  the  French,  but 
after  meeting  with  some  initial  success,  we  were 
forced  to  retire,  struggling  hard  for  every  inch  of 
ground,  and  counter-attacking  at  every  opportunity. 
By  nightfall  on  the  24th  our  line  was  re-established 
at  a distance  of  about  700  yau’ds  in  rear  of  St  Julien, 
slightly  to  the  north  of  Fortuin. 

Sir  John  French  remarks  : — 

“ In  the  course  of  these  two  or  three  days  many 
circumstances  combined  to  render  the  situation 
east  of  the  Ypres  Canal  very  critical  and  most 
difficult  to  deal  with. 

“ The  confusion  caused  by  the  sudden  retirement 
of  the  French  Division,  and  the  necessity  for  closing 
up  the  gap  and  checking  the  enem3^’s  advance  at  all 
costs,  led  to  a mixing  up  of  units  and  a sudden 
shifting  of  the  areas  of  command  which  was  quite 
unavoidable. 

“ Fresh  units  as  they  came  up  from  the  south 
had  to  be  pushed  into  the  firing  line  in  an  area  swept 

^ For  a full  account  of  this  stage  of  the  battle,  see  Lord  Beaverbrook’s 
“ Cauada  in  Flanders,”  vol.  i. 


UNAVOIDABLE  CONFUSION 


28r> 

Ijy  artillery  fire,  which,  owing  to  the  capture  of  the 
French  guns,  we  were  unable  to  keep  down.” 

It  is  thus  clear  that  Sir  John  French  considered 
it  to  be  vitally  necessary  to  check  the  enemy’s 
advance  at  all  costs,  and  it  was  because  of  this 
necessity  that  the  Lahore  Division  was  so  suddenly 
flung  into  the  battle.  How  nobly  the  Division  played 
its  pafrt  will  be  seen,  not  only  from  the  record  of  its 
deeds,  but  from  the  heavy  price  in  blood  which  it 
was  once  again  compelled  to  pay. 

On  Sunday,  the  25th  April,  a strong  counter- 
attack was  organized  by  Brigadier-General  Hull, 
under  the  orders  of  Lt-General  Alderson,  with  a 
view  to  retaking  St  Julien.  Although  not  successful 
in  its  object,  the  move  effectually  checked  the 
enemy’s  advance  in  this  direction.  As  an  example 
of  the  unavoidable  confusion  mentioned  by  Sh  John 
French,  it  may  be  remarked  that  Brigadier- General 
Hull,  at  one  moment  of  the  attack,  was  called  upon 
to  control,  with  the  assistance  only  of  his  own 
Brigade  Staff,  parts  of  battalions  from  six  separate 
Divisions,  all  of  which  were  quite  new  to  the 
ground. 

In  the  early  morning  of  the  26th,  operation  orders 
were  issued  by  General  Sir  Horace  Smith-Dorrien, 
commanding  the  2nd  Army,  under  whose  orders 
the  Lahore  Division  came,  for  an  attack  which  was 
to  take  place  in  the  afternoon. 

The  general  plan  was  as  foUows  : — 

The  French,  strongly  reinforced,  were  to  attack 
the  enemy  in  their  front,  with  their  right  resting  on 
the  Ypres — Langemarck  road. 

That  portion  of  the  2nd  Army  which  was  facing 
north  w^as  to  assault  in  co-operation  with  the 


28G  SECOND  BATTLE  OF  YPRES 

French,  with  a view  to  driving  the  enemy  out  of  his 
positions. 

The  left  of  the  Lahore  Division  was  to  rest  on 
the  Ypres — Langemarck  road,  where  it  would  be 
in  touch  with  the  French  right. 

The  5th  Corps  was  ordered  to  co-operate,  mainly 
on  the  right  of  the  Lahore  Division. 

The  Division  moved  to  its  positions  of  assembly 
as  follows  : — 

The  Julliindm  Brigade  marched  on  Wieltje, 
starting  at  7 a.m.,  by  the  road  passing  by  the  moat 
round  Ypres  on  the  south. 

Ferozepore,  starting  at  5.30  a.m.,  proceeded  to 
St  Jean  via  Vlamertinghe. 

Sirhind,  which  was  detailed  for  Divisional  reserve, 
followed  the  route  of  Ferozepore  to  a position  more 
or  less  under  cover,  south-east  of  St,  Jean. 

The  Jullundur  Brigade,  under  Brigadier- General 
Strickland,  while  passing  close  to  the  moat  round 
Ypres,  came  under  heavy  shell  fire.  Many  of  the 
shells  fell  into  the  moat  or  struck  the  ancient  walls 
of  the  tovm  without  at  first  doing  any  serious  damage, 
the  men  often  cheering  when  a projectile  fell  into 
the  water.  But  suddenly  a big  shell  dropped  right  in 
the  Yusufzai  (the  centre)  company  of  the  recently 
arrived'  40th  Pathans,  wounding  a Jemadar  and 
causing  22  casualties  among  the  men. 

This  was  the  first  experience  of  the  Pathans  of 
shell  fire,  and  it  would  have  been  excusable  had  the 
incident  caused  some  confusion  ; but  there  was  none. 
The  ranks  closed  up  and  the  regiment  marched  on 
without  a pause.  The’ Jemadar  pluckily  kept  going, 
and  was  present  at  the  attack,  only  reporting  his 
wound  the  next  day. 


Second  battle  ol‘  lipi’es 
SitiiUcfioTij  of  Xahore  Xirision 
XrnTn,lZOp.7n.  ZB'fAprillSlS  to  t7i/-  mondne/  of  XdMavl915. 


— -3IporXeacon  'sXarh  ■ 


Poperin^he 
7 miles 


© Feroxepore£riga(X 
Q)  JixlhjiTixluTBripcLde/ 
® SirJdnd-  jBTip(icL& 


^ % 


Heference 

— ?X-3"15  Xeploved/  for  xlt tack . 

Z&Wi5  After  the  Attaek . 

—^Mnrrdrifi  of  ZTlTlo. 

Jhiafti  of  Z7-W15 

FroTth  the  n^hb  of  29 Iflo  to  I-V15 
the  front  Tine  trenches  wa-e  held 
hy  Hritish  fBripaxles  ■ 

Julhmdicr  and  Texoropore  were  nxfhdiynm  . 

Sirhind  awaitiruf  the.  Fi-ench  advaxLce 
before  attaekiruf . 


1000 


500 


Scale  1:40,000 


1000 
- I 


2000 


•lOOoTarus 


HEAVY  SHELLING  ON  THE  MARCH  UP  287 


Captain  Hodge,  the  medical  officer  of  the  regiment, 
remained  to  attend  to  the  wounded,  the  stretcher- 
bearers  as  usual  behaving  splendidly,  and  although 
the  spot  was  heavily  shelled  for  some  time,  the  dead 
were  buried  and  the  wounded  were  successfully 
removed. 

As  soon  as  the  Brigade  formed  up  in  the  fields 
near  Wieltje,  the  enemy  began  shelling  the  village, 
and  put  three  shells  amongst  the  1st  Manchesters, 
causing  12  casualties.  These  shells  were  filled  with 
a form  of  gas  which,  at  a distance  of  50  yards, 
caused  the  men’s  e3^es  to  water  to  such  an  extent  as 
to  render  them  unable  to  use  a rifle  for  some  minutes. 

The  Ferozepore  Brigade,  under  Brigadier-General 
Egerton,  also  came  under  heavy  fire  while  marching 
to  St  Jean,  and  casualties  commenced  early  in  the 
day.  Captain  H.  D.  Acworth,  55th  Rifles,  who  was 
officiating  as  Staff  Captain,  was  wounded  by  a shell 
while  conducting  the  Connaught  Rangers  tlirough 
the  northern  outskirts  of  Ypres,  the  same  shell  killing 
two  men  and  wounding  Lt-Colonel  Murrajg  Captain 
Foster,  and  five  men  of  the  Connaughts. 

The  Sirhind  Brigade  got  into  its  supporting 
position  south-east  of  St  Jean  with  few  casualties 
although  the  road  was  heavilj'  bombarded. 

The  chief  sufferers  were  the  4th  King’s  (Liverpools), 
their  losses  being  2nd  Lieutenant  Lydden  (who  died 
next  day  from  his  wounds),  2nd  Lieutenant  Soden 
wounded,  with  10  casualties  amongst  other  ranks. 

The  Division  was  lucky  to  escape  so  lightly,  for 
the  enemy,  well  aware  that  all  reinforcements, 
supplies,  etc.,  must  come  through  or  round  Ypres, 
had  for  days  past  been  pouring  shells  into  the  town 
and  on  the  approaches. 


2S8 


SECOND  BATTLE  OF  YBRES 


When  General  Keary  moved  up  to  liis  advanced 
head  quarters  near  St  Jean,  he  found  the  road 
strewn  with  corpses  and  dead  animals.  He  himself 
had  a narrow  escape,  for  a shell,  bursting  in  close 
proximity  to  his  car,  blew  his  kit  off  the  roof,  but 
luckily  did  no  more  serious  damage. 

The  three  Brigades  were  in  their  assembly  position 
by  11  a.m.,  and  the  enemy’s  aeroplanes  at  once 
became  verj^  busy  in  observation.  For  some 
unknown  reason  they  were  able  to  carry  on  their 
operations  almost  with  impunity.  The  difference 
l)etween  the  attitude  of  the  German  airmen  at  and 
before  the  battle  of  Neuve  Chapelle,  and  at  the 
second  battle  of  Ypres,  was  so  marked  as  to  give 
rise  to  much  comment.  Whereas  at  Neuve  Chapelle 
the  German  planes  were  practically  unable  to  show 
themselves,  at  Ypres  they  flew  as  they  liked  over 
the  British  positions,  with  the  result  that  our  artillery 
was  located,  and  the  enemy’s  fire  was  accurately 
directed  both  on  our  guns  and  on  our  infantry. 

The  attacking  force  laboured  under  heavy  dis- 
advantages. The  Lahore  Division,  with  the  laurels 
of  Neuve  Chapelle  still  fresh  upon  it,  had  carried 
out  an  exhausting  march  of  30  miles,  and  was  pushed 
up  almost  on  arrival.  The  exact  position  of  the 
enemy’s  line  was  unknown,  air  reconnaissance,  if 
made,  having  apparently  failed  to  reveal  it,  and  it 
was  therefore  impossible  for  our  guns  to  register, 
whereas  the  German  artillery,  ably  assisted  by  their 
airmen,  had  ample  opportunity  to  register  on  our 
successive  positions. 

Registration  is  considered  to  be  a luxury,  not  a 
necessity,  and  in  theory  guns  should  be  able  to  pick 
up  a target  sufficiently  rapidty  without  its  aid.  In 


OUR  ARTILLERY  TIANUTCAPPED  280 


practice,  however,  the  side  which  has  been  able  to 
register  possesses  a very  great  advantage,  especially 
where,  as  in  this  case,  the  position  of  then’  target  is 
unknown  to  the  opposing  artillery. 

It  was  subsequently  found  by  reconnaissance 
that  the  German  line  ran  along  a crest  at  a distance 
of  about  1500  yards  from  our  position  of  deployment. 
From  this  point  of  vantage  the  flash  of  our  guns, 
hastily  concealed  as  they  perforce  were,  was  spotted, 
and  by  this  means  some  of  our  batteries  were  at  once 
roughly  located  by  the  enemy. 

Artillery  fire,  again,  cannot  be  efficiently  directed 
without  good  observing  stations.  With  the  short 
time  at  our  disposal,  we  were  at  first  greatly  depen- 
dent on  local  information  as  to  the  position  of 
suitable  points  of  observation.  On  examination, 
these  were  generally  found  to  be  of  little  use,  as 
they  afforded  no  continuous  view  of  the  ground  on 
which  the  enemy’s  position  was  believed  to  lie. 
It  was  not  until  late  on  the  following  day  that 
satisfactory  observation  posts  could  be  established. 

Throughout  the  battle  it  was  remarked  that  our 
artillery  fire,  both  in  preparation  and  support,  was 
insufficient.  For  this,  however,  no  blame  can  be 
attached  to  the  officers  and  men  of  the  artillery. 
As  observed  by  the  commanding  officer  of  a dis- 
tinguished regiment,  they  worked  like  heroes,  but 
were  unable  to  compete  with  the  weight  of  metal 
opposed  to  them  and  the  other  solid  advantages 
possessed  by  the  enemy. 

At  12.30  p.m.  the  Brigades  moved  out  to  their 
positions  of  deployment,  the  JuUundur  Brigade, 
with  its  right  resting  on  a farm  slightly  west  of 
Wieltje,  occupying  a front  of  500  yards,  while  tlie 

u 


290 


SECOND  BATTLE  OF  YPRES 


Ferozepore  Brigade  continued  tlie  line  to  the  left  as 
far  as  the  Ypres — Langemarck  road,  where  touch  was 
obtained  with  the  French. 

From  right  to  left  the  units  of  the  front  line  of 
the  JuUundm  Brigade  were  disposed  as  follows: — 
1st  Manchesters,  40th  Pathans,  47th  Sikhs. 

The  second  line,  at  an  interval  of  400  yards, 
was  composed  of  the  59th  Rifles  in  rear  of  the 
Manchesters,  and  the  4th  Suffolks  (Territorials)  sup- 
porting the  47th  Sikhs. 

In  the  Ferozepore  Brigade  the  129th  Baluchis 
were  on  the  right,  the  57th  Rifles  in  the  centre,  the 
Connaught  Rangers  on  the  left. 

Supporting  the  Connaughts  were  the  4th  Londons, 
while  the  9th  Bhopal  Infantry  were  in  reserve. 

As  the  result  of  a conference  with  the  C.R.A. 
5th  Corps,  it  was  decided  that  he  should  support  the 
advance  and  assault  with  all  batteries  west  of  the 
Canal.  The  exact  position  of  the  German  line  being 
unknown,  two  Canadian  18-pounder  batteries  and 
one  howitzer  battery,  together  with  one  18-pounder 
and  one  howitzer  battery  of  the  Lahore  Division, 
were  placed  under  the  orders  of  the  Brigadiers  of  the 
two  attacking  Brigades,  so  as  to  afford  them  close 
support. 

The  French  assault  being  timed  for  2.5  p.m., 
that  of  the  Lahore  Division,  which  was  echeloned 
slightly  in  rear  of  the  French,  was  ordered  to  com- 
mence at  2 p.m.  to  enable  the  Division  to  get  up  in 
line. 

The  country  to  'be  crossed  before  the  actual 
assault  could  be  delivered  was  extremely  unfavour- 
able to  the  attacking  troops,  being  absolutely  open 
and  devoid  of  cover.  For  the  first  500  yards  the 


THE  1st  MANCHESTERS 


201 


ground  rose  slightly  to  a crest,  thence  gently  declining 
for  another  500  yards,  after  which  it  ascended  in 
a smooth  glacis-like  slope  to  the  German  front  line 
trenches. 

At  1.20  p.m.  the  bombardment  commenced, 
and  continued  for  40  minutes,  gradually  increasing 
in  intensity.  Immediately  the  guns  opened,  the 
attacking  troops  advanced,  with  a view  to  reaching 
assaulting  distance  before  the  fire  ceased.  The 
general  direction  of  the  attack  was  due  north,  but 
from  the  commencement,  the  Jullundur  Brigade  on 
the  right  inclined  slightly  north-north-west,  and  thus 
crowded  in  on  the  right  of  the  Ferozepore  Brigade, 
forcing  it  to  overlap  the  road  which  formed  the 
dividing  line  between  the  French  and  the  Lahore 
Division.  This  at  once  led  to  such  a confusion  of 
units  that  men  of  the  centre  battalion  of  Jullundur 
actually  got  mixed  up  with  the  Connaught  Rangers 
on  the  extreme  left  of  the  Ferozepore  Brigade. 

The  enemy’s  guns  were  very  active  from  the 
beginning  of  the  attack,  and  when  the  troops  reached 
the  crest,  they  came  under  a perfect  inferno  of  fire 
of  all  kinds,  machine-gun,  rifle,  and  every  variety 
of  shell,  many  of  which  were  filled  with  gas.  On 
crossing  the  ridge,  the  Manch esters  at  once  began  to 
feel  the  effects  of  the  fire,  officers  and  men  falling 
everywhere. 

At  about  this  time  Lieutenants  Huskinson,  Graw- 
hall,  and  Robinson  were  wounded.  This  left  only 
one  officer,  2nd  Lieutenant  Williamson-Jones,  with 
No.  1 Company.  Shortl}^  afterwards  he  too  was  hit, 
and  Captain  Buchan,  D.S.O.,  commanding  the  firing 
line,  was  gassed  by  a shell,  but  saved  himself  to  a 
great  extent  by  covering  his  mouth  and  nose  with  a 


292 


SECOND  BATTLE  OE  YPRES 


wet  handkerchief.  Going  up  the  final  slope,  Captain 
Paulson  and  Lieutenant  Roberts  were  wounded,  the 
latter  in  five  places.  He  died  shortly  afterwards. 

Corporal  Issy  Smith  won  the  Victoria  Cross  by 
his  devotion  in  leaving  his  company  and  going  far 
forward  towards  the  enemy’s  position  to  assist  a 
severely  wounded  man,  whom  he  carried  for  a distance 
of  250  yards  into  safety,  although  he  was  all  the  time 
exposed  to  heavy  machine-gun  and  rifle  fire.  Sub- 
sequently Corporal  Smith  voluntarily  helped  to 
bring  in  many  more  wounded  men,  and  attended 
to  them,  regardless  of  danger. 

Sergeant  J.  Bates  received  the  Distinguished 
Conduct  Medal  for  his  coohiess  and  bravery  at  a 
critical  time  in  the  advance.  Wlien  troops  on  the 
left  of  the  Brigade  were  checking  under  the  torrent 
of  fire,  he  rallied  men  of  several  units  and  led  them 
forward. 

'The  Manchesters,  as  stubborn  and  superb  here 
as  at  Givenchy,  still  puslied  on,  the  casualties  in- 
creasing with  every  yard  gained,  until  they  reached 
a road  at  a distance  of  only  some  60  yards  from  the 
German  trench. 

During  the  last  part  of  the  advance,  Corporal 
Dervin  gained  the  Distinguished  Conduct  Medal  by 
his  gallantry  and  determination  in  advancing,  after 
his  officers  had  been  killed  or  wounded,  and  main- 
taining his  position  close  to  the  enemy.  Previous  to 
this  he  had  rescued  a wounded  man  who  had  fallen 
into  a brook  and  was  in  danger  of  drowning,  and 
under  heavy  fire  got  him  back  to  cover. 

Private  F.  Richardson  also  received  the  Dis- 
tinguished Conduct  Medal  for  his  bravery  in  leading 
on  tlie  men  wlien  his  officers  were  put  out  of  action, 


[Central  News. 

CoRPORAi,  IssY  Smith,  V.C.,  isx  Bn  Manchester  Regiment. 


292.1 


RESCUE  OF  LIEUT.  BRUNSKILL  203 


and  establishing  himself  close  to  the  German  trench. 
He  then  went  back,  moved  his  wounded  Company 
Commander  to  a safer  place,  and  rejoined  his 
company. 

After  a short  pause,  Lieutenant  Brunskill,  47th 
Sikhs,  who,  as  before  related,  had  received  the 
Military  Cross  for  an  audacious  reconnaissance, 
observmg  that  a number  of  the  enemy  w^ere  bolting 
from  a section  of  their  trench,  rushed  forward  with 
one  man  of  the  Manchesters  and  one  of  the  Con- 
naughts,  follow^ed  by  a small  mixed  parUv 

Between  our  firing  line  and  the  Germans  was  a 
ditch  which  Lieutenant  Brunskill  managed  to  reach 
in  one  rush.  In  his  second  rush  he  got  forward  to 
within  a verv  short  distance  of  the  enemv,  w4io  had 
HOW'  been  reinforced  by  a new  regiment  Avearing 
picJcelhaubes  instead  of  the  round  caps  wdiich  the 
men  who  bolted  w^ere  w^earing.  Here  practical!}’ 
the  whole  of  the  party  were  knocked  over.  Lieu- 
tenant Brunskill  was  wounded  in  three  places,  his 
left  leg  being  shattered.  He  lay  for  several  hours 
under  shelter  of  a refuse  heap,  and  was  finally 
rescued  with  the  greatest  devotion  and  bravery  by 
Lance-Corporal  R.  Reilly,  Connaught  Rangers,  wLo 
came  forward  under  a terrible  fire  and  succeeded  in 
reaching  the  wounded  officer.  He  then  took  off 
his  putties,  tied  Lieutenant  Brunskill’s  legs  together, 
and,  himseK  walking  erect,  di’agged  him  back  through 
a perfect  hail  of  bullets  into  safety,  both  arriving 
w’ithout  fiu’ther  damage  after  a w onderful  escape. 

For  his  great  gallantr}’  Lance-Corporal  ReilJy 
was  selected  to  receive  the  Russian  Medal  of  St 
George,  4th  Class. 

The  Adjutant  of  the  Manchesters,  Captain  Heelis, 


294 


SECOND  BATTLE  OF  YPRES 


was  wounded  during  the  afternoon  while  taking  a 
message  to  Brigade  Head  Quarters  under  heavy  fire, 
and  at  about  9.30  p.m.  Lt-Colonei  Hitchins,  Com- 
manding the  Battalion,  was  killed  by  a straj^  bullet 
while  crossing  the  ground  between  the  French  and 
British  trenches. 

During  this  battle  the  Manchesters  sustained  and, 
if  possible,  increased  then  splendid  reputation,  but 
at  a great  cost,  their  casualties  amounting  to  1 officer 
and  15  men  killed,  11  officers  and  206  men  wounded, 
and  56  men  missing. 

Hero  for  the  moment  we  must  leave  them  and 
follow  the  other  units  in  then  progress. 

The  40th  Pathans,  next  on  the  left  to  the  Man- 
chesters, were  led  by  A Company  under  Major 
Perkins,  who  made  the  pace  very  fast,  and  thus 
enabled  the  greater  part  of  the  regiment  to  cross  the 
first  zone  with  comparatively  few  casualties,  but  the 
last  company  and  the  machine  guns,  under  Lieu- 
tenant Munn,  met  the  full  blast,  the  machine-gun 
detachment  having  9 casualties  out  of  18  men. 

Only  some  300  yards  from  the  start,  the  Com- 
manding Officer,  Lt-Colonel  Rennick,  fell  mortally 
wounded,  and  the  Adjutant,  Lieutenant  Campbell, 
got  him  into  a ditch,  where  he  lay  till  dusk.  This 
gallant  officer’s  last  thoughts,  before  being  taken 
away  on  a stretcher,  were  for  his  regiment.  He 
asked  that  two  of  his  faithful  Pathans  might  accom- 
pan^A  him,  as  he  wished  them  to  be  with  him  in  case 
he  died  on  the  way.  Colonel  Rennick  expired  in 
a motor  ambulance  en  route  to  Hazebrouck. 

On  crossing  the  first  ridge,  the  regiment  came 
under  a terrible  fire.  Men  fell  in  heaps,  and  the 
effect  of  this  tornado  of  bullets  is  aptly  compared 


THE  40th  PATHANS 


295 


by  an  officer  who  went  through  it  to  that  ot‘  a scythe 
being  di’awn  across  the  legs  of  the  troops  as  they 
advanced.  At  one  moment  they  were  moving  for- 
ward as  if  nothing  could  stop  them ; the  next 
second  they  had  simply  collapsed. 

The  machine  guns  under  Lieutenant  Munn  fol- 
lowed the  regiment,  but  at  first  could  find  no  target. 
The  officer  went  ahead  with  a few  men,  all  carrying 
ammunition,  to  try  to  find  a better  position.  At  the 
bottom  of  the  downward  slope  was  a small  brook, 
which  Munn  and  seven  men  reached  in  safety;  the 
remainder,  including  those  carrying  the  guns,  were 
mown  down. 

Sepoy  Muktiara,  undeterred  by  the  fate  of  his 
comrades,  at  once  volunteered  to  bring  up  one  of  the 
guns,  and  succeeded  in  crossing  the  250  yards  of 
open  ground  swept  by  enfilade  machine-gun  fire. 
With  the  help  of  Sepoy  Haidar  Ali,  who  also  showed 
wonderful  coolness,  a gun  was  eventually  set  up, 
when  to  their  dismay  it  was  found  to  be  useless,  and 
persisted  in  jamming,  as  a result  of  its  fall  into  a 
stream  when  the  carriers  were  hit.  EventueJly  the 
guns  were  brought  back. 

For  his  gallantry  Lieutenant  Munn  was  awarded 
the  Military  Cross  ; Sepoy  Muktiara  received  the 
Russian  Medal  of  St  George,  4th  Class ; while  Sepoy 
Haidar  Ali  was  awarded  the  Indian  Distinguished 
Service  Medal. 

The  Pathans  got  on  by  short  rushes,  but  by  the 
time  they  arrived  within  assaultmg  distance,  their 
losses  were  very  serious.  The  heroic  Captain  Dal- 
mahoy  was  wounded  four  times,  but  still  continued 
to  lead  his  company  till  he  was  killed.  Captain 
Christopher,  his  Company  Officer,  d^ung  by  his  side. 


296 


SECOND  BAl^TLE  OE  YPRES 


Oil  tlio  bank  of  the  little  stream  at  the  bottom  of 
the  slope  la}^  Captain  Waters,  shot  through  the  brain. 

Hairbreadth  escapes  were  numerous.  Lt-Colonel 
Hill,  on  whom  devolved  the  command  when  Colonel 
Reimick  was  mortally  wounded,  had  his  revolver 
case  cut  off  by  a bullet ; another  went  through 
his  breast  pocket  from  left  to  right,  piercing  a note- 
book, but  leaving  him  unhurt. 

Major  Perkins,  who  led  the  attack  with  splendid 
dash,  got  up  close  to  the  German  trench,  but  was 
then  killed. 

Lieutenant  Thornton,  the  bomb  officer,  got  to 
within  40  yards  of  the  enemy,  when  he  was  wounded, 
and,  unalile  to  move,  lay  for  six  hours  under  cover  of 
a manure  hea]i. 

Diu'ing  the  latter  part  of  the  attack.  Jemadar 
Lehna  Singh  displayed  great  coolness  and  coui'age 
in  bringing  his  support  up  through  the  front  line. 
He  then  occupied  and  held  a position  with  wonderful 
tenacity  under  heavy  fire  at  close  range.  For  his 
conspicuous  bravery  this  heroic  soldier  received  the 
2nd  Class,  Indian  Order  of  Merit. 

Subadar  Jahandad  Khan  also  did  splendid  service 
in  reorganizing  and  leading  the  men  of  a support 
which  had  lost  very  heavily  from  shell  fire.  This 
gallant  officer  was  unfortunately  killed,  but  his 
services  were  subsecjuently  recognized  by  the  grant 
of  the  2nd  Class,  Indian  Order  of  Merit. 

The  losses  of  the  40th  Pathans  during  the  battle 
amounted  to  3 British,  2 Indian  officers  and  23 
other  ranks  killed  ; 5 British,  10  Indian  officers  and 
258  others  wounded,  to  which  must  be  added  19 
missing. 

The  47th  Sikhs  fared  even  worse  than  the  other 


LOSSES  OF  THE  47th  SIKHS  297 

regiments  engaged.  Althoiigli  the  road  ^\■as  heavily 
shelled,  they  got  up  to  tlieh  place  of  assembly  with 
only  thi-ee  casualties : but  their  trouble  Avas  to 
come.  In  common  with  the  rest  of  the  Brigade, 
the  loss  of  direction  led  to  chaotic  confusion  in  the 
ranks.  Casualties  began  to  occur  as  soon  as  the 
regiment  advanced,  and  on  crossing  the  ridge,  Major 
Talbot  and  Captams  Cook  and  Scott  Avere  killed,  as 
Avas  also  Lieutenant  Allardice,  to  Avhose  gallantry 
at  Neuve  ChapeUe  reference  has  been  made.  In 
addition  to  these,  by  the  time  the  regiment  began 
its  upAvard  course  towards  the  German  trenches, 
all  the  other  British  officers,  except  Lieutenant 
Drysdale,  had  been  put  out  of  action,  Avhile  the  men 
Avere  falling  in  SAvathes. 

Lieutenant  Drysdale,  a subaltern  of  only  IIac 
A’ears’  service,  was  thus  left  in  command  of  the 
remnant  of  the  regiment.  tie  rose  most  nobly  to 
his  task,  cheering  the  men  forAvard  and  leading  them 
under  an  infernal  ure  to  a point  Avithin  seventy  yards 
of  the  enemy,  where  he  held  on,  and  by  his  most 
determined  courage  gained  a well-merited  Military 
Cross. 

The  losses  of  the  47th  reduced  the  regiment  to 
a mere  shadoAv  of  its  former  self.  Its  strength  on 
going  into  action  Avas  11  British,  10  Indian  officers 
and  423  other  ranks.  On  the  morning  of  the 
27th  April,  Avhen  a muster  Avas  taken,  the  regiment 
numbered  2 British,  2 Indian  officers  and  92  others, 
its  losses  being  9 British,  8 Indian  officers  and  331 
other  ranks. 

No  regiment  could  Avish,  and  none  in  the  Army 
possesses,  a prouder  record  than  that  of  the  47th 
Sikhs  at  the  attack  on  Neuve  Chapelle  in  October, 


298 


SECOND  BATTLE  OF  YPRES 


1914,  the  battle  of  Neuve  Chapelle  in  March,  1915, 
and  the  second  battle  of  Ypres. 

The  attack  of  the  Ferozepore  Brigade  on  the  left 
progressed  under  much  the  same  conditions  as  that 
of  the  Jullundur  Brigade. 

The  right  battalion,  the  129th  Baluchis  under 
Major  Hannyngton,  O.M.G.,  advanced  steadily,  but 
its  movements  were  much  cramped  by  the  pressure 
caused  by  the  Jullundur  Brigade  bearing  too  much 
to  the  left. 

The  critical  stage  was  reached  when  the  first 
crest  was  crossed.  Here  officers  and  men  began 
to  fall,  and,  as  was  the  case  with  the  other  units, 
there  was  a natural  disposition  to  bunch  under 
cover  of  farm  buildings  on  the  left. 

The  front  line,  however,  continued  to  push  on, 
and  eventually  reached  the  road  running  from  north- 
west to  south-east,  near  a farm  at  a distance  of 
about  300  yards  from  the  German  trenches.  Com- 
munications had,  as  usual,  been  cut  by  the  enemy’s 
hre,  and  great  difficulty  was  experienced  in  sending 
back  reports. 

Sepoy  Raji  Khan  earned  the  2nd  Class,  Indian 
Order  of  Merit,  by  his  bravery  in  carrying  an  urgent 
message  under  heavy  shell  and  rifle  fire.  A shell 
burst  only  about  three  yards  from  him  during  his 
progress,  wounding  and  almost  putting  him  out  of 
action,  but  he  managed  to  struggle  on  and  delivered 
the  message. 

Later  in  the  day,  at  a critical  moment,  when  the 
troops  were  labouring  under  the  strain  of  the  fumes 
of  gas,  Major  Holbrooke  was  wounded  and  lying  in 
the  open.  Sepoy  Ghulam  Hussein,  attached  from 
the  124th  Baluchis,  dashed  out  and  carried  him 


THE  129th  BALUCHIS 


299 


under  heavy  fire  into  a safe  position.  He  then 
collected  a number  of  men  and  set  them  to  work 
at  a trench  to  form  a rallying  point.  For  his  splendid 
example  of  bravery  and  coolness,  Sepoy  Ghulani 
Hussein  received  the  Indian  Distinguished  Service 
Medal. 

The  losses  of  the  129th  during  the  attack  were 
as  follows  : — 7 British  and  6 Indian  officers  wounded ; 
1 Indian  officer  and  11  other  ranks  killed;  171  other 
ranks  wounded,  and  35  missing. 

For  his  able  leadership  and  gallantry  Major 
Hannyngton  received  the  D.S.O.,  and  Lieutenant 
Griffith-Griffin  was  awarded  the  Military  Cross  for 
his  conspicuous  bravery  during  the  action. 

Next  on  the  left  were  the  57th  Rifles  commanded 
by  Major  Willans.  This  regiment  which,  with  the 
Connaught  Rangers  and  129th  Baluchis,  had  dis- 
tinguished itseK  at  the  first  battle  of  Ypres  in  October, 
1914,  arrived  at  its  position  of  deployment  without 
casualties,  although  frequently  shelled.  During  the 
first  part  of  the  advance,  only  a few  men  were  hit 
by  shrapnel  and  rifle  fire,  but  in  crossing  the  fateful 
ridge,  the  regiment  came  into  an  absolute  inferno, 
and  from  here  onwards  officers  and  men  fell  fast. 

By  the  time  the  bottom  of  the  slope  was  reached. 
Lieutenant  Bainbridge  had  been  overcome  by  a gas 
shell,  and  Major  Willans  had  been  wounded,  as  well 
as  Captain  Radford.  Captain  Mahon,  who  had 
been  hit  in  the  knee  early  in  the  advance,  managed 
to  hold  out  till  the  end  of  the  day. 

The  57th  swept  on,  in  spite  of  their  losses,  and  the 
remnant  succeeded  in  reaching  a point  about  80 
yards  from  the  German  line.  Here  Major  Duhan, 
Captain  Banks  (attached  from  the  Guides)  and 


300 


8ECOND  BATTLE  OF  YPRES 


Captain  Mackie  were  killed,  as  were  also  Subadar 
Badawa  Singh  and  Jemadar  Kirpa  Singh,  four  other 
Indian  officers  being  wounded. 

Captain  Banks’s  orderly,  a Sikh  named  Bhan 
Singh,  also  attached  from  the  Guides,  was  following 
his  officer,  although  himself  severely  wounded  in 
the  face  early  in  the  action.  On  seeing  Captain  Banks 
fall,  Bhan  Singh’s  one  thought  was  to  bring  him 
back,  alive  or  dead.  Weak  as  he  was  from  his 
wound,  he  staggered  along  under  an  appalling  fire, 
carrying  the  body,  until  he  fell  from  exhaustion  and 
was  forced  to  give  up  the  attempt,  contriving, 
however,  to  bring  in  the  dead  officer’s  accoutre- 
ments. 'iffiere  have  been  few  more  striking  instances 
of  the  deep  attachment  which  exists  between  the 
British  officer  and  the  Indian  soldier.  For  his 
signal  act  of  devotion  and  bravery  Sepoy  Bhan  Singh 
was  awarded  the  Indian  Distinguished  Service  Medal, 
and  eventually  received  the  Russian  Medal  of  St 
George,  3rd  Class. 

This  quick  succession  of  casualties  left  the  57th 
with  only  two  British  officers,  Captain  Mahon  already 
wounded,  and  Lieutenant  Deedes  of  the  31st  Pun- 
jabis. The  latter,  although  suffering  severely  from 
the  effects  of  a gas  shell,  was  at  work  on  the  left 
flank  trying  to  bring  his  machine  guns  into  action 
from  the  farm. 

Havildar  Sar  Mast  was  in  charge  of  one  of  the 
guns,  which  he  brought  up  several  times,  but  was 
forced  out  of  his  position  by  the  retirement  of  our 
line.  In  spite  of  this,  he  persevered  until  the  attack 
was  abandoned.  He  w^as  rewarded  for  his  gallantry 
with  the  Indian  Distinguished  tService  Medal. 

Another  member  of  the  machine-gun  detachment. 


CASUALTIES  OE  THE  57th  RIFLES  301 


Naik  Atma  Singh,  helped  to  bring  a gun  up  to  near 
the  firing  line,  and  got  it  into  position  under  a hot 
fire.  Here  he  held  on  until  the  front  line  was  driven 
out  by  gas,  but  he  himself  declined  to  budge  until 
Lieutenant  Deedes  ordered  him  to  retire.  For  his 
conspicuous  gallantry  Naik  Atma  Singh  received  the 
2nd  Class,  Indian  Order  of  Merit. 

Major  Willans,  who  had  led  his  regiment  with 
the  greatest  com’age  and  dash,  was  awarded  the 
D.S.O.,  and  Lieutenant  Deedes  received  the  Military 
Cross  for  bravery  in  this  as  well  as  in  other  actions. 

During  the  day’s  fighting,  the  57th  lost  3 British, 
3 Indian  officers  and  30  other  ranks  killed ; 4 British, 
7 Indian  officers  and  215  others  wounded;  7 men 
being  returned  as  missing.  Among  these  casualties 
were  many  men  of  the  Guides  and  of  other  regiments 
who  were  attached  to  the  57th  Rifles. 

The  Connaught  Rangers,  the  battalion  on  the 
extreme  left  of  the  Ferozepore  Brigade,  had,  as 
before  related,  experienced  bad  luck  during  their 
march  up  through  Ypres.  All  through  the  morning 
they  lay  out  under  heavy  shelling,  and  were  lucky 
to  escape  with  only  two  men  killed  and  three 
wounded. 

On  advancing  from  the  place  of  deployment, 
the  battalion  w^as  much  impeded  by  thick  hedges 
in  their  front,  through  which  the  onty  means  of 
passage  w^as  a few'^  gaps.  This  kept  the  regiment 
back,  and  it  had  not  reached  the  farm  when  our 
bombardment  ceased,  with  the  result  that  it  met 
the  full  blast  of  the  enemy’s  unchecked  fire. 

One  of  the  first  to  be  hit  was  Lieutenant  Badham, 
who  was  wounded  by  a shell  splinter,  losing  an  eye. 
This  young  officer  liad  previously  distinguished 


302 


SECOND  BATTLE  OF  YP.RES 


liimself  at  the  first  battle  of  Ypres  and  in  subsequent 
actions,  for  which  he  was  awarded  the  Military 
Cross. 

As  was  the  case  with  all  the  regiments,  the 
Connaughts  lost  heavUy  on  crossing  the  ridge,  but, 
true  to  their  splendid  reputation,  never  faltered, 
and,  still  suffering  severely,  eventually  reached  a 
point  about  120  yards  from  the  German  trenches. 

During  the  advance  Sergeant  Coldwell,  whose 
never -failing  courage  has  before  been  mentioned, 
again  distinguished  himself  by  taking  command  of 
his  compam^  after  all  the  officers  had  been  hit,  and 
leading  them  with  the  finest  determination.  This 
splendid  non-commissioned  officer  had  already  re- 
ceived the  Distinguished  Conduct  Medal,  and  was 
subsequently  awarded  the  4th  Class  of  the  Russian 
Cross  of  St  George. 

Amid  the  storm  of  fire,  the  stretcher-bearers, 
with  the  spirit  of  seK-sacrifice  which  has  marked  their 
work  throughout  the  campaign,  were  moving  about 
on  their  errand  of  mercy.  Amongst  them  was 
especially  distinguished  Bandsman  Gillan,  who  showed 
the  utmost  contempt  for  danger,  saving  many  lives 
by  his  fearless  devotion  to  duty,  for  which  he 
received  the  Medal  of  St  George,  3rd  Class. 

Sergeants  Finegan  and  Murphy  received  the 
Medal  of  St  George,  2nd  Class,  and  Lance-Corporal 
Reilly  that  of  the  4th  Class,  for  gallant  conduct, 
while  Corporal  Flynn  was  awarded  the  Medaille 
Militaire. 

Private  Duffy,  transport  driver,  displayed  great 
courage  in  bringing  up  ammunition  through  the 
enemy’s  barrage  between  Vlamertinghe  and  La 
Brique  at  a time  when  supplies  were  running  short. 


THE  CONNAUGHT  RANGERS  303 

for  which  valuable  services  he  received  the  Medal  of 
St  George,  4th  Class. 

Captain  Callaghan  gained  the  Military  Cross  by 
his  conspicuous  gallantry  throughout  the  day,  in 
the  course  of  which  he  was  wounded. 

The  bravery  of  our  Irish  regiments  is  well  known, 
but  the  following  figures  of  the  casualties  of  the 
Connaughts  during  this  attack  will  show  with  what 
intrepidity  they  were  led,  and  with  what  determina- 
tion the  regiment  fought : — ■ 

Of  20  officers  actually  in  action,  3 were  killed  and 
12  wounded,  including  the  Commanding  Officer, 
Lt-Colonel  Murray. 

Of  an  approximate  strength  of  900  other  ranks, 
361  were  killed  or  wounded. 

The  front  line  battalions  of  both  Brigades  were 
now  in  the  most  advanced  positions  to  which  the 
attack  as  a whole  was  destined  to  attain,  although, 
as  wiU  be  seen  later,  detachments  of  various  units 
succeeded  in  reachmg  a point  in  close  touch  with 
the  enemy,  and  maintainmg  themselves  there  until 
relieved. 

The  position  was  critical.  The  only  cover  avail- 
able was  that  which  the  men  were  able  to  throw  up, 
aU  the  time  exposed  to  a terrible  fii’e  at  close  range. 
Units  had  been  so  reduced  during  the  advanee  as 
now  to  be  mere  shadows  of  then  former  selves. 
To  make  matters  worse,  the  loss  of  direction  at  the 
commencement  of  attack,  coupled  with  the  natural 
inclination  to  make  use  of  cover  wherever,  as  was 
seldom  the  case,  it  existed,  had  conspired  to  cause 
an  inextricable  confusion,  British,  Indians,  and 
French  being  hopelessly  mixed  up.  In  spite  of  ah, 
it  is  the  opinion  of  officers  who  took  part  in  this 


SECOND  BATTLE  OE  YPRES 


ao4 

terrible  day’s  fighting  that  we  conld  at  least  have 
held  on  to  the  position,  had  not  the  enemy  again 
resorted  to  the  use  of  gas. 

fi’he  British  supports  had  followed  the  attack  at 
a distance  of  about  400  yards,  and  although  they  had 
not  undergone  such  a severe  test  as  those  in  the  front 
line,  they  had  by  no  means  escaped  scathless. 

The  losses  of  the  59th  Rifles  amounted  to  62, 
which  total  included  4 British  officers  wounded. 

The  4th  Suffolks  lost  6 officers  and  20  men 
wounded,  3 men  being  killed. 

The  4th  Londons  escaped  much  more  lightly, 
with  2 men  killed,  1 officer  and  10  men  wounded. 

Terrible  as  had  already  been  our  experiences, 
the  worst  was  yet  to  come. 

At  about  2.20  p.m.  the  ominous  signs  of  gas  were 
seen  proceeding  from  the  German  trenches,  and  in 
a few  minutes  dense  volumes  of  yellowish  vapour 
were  borne  by  the  wind  across  the  front  of  the  line 
from  right  to  left.  The  effect  of  the  gas  in  such 
volume  and  at  such  a short  distance  was  more  than 
even  the  oft-tried  resisting  x^ower  of  the  men  of  whom 
the  Indian  Corps  was  composed  could  support. 

fidie  troojDS  were  quite  unprovided  with  any 
means  of  warding  off  the  effect  of  the  fumes.  The 
most  they  could  do  was  to  cover  their  noses  and 
mouths  with  wet  handkerchiefs  or  pagris,  and,  in 
default  of  such  a poor  resource,  to  keep  their  faces 
pressed  against  their  scanty  parapet.  It  was  of 
little  avail,  for  in  a few  minutes  the  ground  was 
strewn  with  the  bodies  of  men  Avrithing  in  unspeak- 
able torture,  while  the  enemy  seized  the  opportunity 
to  pour  in  a redoubled  fire. 

The  direction  of  the  wind  caused  the  French  and 


MAJOR  DEACON’S  PARTY 


305 

the  Eerozepore  Brigade,  especiall}^  the  i’orjiier,  to 
suffer  more  than  the  right  of  the  attack,  although 
the  wliole  line  was  more  or  less  affected.  The  French 
were  forced  to  give  way,  leaving  the  ground  covered 
with  their  dead  and  dying.  In  their  retirement 
they  carried  with  them  the  greater  part  of  our  line. 
Mixed  in  hopeless  confusion,  French,  British,  and 
Indians  streamed  back,  and  many  of  the  men  reached 
La  Brique  before  it  was  possible  to  rally  them. 

Only  a small  band,  heroes  eveiy  one  of  them, 
men  in  whose  breasts  nothing  human  could  ex- 
tinguish the  flame  of  spiritual  courage,  persisted  in 
carrying  on  under  these  torturing  conditions. 
Amongst  this  party  were  about  60  of  the  Connaughts 
under  Major  Deacon,  who  was  joined  by  Lieutenant 
Henderson  with  some  50  men  of  the  Manchesters. 
Added  to  these  were  a few  men  of  the  40th  Pathans, 
47th  Sikhs,  129th  Baluchis,  and  57th  Rifles. 

For  a short  space  they  held  on  wliere  they  stood, 
but  the  eneni}^  then  counter-attacked,  and  the 
valiant  little  detachment  vas  forced  back  about 
80  yards,  when  it  again  pulled  up  and  established 
itself,  remaining  in  that  position,  in  spite  of  all  the 
efforts  of  the  enemy  to  dislodge  it,  until  relieved  by 
the  Highland  Light  Infantry  under  Captain  Tarrant 
at  2.30  a.m.  on  the  next  day.  For  an  exhibition  of 
sheer  valour,  of  indomitable  tenacity,  this  exploit 
has  never  been  surpassed. 

With  the  party  of  Connaughts  was  Captain 
Ingham,  who  had  led  his  men  in  the  attack  until 
he  was  finally  brought  up  short  by  the  enemy’s  fire 
at  a range  of  about  60  yards,  after  which  he  set 
about  organizing  the  position,  exposing  himself 
meanwhile  with  an  absolute  disregard  of  danger. 

X 


306 


SECOND  BATTLE  OF  YPRES 


Coming  tlirougii  the  ordeal  unscathed,  he  subse- 
quentR  brought  in  a number  of  wounded.  For 
his  conspicuous  gallantry  he  was  awarded  the 

D.S.O. 

Lieutenant  Henderson  of  the  Manchesters,  who 
was  prominent  durmg  this  episode,  had  taken 
command  of  his  company  after  his  seniors  had  been 
killed  or  wounded,  and  throughout  the  day  set  a 
splendid  example  of  courage  to  the  men.  He 
received  the  Military  Cross  for  his  display  of  leader- 
ship and  bravery. 

Major  Deacon,  the  commander  and  guiding  spirit 
of  the  defence,  was  awarded  the  D.S.O. , and  later 
received  the  Cross  of  Officer  of  the  Legion  of  Honour. 

When  the  French  and  British  were  thrown  back 
in  confusion  by  gas.  Jemadar  (now  Subadar)  Mh 
Dast,  55th  Coke’s  Rifles,  attached  57th,  remained 
behind  in  a British  trench,  his  officers  having  been 
killed  or  wounded.  He  collected  all  the  men  he 
could  find,  amongst  them  many  who  had  been  only 
slightly  gassed  and  were  beginning  to  recover,  and 
with  them  he  held  on  until  he  was  ordered  to  retue 
after  dusk.  Diming  his  retirement  he  collected  a 
number  of  men  from  various  trenches  and  brought 
them  in.  Subsequently  he  assisted  in  bringing  in 
eight  wounded  British  and  Indian  officers,  being 
himself  wounded  in  doing  so.  This  splendid  Indian 
officer  already  possessed  the  2nd  Class,  Indian  Order 
of  Merit,  for  his  gallantly  in  the  Mohmand  Expedition, 
and  now  for  his  most  conspicuous  bravery  was 
awarded  tlie  Victoria  Cross,  being  the  fourth  Indian 
soldier  to  receive  that  honour. 

Amongst  those  who  had  been  rendered  un- 
conscious by  the  gas  and  subsequently  rescued  by 


[Central  News. 

Fiei^d-Marshai,  Fare  Kitchener  and  Se’badar  :\Iir  Dast,  V.C., 

55x11  Coke’s  Rifees. 


306.] 


P-'J' 


■ ' 


'■'(iJh  rJ 


j.  ^ 


•M 


THE  LEFT  OF  OUR  LINE  EXPOSED  307 


Jemadar  Mir  Dast,  was  Havildar  (now  Jemadar) 
Mangal  Singh.  On  recovering  consciousness,  in 
spite  of  intense  suffering,  Mangal  Singh  went  out 
time  after  time  and  helped  to  bring  in  the  wounded 
under  fire.  For  his  bravery  and  devotion  he  received 
the  2nd  Class,  Indian  Order  of  Merit. 

Lieutenant  Mein,  also  of  the  55th,  displayed 
the  greatest  ability  and  coolness  in  getting  up 
rations  and  ammunition  for  the  regiment  under 
heavy  shell  fire,  often  passing  through  Ypres  when 
the  town  was  being  subjected  to  a terrific  bombard- 
ment. He  divided  his  time  between  bringing  up 
ammunition  and  helping  in  the  front  line  when 
only  two  officers  were  left  with  the  regiment,  and 
he  took  part  in  the  second  attack  on  the  27th.  For 
his  gallant  conduct  Lieutenant  Mein  was  awarded 
the  Military  Cross. 

The  55th  have  every  reason  to  be  proud  of  their 
representatives  at  this  great  battle. 

The  retirement  of  the  French  and  the  majority 
of  the  British  troops  exposed  the  left  of  our  fragile 
line,  and  the  Sirhind  Brigade  was  therefore  brought 
up  to  La  Brique  in  readiness  for  any  eventuality  on 
that  flank. 

General  Keary,  on  becoming  aware  of  the  pre- 
carious position  of  the  small  body  of  men  under 
Major  Deacon,  who  was  now  completely  isolated, 
ordered  the  Highland  Light  Infantry  and  1/lst 
Gurkhas  up  to  carry  the  JuUundur  Brigade  forward 
to  Major  Deacon’s  assistance.  The  Ferozepore 
Brigade  was  ordered  to  hold  on  wherever  it  could, 
to  support  the  movement,  and,  if  possible,  to  advance. 
Later  it  was  reported  that  to  push  up  the  two 
battalions  in  face  of  the  heavy  fire  would  only  entail 


308  8ECOND  BATTLE  OF  YPEES 

a fruitless  loss  of  life,  and  the  plan  had  to  be  aban- 
doned. 

At  7 p.in.  the  15th  Sikhs  and  l/4th  Gui’khas 
were  detached  from  the  Sirhind  Brigade  to  Feroze- 
pore  with  a view  to  a fresh  attack.  The  advance 
was  made  with  the  Gurkhas  on  the  right  and  the 
Sikhs  on  the  left.  Streams  of  wounded  and  gassed 
men  were  encountered  on  the  way,  the  blackened 
and  swollen  faces  and  protruding  eyes  of  the  latter 
giving  evidence  of  the  torture  to  which  they  had 
been  subjected. 

Overhead  the  monster  shells  of  the  German  42- 
cenbimetre  guns  could  be  heard  hurtling  through 
the  ah'  on  their  way  to  spread  fm-ther  devastation 
in  Ypres,  now  a city  of  the  dead,  deserted  by  all 
else.  The  sound  of  these  enormous  projectiles 
resembled  nothing  so  much  as  that  of  an  express 
train  tearing  through  the  ah,  a resemblance  which 
was,  in  fact,  embodied  in  the  name  by  which  they 
were  known,  that  of  “ the  Wipers  Express.”  To 
illusti’ate  the  destructive  power  of  these  shells,  it 
is  sufficient  to  mention  that  a hole  made  bv  one  of 

v 

them  in  the  ground  near  Ypres  measured  72  feet 
across  by  48  feet  deep. 

The  night  was  fine  and  clear,  but  by  this  time 
it  was  quite  dark,  and  the  ah  was  sickly  with  the 
smeU  of  chlorine  from  the  German  gas,  the  effects 
of  which  were  felt  as  far  as  Popermghe,  seven  miles 
west  of  Ypres.  Communication  with  the  front  line 
had  been  so  scanty,  owing  to  the  telephone  wires  being 
continually  cut  by  shells,  that  even  at  this  late 
period  of  the  day  the  position  of  the  enemy  was  not 
known  to  the  regiments  not  actually  engaged  in 
the  attack. 


DANGERS  OF  UNPREPARED  ATTACK  300 


After  much  wandering  in  the  dark,  tlie  Sikhs 
and  Gurkhas,  under  Lt-Colonel  J.  Hill,  D.S.O., 
arrived  at  a point  on  the  right  of  the  French,  who 
had  by  this  time  been  reinforced.  Inc[uiiy  was 
then  made  from  the  officer  commanding  the  French, 
but  even  he  was  unable  to  give  any  information  as 
to  the  whereabouts  of  the  British  trench. 

The  attack  was  halted,  and  officers  went  forward 
to  attempt  to  ascertain  the  situation.  At  last 
a man  of  the  Manchesters  was  met,  who  led  Colonel 
Hill  to  a trench  where  he  found  the  battered  rem- 
nants of  the  gallant  little  body  of  men  under  Major 
Deacon,  still  holding  on  amidst  their  dead  and 
wounded. 

Here  the  encom’aging  information  was  received 
from  a wounded  British  officer  that  the  German 
trenches  were  about  100  yards  in  advance,  at  the 
sunimit  of  a glacis-like  slope  devoid  of  all  cover, 
and  protected  by  uncut  wire.  Further,  it  appeared 
that  our  trench  ended  on  both  flanks  in  the  air. 

At  the  moment  there  was  little  firing,  so  Colonel 
Hill  returned  and  reported  the  situation  to  Brigadier- 
General  Egerton,  wdio,  after  consulting  Brigadier- 
General  Strickland,  decided  to  abandon  the  attack 
(as  there  was  no  sign  of  any  advance  by  the  French) 
and  to  occupy  the  gap  on  the  right  of  Major  Deacon 
and  slightly  in  rear,  tlie  farm  lield  by  the  French 
being  on  the  left  front.  At  1 a.m.,  then.  Colonel 
Hill’s  men  dug  themselves  in,  and,  assisted  by  a com- 
pany of  the  34th  Sikh  Pioneers,  made  every  pre- 
paration to  cling  to  their  precarious  position. 

'I’liis  episode  has  been  described  in  greater  detail 
than  its  importance  would  appear  to  warrant,  were 
it  not  that  it  gives  a good  idea  of  the  character  of 


310 


SECOND  BATTLE  OF  YPRES 


the  o]3eratioiis  of  this  most  harassing  day.  It 
shows  clearly  the  danger  of  an  attack  on  a strongly 
sited  and  held  position  which  had  been  reconnoitred 
neither  from  the  air  nor  the  ground,  and  whose 
defences  had  defied  an  insufficient  and  undirected 
artillery  preparation. 

Dmfing  this  and  later  phases  of  the  operations 
round  Ypres  many  gallant  deeds  were  performed 
by  others  than  those  actually  engaged  in  the  attacks. 
The  devoted  work  of  the  Signalling  Companies  has 
before  been  described,  and  in  this  battle  they  added 
to  their  already  high  reputation  for  coolness  and  skill. 

Major  W.  F.  Maxwell,  R.E.,  Commanding  the 
Lahore  Divisional  Signal  Company,  was  striving, 
tliroughout  the  action,  to  keep  up  the  communica- 
tions of  the  Division.  Regardless  of  clanger,  he  con- 
tinually exposed  himseK  to  fixe  when  directing  the 
repair  of  lines  which  had  been  cut  by  shells.  His 
valuable  services  gained  for  him  the  D.S.O. 

Lance-Corporal  E.  Humphries  (Royal  Scots, 
attached  to  the  Signal  Company),  on  the  night  of 
the  26th,  when  it  was  vital  that  communication 
should  be  restored  between  the  front  and  Divisional 
Head  Quarters,  volunteered  to  go  out  alone  under 
heavy  shell  fire,  and  repaired  the  line,  remaining 
out  all  night  at  his  work.  His  gallant  conduct 
earned  him  the  Distinguished  Conduct  Medal. 

Sergeant  F.  Birley  (Madras  Volunteer  Rifles, 
attached)  received  the  Distinguished  Conduct  Medal 
for  bravery  from  the  26th  April  to  the  3rd  May  in 
carrying,  as  a motor  cyclist,  despatches  under  heavy 
fire.  On  one  occasion  he  was  blown  off  his  bicycle 
by  a shell,  but  finished  the  journey,  although  severely 
shell-shocked. 


DEVOTION  OF  NON-COMBATANTS  311 


Private  J.  Holman  (1st  Higliland  Light  Infantry, 
attached)  showed  a splendid  example  of  indifference 
to  danger  and  pain  in  the  performance  of  his  duty. 
He  repeatedly  carried  messages  under  heavy  fire, 
and  his  right  hand  was  eventually  shattered  by  a 
shell.  He  still  tried  to  go  out  with  messages,  and 
was  only  stopped  on  being  tliree  times  ordered  to 
desist.  He  also  received  the  Distinguished  Conduct 
Medal. 

Sappers  Jai  Singh  and  Gujar  Singh  earned  the 
Indian  Distinguished  Service  Medal  by  them  great 
courage  in  constantlj’’  repairing  the  lines  under  fire. 

The  work  of  the  drivers  of  motor  cars  during 
this  war,  although  it  does  not  come  much  into  the 
limelight,  is  fraught  with  considerable  danger,  and 
has  been  performed  with  great  skill  and  coolness. 

Sergeant  G.  W.  Staunton  and  Private  J.  D. 
CoUins,  Army  Service  Corps,  won  the  Distinguished 
Conduct  Medal  by  them  bravery  in  continually 
bringing  officers,  supplies,  etc.,  up  through  Ypres 
and  from  Poperinghe  to  Potijye  under  the  heaviest 
shell  fire.  The  greater  the  danger  the  more  cheer- 
fully they  performed  their  duties. 

In  another  branch  of  non-combatant  service, 
the  Reverend  J.  Peal,  Roman  Catholic  chaplain 
attached  to  the  Connaught  Rangers,  was  never 
deterred  from  ministering  to  the  wounded,  althougli 
the  aid  post  at  La  Brique  was  continually  under 
heavy  shell  fire. 

To  resume  the  main  story.  At  about  3 a.m. 
on  the  27th  April,  the  Jullundur  Brigade  v as  reliev^ed 
in  the  front  line  by  Smhind.  Ferozepore  and  Jul- 
lundur then  withdrew  to  La  Brique,  while  the  Smhind 
Brigade,  assisted  by  the  3rd  Sap^iers  and  Miners  and 


312  SEdOND  BA3TLE  OE  VERES 

34th  Pioneers,  proceeded  to  consolidate  the  front 
line. 

The  Sappers  and  Miners,  as  usnal  during  an 
action,  had  been  going  through  a strenuous  time. 
Lt-Colonel  Coffin,  Commanding  the  Royal  Engi- 
neers, had  established  his  head  quarters  in  Poper- 
inghe  on  the  26th.  During  the  afternoon  a terrific 
explosion  took  place,  which  shook  the  town  to  its 
foundations.  On  investigation  it  was  found  that 
several  houses  at  a distance  of  only  about  100  yards 
had  been  destroyed  by  a shell,  believed  to  have 
been  lired  from  a 42-centimetre  gun  at  a range  of 
about  15  miles.  More  of  the  same  kind  arrived  at 
intervals  of  five  minutes,  and  as  the  War  Diary 
tersely  puts  it,  “ It  was  deemed  advisaljle  to  visit 
otlier  parts  of  the  town  till  the  shelling  was  over.” 
The  entry  in  the  Diary  characteristically  concludes 
with  the  remark,  “ Weather  fine.  'J’emperature 

f j • 

Such  is  the  cool  spirit  which  has  won  for  the 
Scientific  Corps  the  admiration  of  the  whole  Army, 
and  has  enabled  its  officers  and  men  to  carry  out  the 
most  dangerous  duties  with  unflinching  courage  and 
never -failing  skill. 


CHAPTER  XIX 

THE  SECOND  BATTLE  OF  YPRES — Contmued 


Reconnaissances  by  Captains  KLsch  and  Nosworthy,  R.E. — Attack  by 
Sirhind  and  Jnlliindur  Brigades — Gallantry  of  4tli  King’s  Regiment — 
Heavy  losses — Major  Beall’s  D.S.O. — Abandoned  French  guns  recovered 
by  1/lst  Gimkhas — 2nd  Lieutenant  Pyper,  4tli  London  Regiment, 
wins  tlie  Military  Cross — Composite  Brigade  under  Colonel  Tuson  joins 
Lahore — 2nd  attack — Death  of  Lt-Colonel  Vivian,  lotli  Siklis — French 
driven  back  by  gas — Our  attack  held  up  in  consequence — Gallant 
defence  of  Captain  Tarrant’s  companj^  Highland  Light  Infantry — 
Death  of  Captain  Tarrant — German  aeroplane  brought  down — Jul- 
lundur  and  Ferozejjore  Brigades  withdrawn — Attack  by  Sirhind  on 
1st  May — Valuable  services  of  the  medical  oflicers  and  their  sub- 
ordinates— Captain  Wood,  I.M.S.,  gains  the  Military  Cross — Attack 
stopped  and  Lahore  Division  witlidi’awn — Casualties  duruigthe  battle 
— General  Keary’s  remarks — Appreciatory  letters  from  Generals 
Smith-Donien  and  Plumer. 

During  the  night  of  the  26th-27th  April,  1915,  very 
daring  and  valuable  reconnaissances  of  the  eneinj^’s 
position  were  made  by  Captains  Kisch  and  Nos- 
worthy, R.E.,  both  of  whom  had  distinguished 
themselves  on  previous  occasions  in  the  campaign, 
the  latter  especially  having  taken  a leading  part  in 
our  attack  on  Neuve  ChapeUe  in  October  of  the 
previous  year.  The  work  was  done  under  con- 
ditions of  great  danger,  the  Germans  continually 
sending  up  flares  which  revealed  the  slightest  move- 
ment on  the  open  ground  between  the  lines,  while 
rifles  and  machine  guns  searched  every  yard  of  No 
Man’s  Land. 

In  the  course  of  his  reconnaissance  Captain  Kisch 


314 


SECOND  BATTLE  OF  YPRES 


was  wounded,  but,  determined  at  all  costs  to  obtain 
the  information  which  meant  so  much  to  his  com- 
rades, he  went  on  with  his  work,  approaching  to 
within  a few  yards  of  the  German  trenches,  and 
succeeded  in  making  a plan  of  the  whole  of  the 
enemy’s  position  in  front  of  the  Jullundur  Brigade. 
In  spite  of  his  wound.  Captain  Kisch  remained  at 
duty  till  the  evening  of  the  27th. 

Captain  Nosworthy,  although  he  had  previousl^^ 
been  badly  shaken  and  gassed  by  a shell,  also  suc- 
ceeded in  making  a sketch  of  the  enemy’s  position 
and  escaped  untouched,  only  to  be  dangerously 
wounded  for  the  second  time  during  a further  recon- 
naissance on  the  28th  April, 

For  his  conspicuous  gallantry  during  the  cam- 
paign' in  France,  as  w^ell  as  in  Mesopotamia,  where 
he  was  again  wounded.  Captain  Kisch  received  the 
D.S.O.,  Captain  Nosivorthy  being  awarded  the 
Military  CToss  for  his  services,  especially  at  Neuve 
Chapelle. 

As  a result  of  these  reconnaissances,  the  nature 
and  position  of  the  enemy’s  line  were  ascertained, 
and  more  definite  plans  could  be  made  for  the 
infantry  attack  and  artillery  support  than  had  been 
possible  on  the  previous  unhappy  day. 

It  was  decided  that  the  French  Moroccans,  on 
the  left  of  the  Lahore  Division,  should  attack  at 
1.30  p.m.  on  the  27th,  the  Sirhind  Brigade  being  in 
touch  with  the  French  right,  the  dividing  line  as 
before  being  the  Ypres — Langemarck  road,  the 
Ferozepore  Brigade  prolonging  the  line  to  the  right. 
The  latter  Brigade,  on  the  morning  of  the  27th, 
was  lying  in  hastily  prepared  trenches  between  La 
Brique  and  St  Jean,  with  the  exception  of  the 


DISPOSITION  OF  TROOPS  FOR  ATTACK  815 


4th  .Londons,  who  were  further  north  in  support  of 
the  Sirhind  Brigade,  which  was  holding  the  front 
line.  The  artillery  of  the  5th  Corps  and  Lahore 
Division  were  to  co-operate  with  the  Canadian 
Artillery  in  the  preparation  and  support  of  the 
infantry  attack. 

The  commencement  of  our  bombardment  was 
timed  for  12.30  p.m.,  when  Ferozepore  would  at 
once  move  forward  so  as  to  arrive  in  line  with  Sirhind 
by  1.15  p.m.,  at  which  time  the  guns  would  lift  on 
to  the  enemy’s  second  line  and  works  in  rear. 

On  the  bombardment  commencing,  the  Feroze- 
pore Brigade  moved  off  and  deployed  for  attack  as 
follows  : — 

The  9th  Bhopal  Infantry  on  the  right  of  the  front 
line,  the  4th  Londons  on  the  left  keeping  touch 
with  the  Sirhind  Brigade.  In  support  were  the 
Connaught  Rangers  following  the  Bhopals  at  a dis- 
tance of  400  yards.  The  57th  Rifles  and  129th 
Baluchis  were  in  Brigade  reserve,  both  battalions 
being  mere  skeletons,  as  a result  of  their  share  in 
the  operations  of  the  previous  day. 

The  Brigade  came  under  heavy  shell  fire  while 
advancing  across  the  open  ground,  but  casualties 
were  minimized  by  making  the  best  use  of  the  slight 
cover  afforded  by  hedges  and  folds  of  the  ground. 
The  Sirhind  Brigade  did  not  wait  for  Ferozepore  to 
come  up  in  line,  but  advanced  as  soon  as  the  bom- 
bardment started.  It  seemed  indeed  to  General 
Walker  that  it  was  better  to  face  the  risks  of  out- 
distancing the  Troops  on  his  flanks  than  to  lose 
artillery  support  by  waiting  for  the  Ferozepore 
Brigade. 

Of  the  Sirhind  Brigade,  one  company  of  the 


SECOND  BATTLE  OE  YPBES 


3]  G 

Highland  Light  Infantry,  under  Captain  Tarrant, 
was  holding  a trench  parallel  to  the  German  line 
and  about  100  yards  from  it,  in  which  it  had  relieved 
Major  Deacon  and  his  brave  little  detachment  of 
Connaughts  and  Manchesters  dmdng  the  night. 
Three  companies  of  the  Highland  Light  Infantry 
were  in  support  of  Captain  Tarrant,  and  on  their 
left  were  the  15th  Sikhs  under  Lt-Colonel  J.  Hill. 

About  300  yards  behind  the  supports  were  the 
remaining  units  of  the  Brigade,  the  4th  Liverpools, 
1/lst  and  l/4th  Gurkhas  in  shelters.  The  Jullundirr 
Brigade  was  in  Divisional  reserve  at  La  Brique, 
where  it  remained  throughout  the  day. 

The  Sirhind  Brigade  advanced  on  a two-battalion 
front,  the  ]/4th  Gurkhas  under  Major  Brodhm'st 
on  the  right,  and  the  1/lst  Gurkhas  commanded  by 
Lt“Colonel  W.  C.  Anderson  on  the  left,  with  the  4th 
Liverpools  and  the  remainder  of  the  1st  High- 
land Light  Infantry  and  the  15th  Sikhs  in  support. 

In  passing  the  ridge,  the  attack  came  under 
severe  frontal  cross  fire  from  rifles  and  machine  guns, 
as  well  as  from  several  other  directions.  The  enemy 
had  registered  the  range  of  every  likely  spot  with 
great  accmracy  ; hedges  and  ditches  which  would 
give  any  sort  of  cover  had  all  been  marked  down, 
and  casualties  were  heaviest  in  their  vicinity. 

Majbr  Brodhurst,  commanding  the  l/4th  Gurklias, 
was  killed  early  in  the  attack,  the  Adjutant,  Captain 
Hartwell,  being  wounded  by  his  side  at  the  same 
moment. 

'Three  British  officers  and  about  thirty  men 
succeeded  in  reaching  a large  farm  at  the  bottom ' 
of  the  slope,  which  had  apparently  been  used  as  a 
Canadian  R.E.  depot.  Here  they  held  on  under 


GALLANTRY  OF  THE  L1VERPOOL8  317 


a shattering  fii'e,  but  the  remainder  of  the  battalion 
could  not  join  them  until  about  4 p.m.,  when  Lt- 
Colonel  Allen,  commanding  the  4th  King’s,  seeing 
that  the  l/4th  Gurkhas  were  held  up,  determined  to 
reinforce. 

The  King’s,  splendidly  led  bj^  then-  officers, 
advanced  by  short  rushes,  with  the  enemy  pumping 
lead  into  them  and  men  failing  in  heaps.  A number, 
under  Major  Beall,  succeeded  in  getting  to  within 
200  yards  of  the  enemy’s  line,  but  it  was  evident 
that  the  wire  in  front  of  the  German  trench  was 
untouched,  and  it  was  impossible  to  push  on  further. 
This  spirited  dash  enabled  a number  of  the  l/4th 
Gurkhas  to  join  the  small  party  which  was  holding 
on  to  the  farm. 

The  4th  King’s  had  not  been  long  in  showing 
them  quality,  for  the  battalion  had  only  landed  in 
France  durmg  the  preceding  month,  and  had  already 
been  present  at  Neuve  Chapelle.  Its  losses  in  this 
attack  were  very  lieavj’,  2nd  Lieutenant  R.  A. 
Lloyd  being  killed  and  8 officers  wounded,  wliile 
there  were  374  casualties  amongst  other  ranks. 

Lt-Colonel  Allen  received  the  C.M.G.,  and  for  his 
conspicuous  courage  and  able  leadership  Major 
Beall,  who  not  only  led  his  men  in  the  attack,  but 
also  returned  across  the  bullet-swept  open  to  bring 
up  reinforcements,  received  the  D.S.O. 

Lance-Sergeant  M.  Vincent  won  the  D.C.M.  by 
his  gallantry  on  this  date  and  on  the  1st  May,  when 
he  carried  a wounded  signaller  into  safety  under 
heavy  fire. 

Private  W.  Elmer  gained  the  same  distinction 
by  his  conspicuous  bravery  in  attending  to  a wounded 
officer  under  fire,  and  for  volunteering  on  the  1st 


318 


SECOND  BATTLE  OF  YPKES 


May  to  carry  messages  under  circumstances  of 
particular  danger. 

By  this  time  three  more  officers  of  the  l/4th 
Gurkhas  had  been  wounded,  Captain  Collins,  Lieu- 
tenant Moore  and  Captain  Lentaigne,  but  the  last- 
named  continued  to  command  his  company  in  spite 
of  his  wound. 

The  1/lst  Gurkhas,  like  the  l/4th,  suffered 
severely  from  a heavy  enfilade  fire  on  their  way  to 
some  enclosed  ground  on  the  downward  slope,  being 
compelled  to  swing  round  towards  the  left  to  face  it. 
One  company  under  2nd  Lieutenant  Fry,  I.A.R.O., 
succeeded  in  pushing  on  to  a ruined  farm  distant 
only  about  250  yards  from  the  Germans,  tiere  it 
held  on  under  heavy  fire  until  withdrawn  after  dusk. 
The  remainder  of  the  battalion  was  brought  to  a 
standstill  at  a distance  of  about  400  3mrds  from  the 
enemy’s  trenches. 

Just  then.  Lieutenant  and  Adjutant  G.  St  George 
was  shot  tlirough  the  chest  by  the  side  of  Colonel 
Anderson,  d^fing  the  next  day  in  hospital.  At 
this  juncture,  too,  Captain  Evans  was  wounded. 
Rifleman  Phalman  Gurung,  seeing  his  Company 
Commander  fall,  ran  over  to  him,  dug  a hole,  threw 
up  rough  cover  round  it,  and,  always  under  heavy 
fii’e,  placed  Captain  Evans  in  it,  thus  undoubtedly 
saving  his  life,  for  which  act  of  gallantry  he  received 
the  Indian  Distinguished  Service  Medal. 

Rifleman  Ramkishan  Thapa  was  awarded  the 
2nd  Class,  Indian  Order  of  Merit,  for  his  braverv  in 
continuing  to  lay  a telephone  line  behind  the  battalion 
as  it  advanced.  Twice  he  was  forced  to  return  to 
the  base  to  renew  his  detachment,  all  of  his  men 
having  been  killed  or  wounded.  Eventually  he 


FRENCH  GUNS  RETAKEN 


319 


brought  the  line  up  by  liimseK,  returning  on  two 
occasions  to  repau*  it  under  very  heavy  fire.  Of 
the  13  signallers  then  with  him,  2 were  killed  and 
9 wounded. 

Rifleman  Khamba  Sing  Gurung  earned  the  Indian 
Distinguished  Service  Medal  by  his  bravery  in 
carrying  a wounded  officer  of  the  4th  King’s  back 
to  cover  under  heavv  fire. 

t/ 

The  battalion  came  out  of  action  with  only  Colonel 
Anderson  and  2nd  Lieutenant  Fry  unhurt,  the 
remaining  five  British  officers  having  been  wounded  ; 
15  other  ranks  were  killed  ; 2 Gurkha  officers  and 
71  others  were  wounded  during  the  attack,  and 
9 others  were  missing. 

Although  the  objective  was  not  reached,  the 
1/lst  Gurkhas  were  able  to  establish  their  position 
in  advance  of  some  French  guns  which  had  been 
abandoned,  and  during  the  night  these  were  safely 
removed. 

In  the  meantime,  the  Ferozepore  Brigade  on  the 
right,  led  by  the  4th  Londons  and  the  9th  Bhopals, 
had  been  moving  on  towards  their  goal,  a farm  on 
the  right  of  the  line  of  attack,  but  they  fell  into  a 
devastating  fire  from  artillerjy  rifles,  and  machine 
guns,  which  caused  such  heavy  losses  as  to  a great 
extent  to  break  up  the  attack. 

Among  the  Bhopals,  Major  Jamieson,  a gallant 
officer  who  was  to  the  fore  in  the  action  at  Neuve 
Chapelle  in  October,  1914,  and  has  since  been  killed 
in  Mesopotamia,  was  wounded  early  in  the  day, 
and  Captain  Etlinger,  acting  Adjutant,  was  mortalR 
wounded  at  about  3 p.m. 

The  attack  was  eventually  held  up  after  it  had 
come  into  line  on  the  right  of  the  Sirhind  Brigade. 


320 


•SECOND  BATTLE  OE  YPBES 


Tlie  losses  of  tiie  Bliopals  were  1 British  officer 
and  15  men  killed,  2 British,  2 Indian  officers  and 
97  other  ranks  wounded,  and  5 missing. 

The  4th  Londons,  who  had  not  so  far  to  go, 
yet  suffered  very  heavily,  but  pushed  on  until  the 
attack  was  smothered  by  an  overwhelming  fire, 
when  only  30  men  remained  of  one  of  the  leading 
companies.  During  this  period.  Lieutenant  Coates, 
who  had  carried  out  a useful  reconnaissance  on 
the  previous  day,  was  killed  at  the  head  of  his 
platoon. 

The  two  companies  in  support  pushed  forward 
to  reinforce,  and,  in  spite  of  heavy  losses,  reached 
then’  goal.  Captain  Saunders,  commanding  D Com- 
pany, fell  mortally  wounded  dining  this  movement, 
still  cheering  on  his  men. 

The  machine-gun  detachment  suffered  very 
severely  in  crossing  the  open  to  take  up  position. 
Here  the  men  were  shot  down  in  rapid  succession 
as  they  advanced.  ^Vhen  one  of  the  guns  had  been 
rendered  useless,  the  whole  detachment  being  either 
killed  or  put  out  of  action,  2nd  Lieutenant  J.  R. 
Pyjier,  although  already  wounded,  pushed  forward 
ivith  the  remaining  gun  and  continued  in  action 
with  it  until  he  was  ordered  back  after  dark.  For 
his  conspicuous  gallantry  Lieutenant  Pyper  received 
the  Military  Cross. 

Lance-Corporal  Colomb  and  Lance-Corporal 
Ehren  won  the  Distinguished  Conduct  Medal,  the 
former  for  bravery  in  rescuing,  under  heavy  shell 
and  rifle  fire,  a‘ wounded  man  who  was  lying  about 
50  yards  away.  He  rendered  first  aid,  and  got  him 
back  to  cover,  in  doing  which  he  was  himseK  wounded. 
Lance-Corporal  Ehren  continually  carried  reports, 


% 


FURTHER  ROMRx\RDMENT  COiMHERCES  32i 

and  on  another  occasion  left  liis  trench  and  brought 
in  a wounded  man,  being  exposed  to  heavy  tu’e  the 
whole  time. 

During  this  period  the  French  had  been  steadily 
attacking,  and,  although  losing  very  heavily,  the}' 
still  continued  to  form  a firing  line. 

At  2.40  p.m.  the  Commander  of  the  2nd  Army 
ordered  the  assault  to  be  pressed  on  vigorously,  at 
the  same  time  placing  a composite  Brigade  under 
Colonel  Tuson  at  the  disposal  of  the  General  Officer 
Commanding  Lahore  Division.  This  Brigade  con- 
sisted of  the  West  Riding  Regiment,  the  Duke  of 
Cornwall’s  Light  Infantry,  the  York  and  Lancaster 
Regiment,  and  the  5th  King’s  Own.  All  these 
battalions  had  aheady  suffered  heavy  losses,  and  the 
enthe  Brigade  hardly  numbered  1300  men. 

Colonel  Tuson  started  forward  at  once  with  orders 
to  get  into  touch  with  the  Sirhind  Brigade,  and  to 
report  whether  there  was  a sufficient  interval  between 
our  front  lino  and  that  of  the  enemy  to  allow  of  a 
further  bombardment  without  danger  to  our  troops. 
At  4.25  p.m.  a report  arrived  from  the  Sii’hind 
Brigade,  announcing  that  the  bombardment  was 
practicable,  and  at  5.30  p.m.  it  commenced,  all  avail- 
able batteries  joining  in.  Under  cover  of  oim  guns, 
the  1st  Highland  Light  Infantry  and  15th  Sikhs 
pushed  forward.  The  Sikhs  managed  to  assemble 
behind  a strong  earthwork  which  had  served  to 
screen  a French  battery  before  its  withdrawal  on 
the  night  of  the  26th. 

The  moment  the  battahon  emerged  from  this 
cover  and  began  to  cross  the  open  ground,  a terrible 
crossfire  was  poured  into  it  from  the  German  trenches, 
while  the  shrapnel,  if  possible,  increased  in  violence. 

Y 


322 


SECOND  BATTLE  OF  YPRES 


Just  then  Lt-Colonel  Vivian,  while  rushing 
with  his  company  over  the  fire-swept  zone,  was 
shot  through  the  heart  and  died  immediate^.  The 
loss  of  this  splendid  officer  was  very  keenly  felt,  as 
throughout  the  campaign,  in  which  he  had  already 
been  wounded,  he  had  shown  most  marked  ability 
and  courage. 

Among  the  many  stories  of  his  daring  is  the 
following.  In  December,  1914,  it  was  necessary 
on  one  occasion  to  ascertain  whether  a German 
trench  in  front  of  the  15th  Sikhs  was  occupied. 
Knowing  the  risk.  Colonel  Vivian  preferred  to  take 
it  himself.  According^  he  crawled  out  120  yards 
along  a ditch  which  ran  towards  the  hostile  position, 
but,  on  arrival  unobserved  at  the  end  of  his  perilous 
journey,  he  found  himsefi  unable  to  see  into  the 
trench.  Determined  not  to  be  baffled,  he  proceeded 
to  climb  a tree  at  a distance  of  only  a few  yards  from 
the  enemy.  The  Germans  spotted  him  and  began 
firing.  Colonel  Vivian  felt  a shock,  and  thought 
that  a bullet  had  gone  through  his  body.  He 
dropped  out  of  the  tree,  and,  fired  at  all  the  way, 
managed  to  crawl  back  to  our  trench,  when  he  was 
found  to  be  unhurt,  the  bullet  having  gone  through 
the  numerous  winter  garments  which  he  was  wearing, 
causing  no  more  damage  than  a graze. 

On  Colonel  Vivian’s  death  Major  Carden  took 
command  of  the  front  line.  Shortly  afterwards. 
Captain  Muir  was  hit.  Major  Carden  went  over  to 
help  him,  and  was  wounded  in  the  side.  He  lay  in 
a ditch  until  the  regiment  retired.  While  he  was 
being  taken  away  on  a stretcher,  both  bearers  were 
wounded,  and  Major  Carden,  being  again  hit,  suc- 
cumbed. This  incident  will  give  some  idea  of  the 


FRENCH  DRIVEN  BACK  BY  GAS  323 


violence  of  the  fire  to  which  our  troops  were  sub- 
jected. 

During  this  attack,  communications  had,  as  usual, 
been  cut  by  shells  and,  when  it  was  urgently  necessary 
to  get  a message  through,  it  had  to  be  carried  by 
hand.  Sepoy  Bakshi  Singh  twice  volunteered  to 
take  messages  over  a space  of  some  1500  yards, 
which  was  literally  swept  by  fire.  On  both  occasions 
he  was  successful,  and  retmned  with  the  replies. 
On  the  1st  May  he  again  distinguished  himself  by 
going  out  several  times  to  repair  the  telephone 
wires  which  had  been  cut  by  shells.  For  his  gallant 
conduct  he  was  rewarded  with  the  2nd  Class,  Indian 
Order  of  Merit. 

The  men  were  now  falling  fast,  and  any  fresh 
advance  could  only  be  possible  with  the  assistance, 
on  the  left,  of  the  French,  who  had  launched  a 
further  attack  under  cover  of  a very  heavy  bombard- 
ment, at  7 p.m. 

At  7.10  p.m.  Colonel  Hill,  on  looking  round  to 
ascertain  the  extent  of  the  French  advance,  saw  that 
they  had  been  driven  back  by  the  fire  of  the  enemy 
and  by  dense  clouds  of  gas. 

The  position  was  very  critical.  Had  the  Germans 
then  seized  the  opportunity  to  attack,  oin  resistance 
could  not  have  been  prolonged,  for  the  trenches 
which  the  Sirhind  Brigade  had  vacated  when  they 
advanced  had  not  been  manned  by  other  troops, 
and  there  was  consequently  no  support. 

The  left  half  battalion,  which  was  then  leading, 
was  at  once  ordered  to  retire  to  the  trenches  occupied 
by  the  right  half  battalion.  This  movement  was 
carried  out  without  further  casualties.  The  din 
of  battle  gradually  died  away  as  the  French  Colonials 


324  8EC0ND  BATTLE  OF  YPRES 

retreated,  and  parties  were  sent  out  to  bring  in 
wounded  and  buiy  the  dead. 

At  the  close  of  the  day,  the  strength  of  the  15th 
Sikhs  amounted  to  4 British,  11  Indian  officers  and 
369  other  ranks,  the  casualties  having  been  2 British 
officers  and  9 others  killed,  and  1 British  officer  and 
86  other  ranks  wounded. 

The  Highland  Light  Infantry  had  no  better 
fortune  than  the  15th  Sikhs,  and  when  the  French 
Moroccan  Brigade  was  driven  back  on  the  left,  the 
battalion  dug  itself  in  and  held  on  where  it  was. 

Great  anxiety  was  felt  as  to  the  fate  of  B Company 
under  the  gallant  Captain  Tarrant,  who  were  left 
utterly  isolated  in  them  advanced  position  only 
100  yards  from  the  German  line.  It  was  feared  that 
they  liad  been  overwhelmed,  or  at  the  least  had  been 
forced  back,  but  when  matters  had  quieted  down,  it 
was  found  that  this  heroic  little  detachment  had 
held  on  without  flinching  against  all  the  attempts 
of  the  enemy,  culminating  in  the  final  discharge  of 
gas  which  drove  back  the  Moroccans.  This  splendid 
effort,  however,  cost  the  life  of  Captain  Tarrant,  who 
was  killed  during  the  afternoon. 

Captain  Tan-ant  is  described  as  being  an  ex- 
ceptionally able  and  gaUant  officer,  a description 
which  is  borne  out  by  the  skill  and  determination 
shown  by  him  in  the  defence  of  his  precarious 
position  in  face  of  a terrible  fire  and  volumes  of 
asphyxiating  gas ; by  his  stubborn  refusal  to  retire 
when  isolated  and  liable  at  anv  moment  to  be  over- 
whelmed ; and  by  his  heroic  death,  which,  as  his 
Commanding  Officer  testified,  was  a heavy  blow  to 
the  resriment. 

When  Captain  Tarrant  took  over  the  hastily  dug 


CAPTAIN  TARRANT’S  PARTY 


325 


trench  from  the  Manchesters  and  Connaiights,  it 
was  necessary  to  get  ammunition  up  to  him  as 
quickly  as  possible,  but  daylight  arrived  before  the 
party  carrying  the  supplies  could  reach  the  trench, 
and  on  the  way  9 of  the  10  men  were  hit.  Captain 
Tarrant  called  for  volunteers  to  go  out  and  bring 
the  ammunition  in.  Company  Sergeant-Major  R. 
BeU  headed  the  party,  and  under  a very  heavy  fire 
succeeded  in  bringing  up  the  sorely  needed  supplies. 
For  his  bravery  on  this  and  other  occasions  he 
received  the  Distinguished  Conduct  Medal. 

The  casualties  of  the  Highland  Light  Infantry 
on  this  day  amounted  to  1 British  officer  killed,  I 
wounded,  and  108  other  ranks  killed,  wounded,  or 
missing. 

The  night  of  the  28th  April  passed  fairly  quietly 
as  far  as  the  troops  were  concerned,  but  a number 
of  42-centimetre  shells  hurtled  overhead  on  their 
wa}^  to  complete  the  ruin  of  Ypres. 

On  the  morning  of  the  28th,  the  Lahore  Division 
was  placed  under  the  orders  of  the  5th  Corps,  and 
later  in  the  day  was  incorporated  with  Plumer’s 
Force,  which  had  just  been  formed. 

From  the  French  operation  orders,  it  was  gathered 
that  their  main  attack  would  be  from  their  left,  the 
right  co-operating  if  it  saw  an  opportunity.  The 
Sirhind  Brigade  was  ordered  to  assist  with  fire,  and 
to  be  ready  to  take  advantage  of  any  decided  success 
on  the  part  of  the  French  by  attacking.  The 
Divisional  Artillery  was  also  ordered  to  help  the 
French,  whose  attack,  however,  which  was  timed  for 
2 p.m.,  was  finally  postponed  till  7 p.m. 

At  1 p.m.,  nevertheless,  an  artillery  bombardment 
began,  but,  as  before,  the  superior  weight  of  metal 


326 


SECOND  BATTLE  OF  YPBES 


of  tlio  enemj^  told  at  once,  and  from  that  hour  till 
4 p.m.  the  whole  area  was  ploughed  up  by  the  German 
shells. 

The  French  attack  did  not  develope,  and  the 
light  was  confined  to  an  artillery  duel. 

At  about  5 p.m.  the  German  aeroplanes  again 
became  active,  but  as  usual  flew  very  high.  One 
daring  pilot,  however,  descended  rather  lower  than 
the  others,  and  paid  for  his  temerity  by  being 
brought  down  by  our  rifle  fire,  falling  in  our  lines  in 
the  direction  of  St  Julien. 

The  night  again  passed  quietty,  and  the  oppor- 
tunity was  seized  to  strengthen  our  position.  It 
was  very  noticeable  that,  whereas  at  the  com- 
mencement of  the  campaign,  the  Indian  troops  did 
not  appreciate  the  importance  of  digging  really  strong 
trenches,  by  this  time  they  so  fully  understood  the 
necessity  that,  as  an  officer  remarks,  the  only  diffi- 
culty was  to  get  them  to  stop  digging. 

An  attack  by  the  French  was  timed  for  noon  on 
the  29th  April,  and  the  Sirhind  and  Ferozepore 
Brigades  were  ordered  to  assist  as  before,  but  after 
the  operation  had  been  postponed  till  further  orders, 
it  was  eventually  cancelled. 

During  the  night  of  the  29th-30th,  the  Jullundnr 
and  Ferozepore  Brigades  were  withdrawn  to  the 
huts  at  Ouderdom  by  General  Plumer’s  orders, 
and  their  share  in  this  great  battle  came  to  an 
end. 

The  story  of  the  30th  April  is  very  much  the  same 
as  that  of  the  previous  twenty -four  hours. 

A French  attack  was  timed  for  11.15  a.m.,  the 
bombardment  commencing  at  10  a.m.  The  Sirhind 
Brigade  stood  ready  for  action  during  the  whole  day. 


FRESH  PLANS  FOR  ATTACK 


and  bombardments  took  place  one  after  another,  as 
the  attack  was  postponed  from  hour  to  hour. 

The  co-operation  of  the  Canadian  Artillery, 
which  had  throughout  rendered  most  valuable  assist- 
ance, was  very  marked  diu-ing  this  period,  when  the 
guns  were  served  under  the  heaviest  shell  fire. 

Finally,  at  6 p.m..  Colonel  Savy,  Commanding 
the  Moroccan  Brigade,  informed  General  Keary  that 
his  losses  had  been  so  heavy  as  to  preclude  any 
further  advance  without  reinforcements.  The  attack 
was  therefore  indefinitely  postponed. 

It  was  then  explained  by  General  Plumer  to 
General  Putz,  Commanding  the  French  Aimiy  in 
Belgium,  that  the  Sirhind  Brigade,  the  only  one 
available,  could  be  utilized  to  support  the  French 
right  in  an  attack  on  Hill  29.  (See  Map.)  Arrange- 
ments were  accordingly  made  for  the  enemy’s  wire 
on  Hill  29  to  be  cut  by  our  artillery,  and  a certain 
section  of  his  line  to  be  subjected  to  a heavy  bom- 
bardment to  keep  down  machine-gun  and  rifle  fhe, 
as  this  section  swung  round  in  a semicircle  towards 
the  right  of  the  Sirhind  Brigade  and  flanked  our 
attack. 

The  position  from  which  Suhind  was  to  attack 
was  left  to  General  Walker’s  discretion,  provided 
only  that  he  advanced  at  the  same  time  as  the 
French.  It  was  then  learnt  from  General  Plumer 
that  General  Putz  thoroughly  understood  that  our 
move  depended  on  that  of  the  French,  and  that 
the  two  attacks  would  not  converge.  It  was  finally 
decided  that  the  French  should  attack  at  3.10  p.m. 
on  the  1st  May,  their  advance  being  preceded  by  a 
prolonged  and  heavy  bombardment.  To  bring  it 
level  with  the  French,  the  Sirhind  Brigade  would 


328 


SEC^ONT)  BATTLE  OF  YPBER 


advance  at  2.50  p.m.,  the  movement  being  supported 
by  artillery  fire. 

Using  the  discretion  allowed  him,  General  Walker 
decided  to  move  up  through  the  farm  on  the  left 
of  the  line  near  the  trench  formerly  held  by 
Captain  Tarrant,  a morning  reconnaissance  having 
shown  this  to  be  the  most  favom-able  line.  It 
Avould,  of  course,  have  been  preferable  to  have  moved 
the  front  lines  of  the  Brigade  up  to  the  forward 
trenches  now  held  by  the  12th  British  Brigade, 
during  the  night  but  this  could  not  be  done,  as  the 
orders  for  attack  were  not  received  till  4 a.m.,  when 
day  was  dawning  ; moreover,  the  forward  trenches 
were  already  fairly  full  of  men. 

The  Brigade  was  disposed  as  follows  : — 

Right  attack : l /4th  Gurkhas,  supported  by  the 
1st  Highland  Light  Infantry. 

Left  attack:  1/lst  Gurkhas,  supported  by  l/4th 
King’s  (Liverpools),  the  15th  Sikhs  holding  the  front 
line  of  trenches. 

Tlie  leading  line  advanced  from  the  point  where 
the  road  running  east  and  west  crosses  the  Lange- 
marck — Ypres  road.  In  order  to  reach  assaulting 
distance,  it  was  necessary  to  pass  down  a long 
steep  slope  exposed  to  the  enemy’s  machine-gun 
and  artillery  fire,  and  the  Commanding  Officers 
of  the  two  leading  Gurkha  battalions  decided  to 
cross  this  danger  zone  at  the  greatest  possible  speed. 

The  sensation  of  being  amongst  even  the  low 
hills  round  Ypres  had  caused  the  Gurkhas  to  feel 
more  at  home  than  amidst  the  dreary  plains  and 
mud  in  which  they  had  fought  for  so  many  months, 
and  the  two  battalions  covered  the  ground  at  a 
tremendous  pace,  passing  through  our  front  line 


GURKHA  DASH 


329 


trenches,  the  occupants  of  which  stood  up  and 
cheered  them  as  they  tore  through.  The  result  of 
this  rapid  advance  was  that  the  perilous  passage 
was  accomplished  before  the  enemy’s  artillery  fire 
had  time  to  develope,  and  the  attack  reached  a poin  t 
on  the  final  upward  slope  at  a distance  of  only  some 
250  yards  from  the  Germans  with  comparatively 
few  casualties. 

The  losses  of  the  1/lst  Gurkhas  during  this 
operation  amounted  only  to  1 British  officer,  Captain 
Johnson,  and  1 Gurkha  officer  wounded,  while  6 
men  were  killed,  G2  wounded,  and  3 missing — a 
small  casualty  list  for  an  attack  in  the  face  of  such 
odds. 

Lt-Colonel  W.  C.  Anderson,  Commanding  the 
1/lst  Gm’khas,  received  the  C.M.G.  in  recognition 
of  the  marked  qualities  of  command  displayed  by 
him  during  this  battle  and  on  other  occasions. 

By  this  time  our  bombardment  had  ceased.  The 
ground  between  our  line  and  that  of  the  enemy  was 
a glacis-like  slope  devoid  of  cover,  and  it  was  apparent 
that  the  whe  in  front  of  the  German  trenches  was 
still  intact.  At  a distance  of  about  150  yards  in 
front  of  the  spot  where  our  attack  halted  was  a trench, 
the  ownership  of. which  was  doubtful. 

It  was  necessary  to  ascertain  at  once  whether 
the  trench  was  occupied  by  friends  or  eiiemies,  but, 
exposed  as  the  ground  was,  the  task  of  obtaining 
the  information  was  liighly  dangerous.  Havildar 
Bhakat  Sing  Rana,  of  the  2/4th  Gurkhas,  undertook 
the  duty,  and  leading  a small  party  across  the  open, 
succeeded  in  getting  through  tlie  enemy’s  fire. 
Having  ascertained  that  the  position  was  held  by 
the  French,  lie  returned  and  reported.  For  his 


mo 


SECOND  BATTLE  OF  YPRES 


gallantry  the  havildar  received  the  2nd  Class,  Indian 
Order  of  Merit. 

The  4th  King’s,  in  support  of  the  1/lst  Gurkhas, 
suffered  severely  from  the  enemy’s  shells,  losing 
Captain  Lumsden  killed,  Major  Beall  and  2nd  Lieu- 
tenant Mason  vounded,  with  43  casualties  amongst 
other  ranks. 

During  this  period  of  the  attack,  the  bodies  of 
two  Indians  were  seen  suspended  by  the  neck  from 
a tree  near  the  hostile  lines,  another  outrage  being 
thus  added  to  the  list  of  German  crimes. 

By  4.30  p.m.  the  l/4th  Gurkhas  had  succeeded 
in  reaching  some  new  trenches  to  the  east  of  the  farm. 
The  Highland  Light  Infantry  then  reinforced,  which 
led  to  the  trenches  becoming  overcrowded,  as  they 
were  also  occupied  by  men  of  the  Essex  Regiment 
and  by  some  of  the  French. 

The  losses  of  the  l/4th  Gurkhas  during  this 
attack  were  light,  amounting  only  to  7 men  killed, 
2 Gurkha  officers  and  49  men  wounded. 

The  casualties  of  the  1st  Highland  Light  Infantry 
were : 2nd  Lieutenant  J.  L.  McIntosh  (Indian  Army 
attached)  killed,  2nd  Lieutenant  C.  P.  Johnstone 
wounded,  and  80  casualties  amongst  other  ranks. 

All  through  the  battle,  the  work  of  the  medical 
officers  and  their  subordinates  had  been  beyond 
praise.  Captain  C.  A.  Wood,  I.M.S.,  I/4th  Gurkhas, 
gained  the  Military  Cross  by  his  bravery  and  un- 
ceasing energy  in  collecting  the  wounded,  even  after 
he  had  himself  been  hit,  and  in  arranging  for  their 
safety  after  his  first-aid  post  had  become  a target 
for  the  enemy’s  artillery.  Throughout  the  campaign 
this  officer  had  shown  himseh  to  be  utterly  regardless 
of  danger  in  the  performance  of  his  duty. 


SIRHIND  WITHDRAWN 


331 


Riflemen  Patiram  Kiinwar  and  Deotinarain 
Newar,  of  the  1/4 th  Gurkhas,  were  in  charge  of 
stretcher  parties.  On  two  occasions  especially 
they  had  particular I3"  hard  work  in  collecting  the 
wounded  on  the  battle-field  under  verv  heaw\’  fire, 
showing  great  courage  in  doing  so,  and  bringing  in 
all  the  wounded,  amounting  to  nearly  200  on  each 
occasion.  For  then  bravery  and  devotion  to  duty 
they  were  awarded  the  Indian  Distinguished  Ser^'ice 
Medal. 

Luckily,  during  this  attack  the  wind  was  from 
the  west,  and  there  was  no  danger  of  gas,  but  shortl}" 
after  oin  front  line  reached  its  most  advanced 
position,  the  enemy  set  up  an  impenetrable  barrage 
of  fire,  which  cut  off  half  of  the  4th  King’s  (Liver- 
pools)  and  prevented  them  from  reinforcing.  Any 
further  forward  move  was  now  out  of  the  question, 
unless  it  could  be  made  in  conjunction  with  the 
French  and  under  cover  of  heavy  fire. 

Our  Allies,  however,  had  suffered  under  an 
extremely  heav^^  bombardment  during  the  pre- 
vious night  and  the  greater  part  of  the  day.  At 
10  a.m.,  especially,  the  Germans  opened  a terrific 
fire  on  the  whole  area  occupied  by  the  Moroccan 
Brigade,  which  had  already  sustained  very  serious 
losses  in  the  battle.  At  6.30  p.m.,  then.  General 
Walker,  who  as  usual,  was  well  up  in  front  in  the 
trenches  of  the  15th  Sikhs,  having  ascertained 
that  there  was  no  prospect  of  any  advance  on  the 
part  of  the  French,  reported  the  situation  to  General 
Keary,  and  orders  were  issued  for  the  Brigade  to 
collect  the  wounded,  bury  the  dead,  and  withdraw 
after  dark. 

This  movement  was  successfully  carried  out. 


3.^,2 


RECiOND  BATTLE  OE  YPBES 


and  the  troops  returned  to  tlie  hntnieirts  at  Ouder- 
doin,  arriving  there  at  5.20  a.ni.  on  the  2nd  May. 
On  the  3rd,  General  Walker  remarks  that,  although 
the  Brigade  had  been  under  shell  fire  from  the 
27th  April  to  the  1st  May  inclusive,  the  behaviour 
of  the  troops  had  been  excellent  throughout,  and, 
in  spite  of  heavy  casualties,  the  moral  of  the  Brigade 
was  unaffected,  all  ranks  after  two  days’  rest  being 
quite  fit  for  further  work. 

On  the  3rd  May  the  Lahore  Division  proceeded 
to  rejoin  the  Indian  C^orps,  having  within  a period 
of  less  than  two  months  talcen  a prominent  part  in 
two  of  the  greatest  battles  in  the  world’s  historv. 

The  casualty  list  was  very  heavy,  as  will  be  seen 
from  the  following  table. 

The  strength  of  the  Division  on  the  23rd  April, 
the  day  preceding  its  departure  for  Ypres,  was  as 
under  : — 


British 

oHicers. 

Indian 

oflicers. 

Sabi'BS. 

Rides 

(Tiritisti). 

Rifles 

(Indian). 

Artillery 

(British). 

Artillery 

(Indian). 

Totai. 

421 

16G 

47.5 

5439 

C808 

2.390 

281 

15,980 

The  casualties  were  as  follows,  showing  killed, 
wounded,  and  missing; — 


British 

oflicers. 

Indian 

ullicers. 

, Sabres. 

Rifles  (British). 

Rifles  (Indian). 

Artillery 

(British). 

Artillery 

(Indian). 

K.  W.  M. 

28  105  — 

II.W.M. 
0 57  1 

K.  W.M. 
2 4 — 

11.  W.  M. 
180  1096  345 

R.  W.  M. 

177  1684  209 

K.W.  M. 

6 47  — 

K.W.  M. 
— 1 — 

Tlie  total  casualties  of  all  ranks  amounted  to 
3889. 


GENERAL  KEARY’S  REMARKS 


333 


In  order,  however,  to  arrive  at  a faii’ly  correct 
estimate  of  the  proportion  of  casualties  to  troops 
actually  engaged  in  the  various  attacks,  it  is  necessary 
to  deduct  the  strength  and  the  casualties  of  the 
Artillery  and  Cavah’y. 

The  combined  strength  of  these  two  arms 
amounted  to  3146,  excluding  officers,  their  casualties 
being  60,  also  excluding  officers,  amongst  whom 
there  were  9 casualties,  all  in  the  Artillery. 

The  strength  actually  engaged  at  one  time  or 
another  in  the  attacks  therefore  comes  to  12,834 
of  all  ranks,  with  a total  of  3829  casualties,  giving 
a percentage  of  very  nearly  30. 

General  Keary’s  remarks,  in  the  summing  up 
of  his  report  on  the  operations,  show  very  clearly 
the  adverse  conditions  under  which  the  troops  had 
to  fight ; the  figures  above  quoted  demonstrate 
the  spirit  with  which  those  conditions  were  met. 

General  Keary  reports  : — “ In  conclusion,  I con- 
sider that  the  troops  did  all  that  it  was  humanly 
possible  to  do  under  most  trying  circumstances. 
They  had  to  pass  along  some  miles  of  road  and 
narrow  streets  under  a hail  of  shell  fire,  advance  to 
a position  of  assembly  over  open  ground,  and  from 
thence  to  a position  of  deployment  under  the  same 
conditions. 

“ The  Germans  had  prepared  a position  which 
required  the  most  accm'ate  and  intense  gun  fire  to 
reduce  it.  Owing  to  the  hurried  nature  of  the  attack, 
it  was  impossible  to  reconnoitre  sufficiently  to 
ensure  such  a fire.  Nor  were  the  guns  registered. 
Dui’ing  the  first  two  days  the  Infantry  advanced 
against  a position  on  an  open  glacis  which  was 
vh’tually  unshaken. 


334 


SECOND  BATTLE  OF  YPRES 


“ After  the  first  two  days  only  one  Brigade  was 
in  action,  and  its  action  depended  on  that  of  the 
French,  whose  right  never  advanced  to  the  attack. 

“ In  spite  of  all  these  disabilities  the  carrying 
of  the  position  by  the  French  and  British  was  only 
prevented  by  the  use  of  asphyxiating  gases.” 

Where  all  had  done  splendid  service,  General 
Keary  considered  that  the  following  units  deserved 
special  mention  : — 


1st  Manchesters. 

1st  Highland  Light  In- 
fantry. 

47th  Sikhs. 

40th  Pathans. 

From  the  time  of  its  arrival  tiU  the  morning  of 


Connaught  Rangers. 
4th  King’s  (Liverpool) 
Regiment. 

57th  Rifles. 


the  28th  April  the  Division  was  under  the  orders  of 
General  Sir  Horace  Smith-Dorrien,  Commanding  the 
2nd  Army.  On  the  7th  May  the  following  letter  was 
received  from  General  Smith-Dorrien  : — 

“ Having  read  the  very  complete  and  excellent 
report  on  the  work  of  the  Lahore  Division  in  the 
heavy  lighting  near  Ypres  on  the  26th  and  27th 
April,  1915,  the  Commander  of  the  2nd  Army  is 
confirmed  in  the  views  he  formed  at  the  time  that 
the  Division  had  been  handled  with  great  skill  and 
determination  by  Major-General  Keary. 

“ Sir  Horace  Smith-Dorrien  fully  realizes  the 
disadvantages  under  which  the  attack  was  made : • 
insufficient  artillery  preparation  on  our  side,  and 
an  open  glacis-like  slope  to  advance  over  in  the  face 
of  overwhelming  shell,  rifle,  and  machine-gun  fire; 
and  the  employment  of  poisonous  gases  on  the 
enemy’s  side;  and  that  in  spite  of  these  disadvan- 
tages the  troops,  although  only  partially  successful 


SAFETY  OF  YPRES  ENSURED  335 


in  wTenciiing  ground  from  the  enemy,  prevented  his 
further  advance,  and  thus  ensimed  the  safet}-  of  the 
town  of  Ypres. 

“ Sir  Horace,  whilst  deploring  the  heavy  casual- 
ties, wishes  to  thank  the  Divisional  General,  Briga- 
diers and  Commanding  Officers  and  all  ranks  of  the 
several  arms  employed  for  the  great  service  they 
performed  for  the  2nd  Army  on  those  eventful  two 
days.  In  this  respect  he  would  esj^eciaUy  mention 
the  following  regiments : 1st  Manchester  Regiment, 
Connaught  Rangers,  1st  Highland  Light  Infantry, 
4th  King’s  (Liverpool)  Regiment,  47  th  Sikhs,  57th 
Rifles,  40th  Pathans.” 

From  the  28th  April  till  its  departm-e  on  the  3rd 
May  the  Division  was  under  the  orders  of  Lt- 
General  Sir  Herbert  Plumer,  Commanding  Plumer’s 
Force.  On  the  2nd  Ma^g  Sir  Herbert  Plumer  wrote 
as  under  to  General  Keary  : — 

“ Will  you  please  convey  to  the  Brigadiers,  Com- 
manding Officers,  and  all  Officers,  Non-Commissioned 
Officers  and  men  of  yoim  Division  my  thanks  for 
the  assistance  they  have  rendered  in  the  recent 
severe  fighting,  and  my  apx^reciation  of  the  way  in 
which  they  have  carried  out  the  very  arduous 
duties  entrusted  to  them  while  under  my  command  ? 

“ I deeply  regret  the  very  heavy  casualties  they 
have  suffered.” 

These  letters  of  appreciation,  proceeding  from 
such  quarters,  speak  for  themselves,  and  it  will  be 
agreed  that  General  Sk  James  Willcocks  had  every 
ground  for  sending  the  following  message  to  General 
Keary  : — 

“ Please  convey  to  all  ranks  of  Division  my  own 
and  all  their  other  comrades’  best  congratulations 


336 


SECOND  BATTLE  OF  YPRES 


on  having  taken  part  in  the  battle  near  Ypres. 
We  are  proud  of  you  all.  Well  done.” 

It  is  only  necessaiy  to  add  that  two  days  after 
rejoining  the  Indian  Corps,  the  Lahore  Division 
relieved  the  Meerut  Division  in  the  trenches : such 
was  the  spirit  and  stamina  of  these  men  ; and  such 
were  the  necessities  of  the  times. 

Casualties  up  to  1st  May,  1915:  — 


Eritiyli  officers 

Killed. 

177 

Wounded. 

376 

Missing. 

45 

Ollier  deaths. 
2 

Indian  officers 

74 

194 

35 

4 

Ot  her  ranks,  British 

lUOO 

3945 

12.53 

9 

Other  ranks,  Indian 

1837 

8036 

2189 

406 

Total 

3088 

12551 

2522 

412 

Crand  total,  18,573. 


CHAPTER  XX 


THE  BATTLE  OF  FESTUBERT 

Events  on  tlie  Eastern  Front — French  offensive  in  the  Woevie — Combined 
operations  in  May,  1915,  Ijy  French  and  BritLsh  to  relieve  pressnre  on 
Russia — Distinct  oltjective  of  British  offensive — Ceneral  instructions 
— 51st  Highland  Division  joins  the  Indian  Corjrs — Weather  extremely 
unfavourable — Disjjo.sitions  for  attack — Inadequate  bombardment — 
Two  attacks  of  tlie  Delira  Dun  Brigade  fail  with  heavy  losses — 
Temporary  success  of  8th  Division— Terrible  condition  of  communi- 
cation trenches — Two  attacks  by  1st  Division  fail — Second  attack 
of  4th  Corps  breaks  down — Bareilly  attack  fails  with  serious  losses 
— Enemy’s  defences  strengthened  as  result  of  Neuvo  Chapelle — ■ 
Progress  by  the  French — Further  operation  orders — Carhwal  attack 
fails  with  very  heavy  casualties — Second  attack  also  breaks  down 
• — Sirhind  takes  over  trenches  captured  by  2nd  Division — Horrible 
condition  of  the  trenches — Situation  on  18th  May — Lieutenant  J.  G. 
Sm\i;h,  15th  Sikhs,  gains  the  Victoria  Cross — Attack  by  Sirhind  on 
18th  May — Further  attack  on  21st  Maj^ — 1/lst  Gurkhas  capture  a 
trench,  remainder  held  up — Attack  withdrawn — Captain  Douie,  R.E., 
gains  the  D.S.O. — General  Walker’s  reasons  for  failure  of  Sirhind 
attack — Magnificent  courage  of  the  troops  throughout  the  operations 
— Sir  John  French's  remarks. 

The  month  of  May,  1915,  was  destined  to  leave  its 
mark  deep  cut  in  the  Indian  Corps.  For  the  greater 
part  of  this  period  fighting  was  continuous,  and 
although  our  object  was  not  gained  in  its  entirety, 
there  can  be  few  pages  in  the  history  of  this  war 
which  testify  to  greater  gallantry  than  that  displayed 
by  the  Corps  in  its  prolonged  heroic  struggle  against 
the  impossible. 

During  April  the  eyes  of  the  world  had  been 

z 


388  THE  BATTLE  OF  FESTUBERT 


fixed  on  the  operations  on  the  Eastern  front,  where 
great  events  were  in  preparation,  the  result  of  which, 
it  was  then  hoped,  would  place  Russia  in  a com- 
nianding  position  for  her  great  summer  offensive. 

Within  the  limits  of  this  history  it  is  impossible 
to  go  into  detail.  It  will  be  remembered  that  the 
Russian  plans  aimed  at  the  possession  of  the  crest 
of  the  Carpathians,  the  domination  of  which  was 
necessary,  whether  the  ultimate  objective  was  the 
Oder  by  way  of  Cracow,  or  the  plains  of  Hungary, 
from  Avhich  the  Germans  drew  vast  quantities  of 
grain.  By  the  25th  April  it  seemed  that  the  Russian 
blow  would  be  successful,  and  that  the  Carpathian 
line  would  shortly  be  in  General  Ivanov’s  hands, 
canning  wnth  it  the  power  to  invade  the  rich  corn- 
lands  of  Hungary. 

During  this  and  the  preceding  month,  however, 
there  had  been  ominous  signs  of  a revival  of  German 
activity,  at  first  taking  the  form  of  operations  by 
the  Baltic  Fleet,  in  the  coiuse  of  which  Libau  was 
bombarded,  while  a little  later  the  German  troops 
advanced  tow^ards  the  Dubissa.  These  moves  were 
generally  construed  as  efforts  to  take  the  Russian 
pressure  off  the  Carpathian  region,  where  the  position 
of  the  Central  Powers  had  reached  a critical  stage. 

The  Germans  kept  their  secret  well,  for  the 
true  meaning  of  them  preliminary  operations  appears 
not  to  have  been  understood  until  Macken sen’s 
thunderbolt  fell  at  the  close  of  April,  and  the  con- 
templated Russian  offensive  was  turned,  as  it  were 
in  an  instant,  into  a desperate  defence. 

For  some  time  past  the  French  had  been  engaged 
in  sanguinary,  but  successful,  fighting  in  the  Woevre, 
their  ultimate  aim,  apparently,  being  a crushing 


COMBINED  OFFENSIVE  339 

advance  into  Alsace  and  Lorraine,  with  a view  to 
breaking  down  the  German  left. 

The  course  of  events  on  the  Bnssian  front  Ijroiight 
a rapid  awakening  from  these  ch’eams.  Any  advance 
into  Alsace-Lorraine  must  perforce  be  slow,  directed 
as  it  would  be  against  a portion  of  the  enemy’s  line 
which  was  covered  by  fortresses  such  as  Metz  ; more- 
over, no  main  arteries  of  communication  could  be 
severed  by  such  a move. 

Whatever  was  to  be  done  must  be  done  quickly, 
and  the  section  which  appeared  to  offer  the  most 
speedy  means  of  diverting  the  enem3"’s  attention  from 
the  Eastern  front  seemed  to  be  that  in  which  lie  the 
important  railway  junctions  of  Valenciennes  and 
Douai,  through  which  passed  a network  of  lines 
supplying  three  German  armies.  If  these  com- 
munications could  be  cut,  the  enemy’s  position 
from  Lille  to  Soissons  would  become  untenable, 
and  there  would  be  no  alternative  to  a retreat. 

In  May,  therefore,  the  French  commenced  an 
offensive  towards  Lens,  the  British  aT  the  same  time 
undertaking  active  operations  further  north.  To 
quote  the  words  of  Sir  John  French  in  his  despatch 
dated  the  1 5th  June,  1915  : — ■ 

“ In  pursuance  of  a promise  which  I made  to 
the  French  Commander-in-Chief  to  support  an 
attack  which  his  troops  were  making  on  the  9th  Ma\" 
between  the  right  of  my  line  and  Arras,  I directed 
Sir  Douglas  Haig  to  carr\"  out  on  that  date  an  attack 
on  the  German  trenches  in  the  neighbomTiood  of 
Rouges  Bancs  (north-west  of  FromeUes)  by  the 
4th  Corps,  and  between  Neuve  Chapelle  and  Givench\" 
b^"  the  1st  and  Indian  Corps.” 

Although  the  British  offensive  was  undertaken 


:i<IO  THE  BATTLE  OE  EE.^TUBEBT 

chiofly  in  support  of  the  French,  it  had  also  a distinct 
and  important  objective,  that  of  wresting  from  the 
enemy  the  famous  Aubers  Ridge,  our  principal  aim 
at  Neiive  Chapelle,  the  possession  of  which  would 
menace  Lille,  Toiu'coing,  Roubaix,  and  La  Bassee. 

On  the  13th  April  secret  instructions  for  the 
forthcoming  operations  v/ere  issued.  Therein  Sir 
Douglas  Haig  laid  emphasis  on  the  fact  that  the 
projected  oft’ensive  was  intended  to  be  much  more 
sustained,  and  that  it  Avas  hoped  that  more  far- 
reacliing  results  would  be  obtained  tlian  from  the 
operations  at  Neuve  Cha|»elle. 

The  object  was  to  co-operate  with  a vigorous 
olTensive  on  a large  scale  by  the  French,  with  a view 
to  breaking  the  enemy’s  front  for  a considerable 
width,  and  then  to  follow  it  up  by  such  action  as 
would  cause  a general  retirement  of  a great  part  of 
the  enemy’s  line. 

Our  aim,  then,  was  not  a local  success  and  the 
capture  of  a few  trenches,  nor  even  of  a portion  of 
the  hostile  position  on  a more  or  less  extended  front, 
but  to  emplo}'  the  entire  force  at  our  disposal,  and  to 
light  a decisive  battle.  At  the  same  time  general 
instructions  for  the  attack  were  issued,  the  details 
of  which  were  to  be  worked  out  by  the  Corps  and 
Divisions  concerned  on  the  same  lines  as  those  for 
the  attack  on  Neuve  Chapelle. 

The  general  instructions  were  briefly  as  follows  : — 
The  1st  Army  was  to  operate  with  a view  to 
breaking  through  the  enemy’s  line  and  gaining  the 
La  Bassee — Lille  road  between  La  Bassee  and  Fournes, 
after  which  an  advance  on  Don  would  take  place. 

The  1st  Corps,  with  its  right  on  Givenchy,  would 
attack  from  the  vicinity  of  Richebourg  L’Avoue, 


SECRET  ORDERS 


341 


on  as  broad  a front  as  possible,  and  advance  on  the 
line  Rue  du  Marais — lilies. 

The  Indian  Corps  was  to  cover  the  left  of  the 
1st  Corps  and  to  capture  the  Ferine  du  Biez,  its 
subsequent  advance  being  directed  on  Lign^^-le- 
Grand — La  Cliqueterie  Farm. 

The  4th  Corps  would  operate  so  as  to  break  through 
the  enemy’s  line  near  Rouges  Bancs  with  the  double 
object  of  organizing  a defensive  flank  from  the 
vicinity  of  La  Cordonnerie  Farm  to  Fromelles,  and  of 
tmming  the  Aubers  defences  from  the  north-east. 

After  gaining  these  objects  the  Corps  would 
advance  on  La  Cliqueterie  Farm  in  the  hope  of 
effecting  a junction  with  the  Indian  Corps. 

The  2nd  Cavalry  Division  was  to  remain  in  readi- 
ness near  Estahes  to  act  as  the  situation  might 
develope. 

The  lesson  of  Neuve  ChapeUe  had  been  learned, 
and  the  most  minute  instructions  were  now'  issued 
to  prevent  the  delay  caused  by  the  late  arrival  of 
reserves,  which  on  that  occasion  proved  fatal  to  our 
plans.  The  importance  of  preserving  communica- 
tions between  commanders  and  the  front  line  of 
attack  was  especially  impressed  on  all  concerned, 
detailed  instructions  as  to  the  method  of  attaining 
this  end  being  given. 

On  the  18th  April  secret  orders  were  issued  by 
Sir  James  Willcocks  for  the  operations  of  the  Indian 
Corps.  The  Meerut  Division  w'as  to  attack  on  a 
front  of  600  yards,  reinforced  by  the  artillery  of  the 
Lahore  Division,  and  bv  anv  other  guns  wliich 
might  be  placed  at  the  disposal  of  the  Corps,  the  line 
being  held  by  the  Lahore  Division,  of  which  one 
Brigade  would  be  in  Corps  reserve. 


342  THE  BATTLE  OF  FESTUBERT 


The  various  stages  up  to  the  first  objective  were 
defined  as — 

{a)  Assault  of  the  enemy’s  first  line  trenches. 

(6)  Capture  of  the  village  of  La  Tourelle  on  the 
La  Bassee — Estaires  road. 

(c)  Capture  of  the  Ferine  du  Biez  near  the 

southern  extremitv  of  the  Bois  du  Biez. 

*/ 

The  subsec{uent  objectives  of  the  Indian  Corps 
were  to  be  the  occupation  of  Ligny-le-Petit,  Ligny- 
le-Grand,  the  Bois  du  Biez  and  La  Cliqueterie,  where 
j unction  would  be  effected  with  the  4th  Corps. 

All  was  in  readiness  for  an  attack  at  an  early 
date,  when  orders  were  received  for  the  Lahore 
Division  to  march  to  Ypres,  where,  as  alreadj^  related, 
it  took  part  in  the  second  battle,  rejoining  the  Indian 
Corps  on  the  3rd-4th  May.  The  operations  intended 
for  April  had  therefore  to  be  postponed  pending  the 
retinm  of  the  Lahore  Division.  At  the  commence- 
ment of  May  our  front  line  was  held  by  the  Meerut 
Division. 

The  Germans  were  evidently  suspicious  of  an 
attack  on  the  1st  May,  for  at  4.45  a.m.  on  that  date 
they  opened  a very  heavy  bombardment  with 
howitzers  on  Port  Arthur  and  the  eastern  end  of 
the  Rue  du  Bois,  but  our  front  line  trenches  were 
left  severely  alone.  There  was  no  sign  of  any 
infantry  attack,  and  it  was  evident  that,  fearing 
an  assault  on  our  part,  the  enemy  was  searching 
for  supports  and  reserves,  and  was  seeking  to  destroy 
the  communication  trenches. 

The  chief  sufferers  w^ere  the  2nd  Leicesters, 
2/8th  Gurkhas,  and  39th  Garhwalis,  but  the  total  of 
only  44  casualties  was  light  considering  the  severity 
of  the  bombardment.  By  6.30  a.m.  all  was  calm 


UNFAVOURABLE  WEATHER 


343 


again,  and  the  cuckoo  was  heard  calling  amongst  the 
ruins  of  Neuve  Chapelle,  as  peacefully  as  if  the  voice 
of  a heavy  howitzer  had  never  been  heard  in  the 
land. 

On  the  2nd  May  the  Corps  received  a valuable 
addition  in  the  shape  of  the  1st  (afterwards  known 
as  the  51st)  Highland  Division  (Territorials),  under  the 
command  of  Major-General  Bannatine-Allason,  C.B. 

The  Territorial  battalions  already  with  the  Corps 
had  established  such  a reputation  that  the  advent 
of  a whole  Division  of  similar  units  was  warmly 
welcomed,  but  their  stay  was  unfortunately  brief. 
On  the  6th  May  the  Jullundur  Brigade  relieved  the 
Garhwal  Brigade  in  the  northern  section  of  the  Corps 
front,  which  now  fell  under  the  Lahore  Division. 

The  Highland  Division  was  not  long  in  getting 
to  work,  for  on  the  night  of  the  6th  May  the  1st 
Highland  Brigade  R.F.A.  was  ordered  into  action, 
while  the  remainder  of  the  Division  was  moved  into 
billets  as  far  forward  as  possible,  in  readiness  for  any 
eventualities. 

The  advance  of  the  1st  Army,  originally  fixed  for 
the  8th  May,  was  put  off  for  24  horns,  partly  on 
account  of  the  thick  mist  and  partly  because  of  the 
postponement  of  the  French  operations  further 
south.  The  weather  during  the  few  preceding  days 
had  been  of  a very  uncertain  nature,  alternating 
between  steamy  heat  and  heavy  rain.  In  the  evening 
of  the  4th  May  a violent  thunderstorm  burst,  and 
dming  the  night  more  rain  fell,  as  had  also  been 
the  case  during  the  preceding  night.  The  trenches 
were,  in  consequence,  once  more  converted  into 
quagmires,  and  the  prospect  of  an  attack  over  heavy 
holding  mud  did  not  seem  very  bright. 


344 


THE  BATTLE  OF  FESTUBERT 


The  6tli  was  a day  of  brilliant  sunshine,  but  on 
the  7 th  there  was  again  rain. 

The  dispositions  of  the  Meerut  Division  for  the 
attack  were  as  follows  : — 

The  assault  on  the  first  objective,  the  enemy’s 
trenches  opposite  to  them,  was  to  be  delivered  by  the 
Dehra  Dun  Brigade  on  a three-battalion  front,  the 
Bareilly  Brigade  being  in  support,  and  the  Garhwal 
Brigade,  less  two  battalions  which  Avere  detailed  for 
another  purpose,  was  to  be  in  Divisional  reserve. 
A separate  force  under  the  command  of  Lt-Colonel 
Drake-Brockman,  was  to  be  organized  as  a complete 
unit  with  its  own  Staff,  signalling  arrangements,  and 
ammunition  supply. 

Colonel  Drake-Brockman’s  Command  was  com- 
posed of  the  Garhwal  Rifles,  the  2/8th  Gurkhas  and 
two  bomb  guns.  His  orders  were  to  move  up  into 
the  front  line  trenches  as  soon  as  they  were  vacated 
by  the  Dehra  Dun  Brigade,  and  eventually  to  secure 
the  eastern  edge  of  the  Bois  du  Biez  and  to  capture 
La  Russie. 

The  mornini.''  of  the  9th  Mav  broke  fine  and  clear. 
By  5 a.m.  our  guns  had  completed  their  registration, 
which  had  been  carried  on  for  several  days  pre- 
viously in  order  not  to  rouse  the  suspicions  of  the 
enemy.  At  that  hour  the  bombardment  commenced 
and  lasted  for  40  minutes.  It  was  noticed  in  our 
trenches  that  the  fire  was  not  so  terrific  as  was 
expected,  and  although*  by  5.20  a.m.  the  enemy’s 
wire  appeared  to  have  been  satisfactorily  cut,  the 
German  parapet  was  seen  to  have  suffered  very 
slightly.  Many  of  our  shells  burst  short  or  over, 
some  of  them  falling  in  our  own  trenches  amongst 
the  1st  fSeaforths  and  2/2nd  Gurkhas,  Captain 


DEHRA  DUN  ASSAULT 


345 


Mullaly  and  several  men  of  the  latter  battalion 
being  wounded  in  this  way. 

The  units  of  the  Dehra  Dun  Brigade,  which  were 
to  deliver  the  assault  were,  from  right  to  left,  the 
2/2nd  Gurkhas,  l/4th  Seaforths,  and  1st  Seaforths, 
the  6th  Jats  and  l/9th  Gurkhas  being  in  support. 
One  company  of  the  6th  Jats  was  sent  forward  to 
close  a small  gap  which  would  otherwise  have  existed 
between  the  left  of  the  1st  Division  and  the  right  of 
the  2/2nd  Gm’khas. 

At  5.25  a.m.  the  assaulting  troops  went  over  the 
parapet  and  lined  out,  preparatory  to  an  advance 
as  the  guns  lengthened  their  range.  The  intention 
was  that  the  front  line  should  creep  up  as  close  to 
the  enemy’s  position  as  our  bombardment  would 
allow,  but  in  consequence  of  so  many  shells  falling 
short,  the  men  were  not  able  to  make  any  appreciable 
advance  before  the  time  fixed  for  the  assault. 

At  5.40  a.m.,  at  the  first  signs  of  an  advance  on 
our  part,  the  enemy’s  parapet  was  manned,  many 
Germans  being  seen  to  look  over,  and  an  appalling 
machine-gun  and  rifle  fire  was  opened  on  us,  the 
machine  guns  firing  apparentl}^  from  ground  level. 

On  the  right,  two  platoons  of  the  6th  Jats 
attempted  to  advance  with  the  2nd  Gurkhas,  but 
were  mown  down  at  once.  Captain  Dudley  and 
Subadar  Lekh  Ram  being  killed,  and  all  the  men 
either  killed  or  wounded.  The  second  line  fared  no 
better.  Lieutenant  Hebbert  being  severely  wounded, 
and  most  of  the  men  put  out  of  action.  In  the  2/2nd 
Gurkhas  also,  all  the  British  officers  who  went  over 
the  parapet  were  at  once  shot.  Captain  Mullaly, 
vdio  was  leading  in  spite  of  his  Avound,  and  Lieu- 
tenant Collins  being  killed. 


346  THE  BATTLE  OF  FESTUBERT 


The  men  fell  in  heaps,  but  the  survivors  dashed 
forward  and  gained  the  cover  of  the  ditch  in  front 
of  the  parapet,  where  they  lay  down,  thousands  of 
bullets  sweeping  through  the  air  just  over  their  heads. 

In  the  centre,  the  leading  platoon  of  No.  3 
Double  Company,  led  by  Captain  Park,  moved  out 
in  support  of  No.  4,  but  could  get  no  further  than 
the  ditch.  Captain  Park,  who,  though  very  ill  at 
the  time,  had  insisted  on  taking  part  in  the  attack, 
was  mortally  wounded. 

The  l/4th  Seaforths  in  the  centre  were  held  up 
in  the  same  manner,  numbers  of  men  being  put  out 
of  action  the  moment  they  began  to  advance.  The 
remainder  pushed  forward  in  the  face  of  a sleet  of 
bullets,  and  as  many  as  could  reach  it  took  cover  in 
the  ditch,  where  they  were  forced  to  remain.  Others 
were  lying  in  the  open  or  in  shell  holes,  unable  either 
to  advance  or  retire. 

This  situation  continued  until  orders  were  issued 
for  any  men  who  could  crawl  back  to  do  so  ; but  few 
succeeded,  as  the  slightest  movement  drew  a terrific 
fire.  More  men  managed  to  regain  our  trenches 
during  the  subsequent  attack  of  the  Bareilly  Brigade, 
but  the  majority  were  compelled  to  lie  out  under 
fire  until  darkness  set  in. 

The  battalion  suffered  severely  during  this  action. 

Lieutenants  Railton  and  Tennant,  2nd  Lieu- 
tenant Bastian  and  62  other  ranks  were  killed, 
5 officers  and  127  men  were  wounded,  while  19  men 
were  missing. 

The  experiences  of  the  1st  Seaforths  on  the  left 
were  of  an  equally  harrowing  nature.  The  moment 
they  attempted  to  advance,  officers  and  men  were 
cut  down  as  if  by  an  invisible  reaping  machine,  the 


OUR  ATTACK  FAILS  347 

sound  of  the  fire  from  a distance  resembling  the 
purring  of  a multitude  of  gigantic  cats. 

By  6 a.m.  it  was  evident  that  our  attack  had 
failed,  although  it  was  believed  that  some  men  of 
the  2nd  Gurkhas  had  reached  the  German  trenches, 
only,  however,  to  be  shot  down  or  captured.  In 
the  meantime  the  remainder  were  lying  out  in  the 
open  between  our  trenches  and  the  enemy,  unable 
to  move. 

The  German  guns,  which  till  then  had  not  been 
much  in  evidence,  now  poiued  a heavy  and  con- 
tinuous fire  on  our  trenches  and  the  ground  in  rear, 
as  well  as  on  the  Rue  du  Bois.  This  bombardment 
caused  a large  number  of  casualties  amongst  the 
Bareilly  Brigade  in  its  assembly  position  north  of 
the  Rue  du  Bois,  the  41st  Dogras  suffering  severely, 
while  the  l/4th  Black  Watch  sustained  14  casualties 
from  premature  bm’sts  of  our  own  shells. 

On  the  right  of  the  Indian  Corps  the  attack  of 
the  1st  Division  had  also  broken  down  with  veiy 
heavy  losses  under  machine-gun  fire,  and  prepara- 
tions were  being  made  for  a second  bombardment. 
Heavy  howitzers  were  now  turned  on  to  the  enemy’s 
parapet,  after  which  the  1st  Seaforths  made  a 
second  gallant  attempt  to  advance,  but  this,  as  well 
as  a subsequent  attack,  was  held  up  as  before  by  fire 
through  which  there  was  no  passing. 

At  9 a.m.,  seeing  that  the  task  was  absolutely 
impossible,  that  most  of  the  officers  had  been  shot, 
and  that  the  men  were  lying  out  under  a terrible  fire 
of  all  kinds,  the  Commanding  Officer  of  the  1st  Sea- 
forths ordered  all  who  were  able  to  move  to  get  back 
to  the  trench  whenever  they  could.  A number  suc- 
ceeded in  doing  so,  but  many  had  to  remain  out  for 


34.8 


THE  BAT4XE  OF  FESTUBERT^ 


lioiirs,  some  returning  at  3.40  p.m.,  when  the  Ba- 
reilly Brigade  attacked,  the  remainder  crawling  back 
after  dark.  The  losses  of  the  1st  Seaforths  during 
this  terrible  day  Avere  7 officers  and  131  other  ranks 
killed,  10  officers  and  346  others  wounded. 

The  8th  Division  of  the  4th  Corps  on  the  left  had 
at  first  met  with  considerable  success,  capturing  the 
front  line  of  German  trenches  near  Rouges  Bancs, 
while  detachments  even  penetrated  to  a considerable 
distance  behind  the  enemy’s  front ; but  eventually 
enfilade  fire  rendered  the  captured  positions  un- 
tenable, and  by  the  morning  of  the  10th  the  4th 
Corps  was  compelled  to  retu-e  to  its  original  line. 

It  Avas  now  observed  that  the  enemy  was  being 
strongly  reinforced  in  front  of  the  Dehra  Dun  Brigade, 
and  there  appeared  to  be  danger  of  a counter-attack. 
The  l/9th  Gurkhas  Avere  accordingly  ordered  to 
support  the  1st  and  4th  Seaforths,  but  by  this  time 
the  communication  trenches  were  so  congested  that 
only  200  of  the  battalion  could  get  up  to  the  front. 

These  trenches,  difficult  to  pass  through  even 
Avhen  occupied  only  b^^  the  ordinary  traffic,  were  now 
in  a state  Avhich  beggars  description.  The  German 
guns  had  been  pouring  high  explosive  and  shrapnel 
into  them  all  the  mornmg  ; in  many  places  the 
parapet  had  been  blown  in,  blocking  the  way,  while 
numbers  of  dead  and  wounded  were  lying  at  the 
bottom  of  the  trenches.  The  dhection  boards  had 
in  many  cases  been  destroyed,  and  men  were  wander- 
ing about,  vainly  attempting  to  find  the  nearest  way 
to  their  units  or  to  the  aid  posts.  The  nearer  one 
got  to  the  front,  the  more  of  a shambles  the  trenches 
became  ; Avounded  men  Avere  creeping  and  crawling 
along  amidst  the  mud  and  debris  of  the  parapet. 


BAREILLY  RELIEVES  DEHRA  DUN  .^49 


many  of  them,  unable  to  extricate  themselves, 
dying  alone  and  unattended,  'while,  amidst  this 
infernal  scene,  the  German  shells  were  continually 
bursting. 

At  7.45  a.m.  on  the  9th  May,  a special  bombard- 
ment by  howitzers  of  the  enemy’s  trenches  com- 
menced and  lasted  till  8.45  a.m.,  under  cover  of 
which  the  Dehra  Dun  Brigade  was  to  make  a further 
assault.  In  the  meantime  news  was  received  that 
the  second  attack  of  the  1st  Division  had  failed 
owing  to  the  enemy’s  wire  not  having  been  cut, 
the  2nd  and  3rd  Brigades  having  lost  ver}'^  heavily. 
The  attack  of  the  Dehra  Dun  Brigade  was  therefore 
postponed,  and  arrangements  were  made  to  organize 
another  assault  to  synchronize  with  that  of  the 
ist  Division,  which  could  not  be  got  ready  under 
two  hours. 

Eventually,  operations  were  fixed  for  2 p.m., 
to  be  undertaken  by  the  Bareilly  Brigade  in  relief 
of  Dehra  Dun.  In  consequence,  however,  of  the 
crowded  and  battered  state  of  the  communication 
trenches,  it  was  found  to  be  impossible  for  the 
Bareilly  Brigade  to  assault  at  that  hour.  The 
bombardment  was  therefore  ordered  to  commence 
at  3.20  p.m.,  the  assault,  both  of  the  1st  and  Meerut 
Divisions,  to  take  place  at  4 p.m. 

In  the  interval  the  Germans  had  been  strongly 
reinforcing  their  second  line,  and  at  noon  General 
Southey,  Commanding  the  Bareilty  Brigade,  reported 
that  the  enemy’s  position  had  been  in  no  way 
weakened  by  our  bombardment,  and  that  the 
machine-gun  fire  which  had  checked  Dehra  Dun 
was  not  lessened,  while  three  of  his  battalions  had 
aheady  suffered  severely  from  shell  fire. 


350  THE  BATTLE  OE  FESTUBERT 


111  spite  of  this  report,  Sir  James  Willcocks,  in 
order  to  conform  with  the  general  plan  of  operations, 
directed  the  attack  to  take  place  as  directed,  and  to 
proceed  at  all  costs. 

The  relief  of  Dehra  Dun  113^  Bareilly  had  been 
in  process  since  10.30  a.m.,  but  the  movement  was 
observed  by  the  enemy,  who  kept  up  a constant 
heavy  shell  fire,  which,  coupled  with  the  congested 
state  of  the  trenches,  greatly  delayed  the  completion 
of  the  arrangements  for  the  assault. 

By  this  time  the  2nd  Black  Watch  had  relieved 
the  2/2nd  Gurkhas  on  the  right,  the  58th  Rifles 
succeeded  the  l/4th  Seaforths  in  the  centre,  and  the 
41st  Dogras  replaced  the  1st  Seaforths  on  the  left. 
It  was  a most  pathetic  sight  to  watch  the  poor 
remnant  of  this  magnificent  battalion,  before  the 
action  over  1100  strong  with  26  officers,  returning 
to  billets  a mere  skeleton,  with  a solitary  piper 
marching  at  its  head. 

The  l/4th  Black  Watch  were  in  reserve  in  the 
Crescent  and  Blackader  trenches  with  the  machine 
guns  of  the  125th  Rifles.  The  Sirhind  Brigade  was 
placed  in  reserve  to  the  Meerut  Division,  sending 
two  battalions,  the  l/4th  King’s  (Liverpools)  and 
1/lst  Gurkhas,  into  Corps  reserve  with  the  Dehra 
Dun  Brigade. 

It  had  now  been  ascertained  that  the  machine- 
gun  fire,  from  which  the  1st  Seaforths  had  suffered 
such  terrible  losses,  was  proceeding  from  the  south- 
west corner  of  the  Bois  du  Biez.  General  Anderson 
arranged  for  artillery  fire  to  cope  with  this  during 
the  next  bombardment,  and  directed  General  Southey 
not  to  make  any  attack  east  of  the  Estaires — ^La 
Bassee  road,  the  left  of  the  41st  Dogras  being  directed 


LANOE-CORP.  FINLAY’S  V.C. 


351 

on  the  west  of  that  road  which,  being  on  a low 
embankment,  afforded  some  protection  from  the 
east  and  north-east. 

Some  idea  of  the  severity  of  the  fire  to  which  the 
Bareilly  Brigade  had  been  subjected  during  its 
move  up  to  relieve  Dehra  Dun  may  bo  gathered 
from  the  fact  that  No.  3 Company  of  the  58th  Rifles 
lost  Lieutenant  Mackmillan  mortall3^  wounded,  two 
Indian  officers  killed,  and  45  casualties  amongst 
other  ranks  ; in  consequence,  one  company  of  the 
l/4th  Black  Watch  had  to  be  lent  to  the  58th. 

Meanwhile  a report  had  been  received  that  the 
second  attack  of  the  4th  Corps  had  also  failed  and 
that  a further  effort  was  being  organized. 

The  artillery  bombardment  commenced  at  3.20 
p.m.  on  the  9th,  and  at  3.40  p.m.  the  assaulting 
troops  began  to  cross  our  parapet  and  form  up  ready 
to  advance.  The  right  battalion,  the  2nd  Black 
Watch,  and  the  right  company  of  the  58th  Rifles  in 
the  centre  w^ere  met  with  an  accurate  and  heav}^ 
.machine-gun  and  rifle  fire  the  moment  they  appeared 
over  the  parapet,  with  the  result  that  onlj"  very 
few  succeeded  in  crossing  the  ditch  in  front,  the 
majority  being  killed  or  wounded  before  the^^ 
reached  it.  This  ditch,  which  was  full  of  water 
and  mud,  ran  parallel  to  our  position  at  a distance 
varying  from  10  to  30  yards,  and  had  proved  a very 
serious  obstacle  to  each  successive  attack.  Seeing 
that  any  further  advance  under  such  circumstances 
was  out  of  the  question,  the  Commanding  Officer 
ordered  the  rest  of  the  attack  to  remain  in  our 
trench. 

During  this  advance  Lance-Corporal  David  Finlay, 
2nd  Black  Watch,  performed  a number  of  heroic 


352  THE  BATTLE  OF  FERTUBEBT 


deeds.  Shortly  after  crossing  tlic  parapet  he  was 
knocked  over  by  the  explosion  of  a shell,  but  on 
finding  his  feet  again,  he  led  forward  a bombing 
party  of  twelve  men,  rushing  from  one  shell  hole  to 
another,  until  ten  of  his  men  had  been  put  out  of 
action.  Seeing  that  further  progress  was  im- 
possible, he  ordered  the  two  survivors  to  make  the 
best  of  their  way  back,  but  himself  crawled  over  to 
a wounded  man  and  carried  him  in  safety  back  to 
our  trench,  crossing,  in  doing  so,  for  a distance  of 
about  100  yards,  a zone  which  was  being  swept  by 
a terrific  fire  of  every  kind. 

liance-Corporal  Finlay  was  awarded  the  Victoria 
C-'ross  for  his  most  conspicuous  bravery  and  devotion, 
but  later  met  his  death,  like  so  many  brave  men  of 
the  Indian  Corps,  in  Mesopotamia. 

In  this  brief  period  the  losses  of  the  2nd  Black 
Watch  were : — Killed : 3 officers.  Lieutenants  the 
Hon.  K.  A.  Stewart,  W.  L.  Brownlow’,  and  B. 
Sinclair  ; other  ranks,  69.  Wounded  : 5 officers  and 
157  others.  Missing  : other  ranks,  36.  Total : 270 
out  of  approximately  450  actually  engaged. 

The  majority  of  these  casualties  were  from 
bullet  wounds,  as  the  battalion  had  not  suffered  to 
an}"  great  extent  from  shells. 

The  wounded  lay  out  in  the  open  exposed  to  a 
fiendish  fire  till  darkness  enabled  them  to  be  brought 
in ; then  too  those  who  had  reached  the  cover  of  the 
ditch  managed  to  creep  back  to  our  trench. 

The  left  of  the  58th  Rifles  succeeded  with  great 
gallantry  in  advancing  about  100  yards,  but  here 
all  further  progress  was  barred  by  our  own  guns, 
which  continued  till  4.10  p.m.  to  plaster  the  ground 
about  130  yards  in  front  of  the  enemy’s  trenches 


[Central  Press. 

Lan’ce-Corporai,  David  Fixray,  2XD  Bx  Black  Watch. 


352-] 


I 


. ■ 


STRETCHER-BEARERR’  GOOD  WORK  35:^ 


with  lyddite,  and  thus  pinned  onr  men  down.  The 
hostile  guns  were  also  knocking  our  parapet  about 
badly,  and  succeeded  in  landing  a shell  on  top  of 
one  of  the  machine  guns  of  the  58th,  killing  2 men 
and  woundmg  4 ; but  the  other  gun  continued  in 
action  in  spite  of  the  heavy  fire. 

After  5 p.m.  those  of  the  men  who  were  still 
lying  out  under  any  slight  cover  they  could  find 
began  to  crawl  back,  some  returning  through 
holes  dug  under  the  parapet,  and  others  climbing 
over  the  top.  Many  were  hit  during  the  process. 
The  stretcher-bearers  went  out  after  dark,  and  with 
their  usual  devotion  brought  in  all  the  58th 
wounded,  and  many  of  the  Seaforths  and  Black 
Watch. 

The  casualties  of  the  58th  were  3 British  officers 
wounded,  of  whom  Lieutenant  Mackmillan  died  that 
night;  2 Indian  officers  and  38  other  ranks  killed, 
5 Indian  officers  and  197  others  wounded  ; 7 others 
missing  ; total,  252. 

The  41st  Dogras  had  been  exposed  to  an  extremely 
accurate  high-explosive  fire,  as  well  as  shrapnel, 
while  moving  up  through  the  Pioneer  trench,  one 
company  being  reduced  to  28  men.  The  remains 
of  two  and  a half  companies  crossed  the  parapet 
and  pushed  forward,  but  Captain  Nixon,  91st 
Punjabis,  who  was  leading  No.  2 Company,  was  at 
once  severely  wounded,  and  the  majority  of  the  men 
were  put  out  of  action. 

Lt-Colonel  C.  A.  R.  Hutchinson  and  Lieutenant 
Vaughan,  I.A.R.O.,  led  on  No.  1 Double  Company, 
and  with  the  remains  of  No.  2 succeeded  in  getting 
a little  further  forward,  but  here  Colonel  Hutchinson 
was  severely  wounded  in  both  legs  and  one  hand, 

2 A 


354  THE  BATTLE  OF  FESTUBERT 


while  Lieutenant  Vaughan  had  his  right  arm 
shattered.  At  the  same  time,  Lt-Colonel  Tribe, 
the  Commanding  Officer,  who  had  been  watching 
the  advance  over  the  parapet,  was  wounded  in  the 
chest  by  a shell  splinter. 

The  men  lay  down  under  whatever  cover  they 
could  find  to  wait  for  4 p.m.,  at  which  time  the 
assault  was  to  be  pressed  home,  but  the  whole 
advance  had  now  been  held  up.  Subadar  Jai 
Singh,  37th  Dogras,  who  was  the  sole  unwounded 
officer,  British  or  Indian,  sent  back  word  that  he 
was  ready  to  assault  and  was  only  awaiting  the 
signal. 

The  casualties,  however,  both  amongst  the  attack- 
ing companies  and  those  still  in  our  trench,  had  been 
so  serious  as  to  preclude  all  idea  of  any  further  move 
forward,  and  Subadar  Jai  vSingh,  who  had  meanwhile 
been  wounded  in  two  places,  was  ordered  to'  abandon 
the  attack,  and  await  darkness  before  attempting  to 
get  back  to  the  trench. 

About  this  time  Major  Milne,  82nd  Punjabis, 
was  severely  wounded  while  bringing  his  men  up  to 
the  front  line. 

From  5 p.m.  the  artillery  and  rifle  fire  on  both 
sides  died  down,  and  the  opportunity  was  seized 
to  reorganize  companies  and  repair  the  trenches,  as 
well  as  to  remove  the  dead  and  evacuate  the  wounded. 

The  losses  of  the  41st  Dogras  during  this  attack 
were : 5 British  officers  wounded  ; 1 Indian  officer 
killed  and  6 wounded,  as  well  as  354  other  ranks  ; 
while  35  others  w^ere  killed  or  believed  to  have  been 
so.  Total : 401  out  of  645  engaged. 

This  was  the  first  assault  in  which  the  battalion 
had  taken  part  during  its  seven  months  of  trench 


THE  41st  DOGRAS 


355 


warfare,  and  under  the  magnificent  leadership  of 
its  British  officers  it  held  its  own  and  made  a last- 
ing reputation  for  itself,  no  small  matter  on  a 
day  when  all  units  engaged  showed  such  heroism. 
For  his  services  on  this  occasion  Lt-Colonel  W. 
Tribe,  wdio  has  since  been  killed  in  action,  was 
granted  the  C.M.G.,  Lt-Colonel  Hutchinson  the 
D.S.O.,  and  Captain  Brind,  37th  Dogras,  machine- 
gun  officer,  the  Military  Cross ; while  Subadar  Jai 
Singh  received  the  Russian  Cross  of  the  Order  of 
St  George,  3rd  Class,  a number  of  decorations  being 
also  awarded  to  the  Indian  ranks. 

By  this  time  the  Commanding  Officers  of  all  the 
battalions  engaged  had  come  to  the  conclusion  that 
to  attempt  any  further  advance  wmuld  only  miean 
useless  loss  of  life.  They  w^ere  led  to  this  opinion 
by  the  fact  that  our  artillery  preparation  had  been 
ineffectual,  and  that  neither  the  enemy’s  parapet, 
personnel,  nor  machine  guns  had  been  seriousR 
weakened.  It  was  stated  bv  the  officers  commanding 
the  2nd  Black  Watch  and  58th  Rifles  that  they  saw 
the  German  marksmen  deliberately  standing  up 
behind  their  breastworks  during  our  bombardment 
and  shooting  our  men  wdiile  assembling,  and  it  was 
only  by  the  use  of  the  regimental  machine  guns  and 
the  Brigade  trench  guns  that  the  enemy  could  be 
kept  down  during  the  advance. 

General  Southey  was  of  opinion  that,  although 
at  Neuve  Chapelle  a forty  minutes’  bombardment  was  • 
entirely  successful,  the  enemy’s  parapet  and  lines 
generally  had  been  much  strengthened  since  that 
battle,  necessitating  a far  longer  and  more  sustained 
battering  of  the  hostile  trenches  before  an  infantrj' 
attack  could  be  made  with  any  prospect  of  success. 


356 


Tvm  BAI^rLE  OF  FES3T1BFRT 


At  G.IA  p.in.  orders  were  received  for  the  relief 
of  the  Bareilly  Brigade  by  Garhwal  as  soon  as 
possible.  The  relief  was  completed  by  1 a.m.  on 
the  10th,  Bareilly  remaining  in  close  support  of  the 
Garhwal  Brigade.  As  a tribute  to  the  gallantry  of 
the  Bareilly  Brigade  in  the  face  of  tremendous  odds, 
the  words  of  General  Southey’s  report  are  worthy 
of  quotation. 

“ I wish  to  bring  to  the  notice  of  the  Lieutenant- 
General  Commanding  the  gallant  behaviom’  of  all 
the  regiments  engaged.  They  saw  in  front  of  them 
the  hundreds  of  men  of  the  Delu'a  Dun  Brigade 
lying  out  on  our  front  wounded  and  dead.  They 
knew  the  c]iemy  were  unshaken,  seeing  them  with 
their  heads  over  the  parapet  firing,  and  thoroughl}'' 
realizing  that  wliat  liad  happened  to  the  Dehra  Dun 
Brigade  would  in  all  probability  happen  to  them  : 
but  not  a man  faltered,  and  as  they  boldly  advanced 
over  the  parapet,  only  to  be  shot  down,  British  and 
Indian  ranks  alike  did  their  level  best  to  reach  the 
enemy’s  line.  Even  when  the  attack  had  failed, 
the  moral  of  the  Brigade  remained  unshaken,  and, 
had  another  attack  been  ordered,  they  would  have 
undertaken  it  in  the  same  spirit.” 

During  the  day  news  was  received  of  good  pro- 
gress by  the  French  in  their  operations  between 
Lens  and  Arras.  By  nightfall  our  Allies  had  cap- 
tured three  lines  of  trench  on  a five-mile  front, 
taking  3000  prisoners  and  a number  of  guns.  Their 
infantry  assault  had  been  most  thoroughly  prepared, 
and  the  bombardment  was  the  heaviest  yet  witnessed 
on  the  Western  front,  lasting  for  hours,  and  abso- 
lutely obliterating  the  German  front  line  trenches, 
while  cutting  off  all  reinforcements. 


CASUALTIES  OE  THE  CORPS 


357 


As  regards  the  British  front,  the  position  on  the 
morning  of  the  10th  May  was  unaltered,  such  ground 
as  had  been  gained  having  been  evacuated  by  us  as 
untenable  in  face  of  the  terrific  enfilade  fixe  main- 
tained by  the  enemy.  Early  in  the  morning  of  the 
10th  orders  were  issued  for  the  day’s  operations, 
but  were  cancelled  later.  During  the  night  of  the 
lOth-llth  the  Indian  Corps  took  over  a small  portion 
of  the  line  on  the  left  of  the  1st  Corps. 

The  approximate  casualties  of  the  Corps  up  to 
midnight  lOth-llth  May  were  as  follows  : — 

Meerut  Division: — British  officers,  69;  Indian 
officers,  24 ; others,  British,  1055 ; others,  Indian, 
823. 

To  these  must  be  added  122  of  all  ranks  of  the 
Lahore  Division,  making  a total  of  2093. 

Nothing  of  special  note  occurred  during  the  1 1th 
and  12th. 

On  the  morning  of  the  13th  Maj^  instructions  w ere 
received  from  the  1st  Army  for  operations  on  the  14th. 

The  general  plan  of  the  main  attack  was  as 
follows  : — • 

(1)  To  continue  pressing  forward  towards  Vio- 
laines  and  Beau  Puits,  establishing  a defensive  flank 
along  the  La  Bassee  road  on  the  left  and  maintaining 
the  right  at  Givenchy. 

(2)  The  line  to  be  established  in  the  first  instance, 
if  possible,  on  the  general  line  of  the  road  Festubert — 
La  Quinque  Rue — La  Tourelle  cross-roads — Port 
Arthur.  This  position  to  be  consolidated,  the  troops 
reformed,  and  communication  established. 

(3)  During  this  process  a bombardment  on  the 
whole  front  would  continue,  with  ffi'e  specially 
directed  on  the  next  objectives,  the  Rue  d’Ouvert — 


358 


THE  BATTLE  OF  FESTUBERT 


Rue  du  Marais,  after  which  a fresh  advance  on  this 
line  would  take  place. 

The  assault  was  to  be  carried  out  simultaneously 
by  the  Indian  Corps  and  the  1st  Division,  com- 
mencing at  11.30  p.m.  on  the  14th  May.  The 
attacking  troops  of  the  Indian  Corps  were  to  be  the 
Meerut  Division,  less  the  Dehra  Dun  Brigade,  whose 
place  was  taken  by  Snliind.  The  Lahore  Division 
was  to  continue  to  hold  its  front  and  to  assist  with 
rifle  and  gun  fire. 

Dmiiig  the  13th  and  14th  considerable  rain  fell. 
Observation  w^as  in  consequence  extremely  difficult, 
and  many  of  oiu'  shells  failed  to  burst  on  account 
of  the  softness  of  the  ground.  The  operations  ordered 
for  11.30  p.m.  on  the  14th  were  consequently  post- 
poned for  24  hours,  as  it  was  found  that  our  bom- 
bardment had  not  been  very  successful.  It  was 
accordingly  continued  throughout  the  15th,  di’awdng 
a strong  reply  from  the  enemy’s  guns  on  the  trenches 
held  by  the  Meerut  Division. 

At  11.30  p.m.  the  guns  lifted  and  our  assault  was 
launched.  The  2nd  Leicesters  were  on  the  right 
with  6 machine  guns,  the  Garhwal  Rifles  with  a 
similar  number  of  machine  guns  on  the  left,  with 
the  3rd  Londons  and  two  companies  of  the  2/3rd 
Gurkhas  in  support,  the  remainder  of  the  2/3rd  being 
in  Brigade  reserve. 

A number  of  portable  bridges  had  been  provided 
to  enable  the  troops  to  cross  the  ditch  which  had 
proved  such  a serious  obstacle  to  previous  assaults. 
The  placing  of  these  bridges  in  position  was  no 
easy  task.  The  enemy  continually  sent  up  flares 
wdiich  illuminated  every  inch  of  the  ground,  and 
followed  them  w ith  bursts  of  rifle  and  machine-gun 


SECOND  ATTACK  BY  MEERUT  359 


fire.  Moreover,  the  ditch  had  in  many  places 
been  much  widened  by  shell  holes  on  the  banks, 
and  trunlvs  of  trees  felled  b}"  shell  fire  blocked  many 
places  where  the  bridges  might  otherwise  have  been 
placed.  The  w ork  was,  however,  quickly  and  skil- 

fullv  carried  out  with  few  casualties. 

(/ 

As  soon  as  the  bridges  were  in  position  the 
assaulting  troops  hied  out,  a portion  of  each  battalion 
lying  on  the  enemy’s  side  of  the  ditch,  another  portion 
on  our  side,  while  the  remainder  were  in  or  behind 
the  front-line  trench  ready  to  support.  These 
movements  were  also  completed  with  small  losses. 

The  moment  om’  men  advanced,  the  enemy 
opened  a murderous  hre  from  rifles  and  machine 
guns,  at  the  same  time  sending  up  flares  and  throwing 
in  front  of  their  parapet  a species  of  hre  grenade, 
which  binst  into  flame  on  striking  the  ground,  the 
result  being  that  the  night  was  literally  as  light  as 
day.  At  the  same  time  they  covered  the  ground  round 
the  ditch  with  trench-mortar  bombs  and  shrapnel, 
a searchlight  exposing  every  movement  of  om’  men. 

As  each  succeeding  line  came  under  hre,  the 
bridges  got  blocked,  and  the  obstruction  caused  by 
shell  holes  and  fallen  trees  so  impeded  the  advance 
that  no  effective  support  could  be  given.  Repeated 
attempts  were  made  to  press  forward,  but  they  all 
ended  in  the  same  waj".  No  living  thing  could 
penetrate  the  storm  of  bullets  which  screened  the 
German  trenches. 

There  seems  reason  to  believe  that  the  enemy  was 
aware,  not  oifly  of  the  hour  of  the  intended  attack, 
but  also  of  the  exact  front  on  which  it  was  to  be 
delivered.  Diu’ing  the  evening  preceding  the  assault 
the  Germans  were  heard  to  call  out,  “ Come  on,  we 


360 


THE  BATTLE  OE  EEiSTUBERT 


are  ready  for  you.”  Moreover,  when  they  opened 
iire  as  our  troops  began  to  advance,  only  the  actual 
front  occupied  by  the  assaulting  companies  was 
swept,  and  not  the  ground  to  the  east  of  it,  as  might 
have  been  expected. 

At  about  midnight  it  became  evident  that  there 
was  not  the  slightest  prospect  of  success,  however 
gallantly  the  assault  might  be  pressed.  The  Leicesters 
and  Garhwalis  were  therefore  withdrawn,  their  place 
being  taken  by  the  2/3rd  Gurkhas  and  3rd  Londons. 

The  casualties  of  the  2nd  Leicesters  in  this 
attack  were  : — Killed  : 2nd  Lieutenants  Gandy, 
Tayler,  Brown,  and  22  other  ranks.  Wounded : 6 
officers,  of  whom  one.  Lieutenant  Crosse,  died,  and 
192  others.  Missing  : 5. 

Iffie  39th  Garhwalis  lost  : — Killed  : 4 men. 

Wounded : Lieutenant  G.  S.  Rogers,  2 Garhwali 
officers  and  136  juen.  Missing  : 11. 

At  2.45  a.m.  on  the  16th  May  we  commenced 
afresh  the  intense  bombardment,  and  at  3.15  a.m. 
the  3rd  Londons  and  2/3rd  Gurkhas  attacked. 
Owing  to  the  early  dawn,  it  was  not  possible  to  get 
the  men  out  before  om*  bombardment  ceased. 
Even  before  the  assault  started,  the  enemy  was 
keeping  up  a very  heavy  fire  on  our  parapet,  and 
numbers  of  men  were  shot  as  they  crossed  the  top. 

In  the  2/3rd  Gurkhas,  Lieutenant  Robertson 
and  2nd  Lieutenant  Nott-Bower  led  two  platoons 
each.  Lieutenant  Robertson  got  the  remnant  of 
his  men  over  the  ditch  by  the  few  remaining  bridges, 
and  was  advancing  by  short  rushes  from  shell  hole 
to  shell  hole  when  he  was  stunned  by  a shrapnel 
bullet  in  the  head.  The  attack  was  shortly  after- 
wards held  up  all  along  the  line,  the  Londons  on  the 


ATTACK  ABANDONED 

lelt  and  the  Worcesters  of  the  British  Division  on 
the  right  being  unable  to  advance. 

The  situation  was  reported,  and  orders  were 
issued  for  the  line  to  be  held,  but  no  further  attempt 
at  advance  to  be  made.  In  retiring  from  the  position 
reached  during  the  assault,  2nd  Lieutenant  Nott- 
Bower  was  killed  in  a gallant  attempt  to  bring  in 
a badly  wounded  private  of  the  Leicesters.  Captain 
Grigg  was  also  killed  during  the  morning  by  shell  lire. 

At  6 a.m.  the  front  line  was  vacated  to  allow 
of  our  artillery  bombarding  the  German  parax:>et, 
the  troops  again  occupying  the  trenches  at  2 p.m. 

The  losses  of  the  2/3rd  Gurkhas  were  2 British 
officers  and  9 other  ranks  killed,  64-  others  wounded, 
1 missing. 

The  3rd  Londons  lost  10  men  killed,  3 officers 
and  86  men  wounded,  5 missing. 

In  view  of  the  extraordinary  strength  of  the 
defence,  it  was  decided  that  no  further  attempts 
should  be  made  to  break  through  on  tliis  front,  but 
that  troops  should  be  pushed  through  the  opening 
made  on  the  right  of  the  Indian  Corps.  The  Suhind 
Brigade  was  now  put  under  the  orders  of  the  General 
Officer  Commanding  2nd  Division,  as  also  were  the 
107th  Pioneers  and  No.  4 Company  Sappers  and 
Miners. 

On  the  night  of  the  16th,  Bareilly  relieved  the 
Garhwal  Brigade  in  the  front  line.  Throughout 
the  darkness  our  guns  continued  to  hammer  at  the 
Germans  in  order  to  give  them  no  rest,  and  to  keep 
them  from  sending  out  working  parties.  Our  scouts 
made  repeated  attempts  to  get  close  to  the  hostile 
line,  but  were  always  prevented  by  the  constant  rifle 
and  machine-gun  fire,  and  the  never-ceasing  flares. 


362 


THE  BATTLE  OF  FESTUBERT 


On  the  17th  May  tlie  Sirhind  Brigade  took  over 
from  the  5th  Brigade  a portion  of  the  trenches 
captured  by  the  2nd  Division.  This  relief  was 
carried  out  with  the  greatest  difficulty,  owing  to 
the  communication  trenches  being  blocked  with 
wounded  and  also  knee-deep  in  mud  and  water, 
through  which  the  men,  heavily  laden  with  300 
rounds  of  ammunition,  bombs,  sandbags,  etc.,  had 
to  plod  their  way.  The  result  v^as  that  the  relief 
was  only  partially  completed  when  dawn  broke  on 
the  18th,  and  there  was  considerable  confusion. 

The  whole  area  of  the  support  and  fire  trenches 
bore  witness  to  the  terrible  fighting  which  had  taken 
place  there  on  the  previous  day.  The  parapets 
were  in  many  places  levelled  and  the  trenches  filled 
up  ; the  ground  was  everywhere  pitted  with  huge 
shell  holes,  and  might  almost  be  described  as  carpeted 
with  dead  bodies. 

At  4 a.m.  the  enemy  made  a half-hearted  attack 
on  the  left  of  the  15th  Sikhs,  but  was  easily  beaten 
off  by  rifle  fire. 

The  1st  Highland  Light  Infantry,  who  relieved 
their  own  second  battalion,  suffered  a number  of 
casualties  during  the  relief  and  on  the  previous  day, 
owing  to  the  incessant  shell  fire  maintained  by  the 
enemy,  2nd  Lieutenant  Davidson  being  killed,  Lieu- 
tenants Henderson,  Cowan,  McNeill,  and  Murray 
wounded,  while  there  were  70  casualties  amongst 
the  rank-and-file. 

The  battalion  found  the  trenches  in  a shocking 
condition,  many  corpses  and  wounded  being  still 
there ; 104  dead  of  different  units  were  interred  by 
the  company  in  the  front  line  during  the  night  of 
the  18th  Ma}^  The  Germans  had  buried  many 


TRENCH  HORRORS 


363 


bodies  in  the  parapet  from  which  our  shelling  had 
unearthed  them ; mangled  remains  were  trodden 
into  the  deep  mud  at  the  bottom  of  the  trenches, 
and  it  was  not  till  some  days  later  that  they  could 
be  extricated.  The  conditions  in  the  meantime 
cannot  with  decency  be  described. 

At  noon  on  the  18th  May  the  position  of  the 
Meerut  Division  and  Sirhind  Brigade  was  as  follows: — 

The  Bareilly  Brigade  and  2/8th  Gmkhas  were 
holding  the  line  from  the  La  Bassee  road  to  a point 
near  the  cinder  track  on  the  Rue  du  Bois,  where  a 
communication  trench  had  been  cut  to  the  newly 
captured  position. 

Of  the  Sirhind  Brigade,  the  15th  Sikhs  and  one 
company  Highland  Light  Infantry  were  in  the 
captured  trenches,  with  the  4th  King’s  (Liverpools) 
in  our  old  trench  to  the  west.  The  1/lst  and  l/4tii 
Gurkhas  were  in  support. 

Of  the  Garhwal  Brigade,  one  battalion  was  at 
Lansdowne  Post,  the  remainder  in  billets  and  in 
second-line  trenches  at  Croix  Barbee.  The  Dehra 
Dun  Brigade  was  in  reserve. 

On  the  night  of  the  17th  May  a company  of  the 
loth  Sikhs  under  Captain  K.  Hy de-Cates  relieved 
the  2nd  Highland  Light  Infantr}^  in  a section  of  the 
captured  trench  known  as  the  “ Glorj'^  Hole  ” on 
account  of  its  dangerous  position  and  the  number 
of  casualties  which  had  occurred  there,  the  enemy 
being  only  divided  from  us  by  barricades. 

In  the  early  morning  of  the  18th  Captain  Hy  de- 
Cates  observed  that  attempts  were  being  made  to 
reinforce  the  enemy,  swarms  of  Germans  being  seen 
rushing  towards  the  fmTher  extremit}^  of  the  trench. 
Rapid  fire  was  opened  on  them,  but  in  the  dim  light 


THE  HATTLE  OE  EESTUBERT 


:]64 

the  eltect  could  not  be  ascertained.  When  day 
broke,  it  was  found  that  the  enemy’s  trench  was 
packed  with  men,  and  an  attack  seemed  certain. 

vSliortly  aftei'Avards  the  Germans  commenced 
heavy  bombing,  to  which  the  15th  replied  vigorously, 
and  succeeded  in  holding  their  own  till  noon  when 
all  our  dry  bombs  had  been  expended,  the  remainder 
having  been  rendered  useless  by  the  incessant  rain 
and  the  mud.  The  situation  at  once  became  very 
critical,  as  Avithout  bombs  the  position  could  hardly 
be  held. 

At  3.30  p.m.  Lieutenant  J.  G.  8myth,  15th  Sikhs, 
Avas  ordered  to  attempt  to  take  bombs  and  a bombing 
party  from  the  support  trench  (our  former  front 
line)  to  Captain  Hyde-Cates.  The  distance  to  be 
covered  was  about  250  yards  over  oi)en  ground. 
'Idle  only  means  of  communication  Avas  a shallow 
trench  half  full  of  mud  and  water,  and  in  many 
places  exposed  to  the  lire  of  the  enemy’s  snipers  and 
machine  guns.  'Jdie  trench  Avas  crammed  with  the 
dead  bodies  of  British  and  Indian  soldiers,  as  well  as 
Germans.  Lieutenant  Smyth  took  with  him  ten 
bombers  from  No.  4 Company,  selected  from  the 
crowd  of  volunteers  who  at  once  responded  to 
the  call. 

The  names  of  these  heroes  deserve  to  be  put  on 
record.  They  were  Lance-Naik  Mangal  Singh, 
Sepoys  Lai  Singh,  Sucha  Singh,  Sapuram  Singh, 
Sarain  Singh,  Sundur  Singh,  Ganda  Singh,  Harnam 
Singh  (the  last  four  being  all  of  the  19th  Punjabis), 
Fateh  Singh  and  Ujagar  Singh,  both  of  the  45th 
Sikhs. 

The  party  took  with  them  two  boxes  of  bombs 
containing  48  each.  For  the  lirst  50  yards  the  trench 


\^Gillinan.  Oxford. 

LIEUX  J.  G.  Smyth,  V.C.,  15TH  Sikhs. 


364-] 


T.TETIT.  SMYTH  GAINS  THE  V.C. 


3G5 


gave  cover  from  the  enemy’s  view,  bnt  on  emerging 
from  this  portion  the  men  came  under  enfilade 
shrapnel  fire  from  the  German  field  guns,  which  was 
so  severe  as  to  force  them  to  crawl  off  to  the  right 
and  take  refuge  in  a small  stream  where  the  water 
reached  chest-high.  Here  the  first  man  was  hit. 

Our  men  waited  until  the  shelling  slackened, 
and  then,  returning  to  the  trench,  continued  their 
laborious  progress.  But  now  man  after  man  was 
killed  or  wounded,  for  it  was  necessary  to  crawl  over 
the  top  of  the  dead  bodies,  and  the  sides  of  the  trench 
had  been  in  many  places  broken  down,  exposing  the 
party  to  the  full  view  of  the  enemy,  who,  well  aware 
of  the  object  of  the  enterprise,  pumped  torrents  of 
bullets  into  the  trench.  By  the  time  Lieutenant 
Smyth  had  arrived  within  30  yards  of  Captain  Hyde- 
Cates’  position,  he  had  only  three  men  left,  and  the 
slightest  attempt  to  rise  from  a lying-down  position 
brought  a shower  of  bullets. 

Up  to  this  point  the  boxes  had  been  pushed  or 
pulled  along  by  means  of  pagris  attached  to  them, 
but  with  the  few  men  left,  this  was  no  longer  possible. 
Lieutenant  Smyth  now  gave  orders  for  the  boxes 
to  be  opened,  and  for  each  man  to  carry  two  bombs 
in  his  hands.  While  opening  a box,  another  man  was 
shot  through  the  head  and  killed.  There  was 
nothing  for  it  but  to  leave  the  bombs  in  the  communi- 
cation trench  to  be  brought  in  after  dark. 

The  officer,  Lance-Naik  Mangal  Singh,  and 
one  sepoy  managed  by  crawling  through  the  mud 
and  water  to  reach  Captain  Hyde-Cates’  trench, 
being  the  sole  survivors  of  the  little  band  of  eleven. 

So  ended  one  of  the  most  gallant  episodes  of  the 
war.  For  his  most  conspicuous  bravery  Lieutenant 


36G  THE  BATTLE  OF  FESTUBERT 


Smyth  was  awarded  the  Victoria  Cross  and  later 
the  4th  Class  of  the  Order  of  St.  George.  Lance- 
Naik  Mangal  Singh  received  the  2nd  Class,  Indian 
Order  of  Merit,  while  the  Indian  Distinguished 
Service  Medal  was  conferred  on  all  the  sepoys  of 
the  party. 

An  attack  by  the  Sirhind  Brigade  on  the  Ferine 
du  Bois  was  timed  for  4.30  p.m.  on  the  18th  May,  in 
conjunction  with  an  assault  by  the  Guards  Brigade 
on  the  Com*  d’Avoue.  As  a first  move,  Sirhind 
was  intended  to  bomb  along  the  German  trenches 
in  their  front  and  thus  establish  a pied  a terre  from 
which  to  launch  an  attack  on  the  Ferine  du  Bois. 
After  the  capture  of  the  farm,  the  Brigade  was  to 
conform  to  the  progress  of  the  Guards’  attack. 

Our  artillery  bombardment  commenced  at  2 
p.m.,  from  which  time  till  4 p.m.  it  was  slow  and 
deliberate  in  order  to  ensure  proper  observation  of 
the  effect.  At  4 p.m.  the  guns  quickened  up  till 
4.20  p.m.,  ending  with  intense  fire  till  4.30  p.m., 
when  the  attack  was  to  be  launched. 

At  4.20  p.m.,  however,  the  bombing  parties  of 
the  Sirhind  Brigade  were  still  held  up  in  their  own 
trenches  by  the  heavy  artillery  fire  of  the  enemy, 
who  deluged  our  line  and  the  ground  in  rear 
with  shells  of  all  caUbres,  from  the  “ pipsqueak  ” 
of  the  field  guns  to  the  “ coal  boxes  ” or  “ black 
Marias  ” of  the  heavy  howitzers.  The  Highland 
Light  Infantry  attempted  to  dribble  men  up  the 
communication  trench  to  the  firing  line  with  their 
bombing  parties,  but  they  were  at  once  spotted, 
and  their  losses  prevented  them  from  making  any 
further  progress.  The  attack  of  the  4th  King’s  could 
not  develope  in  face  of  the  terrible  fire,  and  by 


SIRHIND  ATTACK  ABANDONED  3G7 


6.30  p.m.  the  attempt  died  away,  although  tlie 
artillery  on  both  sides  continued  an  intermittent 
bombardment. 

Alread}^  the  company  of  the  15th  Sikhs  in  the 
front  line  under  Captain  Hy de-Cates  had  lost  approxi- 
mately half  its  strength,  but  still  held  on  bravely 
until  relieved  by  No.  2 Company,  under  Captain 
Beattie-Crozier  at  8.30  p.m.  With  them  the  15th 
Sikhs’  machine  guns  under  Captain  Daniell  moved 
up  to  the  front  line,  and  a section  of  the  l/4th 
Gurkhas  relieved  a party  of  the  2nd  Highland  Light 
Infantry.  The  Germans  were  thoroughly  on  the  alert, 
and  at  once  opened  a heavy  fire,  wounding  two 
Indian  officers  and  a number  of  men. 

In  the  meantime  the  Guards  Brigade  had  made 
some  progress  by  short  rushes,  and  a night  attack 
by  Sir  hind  was  now  ordered  to  take  place  as  soon  as 
the  reliefs  of  the  2nd  Division  on  the  right  were 
completed.  At  10  p.m.  Brigadier  General  Walker, 
V.C.,  Commanding  the  Sirhind  Brigade,  reported  that 
the  strength  of  the  German  position  round  the 
Ferme  du  Bois  was  such  as  to  render  the  chance  of 
success  of  an  attack  very  doubtful ; that  any 
advance  would  entail  useless  loss  unless  oim  present 
front  could  be  properlj^  consolidated  and  a base  for 
the  attack  assured. 

Sir  James  Willcocks,  while  again  impressing  on 
General  Walker  the  desirability  of  making  the 
attack,  left  it  to  his  judgment  on  the  spot  to  decide 
whether  to  assault  or  not.  At  11.10  p.m.  it  was 
definitely  decided  by  General  Walker  that  the 
attack  should  not  take  place,  and  with  this  decision 
Sir  James  Willcocks,  for  the  reasons  given,  agreed. 

The  weather  during  this  period  continued  to  be 


3r,S  TITE  BATTLE  OE  FESTUBEBT 


atrocious,  rain  rrcc^nently  falling,  and  tlio  trenches 
being  half  full  of  innd  and  water. 

The  19th  May  began  badly  for  the  15th  Sikhs, 
for  news  was  received  early  in  the  morning  that 
Captain  Beattie-Crozier  and  Lieutenant  Thomson 
had  been  mortally  wounded,  and  further,  that  the 
Germans' on  the  left  were  bombing  slowly  along  the 
trench,  while  of  No.  2 Company  in  the  front  line  and 
the  machine-gun  section,  only  48  men  remained 
imhurt,  and  that  assistance  was  badly  requwed. 
'This  was  at  once  reported,  and  a company  of  the  1st 
Highland  Light  Infantry  was  sent  up  to  support  the 
15th  with  a bombing  party.  At  the  same  time 
artillery,  rifle,  machine-gun  and  bomb-gun  fire  was 
directed  on  the  Germans,  with  the  result  that  bv 
f».25  a.in.  the  situation  had  been  adjusted.  It  was 
found  later  that  the  15th  had  not  yielded  an  inch  of 
ground. 

Artillery  fire  continued  on  both  sides  throughout 
the  day,  the  Germans  shelling  om?  supports  with 
shrapnel,  while  their  heavy  artillery  attended  to  the 
reserve  trenches  and  any  lilcely  positions  for  head 
quarters  in  rear  of  the  line.  A number  of  heavy 
shells  burst  in  an  open  field  at  a distance  of  only 
about  100  yards  from  the  15th  Sikhs’  head  quarters, 
without,  however,  doing  the  slightest  damage. 

Dining  this  period  Captain  Waterfield,  of  the 
15th,  w'as  mortally  wounded  in  the  head  by  a shell 
while  talking  to  Captain  Finnis  and  Lieutenant 
Smyth  of  his  plans  for  his  next  leave.  He  died  during 
the  night  without  regaining  consciousness,  the  Regi- 
mental Diary  testifying  that  the  loss  of  this  gallant 
officer  was  most  keenly  felt  b}^  the  officers  and  men 
of  the  regiment. 


THE  EERME  DU  BOIS 


360 


Diuing  the  lOtli  May  the  4t}i  King’s  were  relieved 
by  the  l/4th  Gurkhas,  and  the  15th  Sikhs  by  the  1st 
Highland  Light  Infantry.  The  4th  King’s  had 
suffered  severely  during  the  shelling  of  the  18th 
May,  losing  7 men  killed,  Captain  Jenkins  and  82 
men  wounded. 

On  the  20th  May  Sir  James  WiUcocks  impressed 
on  General  Anderson  that  the  Ferine  du  Bois  must 
be  captured  before  the  morning  of  the  22nd.  The 
general  idea  of  the  operations  was  that  the  Canadian 
and  Highland  Divisions  should  work  southwards, 
and  also  capture  a group  of  houses  south  of  the  Cour 
d’Avoue,  while  the  Indian  Corps  was  to  carry  on 
continuous  active  hostilities  with  a view  to  harassing 
the  enemy  and  wearing  down  his  resistance. 

The  Sirhind  Brigade,  as  a first  objective,  was 
ordered  to  secure  the  Ferine  du  Bois,  preparation 
for  the  attack  on  this  position  being  made  by  occupy- 
ing certain  important  tactical  points  in  advance  of 
the  general  attack  which  was  to  be  carried  out  by  the 
Brigade. 

During  the  night  of  the  20th-21st  a thorough 
reconnaissance  of  the  position  was  made  and  a picquet 
established  slightly  to  the  west  of  the  Ferine  du  Bois. 
Our  artillery  bombardment  was  timed  to  commence 
at  1 p.m.  on  the  21st  May,  and  to  continue  till  5 a.m. 
on  the  22nd,  being  directed  on  the  enemy’s  trenches 
and  the  area  round  the  Ferine  du  Bois,  at  the  same 
time  forming  barrages  to  prevent  the  arrival  of 
reinforcements. 

The  Sirhind  Brigade  was  disposed  for  attack  as 
follows  : — 

Right  attack  ; the  1 /4th  Giu'khas. 

Centre  attack  : the  1/lst  Gurkhas. 

2 B 


370 


THE  BATTLE  OF  FESTUBERT 


Left  attack  : the  1st  Highland  Light  Infantry. 

The  4th  King’s  were  in  support,  with  the  15th 
Sikhs  in  Brigade  reserve. 

The  troops  got  into  position  correctly,  and  the 
attacks  were  launched  punctual^  at  1 a.m.  The 
ground  over  which  the  assault  had  to  advance  was 
broken  up  by  old  trenches,  ditches  and  hedges,  and 
a satisfactory  da^dight  reconnaissance  not  having 
been  possible,  dhection  was  to  some  extent  lost  and 
units  in  places  became  mixed  up.  At  fu’st  there  was 
very  little  firing  on  the  part  of  the  enemy. 

On  the  right  the  l/4th  Gurkhas  advanced,  with 
very  slight  casualties,  until  a broad  ditch  about  six 
feet  deep  containing  three  feet  of  water  was  en- 
countered at  a distance  of  some  30  yards  from  the 
German  position.  Here  the  enemy  commenced  a 
heavy  ftre  from  two  directions,  as  at  this  point  then’ 
trenches  formed  a emwe  round  the  Ferine  du  Bois, 
and  at  the  same  time  showers  of  bombs  were  hurled  at 
the  Giu’khas.  It  was  found  that  the  ground  between 
the  ditch  and  the  enemy’s  trench  was  protected  by 
strong  who,  wdiich  had  not  been  sufficiently  destroyed 
by  the  bombardment. 

In  spite  of  repeated  attempts  to  advance,  the 
right  attack  was  held  up.  The  only  unwounded 
British  officer  with  the  Gurkhas  returned  at  1.50  a.m. 
to  fetch  up  reinforcements.  Unfortunately,  two 
machine  guns  of  the  4th  King’s,  which  were  attached 
to  the  right  attack,  were  lost.  The  officer  in  charge, 
2nd  Lieutenant  F.  A.  Ballinger,  had  been  ordered 
to  foUow  up  in  rear  of  the  last  company  of  the 
Gurkhas,  which  was  carrying  entrenching  tools  and 
ammunition,  but  in  his  anxiety  to  get  forward  he 
did  not  wait,  but  pushed  right  up  to  the  wire  in 


SUCCESS  OF  THE  1/1st  GURKHAS  371 

front  of  the  enemy’s  trench,  where  he  and  most  of 
the  gun  teams  were  killed.  An  exhaustive  search 
was  made  for  the  guns  on  the  following  night,  but 
without  success,  for  doubtless  they  had  been  carried 
off  by  the  enemy. 

The  losses  of  the  l/4th  Gurkhas  were:  Major 
Moule  and  Captain  Robinson  missing,  believed 
killed;  2 riflemen  killed;  1 Gurkha  officer  and  76 
men  wounded  ; IS  missing. 

The  1/lst  Gurkhas  in  the  centre  met  with  more 
success,  Avhich  unfortunately  was  not  known  until 
it  was  too  late  to  take  advantage  of  it.  Under 
cover  of  very  effective  artillery  support  and  the  pro- 
tection afforded  b}’  a slight  ridge  in  front  of  the  farm, 
the  attack  got  on  Avith  slight  loss,  and  reached  the 
ditch,  when  the  enenyv  opened  a heavy  fire  from  the 
front  and  right  rear. 

The  leading  company  halted  until  reinforced  by 
the  second  line,  when  both  charged  and  got  into  the 
German  trench,  Avhich  was  captiwed  after  a hand-to- 
hand  fight,  in  which  15  Germans  were  killed,  the 
remainder  retreating  to  a second  trench  about 
20  yards  in  rear. 

The  enemy  at  once  commenced  bombing  counter- 
attacks from  both  flanks  and  from  their  second 
trench.  Captain  Mellis  and  Lieutenant  Sutcliffe 
had  been  wounded  earlier  in  the  assault,  and  during 
the  counter-attacks  Lieutenant  Hejdand  and  2nd 
Lieutenants  Herbert  and  Fry  were  killed,  2nd 
Lieutenant  Gamble,  who  was  missing,  being  also 
believed  to  have  been  killed. 

Subadar  Jit  Sing  Gurung  now  assumed  command, 
and  sent  back  Avord  that  the  first  line  had  been  cap- 
tured, but  could  not  be  held  unless  reinforcements 


372 


rHE  JJATTLE  OE  EE.Sl'UBERT 


were  sent  up.  By  this  time  the  1/4-th  Gurkhas 
and  ist  Highland  Light  Infantry  had  been  with- 
di-awn,  the  success  of  the  1/lst  Ginkhas  not  being 
known,  and  Lt-Colonei  Anderson,  Commanding  the 
1/lst,  was  compelled  to  order  Subadar  Jit  Sing  to 
rethe  to  our  old  line,  which  he  did,  capturing  on 
the  way  a man  of  a German  patrol. 

The  casualties  of  the  1/lst  Gurkhas,  who  behaved 
throughout  with  great  gallantry,  were:  4 British 
officers  killed;  2 wounded;  115  other  ranks  killed 
and  wounded. 

Lt-Colonel  Anderson  particularly  brought  to 
notice  the  very  adecpiate  support  which  his  battalion 
received  from  the  artillery  during  the  advance. 

The  1st  Highland  Light  Infantry  on  the  left  met 
with  much  the  same  fate  as  the  l/4th  Giu-khas  on 
the  right.  They  reached  the  ditch  with  comparatively 
slight  losses,  but  were  here  stopped  by  machine-gun 
lire,  which  caused  very  heavy  casualties  amongst 
both  officers  and  men.  At  1.50  a.m.  it  was  reported 
that  the  attack  had  been  completely  held  up.  The 
three  Commanding  Officers  of  the  attacking  units, 
after  consultation,  decided  to  order  a withdrawal 
at  once  in  order  to  complete  the  movement  before 
daylight.  It  was  not  tiU  after  the  orders  for  the 
withckawal  had  been  issued  and  the  troops  were 
actually  retiring  that  news  was  received  of  the 
1/lst  Gurkhas  having  taken  a trench.  It  was  then 
too  late  to  countermand  the  withdrawal,  and  the 
Gurkhas  had  also  to  rethe  as  both  flanks  were  now 
exposed. 

The  losses  of  the  Highland  Light  Infantry 
were  : — Khled  : 2nd  Lieutenant  xLgnew.  Wounded 
and  missing  : 2nd  Lieutenant  B.  Ivy.  W ounded : 


CAPTAIN  DOUIE’S  D.R.O.  373 

Lieutenant  Murray-Ly on,  2nd  Lieutenants  Mummery, 
Westwater,  and  Wright.  The  casualties  in  the  ranks 
amounted  to  120. 

At  the  close  of  this  attack,  after  day  had  fully 
dawned,  a wounded  man  was  observed  to  be  lying 
within  80  yards  of  the  German  parapet,  from  which 
the  enemy  were  firing  at  him.  Captain  F.  M.  Douie, 
R.E.,  M.C.,  regardless  of  the  apparent  hopelessness 
of  the  attempt,  at  once  went  over  the  parapet, 
accompanied  by  his  orderly.  Sapper  Jiwa  Khan, 
No.  3 Company  1st  Sappers  and  Miners,  and  although 
the  German  trench  was  being  shelled  by  our  guns 
they  succeeded  in  bringing  in  the  man.  Captain 
Douie  also  helped  to  bring  in  another  wounded 
soldier  on  a stretcher,  in  spite  of  the  fire  kept  n]i  by 
the  enemy.  For  his  consjoicnous  gallantry  Captain 
Douie  received  the  D.S.O.,  while  Sapper  Jiwa  Khan 
was  awarded  the  2nd  Class,  Indian  Order  of  Merit. 

In  General  Walker’s  opinion  the  failure  of  the 
attack  was  due  to  the  following  reasons  : - 

(i)  The  excessive  casualties  among  the  British 
officers  with  the  assaulting  eompanies.  Wlien  the 
attack  was  finally  held  up  there  remained  with  the 
Highland  Light  Infantry  only  one  subaltern,  with 
the  1/lst  Gurkhas  no  British  officer,  witli  the  l/4th 
Gurkhas  one  subaltern. 

(ii)  The  deep  ditch  in  front  of  the  objectiv^e. 
Though  not  an  insuperable  obstacle,  it  was  a very 
serious  one  at  night,  and  effectually  stopped  the 
impetus  of  the  attack. 

(iii)  The  hour  fixed  for  the  attack,  I a.m.,  was 
too  late.  The  organization  of  a second  assault  before 
daylight  was  impossible,  nor  could  the  troops  have 
dug  themselves  in  on  ground  captured. 


374 


THE  BATTLE  OF  FESTUBERT 


(iv)  The  want  of  aeroplane  photographs  showing 
the  German  trenches. 

General  Walker  further  considered  that  the 
Commanding  Officers  were  right  in  witlidrawing 
their  men  in  view  of  the  approach  of  daylight. 

The  total  losses  of  the  9 companies  actually 
engaged  were  very  heavy,  amounting  to  16  British, 
2 Indian  officers,  137  other  ranks  British,  and  173 
Indian.  This  attack  marked  the  conclusion  of  our 
active  operations  during  May,  1915. 

The  Sirhind  Brigade  was  relieved  by  Dehra  Dun 
on  the  23rd  May,  and  went  into  billets  for  a well- 
earned  rest.  The  Brigade  had  practically  had  not 
a moment’s  quiet  since  it  left  to  take  part  in  the 
second  battle  of  Ypres  on  the  23rd  April.  All 
ranks  were  feeling  the  strain  of  the  last  month  ; 
regiments  were  mere  skeleton  battalions,  requiring 
thorough  reorganization  before  they  could  become 
fit  for  any  further  offensive  operations. 

The  Indian  Corps  failed  to  attain  its  objective 
through  no  fault  of  its  own,  but  owing  entirely  to 
the  misfortune  of  being  faced  by  an  extraordinarily 
strong  position,  an  experience  shared  by  the  British 
4th  Corps  operating  on  its  left.  Had  success  been 
possible  under  the  circumstances,  it  would  have 
been  attained  by  the  troops,  British  and  Indian, 
who  had  so  recently  covered  themselves  with  glory 
at  the  battles  of  Neuve  Chapelle  and  Ypres. 

Sir  John  French,  in  his  despatch  dated  the  15th 
June,  1915,  sums  up  the  results  of  the  battle  in  the 
following  words  : — 

“ In  the  battle  of  Festubert  above  described  the 
enemy  was  driven  from  a position  which  was  strongly 
entrenched  and  fortified,  and  ground  was  won  on 


CASUALTIES 


375 


a front  of  four  miles  to  an  average  depth  of  GOO  yards. 
The  enemy  is  known  to  have  suffered  very  heavy 
losses,  and  in  the  coimse  of  the  battle  785  prisoners 
and  10  machine  guns  were  captured.  A number  of 
machine  guns  were  also  destroyed  by  our  fire.” 


British  officers 
Indian  officers 
Other  ranks,  British 
Other  ranks,  Indian 

Total  . 


Killed. 

Wounded. 

213 

501 

88 

260 

1376 

6,073 

1943 

10,650 

3620 

17,484 

Missing. 

Other  deaths. 

58 

2 

35 

4 

1724 

? 

2504 

447 

4321 

453 

CHAPTER  XXI 


CHANGES  IN  COMPOSITION  OF  THE  CORPS 

Ttie  8th  and  49th  West  Riding  DivLsioixs  attaclied  to  the  Corps — The 
Highland  Division  transferred  to  the  4th  Corps — Strength  of  the 
Indian  (Jorps  on  the  hth  June — Arrival  of  the  (i9th  and  89tb  Pun- 
jabis, relieving  the  9th  Bhopals  and  125th  Rifles — Success  of  sanitary 
measiu-es  under  Colonel  Pike,  D.S.O.,  R.A.M.C. — Mmor  operation  by 
the  1st  Highland  Liglit  Infantry — Temporary  success  of  the  4th  Corps 
— 49th  Division  transferred  to  the  2nd  Army — The  Highland  Division 
rejoins,  the  8th  Division  going  to  the  flrd  Corps — Adventures  of  Naik 
Ayid)  Khan,  129th  Balucliis — Indian  units  taken  out  of  the  line  for 
reorgaiuzation—Opportunity  thus  given  for  Musalmans  to  observe 
tlie  Ramazan— The  19tl»  Division  joins  the  Corps — Gallant  work  by 
Captain  Roe,  1 /4th  Gurkhas — Bravery  of  Subadar-Major  Senbir  Gurung 
— Fall  of  Warsaw — The  tlth  flats,  the  ]5fh  Sikhs,  and  41st  Dogras 
leave  for  another  tlieatre  of  war. 

On  the  31st  May,  1915,  the  51st  Highland  Division 
was  transferred  to  the  4th  Corps,  while  the  8th 
Division  of  that  C^orps  and  the  newly  arrived  49th 
West  Riding  Division  of  tlie  New  Army  were  attached 
to  the  Indian  Corps.  The  month  of  June  then 
opened  with  the  line  held  by  jiortions  of  the  Meerut, 
Lahore,  8th,  and  49th  Divisions. 

This  month  was  destined  to  see  many  changes  in 
the  composition  of  the  Corps,  and  the  departure  for 
fresh  liattlefields  of  several  regiments  which  had 
carved  their  names  deep  on  the  roll  of  honour  of  the 
Indian  Army. 


THE  C0RP8  STRENGTHENED 


The  strength  of  the  Corps  on  the  5th  June  was 
as  follows  : — 


Formation. 

British  Indian 
olficers.  officers. 

Sabres 

or 

lances. 

British 

rifles. 

Indian 

rifles. 

Artillery 

per- 

sonnel, 

British. 

Artillery 

per- 

sonnel, 

Indian. 

Guns. 

Machine 

guns. 

Lahore  'i 
Division/ 

346 

129 

440 

5077 

4916 

2438 

283 

64 

42 

Meerut  \ 
Division/ 

390  j 

158 

482 

4734 

6216 

2460 

280 

68 

48 

8th  i 

Division/ 

539  — 

132 

14,345 

— 

2818 

— 

58 

60 

49th  1 
Division  / 

483  i — 

127 

12,007 

1 

— 

2793 

— 

52 

48 

Corps  ■! 
Troops  / 

12 

1 

— 

257, 

98 

— 

— 

5 

9 

Totals 

1770 

2S8 

1181 

36,420 

11,230 

10,509 

563 

247 

207 

The  total  strength  of  the  Corps,  including  artillery, 
therefore  ainounted  to  59,903,  a striking  contrast  to 
the  15,700,  all  told,  with  which  it  held  the  front  taken 
over  from  the  2nd  Corps  in  1914. 

On  the  4th  June  the  89th  Punjabis,  and  on  the 
5th  June  the  G9th  Punjabis,  arrived  to  take  the  place 
respectively  of  the  9th  Bhopals  and  the  125th  Rifles, 
the  two  latter  battalions  leaving  for  Egypt.  The 
89th  were  posted  to  the  Eerozepore  Brigade,  and  the 
69th  to  BareUly. 

The  weather,  as  a whole,  throughout  the  month, 
was  an  agreeable  contrast  to  that  experienced  during 
May,  being  generally  fine  and  warm.  It  was  feared 
that  the  advent  of  warm  v^eather  might  cause  an 
epidemic  of  typhus,  to  which  the  inhabitants  of  the 
surrounding  country  are,  even  in  normal  years. 


378  CHANGES  IN  COMPOSITION  OF  CORPS 


particularly  liable.  This  fear,  however,  happily 
proved  to  be  unfounded,  but  the  immunity  of  the 
troops  must  be  ascribed  to  the  perfection  of  the 
sanitary  measures  carried  out  by  the  medical  officers 
under  Colonel  W.  W.  Pike,  H.S.O.,  the  Deputy 
Dnector  of  Medical  Services,  to  which  more  detailed 
reference  will  be  made  hereafter. 

On  the  15th  June  the  4th  Corps  on  the  left  of  the 
Indian  Corps  resumed  the  offensive  in  the  direction 
of  the  Rue  d’Ouvert,  on  the  northern  end  of  which 
the  51st  Highland  Division  was  directed,  while  the 
7th  Division  attacked  the  southern  end  and  Chapelle 
St  Roch,  the  Canadian  Division  forming  a defensive 
hank.  In  conjunction  with  this  the  Lahore  Division 
carried  out  a minor  operation  for  which  the  Sirhind 
Brigade  and  other  troops  were  detailed. 

The  general  idea  of  this  operation  was  to  capture 
an  advanced  post  and  then  to  bomb  down  the 
enemy’s  trenches  until  a point  was  reached  in  a 
salient  in  his  line  from  which  a trench  could  be  dug 
to  connect  with  our  front.  The  artillery  preparation 
was  to  commence  at  5.25  p.m.  on  the  15th,  the  assault- 
being delivered  at  6 p.m.  The  assaulting  party 
consisted  of  two  detachments  of  the  1st  Highland 
Light  Infantry,  in  each  of  which  were  4 bayonet  men, 
4 bombers,  1 non-commissioned  officer,  and  an  extra 
man  for  communication  and  signalling  purposes. 

Punctually  at  6 p.m.  the  first  bombing  party 
crept  out  by  an  exit  which  had  been  prepared  in  our 
listening  post,  although  it  was  evident  that  the 
German  barricade  and  defences  generally  were 
practically  undamaged  by  our  bombardment.  The 
party  got  nearly  half-way  across  the  open  ground 
without  any  casualty,  and  immediately  threw  six 


OUR  BOMB  ATTACK  FAILS 


379 


bombs,  of  wliicli  two  or  three  landed  right  on  the 
German  barricade,  which  the  enemy  was  still  manning, 
apparently  little  disturbed  by  our  artillery,  for  the 
moment  our  attack  started  they  kept  up  an  accurate 
fire  on  our  periscopes.  As  soon  as  our  bombs  were 
thrown,  the  Germans  replied  in  kind,  as  well  as  with 
machine-gun  and  rifle  file,  killing  two  and  wounding 
six  of  the  ten  men  of  the  party,  which  was  con- 
sequently forced  to  retire  as  best  it  could,  although 
one  man  succeeded  in  getting  to  the  foot  of  the 
barricade  before  he  was  killed. 

Captain  Alston,  who  was  in  command  of  the 
operation,  was  then  directed  to  withdraw  his  men 
to  a distance  of  150  yards  from  the  barricade,  when 
the  9 "2  howitzer  would  fire  9 rounds,  after  which 
another  assault  was  to  be  launched,  if  Captain  Alston 
considered  that  there  was  a chance  of  success.  This 
second  bombardment,  however,  did  little  more 
damage  than  the  fii’st.  The  Germans  opened  a steady 
fire  and  were  seen  observing  with  a periscope  from 
their  barricade.  It  was  evident  that  they  were 
fully  prepared  to  receive  another  assault.  Under 
these  circumstances  Captain  Alston  reported  that 
there  appeared  to  be  no  chance  of  success,  with  which 
opinion  Lt-Colonel  Hill,  Commanding  the  1st  High- 
land Light  Infantry,  and  Brigadier-General  Walker 
agreed,  and  the  attempt  was  abandoned. 

The  4th  Corps  twice  captured  the  entire  front  line 
of  the  enemy,  but  on  each  occasion  was  driven  back 
by  concentrated  gun  and  bomb  fire. 

On  the  26th  June  the  51st  Highland  Division 
'again  joined  the  Corps,  the  8th  Division  going  to 
the  3rd  Corps.  The  Indian  Corps  now  consisted  of 
the  Lahore,  Meerut,  and  51st  Highland  Divisions, 


380  CHANGES  IN  COMPOSITION  OF  CORPS 


the  49th  (West  Riding)  Division  joining  the  2nd 
xArmy. 

On  the  night  of  the  21st  June  Naik  Ayub  Khan, 
129th  Baluchis,  was  ordered  to  go  out  with  a patrol 
between  the  lines.  When  the  patrol  returned, 
x\yub  Khan  was  missing.  He  had  last  been  seen 
close  to  the  German  wm’e,  and  it  was  feared  that  he 
had  either  been  killed  or  taken  prisoner.  Failing 
either  of  these  contingencies,  the  only  remaining 
supposition  was  that  he  had  deserted  to  the  enemy. 
This,  however,  the  officers  of  the  regiment  stoutly 
refused  to  admit  as  possible,  for  the  naik  in  question 
was  well  known  as  a good  and  courageous  soldier. 

On  the  22nd  June  Sir  James  Willcocks  visited 
the  trenches  south-east  of  Neuve  Chapelle  which 
were  held  by  the  1 29th  Baluchis.  Lieutenant  Lewis, 
M.C.,  to  whose  company  Ayub  Khan  belonged,  at 
once  begged  Sir  James  to  allow  him  to  go  out  at 
night  and  search  for  the  naik,  who,  he  was  sure,  was 
lying  either  dead  or  wounded  near  the  German  line. 
General  Willcocks,  while  fully  appreciating  the 
spirit  which  inspired  the  request,  felt  unable  to  give 
permission  for  an  officer  to  undertake  such  risk  with 
so  little  prospect  of  success. 

The  22nd  passed  and  the  night  of  the  23rd 
arrived,  and  at  11.30  p.m.  in  stalked  Naik  Ayub 
Khan,  none  the  worse  for  his  experiences,  bringing 
with  him  his  rifle  and  ammunition. 

The  story  of  his  adventures  is  unique  in  the 
history  of  the  war,  and  illustrates  the  peculiar 
histrionic  capabilities  which  are  possessed  by  so  many 
Orientals,  coupled  with  a sangfroid  under  circum- 
stances of  concentrated  danger  which  could  hardly 
be  surpassed.  It  appeared  that,  on  nearing  the 


AY  UB  KHAN’8  ADVENTURES 


381 


German  wire,  Naik  Ayiib  Khan  made  up  his  mind  to 
visit  the  enemy  in  his  trench  and  to  pick  up  whatever 
useful  information  he  could  obtain.  Ke  concealed 
his  ritle  and  ammunition,  and  then,  taking  his  life 
in  both  hands,  boldl}^  walked  up  to  the  wue,  where 
he  stood  calling  out  “ Musalnian.”  German  heads 
appeared  over  the  parapet,  and  for  a moment  his 
life  hung  in  the  balance.  An  officer  came  up,  how- 
ever, and  called  to  him  to  come  in,  which  he  did. 
At  first  the  occupants  of  the  trench,  fearing  a ruse, 
were  all  for  shooting  Ayub  Khan  offhand,  but  milder 
counsels  prevailed,  and  he  was  conducted  along  the 
trench  to  the  Bois  du  Biez,  through  which  he  was 
taken  behind  the  lines,  and  eventually  found  himself 
at  the  head  quarters,  presumably  of  the  13th  Division 
Vllth  Corps,  at  Marquillies.  All  this  time  Ayub 
Khan  was  keeping  his  eyes  and  ears  very  wide 
open,  and  making  mental  notes  of  everything  of 
value. 

At  Marquillies  he  was  taken  before  the  General, 
and  was  closely  interrogated  by  the  Staff  through 
the  medium  of  an  officer  who  spoke  extremely  bad 
Hindustani,  learned  doubtless  during  a tour  in  India 
with  a view  to  the  future  discomfiture  of  his  hosts. 
This  interrogation  was  a very  trying  ordeal,  for  on 
the  nature  of  his  answers  the  naik’s  life  hung.  He 
was  anxious,  of  course,  not  to  give  any  information 
of  value  to  the  enemy,  but  had  at  the  same  time  to 
avoid  arousing  suspicion.  He  was  asked,  amongst 
other  matters,  many  questions  about  our  troops  in 
this  portion  of  the  line  and  particularly  about  the 
new  regiments,  the  69th  and  89th  Punjabis,  which 
had  recently  arrived.  To  unimportant  questions 
he  sometimes  replied  correctly ; in  other  cases. 


382  CHANGES  IN  COMPOSITION  0¥  CORPS 

while  giving  a general  appearance  of  truth  to  his 
answers,  he  nullified  their  value  by  supphfing  in- 
correct details. 

The  Germans  talked  about  the  supposed  dis- 
affection in  India,  and  impressed  on  Ayub  Khan  that 
it  was  very  wrong  of  Musalmans  to  fight  against 
the  friends  of  Turkey,  dexterously  ignoring  the  fact 
that  the  policy  of  these  friends  of  Islam  has  been  to 
undermine  the  Mahomedan  religion  in  their  colonies 
by  every  possible  means,  as  has  been  proved  by 
secret  documents  captured  in  Africa.  Ayub  Khan 
was  asked  whether  there  was  not  considerable  dis- 
affection in  his  regiment,  and  whether  a large  number 
of  men  were  willing  to  desert  as  he  had  done.  To 
these  questions  he  retinned  a vigorous  affirmative, 
and  offered  to  bring  back  with  him  at  least  20  men. 
This  offer  was  greedily  accepted,  and  he  was  pro- 
mised 400  marks  (Rs.  300)  if  he  brought'  over  20 
men,  i.e.  at  the  rate  of  20  marks  per  man. 

He  remained  at  the  head  quarters  throughout  the 
22nd,  and  was  well  fed  and  looked  after,  evidently 
with  a view  to  impressing  on  him  the  kindly  nature 
of  the  Germans.  Many  men  came  to  see  him,  and 
he  kept  a careful  note  in  his  mind  of  the  numbers 
on  shoulder-straps,  the  various  kinds  of  uniform, 
etc.,  details  which  were  subsequently  fully  con- 
firmed by  the  statements  of  prisoners  and  deserters, 
and  were  of  considerable  value  to  our  Intelligence 
Department. 

On  the  night  of  the  23rd  he  was  taken  by  a Staff 
officer  and  the  interpreter  in  a motor  car  to  the  Bois 
du  Biez,  and  thence  through  the  trenches  to  the  spot 
at  which  he  had  entered  them.  There  he  bade  an 
affectionate  farewell,  and  with  one  eye  over  his 


VALUABLE  INFORMATION 


O QO 

ooo 

shoulder  in  case  the  Germans  might  at  the  last 
moment  change  their  minds  and  put  a bullet  through 
the  departing  guest,  he  returned  to  our  trench,  re- 
trieving on  the  way  his  rifle  and  ammunition. 

Naik  Ayub  Khan  was  able  to  describe  the  paths 
through  the  Bois  du  Biez,  and  to  give  a good  idea 
of  the  strength  and  the  units  by  which  the  enemy’s 
line  was  held.  Further,  he  was  able  to  report  that 
there  was  no  installation  of  asphj^xiating  gas  in  the 
trenches  through  which  he  had  passed,  a detail  of 
no  small  importance  to  us  at  the  time. 

Flis  story  was  an  extraordinary  one,  but  as  before 
stated,  any  lingering  doubt  of  its  veracity  was 
removed  by  corroborative  evidence  obtained  from 
other  sources.  In  order  to  make  the  enemy  believe 
that  we  had  discovered  Ayub  Khan’s  intention  of 
deserting  with  20  of  his  comrades,  a notice  was 
put  up  outside  our  trench  to  the  effect  that  the 
traitor  had  been  shot  by  us.  Whether  the  Germans 
credited  the  statement  or  not  was  never  discovered. 

For  his  great  daring  and  skill  Naik  Ayub  Khan 
was  promoted  to  Jemadar  and  was  awarded  the 
2nd  Class  of  the  Indian  Order  of  Merit. 

There  were  no  further  events  of  special  interest 
during  June.  The  weather  underwent  a change  for 
the  worse  towards  the  end  of  the  month,  heaw 
rain  falling  at  intervals,  which  rendered  life  in  the 
trenches  once  more  uncomfortable. 

July  found  the  Corps  holding  a line  from  La 
Quinque  Rue  to  a point  slightly  south-east  of  Pi- 
cantin,  opposite  Laventie.  Each  of  the  three 
Divisions  had  2 Brigades  in  the  front  line  and  a 
Brigade  in  reserve,  the  front  of  each  Division  being 
roughly  3400  yards. 


384  CIJANGES  IN  COMPOSITION  OP  CORPS 


The  casualties  up  to  the  1st  July,  1915,  were  as 
under  : — 


British  officers 

Killed. 

22.3 

Womidod. 

531 

Slissiiig. 

58 

Other  deaths, 
2 

Indian  officers 

88 

274 

35 

4 

Other  ranks,  British  . 

1465 

6,517 

1747 

9 

Other  ranks,  Indian 

2002 

11,285 

2508 

483 

Total  . 

3778 

18,607 

4348 

489 

On  the  9th  JuW  instructions  were  received  from 
the  1st  Aimiy  for  the  1st  Corps  to  take  over,  as  a 
temporary  measure,  a portion  of  the  Indian  Corps 
front.  This  change  was  made  with  a view  to  the 
reorganization  of  the  Indian  units  of  the  Corps,  a 
measure  of  which  they  stood  sadly  in  need.  The 
heavy  fighting  in  which  thej^  had  been  engaged  at 
Neuve  Chapelle  in  March,  at  Ypres  in  April  and 
during  May,  had  necessitated  the  repletion  of  the 
ranks,  for  which  purpose  drafts  of  other  units  or 
recruits  from  India  had  arrived.  The  immediate 
result  was  that  a large  proportion  of  the  men  were 
quite  unknown  to  then-  officers,  and  required,  more- 
over, thorough  training  in  the  methods  of  warfare 
obtaining  in  France. 

Sh'  James  Willcocks,  with  his  usual  solicitude  for 
the  weKare,  moral  as  well  as  physical,  of  his  troops, 
suggested  to  Sir  John  French  that  the  period  of 
reorganization  might  be  so  arranged  as  to  coincide 
as  far  as  possible  with  the  Musalman  Fast  of  Rama- 
zan. The  suggestion  was  approved,  and  the  Musal- 
mans  of  the  Corps  were  thus  enabled  to  observe  their 
religious  rites  during  at  least  a portion  of  the  pre- 
scribed period,  a boon  for  which  they  were  sincerely 
grateful. 

All  the  British  units  were  now  grouped  together 


19Tfi  DIVISION  JOINS 


385 


ill  the  Lahore  Division,  which  was  to  continue  to 
hold  the  line,  the  Indian  battalions  being  assembled 
in  the  Meerut  Division,  which  was  withdrawn  into 
reserve. 

Units  were  exchanged  by  Brigades  as  follows  : 
Dehra  Dun  with  JuUundru’,  Garhwal  with  Srrhind, 
and  Bareilly  with  Ferozepore. 

This  reorganization  was  completed  on  the  night 
of  the  15th-16th  Julv,  the  Lahore  Division  thus 
being  composed  entirely  of  British  and  the  Meerut 
of  Indian  units. 

The  original  intention  was  that  the  Indian  regi- 
ments should  remain  in  reserve  for  a full  month,  but 
war  necessities  made  shipwreck  of  this  expectation. 
On  the  19th  July  instructions  were  received  for  the 
Lahore  Division  to  relieve  the  Highland  Division 
south  of  the  Fauquissart — Aubers  road  by  6 a.m. 
on  the  23rd. 

In  order  to  carry  this  out  it  was  necessary  to 
strengthen  each  Brigade  of  Lahore  by  about  1000 
rifles  of  Indian  units  taken  from  the  afhliafced  Brigade 
in  the  Meerut  Division.  This  relief  took  place  on 
the  night  of  the  23rd,  and  the  rest  of  a large  pro- 
portion of  the  Indian  troops  came  to  an  abrupt 
conclusion. 

On  the  24th  July  the  19th  Division,  under  the 
command  of  Major-General  Fasken,  joined  the  Corps, 
its  strength  being  as  follows  : 552  officers,  133  sabres, 
13,379  British  rifles,  2783  artillery  personnel,  64 
guns,  39  machine  guns. 

At  the  commencement  of  July  a very  skilful 
and  daring  reconnaissance  was  carried  out  by  Captain 
C.  D.  Roe,  l/4th  Gurkhas.  The  battalion  was  then 
in  trenches  near  Neuve  Chapelle.  In  front  of  the 

2 c 


386  CHANGES  IN  COMPOSITION  OF  CORPS 


position,  “ No  Man’s  Land  ” was  covered  with  thick 
long  grass,  which  lent  itself  to  daylight  reconnaissance 
by  either  side,  and  tussles  between  patrols  were 
frequent. 

On  the  night  of  the  1st  July,  Captain  Roe, 
accompanied  by  Lieutenant  Manson  and  acting 
Subadar-Major  Senbir  Gurung,  made  a reconnais- 
sance, and  the  following  morning  the  same  party, 
strengthened  by  two  riflemen,  went  out  at  3 a.m., 
with  a view  to  ascertaining  which  of  the  network 
of  trenches  in  front  was  actually  held  by  the  enemy, 
whether  some  ruined  houses  were  occupied,  the 
exact  position  of  two  snipers’  posts  (the  occupants 
of  which  had  been  giving  considerable  trouble), 
the  amount  of  wire  in  front  of  the  German  trenches, 
and  finally,  what  use  the  enemy  was  making  of  a 
re-entrant  in  their  line. 

The  party  crawled  out  through  the  long  grass, 
and  meeting  with  no  opposition,  managed  to  get 
right  up  to  the  front  line  of  trench,  which  they 
investigated,  and  ascertained  exactly  which  position 
was  occupied  by  day.  Creeping  along.  Captain 
Roe  explored  the  buildings  in  the  hope  of  finding 
a sniper  asleep,  but  failed  in  his  quest,  although  he 
made  a systematic  search  through  each  house.  He 
was  able,  however,  to  locate  the  haunt  of  the  snipers 
by  finding  about  100  empty  cartridge  cases  which  had 
evidently  been  recently  fired,  while  five  yards  to  the 
left  was  a dummy  machine  gun. 

StiU  crawling  along,  the  party  found  that  the 
whole  of  that  part  of  the  line  was  wired  in  the  most 
formidable  manner,  and  that  unless  cut  by  artillery 
fire,  passage  through  it  would  be  impossible.  Further, 
a most  important  point  was  now  cleared  up.  It 


CAPTAIN  ROE’S  ADVENTURES 


387 


was  evident  from  the  arrangement  of  the  wire  that 
the  enemy  intended  to  use  the  re-entrant  as  a trap 
for  us  in  any  future  attack,  hoping  that  we  would 
make  for  it  and  thus  be  taken  from  every  angle 
machine-gmi  fire.  At  another  point  Captain  Roe 
found  a barricade  which  was  occupied  and  doubtless 
concealed  a machine  gun. 

The  adventure  was  destined  to  end  with  some 
excitement,  for  as  the  party  was  creeping  on,  they 
saw  a German  officer  at  a distance  of  about  250  yards 
in  the  act  of  getting  over  the  parapet.  Captain  Roe 
and  the  Subadar-Major  fired  together  and  hit  the 
officer  in  the  hip,  knocking  him  backwards.  Im- 
mediately another  man  showed  his  head  and  shoulders,  * 
evidently  trying  to  discover  where  the  bullets  came 
from.  Captam  Roe  fired  again,  and  the  man  fell. 
The  result  of  a third  attempt  at  another  man  who 
looked  over  could  not  be  observed.  The  only  reply 
was  one  wild  shot  fii’ed  at  an  angle  of  about  45 
degrees  away  to  the  left.  The  party  eventually 
returned  in  safety,  having  completely  carried  out 
their  programme. 

On  the  3rd  July  two  men  of  the  battalion  were 
hit  while  on  listening  patrol.  Captain  Roe  decided 
to  go  out  next  morning  and  try  to  discover  thek 
fate,  and  further,  to  ascertain  whether  the  enemy 
. had  occupied  the  ruins  near  which  his  men  had  fallen. 

In  view  of  the  probability  that  some  opposition 
would  occur,  the  preparations  were  now  'more 
elaborate.  Covering  fire  was  to  be  supplied  from  the 
trench  of  the  1/lst  Gurkhas,  and  a small  party  under 
Lieutenant  Manson  was  posted  in  a suitable  position 
to  assist  in  case  of  emergency.  Another  party 
under  Subadar-Major  Senbh  Gmumg  was  put  out 


388  CHANGES  IN  COMPOSITION  OE  CORPS 


on  the  right  of  Captain  Roe’s  line  of  advance,  and 
six  men  accompanied  the  officer  to  search  the  ruins. 
At  the  same  time  the  84th  Batter}^  R.F.x4..  was  to 
assist  with  the  ffi‘e  of  one  gun  towards  the  left,  and 
on  a new  communication  trench  made  by  the  enemy. 
Captain  Roe  carried  five  bombs  himself,  while  the 
Subadar-Major  also  had  five,  and  24  were  kept  handy 
in  reserve. 

At  8.10  a.ni.  the  expedition  started,  and  after 
posting  Lieutenant  Manson’s  party.  Captain  Roe 
pushed  along  up  a comminiication  trench,  and  had 
just  arrived  at  his  pre-arranged  position  when  the 
84th  Battery  fired  its  first  shell.  At  this  moment 
three  bombs  were  thrown  at  the  party  from  a distance 
of  about  20  yards,  followed  almost  at  once  by  two 
more.  All  live  exploded  round  Captain  Roe  and  his 
ordcrl)',  partially  burying  them.  The  six  men 
beliiml  tliem,  tliinking  they  were  killed,  retired 
towards  the  British  line.  ISubadar-Major  vSenbir, 
however,  at  once  rallied  and  brought  them  up  to 
where  Captain  Roe  was  busily  engaged  in  bomb- 
ing the  Germans.  Lance-Naik  Lachman  Gurung, 
a bomber,  rushed  up  and  took  the  enemy  from  the 
front,  and  with  this  assistance  they  were  driven 
back  with  the  loss  of  five  of  their  number.  They 
retreated  until  they  were  joined  by  an  officer  and 
about  25  men. 

Captain  Roe  had  now  used  all  his  bombs,  and  had 
to  retire  to  the  spot  where  he  had  left  his  reserve 
supply.  Armed  with  these,  he  again  advanced  and 
bombed  the  officer’s  party  steadily  back.  Then  it 
was  found  that  the  enemy  had  got  round  on  both 
flanks,. and  they  soon  made  then-  presence  felt  by 
bombing  and  firing. 


SUBADAR-MAJOR  SENBTR  GURUNG  3R9 

Subadar-Major  Senbir  was  now  bit  by  a bomb 
wbicb  shattered  his  left  leg,  but  in  spite  of  his 
suffering  he  held  on  in  the  most  gallant  way,  and 
continued  to  dnect  his  men.  At  this  junctm’e 
Lieutenant  Manson  caught  sight  of  the  Germans  and 
at  once  opened  rapid  fire.  The  enemy  were  seized 
with  panic,  and  were  bolting  through  the  ruins, 
when  two  shrapnel  shells  fired  by  the  84th  Battery 
burst  right  over  them  and  added  wings  to  their 
flight. 

By  good  luck  our  bombs  had  outlasted  those  of 
the  enemj^  and  it  was  due  to  this  fact  and  the 
assistance  of  the  84th  Batter}-  that  Captain  Roe 
was  able  to  return  with  only  one  casualty,  Subadar- 
Major  Senbir  C4urung.  This  Gurkha  officer  had 
throughout  the  campaign  behaved  with  the  greatest 
gallantry,  having  especially  distinguished  himself 
at  Ypres,  and  whenever  he  got  near  the  enemy,  to 
use  the  words  of  his  Commanding  Officer,  Lt- 
Colonel  H.  B.  Champain,  “ he  showed  amazing 
coolness  and  resource.” 

Thus  ended  a most  dashing  little  episode,  the 
skilful  and  daring  execution  of  which  obtained  for 
us  information  of  considerable  value  and  ])roved  the 
worth  of  our  men,  when  led  by  British  officers,  in 
hand-to-hand  fighting  against  superior  numbers. 
For  his  conspicuous  gallantry  and  leadership  Captain 
Roe  was  awarded  the  D.S.O.,  while  Lieutenant 
Manson  received  the  Military  Cross,  and  Subadar- 
Maior  Senbir  Gurung  the  2nd  Class,  Indian  Order  of 
Merit. 

Lance-Naiks  Lachman  Gurung  and  Asbu  Rana 
with  Rifleman  Garbha  Sing  Gurung,  who  had  stuck 
to  the  two  officers  and  had  behaved  throughout 

o 


390  CHANGES  TN  COMPOSITION  OF  CORPS 


with  the  greatest  bravery,  were  awarded  the  Indian 
Distinguished  Service  Medal. 

On  the  1st  August  a melancholy  illustration  of 
the  chances  of  war  occurred. 

Lieutenant  E.  G.  Bullard,  of  the  Indian  Postal 
Service,  was  proceeding  on  duty  in  a car  near  Croix 
Barbee,  when  a German  shell  exploded  practically 
in  the  motor,  killing  him  and  the  chauffeur  instan- 
taneously. 

This  young  officer  had,  by  his  kindly  disposition 
and  zeal  in  the  performance  of  his  important  duties, 
endeared  himself  to  his  comrades  in  the  Corps,  and 
his  loss  was  keenlv  felt. 

The  occurrence  was  particularly  unfortunate, 
as  Lieutenant  Bullard  was  to  have  proceeded  on 
leave  the  next  day,  while  the  chauffeur  was  onlj^ 
taking  the  duty  of  another  man. 

By  the  2nd  August  the  Corps  had  once  more 
been  reorganized  into  its  normal  formation,  and  the 
front  was  held  by  the  Lahore  and  Meerut  Divisions, 
while  the  19th  Division,  in  reserve  billets,  was  re- 
ceiving instruction  in  trench  warfare. 

On  the  5th  August  loud  cheering  was  heard  in 
the  German  lines,  after  which  a notice  board  was 
placed  just  outside  their  wire  with  the  following 
inscription : “ Warchaou  * conquered.”  To  this  we 
replied  by  a similar  board  bearing  the  legend, 
“ Another  Zeppelin  brought  down.” 

The  German  notice  remained  in  position,  although 
riddled  with  bullets  by  us,  and  several  unsuccessful 
attempts  were  made  to  bring  it  in  under  cover  of 
darkness.  On  the  night  of  the  16th  August,  however, 
Lance-Naiks  Kale  Singh  and  But  Singh,  of  the  47th 


* Warsaw. 


DEPARTURE  OF  REGIMENTS 


391 


Sikhs,  succeeded  in  cravvding  up  to  the  board  and 
cutting  the  wire  which  attached  it  to  the  German 
parapet.  While  doing  this,  four  bombs  were  thrown 
at  them,  but  they  escaped  uninjiued,  and  bore  the 
notice  back  in  triumph  to  the  47th,  by  whom  it  is 
treasm’ed  as  a souvenir  of  an  audacious  deed. 

The  remainder  of  the  month  passed  without 
any  event  of  special  importance.  A deserter  gave 
himself  up  on  the  night  of  the  28th  August,  and, 
apparently  by  way  of  justifying  his  existence,  in- 
formed us  that  the  enemy  had  installed  gas  in  his 
trenches  with  a view  to  an  attack  on  the  30th  August. 
To  ascertain  the  truth  or  otherwise  of  his  story,  a 
bombardment  of  the  enemy’s  front  line  took  place  on 
the  29th  and  again  on  the  30th,  but  although  the 
parapet  was  badly  damaged  and  heavy  timber, 
sandbags  and  earth  were  thrown  up  into  the  air,  there 
were  no  signs  of  any  preparation  for  a gas  attack. 

On  the  17  th  August  the  6th  Jats  under  the 
command  of  Captain  Ross,  the  15th  Sikhs  under 
Colonel  Hill,  and  the  41st  Dogras  under  Lt-Colonel 
Tribe,  left  for  another  theatre  of  war,  where  they 
have  since  fully  maintained  the  great  reputation 
which  the3^  had  won  in  France.  It  is  pleasing  to 
note,  as  testifying  to  the  spirit  wdiich  existed  between 
our  Allies  and  ourselves,  that  the  War  Diary  of  the 
6th  Jats  records  the  great  reluctance  with  which  the 
regiment  parted  with  them  interpreter.  Monsieur 
Henri  Le  Gros,  who,  it  is  remarked,  had  served  with 
them  since  their  arrival  in  France,  in  October,  1914, 
without  a daj^’s  absence,  having  rendered  invaluable 
service  and  become  almost  one  of  the  regiment. 


CHAPTER  XXII 


THE  BATTLE  OF  LOOS 

Front  held  by  Indian  Corps  at  the  commencement  of  September — General 
Sir  James  Willcocks  succeeded  by  Lt-General  Sir  Charles  Anderson 
— Preparations  for  offensive  on  a large  scale — Reasons  for  choice  of 
Champagne  as  scene  of  main  operations — Minor  “ holding  ” actions 
to  be  undertaken — Operations  orders— Gas  and  smoke  to  be  used — 
Doubt  as  to  utility  of  gas — Prolonged  bombardment  of  enemy’s 
positions — Rainy  weather  unfavomable  to  attack — Enemy’s  bomb 
bursts  gas  cylinders  in  our  trench — Wind  unfavourable  to  gas  attack — 
Our  mine  exploded — Field  guns  and  Hotchkiss  employed  in  front 
trenches — Presence  of  mind  of  gas  detachments  prevents  a disaster — 
Assault  of  the  Garhwal  Brigade — Right  attack  held  up- — Lieutenant 
Bagot-Chester — Rifleman  Kulbu-  Thapa,  2/3rd  Gurkhas,  wins  the 
Victoria  Cross — Great  gallantry  of  2/8th  Gurkhas — Colonel  Morris 
mortally  wounded — Captain  Buckland,  D.S.O. — Subadar  Sarbjit 
Gurung — Splendid  stand  by  Subadar  Ransim  Rana — Terrible  losses 
of  the  2/8th  Gurkhas — Congested  state  of  the  trenches  delays  attack 
by  Debra  Dun  Brigade — Umsirccessful  assault  by  39th  Garhwalis  and 
2/2nd  Gurkhas — Causes  of  failure  of  attack — Remarks  by  Brigadier- 
General  Blackader. 

At  the  commencement  of  September,  1915,  the  line 
of  the  Indian  Corps  was  held  as  follows  (see  Map) ; — 
On  the  right  lay  the  1 9th  Division,  with  two 
Brigades  in  the  front  trenches,  and  one  in  reserve. 

Southwards  the  line  was  continued  by  the  1st 
Corps. 

The  right  of  one  Brigade  of  the  1 9th  Division 
rested  on  a point  almost  opposite  Le  Plantin,  the 
left  being  slightly  north-west  of  the  Cour  d’Avoue 
Earm. 

Thence  the  Lahore  Division  continued  with 


CHANGE  TN  CORPS  CiOMMAND  391^ 


Ferozepore  in  front,  the  remaining  two  Brigades 
in  reserve,  the  front  of  the  Division  extending  to  the 
southern  edge  of  the  La  Bassee — Estaires  road,  whence 
the  line  was  held  by  the  Garhwal  and  Bareilly 
Brigades  of  the  Meerut  Division  with  Dehra  Dun 
in  reserve,  a Brigade  of  the  3rd  Corps  carr^dng  on  to 
the  left  from  Winchester  Road,  the  total  front  of 
the  Corps  being  about  9500  yards. 

The  casualties  of  the  Corps  up  to  the  31st  August, 
1915,  amounted  to  : — 


Killed. 

Wounded. 

Missing. 

Other  deaths. 

British  officers 

. 234 

.559 

59 

2 

Indian  officers 

90 

290 

35 

0 

Other  ranks,  British 

. 1502 

7,009 

1748 

y 

Other  ranks,  Indian 

. 2084 

12,058 

2518 

578 

Total 

. 3970 

19,970 

4300 

580 

During  the  first  few  days  of  the  month  the  weather 
was  inclined  to  be  changeable,  and  on  the  3rd  Sep- 
tember heavv  rain  fell,  which  once  more  converted 
the  trenches  into  morasses,  although  much  had  now 
been  done  to  improve  them  by  drainage,  by  boarding 
the  footways,  and  by  strengthening  the  sides. 

On  the  6th  September  the  Corps  sustained  an 
irreparable  loss  by  the  sudden  departure  of  Sir  James 
Willcocks.  This  is  neither  the  time  nor  tlie  place 
in  which  to  enter  into  the  causes  which  led  to  so 
untoward  an  event.  With  the  simple  loyalty  to  duty 
which  has  marked  General  Willcocks’  enthe  career, 
he  has  preserved  a silence  which  the  present  historians 
have  no  right,  while  the  war  continues,  to  break. 

The  blow  was  keenly  felt  by  both  officers  and  men 
of  the  Corps.  General  Willcocks’  knowledge  of  the 
Indian  Army  is  unique,  and  throughout  the  campaign 
he  had  never  spared  himself  in  his  zeal  for  the 


394 


THE  BATTLE  OF  LOOS 


weKare  and  efficienc}^  of  tlie  troops  under  his  com- 
mand. It  is  not  too  much  to  say,  and  those  who 
know  the  extreme  difficulties  of  the  position  will 
agree,  that  it  was  largely  owing  to  his  personal  in- 
fluence, his  never-failing  sense  of  justice,  his  infinite 
patience,  and  his  constant  cheerfulness,  that  the 
Corps  M^as  able  to  hold  its  own  against  the  superb 
troops  wliich,  dining  these  critical  months,  did  their 
utmost  to  destroy  its  spirit  and  undermine  its  moral. 

Never  in  the  history  of  the  Indian  Army  has  a 
command  fraught  with  such  mixed  and  onerous 
responsibilities  been  placed  upon  the  shoulders  of 
a British  officer.  Composed  as  the  Corps  was,  at 
various  stages  of  its  career,  of  English,  Irish,  and 
Scotch  regiments,  battalions  of  Gurkhas,  subjects 
of  a foreign  state,  of  units  largely  formed  of  Trans- 
Frontier  men,  Imperial  Service  Troops,  and  even 
Indian  police — a medley  of  religions  and  customs, 
in  a foreign  country  and  amid  strange  and  depressing 
surroundings — to  command  such  a body  of  troops 
with  success  called  for  the  firmness  of  Kitchener, 
tlie  patience  of  Job,  and  the  tact  of  Talleyrand. 

To  what  extent  Sir  James  Willcocks  succeeded 
can  be  judged  by  the  fact  that  the  Corps,  in  spite  of 
its  losses,  in  spite  of  the  substitution  of  reinforce- 
ments mostly  far  inferior  to  its  original  Indian 
personnel,  in  face  of  the  cruel  and  always  growing 
losses  of  British  officers,  continued  to  the  end  of  his 
command  to  preserve  its  special  character  and  to 
hold  its  place  amongst  that  vast  concourse  of  the 
best  fighting  material  of  the  British  Empire. 

The  future  historian,  writmg  when  the  dark  places 
have  been  made  light,  and  tongues,  now  sealed,  are 
free,  will  be  able  to  give  Sir  James  Willcocks  his  due 


[ 


t;. 


E 

I 


Lieut-General 


Sir  Charles  Anderson,  K.C.B. 


395-1 


LT-GEN.  SIR  CHARLES  ANDERSON  395 


niche  in  the  Temple  of  Fame,  till  which  time  he  will 
rest  content  with  his  place  in  the  hearts  of  those  whom 
he  commanded  in  a dark  and  blood}^  season.  He 
will  not,  we  predict,  be  counted  in  the  passionless 
scales  of  history,  the  least  of  the  heroes  who  stood  for 
England  in  the  autumn  of  1914. 

General  Willcocks,  who  for  his  services  during 
the  war  had  been  created  a Knight  Grand  Cross  of 
St  Michael  and  St  George  and  a Grand  Officer  of 
the  Legion  of  Honour,  was  succeeded  b}^  Lieutenant- 
General  Sir  Charles  Anderson,  K.C.B.,  who  had 
commanded  the  Meerut  Division  since  the  com- 
mencement of  the  war,  and  on  whom  had  fallen  the 
brunt  of  several  important  battles,  notably  that  of 
Neuve  Chapelle.  He  took  over  the  command  under 
the  best  auspices,  as  a personal  friend  of  his  late 
chief  whose  last  recommendation  was  that  he  should 
succeed  him. 

To  his  brilliant  career  as  a soldier.  General 
Anderson  united  the  indispensable  qualifications, 
although  himself  an  artillery  officer,  of  long  residence 
in  and  intimate  knowledge  of  India.  The  Corps 
profoundly  regretted  the  loss  of  Sir  James  Willcocks, 
but  it  was  agreed  that  his  mantle  could  have  fallen 
on  no  more  competent  shoulders  than  those  of  Sir 
Charles  Anderson,  whose  sympathetic  dare-devil 
Irish  nature  appealed  strongly  to  the  Indians, 
creatures  always  of  impulse  and  temperament,  more 
easily  to  be  led  than  driven. 

By  September,  1915,  the  preparations  of  both 
sides  had  advanced  long  stages  towards  such  com- 
pletion as  is  possible  in  a war  where  nothing  can  be 
complete  until  the  opposing  army  has  been  finally 
crushed. 


30G 


THE  BATTLE  OF  LOOS 


'i'he  Germans  had  learnt  many  lessons  from 
Neuve  Cliapelle,  and  their  defences  were  now  of  a 
totally  different  class  from  those  which  we  had  met 
and  overcome  on  that  occasion. 

We,  ill  our  tiu’n,  slow  as  we  are  to  learn,  had  at 
last  grasped  the  fact  that  the  success  of  infantry 
attacks  depended  on  adequate  artillery  preparation 
and  support.  Throughout  the  summer  every  nerve 
had  been  strained  to  bring  us  abreast  of  our  oppo- 
nents in  this  respect,  and  with  such  success  that  it 
was  now  deemed  possible  tb  make  a serious  offensive 
move  on  a large  scale,  although  it  was  felt  that  we 
could  not  hojie  to  arrive  at  a thoroughly  satisfactory^ 
position  in  the  matter  of  munitions  until,  at  tlie 
earliest,  the  spring  of  1910. 

Our  French  Allies  had  been  even  more  successful 
than  ourselves,  and  between  us  we  possessed  at 
least  an  ecpiality  of  gun  power  with  the  Germans, 
while  the  preponderance  of  man  power  on  tlie 
Western  front  was  certainly  in  our  favour. 

The  position  at  tlie  commencement  of  September 
was  briefly  as  follows  : — 

9die  2nd  Army,  commanded  by  Sk  Herbert 
Flumer,  held  the  line  from  Boesinghe,  north  of 
Ypres,  to  a point  slightly  south-west  of  ^Armen- 
ticres.  Next  came  the  1st  Army,  under  Sir  Douglas 
Haig,  which  reached  as  far  south  as  Grenay,  north- 
west of  Lens.  Here  the  line  was  taken  up  by  the 
French  10th  Army,  which,  continuing  to  a point 
south  of  Arras,  separated  our  new  3rd  Army  under 
Sir  Charles  Monro  from  the  remainder  of  the  British 
forces.  The  front  of  the  3rd  Army  extended  to  the 
south  as  far  as  the  Somme. 

In  the  September  operations  Champagne  was 


SUBSIDIARY  ACTIONS 


397 


chosen  as  the  area  for  the  main  attack.  It  is  not 
possible  to  discuss  in  detail  the  reasons  which 
governed  this  decision,  but  one  obvious  object  was 
to  cut,  if  possible,  the  railwa}^  communication  which 
brought  up  supplies  from  the  Rhine,  and  thus  limit 
the  enemy  to  the  use  of  his  northern  network  of 
railways.  Added  to  this  was  the  remote  possibility 
of  isolating  the  Crown  Prince’s  Army  opposite 
Verdun. 

In  conjunction  with  the  main  operations,  a 
number  of  subsidiary  actions  was  necessary  to  pre- 
vent the  enemy  from  reinforcing  his  line  in  Cham- 
pagne from  other  sectors  of  his  front.  The  scene  of 
the  chief  of  these  operations  was  the  area  between 
La  Bassee  and  Arras,  the  object  now  being  the  same 
as  in  May,  i.e.  to  cut  the  German  communications 
between  Lille  and  Soissons  by  an  advance  on  Douai 
and  Valenciennes,  always  with  the  idea  of  Lille  in 
the  background. 

From  north  to  south  the  holding  engagements 
were  as  follows  : — 

{a)  By  the  5th  Corps  under  General  Allen  by, 
plus  the  14th  Division  lent  by  the  6th  Corps,  the 
objective  being  Bellewaarde  Farm,  situated  to  the 
east  of  Ypres. 

(6)  By  General  Pulteney’s  3rd  Corps  near  Bois 
Grenier. 

(c)  By  the  Indian  Corps  in  the  vicinity  of  Neuve 
Chapelle. 

(d)  By  the  2nd  Division  of  the  1st  Army  near 
Givenchy. 

The  purpose  of  this  history  being  to  present  an 
intelligible  account  of  the  operations  of  the  Indian 
Corps,  reference  will  only  be  made  in  this  complicated 


398 


THE  BATTLE  OF  LOOS 


phase  of  the  war  to  such  occurrences  in  other  areas 
of  the  fighting  as  may  be  necessary  to  that  end. 

Verbal  instructions  were  given  on  the  30th 
August,  followed,  on  the  20th  September,  by  detailed 
orders. 

The  general  idea  was  for  the  Indian  Corps  to 
carry  out  an  attack,  in  conjunction  with  the  main 
operations,  with  a view  to  holding  the  enemy  and 
preventing  him  from  sending  reinforcements  south- 
wards ; also  with  the  object  of  inducing  doubt  in 
his  mind  as  to  the  real  point  of  the  main  attack. 

Three  objectives  were  laid  down  for  the  Corps. 

(а)  To  attack  the  enemy’s  line  between  Sunken 
Road  and  Winchester  Road,  and  to  establish  our 
line  along  the  road  running  from  Mauquissart  to 
the  “ Duck’s  Bill.” 

(б)  To  press  on,  with  the  left  in  front,  until  the 
high  ground  between  Haut  Pommereau  and  La 
Cliqueterie  Farm  was  gained. 

(c)  To  continue  the  advance  from  that  point  in 
a south-easterly  dnection,  in  order  to  assist  our 
main  offensive  in  the  south  by  tmming  the  La  Bassee 
defences  from  the  north. 

For  the  first  time  gas  was  to  be  used  by  the 
British  troops,  a step  which  was  taken  vvith  the 
greatest  reluctance,  and  not  until  it  w'as  forced  upon 
us  by  the  enemy’s  continual  use  of  this  barbarous 
method  of  warfare.  Gas,  how^ever,  as  the  enemy 
has  more  than  once  found  to  his  cost,  is  an  un- 
trustworthy servant.  At  a conference  held  at  the 
commencement  of  September,  grave  doubts  were 
expressed  as  to  the  utility  of  the  device,  unless,  in 
the  event  of  the  gas  being  a failure  on  the  Indian 
Corps  front,  adequate  artillery  support  was  to  be 


ORDERS  FOR  ATTACK  399 

forthcoming.  Later  events  were  to  prove  that  these 
doubts  were  well  founded. 

It  was  felt  that  gas  should  not  be  used  unless  the 
wind  were  in  a pronouncedly  favourable  direction, 
and  in  amply  sufficient  strength  to  carry  it  away 
from  our  line  on  to  the  German  trenches.  In  con- 
sequence, two  programmes  were  drawn  up,  the  second 
for  adoption  if  it  appeared  unwise  to  use  gas  and 
smoke. 

As  will  be  seen  later,  the  gas  was  a failure  upon 
the  Indian  Corps  front,  causing  no  inconvenience  to 
the  enemy  and  very  seriously  interfering  with  the 
movements  of  our  troops. 

The  attack  was  to  be  delivered  by  the  Meerut 
Division,  now  commanded  by  Brigadier- General 
C.  W.  Jacob  (who  was  succeeded  in  the  Delira  Dun 
Brigade  by  Lt-Colonel  W.  J.  Harvej^,  of  the  2nd  Black 
Watch),  the  19th  and  Lahore  Divisions  holding  the 
whole  of  the  front  except  that  portion  from  which 
Meerut  was  to  advance.  The  20th  Division  of  the 
3rd  Corps  on  the  left  was  to  co-operate  with  Lahore 
in  covering  the  flanks  of  the  Meerut  Division  with 
its  fire. 

The  assault  was  to  be  preceded  by  (1)  four  days’ 
deliberate  bombardment  by  artillery  and  trench 
mortars,  the  enemy  at  the  same  time  being  pre- 
vented by  rifle,  rifle-grenade  and  machine-gun  fire 
from  repairing  the  damage  done  to  his  obstacles  and 
defences  ; (2)  the  explosion  of  a mine  under  the 
enemy’s  parapet,  opposite  the  left  of  our  attack,  two 
minutes  before  the  gas  and  smoke  commenced ; 
(3)  a gas  and  smoke  attack  immediately  before  the 
assault ; (4)  the  formation  of  thick  smoke  barrages 
on  each  flank  of  the  assaulting  troops. 


400 


4’liE  J3ATTLE  OF  LOOS 


Proiiting  l^y  the  lesson  learned  in  the  May  fighting, 
field  guns  were  now  placed  in  the  front  parapet, 
with  a view,  by  point-blanlv  fii’e,  to  destroying 
machine  guns  and  their  emplacements,  while  a 
Hotchkiss  gun  was  also  to  be  used  for  the  same 
object. 

The  Garhwal  Brigade  was  detailed  for  the  right 
assault,  Bareilly  for  the  left,  with  the  Dehra  Dun 
Brigade  in  Divisional  reserve,  each  assaulting  Brigade 
having  three  battalions  in  the  front  line  and  two  in 
reserve. 

It  was  calculated  that,  in  order  to  ensure  the 
success  of  the  gas  attack,  it  would  be  necessary  to 
employ  1100  cylinders,  and  the  requisite  shelters 
were  ])repared  in  the  trenches  by  the  6th  September. 
It  was  subsequently  found  that  only  160  cylinders 
would  Ijo  available,  and  the  whole  plan  had  to  be 
recast,  distributing  the  gas  in  such  a way  that  it 
could  be  used  from  the  salients  if  the  wind  proved 
to  come  from  the  south-east,  south,  or  south-west. 
By  the  night  of  the  23rd-24th  September  the  cylinders 
had  been  placed  in  position  by  Lieutenant  Kent  of 
the  189th  Company  Royal  Engineers 

In  addition  to  the  arrangements  for  gas,  dis- 
positions were  made  to  cover  the  advance  of  our 
troops  by  a screen  of  smoke  along  the  entire  front, 
supported  by  barrages  of  smoke  on  either  flank. 
To  this  end  a number  of  appliances  were  used,  such 
as  smoke  candles  and  phosphorus  smoke  bombs, 
which  were  hurled  out  by  catapults  and  proved 
most  effective,  attaining  a range  of  350  yards. 
Bombs  were  also  tlirown  out  of  95-millimetre 
and  2-inch  trench  mortars  with  verv  satisfactorv 

*'  V 

results. 


FOUR  DAYS’  BOMBARDMENT  401 

On  the  21st  September  the  deliberate  bombard- 
ment commenced  and  lasted  throughout  four  days 
and  nights,  a weary  time  for  the  gunners,  but  their 
strength  and  spirits  were  sustained  by  the  hope  that 
for  the  first  time  there  would  be  sufficient  ammunition 
to  enable  them  to  strike  at  the  enemy  hard,  effectively, 
and  continuously. 

Observation  was  very  difficult,  owing  to  the  haze 
and  dense  clouds  of  smoke  which  hung  over  the 
German  trenches  during  the  first  three  days,  and  it 
was  rendered  still  more  difficult  by  rain  and  mist  on 
the  24th.  By  the  evening  of  that  day  it  w^as  re- 
ported that  the  enemy’s  wire  had  been  satisfactorily 
cut,  except  in  one  section  in  front  of  the  Garhwal 
Brigade.  This  failure  was  destined  to  cost  us  dear, 
as  it  held  up  om’  men  under  terrible  fire,  while  they 
were  seeking  a way  through  the  web  of  death. 

Throughout  the  bombardment  we  kept  up  a 
constant  fusillade  from  the  front  line  with  rifles, 
grenades,  machine  guns  and  trench  mortars,  as  well 
as  indirect  machine-gun  fire  from  points  in  rear,  thus 
practically  limiting  repairs  to  the  placing  of  rolls  of 
wire  in  some  of  the  gaps  caused  by  our  artillery. 
In  spite  of  the  fact  that  his  parapets  were  being 
gradually  destroyed,  the  enemy’s  guns  showed  very 
little  more  than  their  usual  activity,  and  our  casualties 
were  slight. 

On  the  22nd  September  the  Lahore  Division  made 
a feint  of  attack.  The  artillery  fired  for  five  minutes 
on  the  enemy’s  front  line  and  then  for  five  minutes 
on  his  support  trenches,  after  which  bayonets  were 
shown  over  the  top  of  the  parapet,  while  a number 
of  dummy  heads,  which  had  been  previously  prepared, 
were  raised  with  an  accompaniment  of  shouting. 

2 D 


402 


THE  BATTLE  OF  LOOS 


Tliis  probabH  led  to  the  enemy  crowding  his  trenches 
with  men  to  receive  the  attack  which,  however,  did 
not  come.  In  its  place  our  guns  rained  shrapnel 
with  great  accurac}^  over  the  opposite  trenches, 
causing,  it  was  hoped,  considerable  loss.  In  spite  of 
this,  the  enemy  could  not  be  di-awn  into  retaliation. 
A similar  feint  was  carried  out  by  the  19th  Division 
on  the  following  day,  but  the  enemy  utterly  declined 
to  take  any  interest  in  it.  On  this  date  the  93rd 
Burma  Infantry,  under  the  command  of  Lt-Colonel 
Stevens,  joined  the  CorjDS,  and  was  posted  to  the 
Dehra  Dun  Brigade.  > 

A party  of  seven  civilians  paid  an  ill-timed  visit 
to  the  enemy’s  trenches  at  the  commencement  of  the 
l)ombardment.  Of  these,  with  the  German  sense  of 
the  fitness  of  things,  three  wore  top  hats,  two  bowlers, 
and  one  a soft  grey  hat,  while  the  seventh  carried 
a top  hat  m his  hand.  Unfortunately  for  them, 
their  arrival  was  noticed  by  one  of  our  snipers 
jjerched  in  a tree,  and  he  at  once  gave  the  whole  of 
his  attention  to  them.  Yells  were  heard  ; top  hats 
were  seen  fallmg  in  every  direction  ; and  the  party, 
or  such  of  it  as  survived,  retmned  home  with  a real 
experience  of  trench  warfare. 

The  weather,  which  for  the  greater  part  of  the 
month  had  been  extremely  good,  now  showed  signs 
of  change,  and  from  the  evening  of  the  23rd  Sep- 
tember it  became  rainy  and  unfavourable  generally. 
By  the  evening  of  the  25th  there  was  a foot  of 
water  in  the  trenches  and  movement  was  very 
difficult. 

During  the  24th  aU  thoughts  were  concentrated 
on  the  question  as  to  whether  the  wmd  would  be 
favourable  to  a gas  attack.  At  this  time  a gentle 


OUR  FIRST  USE  OF  GAS 


403 


breeze  was  blowing  from  the  west,  but  during  the 
night  it  changed,  veering  round  from  west  to  south 
and  from  south  to  south-west,  till  at  3.15  a.m.  on  the 
25th  it  was  again  blowing  from  the  west  with  a 
velocity  of  three  mdes  an  hour. 

At  4.40  a.m.  a German  bomb  burst  in  the 
“ Duck’s  Bill,”  a projecting  portion  of  trench  on  the 
right  which  was  held  by  the  l/3rd  Londons.  The 
explosion  blew  off  the  heads  of  several  cylinders  of 
gas,  which  escaped  in  large  volumes.  Although  gas 
masks  were  ready,  the  vapour  filled  the  front  and 
support  trench  in  such  density  and  with  such  rapidity 
that  one  officer  and  18  men  of  the  Londons  were 
put  out  of  action,  as  was  also  a bombing  party  of 
the  Manchester  Regiment  which  had  been  sent  to 
the  “ Duck’s  Bill  ” preparatory  to  the  attack. 
The  officer  in  charge  of  the  gas  detachment  was 
himself  “ gassed,”  and  the  senior  non-commissioned 
officer  at  once  gave  orders  that  no  gas  was  to  be 
liberated  in  view  of  the  change  in  the  wind. 

The  Londons  behaved  with  great  coolness  under 
this  unexpected  contretemps  ; the  cylinders  were 
promptly  covered  with  earth,  and  by  this  swift 
action  more  serious  losses  were  prevented. 

The  wind,  slight  as  it  was,  had  changed,  and  was 
now  blowing  rather  towards  than  from  our  trenches. 
General  Jacob,  in  his  report  on  the  action,  suggests 
that  in  future  the  responsibility  for  using  gas  should 
rest  with  the  officers  commanding  on  the  spot,  who 
would  alone  be  in  a position  to  decide  as  to  the 
advisability  of  its  use  in  the  event  of  the  wind  sud- 
denly veering  round  as  it  did  on  this  occasion.  Had 
officers  commanding  been  allowed  to  exercise  their 
discretion,  there  can  be  little  doubt  that  gas  would 


404 


THE  BATTLE  OF  LOOS 


not  have  l^ccn  used.  As  it  was,  it  was  solely  due  to 
the  initiative  of  the  gas  detachments,  who  took  the 
responsibility  of  timning  off  the  gas  as  soon  as  it  was 
found  to  be  blown  back  into  our  trenches,  that  a 
serious  disaster  was  prevented. 

At  5.48  a.m.,  with  a deafening  roar,  which  was 
heard  and  felt  at  a distance  of  many  miles  from  the 
scene  of  the  explosion,  the  mine  on  the  left  of  our 
attack  went  up.  Charged  as  it  was  with  one  ton 
of  guncotton,  the  effects  were  awe-inspiring.  The 
point  of  the  German  salient  disappeared  ; enormous 
masses  of  earth  flew  high  into  the  air,  and  over 
all  hung  a dense  cloud  of  dust  and  smoke.  The 
crater  was  afterwards  found  to  measime  92  feet  in 
breadth,  and  for  a considerable  distance  around 
piles  of  debris  were  lying. 

At  5.50  a.m.  the  intense  bombardment  com- 
menced, lasting  till  6 a.m.,  when  the  guns  lifted. 
The  two  field  guns  and  the  Hotchkiss  in  the  front 
line  took  an  active  part  in  this  phase  of  the  prepara- 
tion. One  gun,  owing  to  the  “ striker  ” breaking, 
fired  only  47  rounds  of  high  explosive,  but  the  other, 
in  the  “ Duck’s  Bill,”  fired  76  rounds  in  4|  minutes. 
The  first  five  rounds  of  the  latter  gun  were  observed 
to  be  direct  hits,  which  did  enormous  damage  to 
the  enemy’s  parapet.  The  smoke  barrage  rendered 
further  observation  impossible,  but  from  the  reports 
subsequently  received  from  the  infantry,  there  was 
no  doubt  of  the  complete  success  of  this  novel 
departure  in  trench  warfare. 

At  the  moment  of  the  commencement  of  the 
intense  bombardment,  the  gas  should  have  been 
turned  on,  but  the  direction  of  the  wind  rendered 
its  liberation  unsafe  in  some  sections  of  the  line,  and 


e*!' JaJis  BRITISH 


2"-'^  Gurkhas 


frchard 


Charing 

LCross 


Gurkhas 

VTheRe3oubt 


■Rccadill^^-^ 


<t.  Maxajtdrew 
^ killed  , 


/ Mackenzie, 
''wounded 


LINE 


Left 


of 


Str^ 


ff'rkh 


kM  BaJ<er 
'wounded 


Supp 


9.  Gurkhas  in  support. 


Sniper;^  House 

" w 


• Piquet  House 


\Hell  Corner 

S^ClaJr 
n ^killed 


CcLpt.  Dayidson  Snd 

Madtland 

wounded 


Brewery 


Ori^inaJ  Line  held  by  Seaforths C.  B.  A . 

Line  held  after  attack  on  20^1  Dec....C.  B.  E.F.  G.  H. 


1 1 

ino  50  0 


lef  to  22'’.’^  Dec.  1914. 

Trenches Red 

Communicaution  Trenches.. .Green 
Scale  of  Yards 

— I 1 1 I I ; , 

100  200  300  400  500  600  700 


1 1 
1 1 
n 
u 
11 
11 
11 
II 
II 
II 

n 

II 


I 


i 


.1 


.1 


1, 


GAS  SHUT  OFF 


405 


ill  others  a sudden  change  brought  tlie  poisonous 
fumes  back  into  our  trenches.  Seeing  tliis,  the  gas 
detachments,  on  tlieh’  own  initiative,  at  once  closed 
the  valves.  An  officer  records  that,  in  spite  of  wearing 
two  gas  helmets,  he  suffered  from  soreness  of  the 
throat,  while  one  of  the  gas  detachment  was  lying 
at  his  feet,  quite  overcome,  and  groaning  horribl}". 
In  fact,  as  he  remarks,  every  one  was  glad  when  the 
order  came  to  go  over  the  parapet. 

At  6 a.m.,  amidst  dense  clouds  of  smoke,  the 
infantry  assault  commenced,  and  from  the  moment 
the  troops  advanced  they  were  lost  to  sight,  as  the 
wind  bore  the  right  barrage  down  in  3/  north-easterly 
direction  and  utterly  obscured  all  view  in  front  of 
our  line. 

From  right  to  left  the  assaulting  troops  were 
disposed  as  follows  : — 

Garliival  Brigade.  2/3rd  Ginkhas,  2nd  Leicesters, 
and  2/8th  Gurkhas.  On  the  extreme  right  the 
l/3rd  Londons  continued  to  hold  the  “ Duck’s  Bill,” 
while  the  39th  Garhwal  Rifles  held  the  Home  Counties 
trench  in  rear  of  the  centre  of  the  Brigade. 

Bareilly  Brigade.  l/4th  Black  Watch,  69th  Pun- 
jabis and  2nd  Black  Watch  in  the  front  line,  the 
33rd  Punjabis  being  next  to  the  Garh waits  in  the 
Home  Counties  trench,  and  the  58th  Rifles  in 
the  trenches  along  the  Rue  Tilleloy  in  rear  of  the 
Brigade. 

The  Dehra  Dun  Brigade,  which  was  in  Di- 
visional reserve,  had  orders  to  concentrate,  as  soon 
as  the  assaulting  troops  advanced,  in  the  Home 
Counties  and  Tilleloy  trenches,  posting  picquets 
only  in  the  front  line.  The  object  of  this  dis- 
position was  to  ensine  that  the  Brigade  woidd  be 


406 


THE  BATTLE  OF  LOOS 


concentrated  and  ready  to  move  at  once  in  any 
reqnii’ed  dii’ection. 

The  2/3rd  Gurkhas  had  been  warned  that  the 
German  wire  in  then  front  had  probably  not  been 
destroyed,  and  the  advance  Avas  therefore  made  on 
a naiTow  front.  No.  4 Double  Company,  under 
Lieutenants  Bagot-Chester  and  Wood,  led  the  assault, 
closely  followed  by  No.  3,  under  Lt-Golonel  Brakspear 
and  Lieutenant  Tyson.  They  got  into  good  line, 
but  found  themselves  faced  by  a wall  of  smoke  and 
gas  of  such  density  that  it  Avas  only  possible  to  see 
a feAv  yards  ahead.  At  first  not  a shot  Avas  fired  from 
the  German  trenches,  and  Ave  began  to  hope  that 
perhaps,  after  all,  the  gas  had  inflicted  more  damage 
on  the  enemy  than  on  ourselves,  and  that  they  might 
be  lying  in  then  trenches  out  of  action. 

The  distance  to  be  coA^ered  Avas  about  200  yards, 
and  for  the  first  80  yards  the  smoke  hid  our  troops, 
Avho  adA^anced  at  a quick  Avalk,  from  the  Germans, 
but  the  moment  the  Gurkhas  came  into  vieAV,  the}^ 
Avere  met  by  a blizzard  of  bullets.  They  put  on  the 
pace  at  once,  but  Lieutenant  Bagot-Chester  saw  his 
men  dropping  all  round  him  until,  Avhen  he  reached 
the  German  w'ire,  which  Avas  quite  uncut,  he  and  the 
very  few  left  Avere  forced  to  run  along  the  front  of 
the  position,  seeking  in  vain  for  a passage  by  which 
to  get  to  grips  Avith  the  enemy.  A number,  partly 
overcome  by  oim  OAvn  gas  and  blinded  by  the  smoke, 
charged  headlong  to  the  right,  until  they  were  brought 
up  by  the  projecting  “ Duck’s  Bill  ” held  by  the 
l/3rd  Londons. 

A moment  later  Lieutenant  Bagot-Chester  Avas 
knocked  over  by  a terrific  blow  on  his  right  shoulder. 
Luckily  for  him,  he  fell  close  to  a “ pipsqueak  ” hole. 


ADVENTURES  OF  WOUNDED  407 

into  which  he  at  once  rolled.  The  hole  unfortu- 
nately was  very  small  and  shallow,  and  was  already 
tenanted  by  a wounded  Gurkha,  Budhiman  Gurung 
by  name. 

As  an  example  of  the  experiences  tlirough  which 
wounded  too  often  pass,  it  is  instructive  to  follow 
the  pair  in  them  perilous  adventures.  Looking 
cautiously  over  the  edge  of  the  hole,  the  officer  could 
see  several  dead  Gimkhas,  and  one  or  two  others 
mortally  wounded  and  writhing  in  agony  ; a couple 
more  were  lying  flat,  apparently  unbounded,  but 
even  as  he  looked  they  were  hit  several  times.  In 
front  of  him  lay  the  German  wme  and  trench. 

It  was  evident  the  attack  had  failed,  and  the  onR 
chance  of  life  was  to  lie  absolutely  still  for  the  rest 
of  the  day,  within  15  yards  of  the  enemy,  with  shells 
bursting  all  round  and  the  alternatives  of  being  blown 
to  bits  or  shot  by  the  Germans.  In  the  hole  there 
was  only  room  to  shelter  their  heads  and  bodies  ; 
their  legs  had  to  remain  outside. 

Soon  Lieutenant  Bagot-Chester  heard  a scjueal 
from  Budhiman  on  being  hit  a second  time  by  the 
Germans,  who  w^ere  following  them  usual  practice 
of  shooting  at  the  wounded.  Next  the  officer 
received  a piece  of  iron  in  his  groin.  Then  Budhiman 
was  hit  again.  StiU  there  they  had  to  lie,  unable 
even  to  move  sufficiently  to  get  out  the  morphia 
which  was  in  Lieutenant  Bagot-Chester’s  pocket. 
The  Germans  kept  up  their  fire,  and  the  officer  was 
again  wounded  by  a piece  of  bomb  in  the  left  foot, 
followed  almost  at  once  by  another  wdiich  entered 
his  left  leg  below^  the  knee. 

Shortly  afterrvards  (according  to  the  Regimental 
Diary,  at  about  3 p.m.),  it  began  to  rain,  which  was 


40S 


THE  BATTLE  OF  LOOS 


a blessing  in  disguise,  as  it  appeared  to  reduce  tlie 
firing.  It  fell  in  sheets,  and  the  hole  rapidly  filled 
with  icy  'VA'ater  and  mud.  After  a time  the  I’ain 
stop]ied  and  dusk  crept  slowly  on.  The  gallant 
Budliiman,  sorely  wounded  as  lie  was,  was  all  for 
starting  back  the  moment  it  grow  dusk,  but  Lieu- 
tenant Bagot-Chestcr,  combining  prudence  with 
valour,  thought  it  better  to  wait  for  complete  dark- 
ness before  beginning  the  horrible  pilgrimage. 

At  about  8 p.m.  the  crippled  pair  started,  but 
were  soon  separated.  'The  officer  was  so  much 
tlamaged  and  had  lost  such  a quantity  of  blood 
that  he  was  unable  to  stand.  'The  rain,  however, 
had  made  the  ground  slippery,  and  he  was  able  to 
slide  along  on  his  back,  every  minute  of  jii’ogress  a 
year  of  torture.  Erequently  he  came  upon  a dead 
body,  and  it  taxed  the  poor  remnant  of  his  strength 
to  work  his  way  round  it.  By  the  time  he  had 
accomplished  half  his  journey,  he  found  that  he  could 
j ust  stand  on  one  foot  and  the  heel  of  the  other,  and 
thus  he  completed  his  way,  collapsing  every  few 
yards,  and  being  eventuall}"  found  at  about  10  p.m. 
by  Claptain  Burton,  D.S.O.,  who  has  since  himself 
been  killed. 

Lieutenant  Bagot-Chester  had  throughout  the 
campaign  been  conspicuous  for  his  bravery  and 
skill,  especially  in  reconnaissance  and  patrol  work, 
and  a detailed  account  of  his  experiences  on  this 
occasion  has  been  deemed  Avorthy  of  insertion,  as 
showing  what  the  human  body  can  suffer,  and  yet 
survive,  when  animated  by  such  a spirit  as  that  of 
this  young  officer.  For  his  gallantry  Lieutenant 
Bagot-Chester  was  mentioned  in  despatches.  Of  his 
Double  Company,  Lieutenant  Wood  was  killed,  and 


JJEATH  OF  COL.  BKAKSPEAR  409 

of  a total  of  120  men  who  went  into  action,  86  were 
killed,  wounded,  or  missing. 

Lt-Colonel  Brakspear  and  Lieutenant  Tyson, 
with  No.  3 Double  Company,  had  followed  closely 
behind  Lieutenant  Bagot-Chestcr,  but,  bearing  aw^a}' 
a little  to  the  right,  came  up  against  high  wire 
entanglement  absolutely  untouched,  as  at  this  point 
in  the  line  there  were  a number  of  trees  which  pre- 
vented the  full  force  of  our  wire-cutting  bombard- 
ment being  felt.  Colonel  Brakspear,  who  had  given 
man}"  proofs  of  his  bravery  dmtiig  the  war,  tried, 
with  Lieutenant  Tyson,  to  force  his  way  through 
the  entanglement,  but  it  was  impossible,  and  both 
officers,  with  many  of  their  men,  were  mowii  down 
by  the  Germans.  Lieutenant  Fisher,  wnth  No.  2 
Company,  on  arriving,  found  the  line  held  up,  and 
likewise  failed  to  get  through  the  ware,  being  wounded 
in  the  attempt. 

For  some  unknowm  reason  it  had  been  reported 
to  Colonel  Ormsby,  commanding  the  2/3rd  Gurkhas, 
that  our  distinguishing  flags  had  been  seen  w aving 
in  the  German  trenches,  but  that  a gap  existed 
between  the  left  of  the  Gmkhas  and  the  right  of  the 
Leicesters.  To  fill  this  gap,  Subadar  Bhim  Sing 
with  A Company  was  sent  forward,  and  he  too 
disappeared  into  the  haze.  On  reaching  the  vicinity 
of  the  German  line,  he  found  that  the  attack  had 
failed,  and  that  the  parapet,  wherever  any  of 
it  remained,  was  strongl}^  manned,  while  enfilade 
machine-gun  fire  was  being  poured  into  our  men 
from  both  flanks. 

He  reported  that  the  remnant  of  the  Leicesters 
and  2/3rd  Gurkhas  w^ere  taking  cover  in  ditches  as 
best  they  could,  and  later,  orders  wmrc  received  to 


410 


THE  BATTLE  OF  LOOS 


try  to  dribble  the  men  back  as  opportunity  offered. 
The  Giu’khas  Avere  finally  relieved  by  the  Hehra  Dun 
Brigade  at  1 p.m.,  the  relief  being  much  delayed  by 
the  numbers  of  wounded  who  were  still  crawling  back 
over  the  parapet. 

The  2/.‘Jrd  Giu’khas  suffered  heavy  losses  in  this 
action,  in  which  thcyfoiight  with  the  utmost  gallantry, 
but  no  gallantry  can  prevail  against  uncut  wLe  and 
entilade  machinc-gun  lire.  Thirty-five  dead  Gurkhas 
were  seen  lying  on  the  front  of  the  German  parapet, 
and  it  was  believed  that  a small  party  of  men  fought 
their  way  into  the  trench,  where,  as  far  as  is  known, 
they  were,  with  one  exception,  killed,  as  the  total 
number  of  'prisoners  of  war  belonging  to  this  battalion 
does  not  exceed  ten  for  the  whole  campaign. 

Lieutenant AVood,  with  only  four  men,  is  reported 
to  have  pushed  his  way  through  the  wire  into  the 
German  trench,  where  he  and  his  men  were  killed. 
The  few  lanes  cut  in  the  wire  were  piled  in  places 
four  and  five  deep  with  dead  Gurkhas. 

The  casualties  were  as  follows  : — Killed  : Lt- 
Colonel  W.  R.  Brakspear,  Lieutenant  T.  P.  Wood, 
2nd  Lieutenant  Tyson,  2 Gurkha  officers,  and  31 
other  ranks.  Wounded  : Lieutenants  W.  G.  Bagot- 
Chester  and  G.  T.  Fisher,  3 Gurkha  officers  and 
126  others.  Missing  : 64  other  ranks  ; a total  of  231. 

During  this  action  a deed  which  could  hardly  be 
siu’passed  for  sheer  bravery  and  self-sacrifice  was 
performed  by  Rifleman  Kulbir  Thapa.  He  is  the 
exception  noted  above,  as  having  entered  the  German 
trench  and  escaped  alive.  Kulbir  succeeded,  after 
being  wounded,  in  getting  through  the  wire  in  some 
extraordinary  way  and  charged  straight  tlnough  the 
German  trench.  In  rear  of  it  he  found  a badly 


Rii'i.Emax  Kuebir  Thapa,  V.C.,  2ND  Bx  3RD  Gurkha  Rifdes. 


410.] 


T.-r^ 


9 


KULBIR  THAPA’S  V.C. 


411 


injured  man  of  the  2nd  Leicesters.  The  wounded 
man  begged  Kulbir  Thapa  to  leave  him  and  save 
himself,  but  the  Gimkha  refused  to  do  so,  and  remained 
by  his  side  throughout  the  day  and  the  following 
night. 

Luckily,  there  was  a heavy  mist  on  the  morning 
of  the  26th  September,  of  which  Kulbir  took  advan- 
tage to  bring  the  man  out  through  the  German  wire. 
He  succeeded,  after  hairbreadth  escapes,  in  doing  this 
unobserved,  and  put  the  wounded  man  in  a place 
of  safety.  Not  content  with  this,  he  retmmed  and 
rescued,  one  after  the  other,  two  wounded  Gurkhas. 
He  then  went  back  again  and  brought  in  the  British 
soldier  in  broad  daylight,  carrying  him  most  of  the 
way  under  fire  from  the  enemy. 

For  these  successive  acts  of  extreme  bravery 
Rifleman  Kulbir  Thana  received  the  Victoria  Cross, 
and  it  will  be  agreed  that  seldom,  if  ever,  has  this 
supreme  reward  of  valour  been  more  splendidly  won. 
The  deaths  of  officers  and  men  who  won  the  V.C. 
have  so  often  been  recorded  in  this  history,  that  it  is 
pleasant  to  mention  that  Kulbir  Thapa  survived  his 
wound,  proceeded  to  Egypt  with  his  regiment,  and 
eventualK  returned  to  India. 

The  barbarity  of  the  Germans  has  seldom  been 
more  vividly  illustrated  than  during  this  action. 
In  addition  to  the  incident  already  related  of  them 
firing  on  Lieutenant  Bagot-Chester  while  lying 
wounded,  at  a distance  of  15  yards,  it  is  on  record  that 
on  the  morning  of  the  26th  September,  diming  the 
dense  fog  which  enabled  Kulbir  Thapa  to  perform 
his  deeds  of  heroism,  numbers  of  Germans  left  them 
trenches  for  the  express  purpose  of  shooting  and 
bayoneting  our  wounded.  This  information  was 


412 


44 IK  BA4’'rLE  OK  LOOS 


.sii])j)licd  by  wounded  lucii  who  escaped  by  [cigning 
dcatli,  and  the  evidence  is  sufficient  to  establish  the 
chai'ge. 

4’he  2iid  Leiccsters,  on  the  left  of  the  2/3i(l 
Oni’khas,  seid.  their  hrst  line  over  the  parapet  at 
()  a. in.,  closely  followed  by  the  second,  the  third  and 
ionrth  lines  at  once  filling  their  places  in  the  trench. 
44iey  moved  forward  ra])idly,  but  a number  were 
affected  by  the  gas,  and  great  difficulty  was  ex- 
perienced in  keeping  the  right  direction  owing  to 
the  smoke. 

tfasnalties  began  as  soon  as  our  men  were  in  the 
0])en,  and  the  third  line  was  sent  out  to  fill  up  gaj)S, 
tolloAved  by  the  fourth  line.  4’he  attack  dashed  on, 
but  A Company,  on  the  extreme  left,  ran  into  heavy 
rifle  and  machine-gun  fire,  which  caused  a large 
number  of  casualties,  including  all  the  officers  and 
most  of  the  non-commissioned  officers  of  the 
company. 

Major  Lewis  showed  conspicuous  gallantry  and 
ability  during  this  action,  in  which  he  was  second  in 
command.  Shortly  after  the  attack  was  launched, 
he  was  wounded  in  the  neck  by  shrapnel,  but  re- 
mained at  his  post  for  three  hours,  and  returned  as 
soon  as  his  wound  had  been  dressed.  When  Colonel 
Gordon  was  wounded  at  about  3.30  p.in..  Major 
Lewis  took  command  of  the  battalion.  He  had 
previously  been  brought  to  notice  for  gallant  conduct, 
and  was  now  awarded  the  D.S.O. 

vStill  undaunted,  the  left  of  the  Leiccsters  went 
forward,  and,  scrambling  through  the  wire,  were  in 
the  German  front  line  by  6.10  a.m.,  when  their 
distinguishing  flag  was  seen  flying  over  the  enemy’s 
position.  Carrying  on  their  rush  still  further,  a 


CONFLICTING  REPORTS 


413 


portion  of  the  left  of  tlie  battalion  reached  the  road 
from  Mauquissart  to  the  “ Duck’s  Bill.” 

Captain  Wilson,  whose  name  had  several  times 
been  brought  to  notice  for  gallantry  and  determina- 
tion, was  severely  wounded  while  issuing  final 
instructions  to  his  men  before  the  advance,  but  he 
refused  to  give  in,  and  went  forward  with  the  attack 
until  he  could  see  that  the  men  were  over  the  German 
parapet.  He  was  then  taken  back  in  a state  of 
collapse.  For  his  conspicuous  gallantry  he  received 
the  D.S.O. 

The  general  position  was  now  extremely  obscure. 
Conflicting  reports  came  in  one  after  the  other,  and 
at  first  it  was  believed  that  the  enem3ds  front  line 
had  been  captured.  This  was  later  found  to  be 
incorrect,  and  at  7 a.m.  there  was  no  doubt  that  the 
right  of  the  Garhwal  Brigade  had  been  held  up  bj^  the 
German  wire,  in  which  such  gaps  as  existed  had  been 
fiUed  by  the  enemy  with  rolls  of  French  whe.  On 
the  left,  however,  the  2/ 8th  Gurkhas  and  a portion 
of  the  2nd  Leicester’s  had  got  through  the  front 
trenches,  but  only  with  very  heavy  losses,  especially 
in  officers. 

The  progress  of  this  action  cannot  be  recorded 
with  accuracjq  owing  to  the  impossibility  of  observa- 
tion from  our  front-line  trenches,  due  to  the  impene- 
trable wall  of  smoke  and  gas,  which  was  rendered 
even  more  opaque  by  the  dampness  of  the  ah. 
Secondl^q  as  reported  by  General  Jacob,  the  heavy 
losses  of  officers,  especially  of  those  who  would  have 
been  able  to  throw  light  on  obscure  points,  prevents 
certainty  as  to  the  details.  The  main  story,  how- 
ever, can  be  reconstructed  without  grave  inaccuracy. 

As  regards  the  Leicesters,  the  position  reniained 


414 


THE  BATTLE  OF  LOOS 


unchanged  throughout  the  day  until,  at  4.30  p.m., 
orders  were  received  for  the  survivors  to  get  back  to 
our  trendies  as  opportunity  offered.  The  battalion 
had  fought  with  all  the  bravery  for  which  it  was 
famous,  and,  had  the  wue  in  front  of  the  right  of  the 
Garhwal  Brigade  been  cut,  there  is  little  doubt  that 
the  whole  of  the  enemy’s  first-line  trenches  would 
have  been  cajitured.  As  it  was,  the  holding  up  of 
the  right  and  right  centre  attacks  exposed  the  right 
of  the  left  attack  and  rendered  its  temporary  success 
of  no  avail. 

The  losses  of  the  Leicesters  were  very  heavy. 
Killed  : Captain  Boniilly  who  had  won  the  D.S.O. 
at  Neuve  Chapelle,  Captain  Deane,  R.A.M.C.,  Lieu- 
tenant Browne,  and  72  men.  Wounded:  10  officers 
and  217  others,  amongst  whom  was  Lt-Colonel 
Gordon,  D.S.O.,  the  Commanding  Officer.  Missing 
and  believed  Ivilled  : 2 officers.  Missing  and  known 
to  have  been  wounded  : 1 officer.  Missing  and  no 
trace  found : 3 officers.  Of  the  rank-and-file  96 
were  missing.  In  addition  to  these  casualties,  1 
officer  and  42  men  were  gassed,  making  a total  of 
20  officers  and  427  men. 

Inseparably  bound  up  with  the  record  of  the  2nd 
Leicesters  in  this  war  is  the  name  of  the  Reverend 
Ronald  Irwin,  the  regimental  chaplain.  Coming  from 
India  with  the  Corps,  he  was  present  at  all  the 
actions  in  which  the  battalion  was  engaged,  and,  non- 
combatant  though  he  was,  showed  on  many  occasions 
as  high  a degree  of  heroism  as  any  soldier  could  attain. 
He  accompanied  the  Indian  troops  to  Mesopotamia, 
where  he  again  displayed  the  greatest  bravery 
and  devotion  to  his  duties,  attending  the  wounded 
and  dying  under  the  heaviest  fire,  and  was 


415 


THE  2/8th  GURKHAS 

eventually  very  severely  wounded  in  carrying  a man 
out  of  action.  For  his  conspicuous  gallantry  lie 
has  received  the  D.S.O.  and  the  Military  Cross  with 
a bar. 

At  6.30  p.m.  the  remnant  of  the  battalion  was 
relieved  by  the  Garhwal  Rifles,  and  moved  into 
support  and  local  reserve  close  in  rear. 

The  2/8th  Gm’khas,  under  Lt-Colonel  G.  M. 
Morris,  were  destined  to  play  a very  gallant  part 
during  this  day’s  fighting.  The  battalion,  it  will  be 
remembered,  had  undergone  a terrible  experience 
within  a few  hours  of  its  first  arrival  in  the  trenches 
on  the  30th  October,  1914.  On  that  date  it  lost  a 
large  number  of  officers  and  men.  The  deeds  of  the 
regiment  on  the  25th  September,  1915  will  never  be 
forgotten,  and  the  memory  of  their  fallen  comrades 
was  fully  avenged,  although  at  a terrible  cost  to  the 
battalion. 

When,  as  before  stated,  the  gas  was  turned  on  at 
5.50  a.m.,  the  wind  at  once  brought  it  back  into  our 
trenches,  and  the  valves  were  therefore  closed. 

At  5.59  a.m.  G,  the  leading  company,  under  Cap- 
tain Buckland,  D.S.O. , crossed  the  parapet,  lined  up 
outside,  and  advanced  at  6 a.m.  Owing  to  the  dense 
smoke  and  mist,  it  was  impossible  to  form  an  accimate 
idea  of  the  exact  dhection,  but  as  straight  a line  as 
possible  was  taken  towards  the  German  position, 
which  was  reached  without  much  difficulty.  The 
right  of  the  company  entered  the  trench  unopposed, 
but  on  the  left  the  Germans  put  up  a fight.  Lieu- 
tenant Inglis  led  his  men  straight  at  them,  and  was 
shot  in  a hand-to-hand  struggle,  which  ended  in  the 
death  or  capture  of  all  the  defenders  of  the  trench, 
numbering  about  50  men. 


41G 


THE  BATTLE  OF  LOOS 


(!  C!om]:)any  then  pushed  on  to  the  next  German 
line  with  them  riglit  resting  on  the  road  near  a clump 
of  trees  on  the  right  of  the  objective.  A position  was 
taken  up  on  some  rising  ground  and  the  men  began 
to  dig  themselves  in.  Patrols  were  sent  out  to  both 
flanks  to  endeavour  to  establish  touch,  but  could  find 
no  trace  of  the  battalions  on  the  right  or  left.  At 
this  point  eight  Germans  were  captured  in  a dug-out, 
and  two  men  of  the  Leicesterseame  up  by  themselves, 
but  could  give  no  news  of  the  whereabouts  of  the 
remainder  of  the  battalion. 

B Company,  under  2nd  Lieutenant  Meldrum, 
which  formed  the  second  line,  advanced  immediately 
behind  Captain  Buckland,  but  in  the  fog  must  have 
swung  to  the  left  and  become  mixed  with  the 
4th  Black  Watch.  Still,  they  pressed  on  and 
rushed  the  German  trench,  where  a fight  ensued,  in 
which  IMajor  Kemball,  who  had  come  up  with  two 
platoons  in  support,  was  wounded  and  put  out  of 
action,  a number  of  other  casualties  occurring  at 
the  same  time.  The  trench  was  taken,  and  Lieu- 
tenant Meldrum,  advancing  still  further,  began 
digging  himself  in  astride  of  a communication 
trench,  a party  of  the  4th  Black  Watch  being  on  his 
right  and  some  of  the  33rd  Punjabis  eventual^ 
arriving  on  the  left. 

The  3rd  line,  which  now  formed  the  new  support, 
followed  closely  on  Major  Kemball’s  heels,  coming 
under  heavy  rifle  and  shell  fire  on  its  way  up.  Lieu- 
tenant Taylor  being  wounded  and  taken  back, 
while  a number  of  the  men  fell.  The  remainder  of 
the  company,  under  Subadar  Ransur  Rana,  succeeded 
in  getting  through  the  German  front  line,  and 
eventually  joined  Captain  Buckland. 


DEATH  OF  COLONEL  MORRIS 


417 


The  grenade  parties  then  advanced,  but  met  with 
heavy  fire,  and  Lieutenant  Bampton  was  wounded 
shortly  after  entering  the  German  trench.  With 
much  diminished  numbers  some  of  the  men  reached 
the  right  of  our  line  and  some  the  left. 

D Company,  on  its  way  up  the  communication 
trench,  came  under  fire.  Captain  Browning  being 
wounded.  Subadar  Pahalsing  Gimung  then  brought 
up  his  company,  and  with  it  a fresh  supply  of  ammu- 
nition, losing  heavily  during  the  advance. 

Colonel  Morris  and  Lieutenant  Harington,  the 
Adjutant,  came  on  with  the  last  of  D Company,  but 
at  a point  about  50  yards  from  the  British  parapet 
Colonel  Morris  was  mortally  wounded,  and  sub- 
sequently died  in  hospital  at  Merville.  Lieutenant 
Harington  at  once  tried  to  get  his  Commanding 
Officer  back  into  oiu?  trench,  but  was  wounded  in  the 
attempt,  and  Colonel  Morris  was  eventually  rescued 
under  heavy  fire  by  Lance-Corporal  S.  W.  Evans, 
2nd  Leicesters.  Dying  as  he  was,  but  ever  forgetful 
of  himself  in  his  care  for  others.  Colonel  Morris 
specially  requested  that  this  brave  soldier  miglit  be 
rewarded  for  his  gallantry. 

At  the  same  time  two  machine  guns  came  up,  but 
the  officer.  Lieutenant  Ryall,  was  mortally  wounded. 

The  position  at  this  juncture  was  as  follows  : — 

Captain  Buckland,  with  the  siu’vivors  of  a party 
of  150  men  and  two  machine  guns,  was  holding  his 
ground  near  the  Moulin.  In  front  was  a strong 
party  of  Germans,  who  were  keeping  up  an  incessant 
fire.  These  Captain  Buckland  engaged  and  finally 
dispersed. 

Lieutenant  Meldrum  with  60  men  was  astride  a 
communication  trench  in  front  of  the  Moulin  du 

2 E 


418 


THE  BATTLE  OF  LOOS 


Pietre,  which  was  very  strongly  held  by  the  enemy, 
who  poured  a hail  of  bullets  on  to  the  devoted  little 
party. 

Captain  Buckland  saw  that,  unless  at  once  rein- 
forced, his  position  would  rapidly  become  very 
critical.  He  made  up  his  mind  to  risk  crossing  the 
fire-swe])t  zone  between  his  position  and  our  original 
front  line,  and  taking  two  men  with  him  to  ensure  the 
arrival  of  the  message  in  the  event  of  his  being  killed 
on  the  way,  he  succeeded  in  reaching  our  trench. 
Here  he  informed  the  Staff  Captain,  Bareilly  Brigade, 
of  his  position,  and  asked  the  Officer  Commanding 
the  33rd  Punjabis  to  arrange  with  the  4th  Black 
Watch,  which  was  the  nearest  battalion  of  Bareilly, 
to  link  up  with  him. 

He  then  took  two  of  his  own  signallers  to  attempt 
to  lay  a telephone  line  up  to  the  advanced  position. 
With  them  went  the  artillery  observation  officer  and 
two  signallers,  and  together  they  started  back. 
Before  they  had  gone  far,  the  artillery  officer  was 
kdled,  and  presumably  the  signallers  also,  as  Captain 
Buckland  was  the  only  one  to  complete  the  journey. 
On  his  arrival  he  found  that  the  Germans  had  begun 
to  come  in  from  the  right,  bombing  along  the  trench. 
They  had  been  most  gallantly  counter-attacked  by  a 
party  led  by  Subadar  Sarbjit  Gurung,  which  fought 
with  superb  bravery  against  overwhelming  odds,  but 
was  killed  to  the  last  man,  one  of  our  machine  guns 
being  also  put  out  of  action  by  a bomb. 

Subadar  Sarbjit  Gurung  was  posthumously 
awarded  the  2nd  Class,  Indian  Order  of  Merit  in 
recognition  of  his  bravery  and  self-devotion. 

The  fact  was  that  the  Germans,  finding  that  our 
right  attack  had  been  finally  held  up,  had  occupied 


CAPTAIN  BUCKLAND,  RS.O.  419 

some  houses  on  that  flank,  where  they  had  posted 
a machine  gun,  and  the  footing  which  they  thus 
obtained  in  the  front  trench  enabled  them  to  bomb 
the  Gurldias  from  behind. 

Captain  Buckland  was  now  in  a most  dangerous 
position,  as  his  small  party  was  isolated,  and,  with 
the  exception  of  himself,  no  British  officer  had  escaped 
being  killed  or  wounded.  Lieutenant  Meldrum  having 
just  then  been  killed  by  the  Are  from  a trench  in  his 
front.  On  his  death.  Jemadar  Rimani  Thapa  took 
command,  and  held  on  until  all  the  troops  on  his  flank 
had  retired,  when  he  was  forced  to  leave,  as  one  of 
our  own  shells  had  burst  in  the  middle  of  his  party, 
reducing  its  number  to  about  30  men.  On  his  way 
back  he  made  stands  in  the  German  trenches  before 
finally  retiring  to  the  British  line. 

Captain  Buckland’s  strength  was  novv^  under 
100,  but,  determined  not  to  give  ground,  he  swung 
back  his  right  flank  and  organized  bombing  parties 
in  each  of  the  German  lines.  On  his  left  were  some 
small  parties  of  the  4th  Black  Watch,  with  whom  he 
established  communication.  Grenades  had  run  out, 
but  a number  of  German  bombs  were  collected  and 
used  with  good  effect  on  the  enemy,  who  were  still 
pressing  on. 

It  vv^as  evident  that  the  position  was  no  longer 
tenable  unless  reinforcements  were  immediately  forth- 
coming. Once  more  Captain  Buckland  accepted  the 
risk  of  going  back.  He  left  Subadar  Ransur  Rana 
in  charge,  with  instructions  to  keep  touch  with  the 
4th  Black  Watch.  He  then  retmmed  with  a havildar 
and  two  men,  one  named  Bahadur  Pun  carrying  the 
damaged  machine  gun,  and  the  other,  Ratbaran 
Gurung,  the  captured  German  gun. 


420 


THE  BATTLE  OF  LOOS 


Together  they  crawled  back  under  very  lieavy 
fire,  still  clinging  to  the  guns  for  which  they  had 
risked  so  much.  Bahadur  Pun  was  seen  to  arrive  with 
his  gun  at  oiu’  parapet,  and  Ratbaran  Gurung  was 
eventually  found  wounded  in  a field  ambulance, 
having,  after  all,  succeeded  in  bringing  in  his  trophy. 

Captain  Buckland  and  the  havildar  got  safely 
back,  in  spite  of  the  heavy  fire  through  which  they 
passed,  and  the  former,  as  the  senior  officer  left  rvith 
the  battalion,  was  ordered  to  take  command  in  our 
trench  and  to  issue  instructions  for  the  2/8th  to  hold 
on  to  tlieir  ]:)osition,  bombing  u])  both  flanks  to  gain 
touch  with  the  Leicesters  on  the  right  and  the  Black 
Watch  on  the  left. 

'I’he  orders  were  easy  to  issue,  but  impossible  to 
cany  out.  The  advanced  party  of  the  2/8th,  under 
Subadar  Ransur  Rana,  was  already  in  touch  with 
a few  men  of  the  Black  Watch,  but  the  Leicesters 
had  not  reached  the  enemy’s  second  line,  and  touch 
could  therefore  not  be  established  with  them. 

The  havildar  who  had  accompanied  Captain 
Buckland  was  sent  back  with  a signaller,  but  was 
heavily  fired  on  and  had  to  return  with  the  report 
that  it  was  impossible  to  get  through.  It  was  now 
obvious  that  the  Germans  were  again  holding  their 
front  line,  and  had  cut  off  Subadar  Ransur  Rana  and 
his  party.  This  took  place,  as  far  as  can  be  gathered, 
at  about  3 p.m.,  but  firing  was  heard  from  the  direction 
of  the  spot  where  the  heroic  band  of  Gurkhas  was 
besieged  until  about  noon  next  day,  when  it  gradually 
died  down,  and  the  last  act  of  the  tragedy  was 
complete. 

From  the  available  information  as  to  the  total 
number  of  prisoners  of  the  2/8th  Gurkhas  now  in  the 


421 


THE  2/8x11  GURKHAS 

hands  of  the  Germans,  it  seems  probable  that  few 
of  Subadar  Ransim  Rana’s  party  survived.  Deter- 
mined to  take  their  full  toll  for  the  loss  of  their 
officers  and  comrades  on  the  30th  October,  1914, 
they  appear  to  have  fought  until  their  ammunition 
was  expended  and  they  w'ere  overwhelmed.  Amongst 
the  survivors,  happily,  was  Subadar  Ransur  Rana, 
now  a prisoner  in  Germany. 

The  losses  of  the  2/8th  Gm’khas  were  as  follows, 
and  the  mixed  condition  to  which  many  Indian 
regiments  had  now  been  reduced  can  be  gathered 
from  the  list  of  the  officers  : — 

Killed  : Lieutenant  C.  N.  D.  Inglis,  and  2nd  Lieu- 
tenant A.  E.  Meldrum,  Indian  Army  Reserve  of 
Officers  (I.A.R.O.). 

Died  of  wounds : Lt-Colonel  G.  M.  Morris 
(2/8th  Ginkhas),  Lieutenant  A,  M.  Taylor  (1st 
Brahmans),  and  Lieutenant  R.  W.  Ryall  (2/8th 
Gurkhas. 

Wounded : Major  G.  Kemball  (31st  Punjabis), 
Captain  E.  R.  L.  Browning  (1st  Brahmans),  Lieu- 
tenant H.  R.  Harington  (l/8th  Gm’khas),  2nd  Lieu- 
tenant J.  A.  H.  Bampton  (I.A.R.O.). 

It  is  thus  seen  that  of  the  9 officer  casualties  out 
of  a total  strength  of  12  combatant  officers,  only  2 
belongred  to  the  battalion. 

o 

Of  the  Gm’kha  officers,  2 were  killed,  1 was 
wounded,  and  5 were  missing.  In  the  ranks  there 
were  18  killed,  151  w ounded,  and  295  missing,  making 
a total  of  481  casualties.* 

Lieutenant  Harington  and  iSubadar  Sarbjit 
Gurung  w^ere  mentioned  in  despatches. 


* The  total  casualties  (excluding  sick)  of  the  2/Sth  Gurkha  Ilillcs  in 
France  amounted  to  40  British,  27  Gurkha  officers,  and  1350  other  ranks. 


422 


THE  BATTLE  OF  LOOS 


Of  tlie  two  battalions  in  reserve,  the  l/3i'cl  Londons 
eontinned  to  liold  the  “ Duck’s  Bill  ” throughout 
the  day,  and  escaped  with  a casualty  list  of  only  52. 
Amongst  these  were  2nd  Lieutenant  Gedge  killed, 
cxnd  Major  Beresford  gassed. 

The  39th  Garhw^alis,  under  Lt-Colonel  Drake- 
Brockman,  had  orders  to  move  up  as  soon  as  the  mine 
was  exploded,  and  to  hold  the  front  of  the  Brigade. 
Accordingly  they  at  once  began  to  file  up  the  three 
communication  trenches,  but  were  soon  totally 
blocked  by  the  numbers  of  wounded  and  gassed  men 
of  the  Leicesters  and  2/3rd  Gurkhas  who  were  crowd- 
ing back  ; only  the  left  company  of  the  GarliAvalis 
was  able  to  get  into  its  place  in  the  front  trench. 

At  about  8.30  a.m.  the  Garhwalis  were  ordered 
to  send  half  the  battalion  and  two  bombing  parties 
to  reinforce  the  left  of  the  Leicesters,  and  then  to 
clear  the  German  trenches  in  order  to  assist  the 
Leicesters’  riglit  frontal  attack.  B}'^  9 a.m.,  however, 
it  was  veiy  doubtful  whether  the  Leicesters  had 
succeeded  in  breaking  tlnough  any  portion  of  the 
enemy’s  front,  so  the  Garhwalis  were  directed  to 
put  in  liaK  tlie  battalion  and  two  bombing  parties 
behind  the  2/8th  Gurkhas  to  work  towards  the  right, 
the  remaining  half- battalion  and  bombers  meantime 
working  towards  the  left. 

The  idea  of  this  move  was  to  work  inwards,  and, 
by  attacking  the  enem3^’s  line  in  front  of  the  2/3rd 
Gurkhas  and  Leicesters,  to  assist  their  advance. 

The  message  was  received  at  the  Leicesters’ 
head  quarters  at  10.15  a.m.,  but  took  an  hour  longer 
to  reach  Colonel  Drake-Brockman.  This  was  due  to 
the  fact  that  the  Garhwalis  were  occup^dng  a front 
of  about  600  vards,  while  the  congested  state  of  the 


SITUATION  DOUBTFUL 


423 


trenches,  which  were  also  deep  in  mud  and  water, 
rendered  movement  almost  impossible,  even  a single 
man  taking  a long  time  to  advance  fifty  yards. 
To  add  to  the  trouble,  the  Dehra  Dun  Brigade  now 
began  to  arrive,  and  the  trenches  were  completely 
blocked,  rendering  it  impossible  to  organize  the 
Garhwalis’  attack,  and  it  was  not  until  2.30  p.m.  that 
the  companies  could  be  got  into  position.  By  this 
time  the  propitious  moment  had  passed. 

The  original  orders,  received  at  about  10.30  a.m., 
were  for  the  Dehra  Dun  Brigade  to  advance  through 
the  German  trenches  and  establish  itself  on  the  line 
Haut  Pommereau — La  Cliqueterie,  and  by  2.15  p.m. 
the  Brigade  was  concentrated  in  position  to  advance 
in  the  following  order  from  right  to  left : 4th  Sea- 
forths,  2/2nd  Gurkhas,  1st  Seaforths,  9th  Gurkhas. 

It  became  necessary,  however,  to  cancel  these 
orders  when  it  was  certain  that  the  attack  of  the 
BareiUy  Brigade,  at  first  highly  successful,  had  been 
driven  back,  and  that  the  Germans  had  reoccupied 
their  front-line  trenches.  Orders  were  then  issued  for 
the  Brigade  to  attempt  to  establish  touch  with  an}^ 
British  troops  still  remaining  in  the  German  trenches. 

Accordingly  a company  of  the  1st  Seaforths  was 
ordered  to  advance  on  the  left  and  a company  of 
the  2/2nd  Gmkhas  on  the  right.  Before  the  move 
commenced,  it  was  reported  that  no  British  troops, 
other  than  killed  or  wounded,  were  now  in  the  enemy’s 
trenches  on  the  left.  The  advance  of  the  Seaforth 
company  was  therefore  countermanded.  As  there 
was  still  some  doubt  as  to  the  situation  on  the  right, 
one  company  of  the  2/2nd  Gurkhas  and  two  of  the 
39th  Garhwalis  were  launched. 

A small  German  flag  was  now  seen  floating  over 


424 


4M4E  BATTLE  OE  LOOS 


the  enemy’s  front  line,  and  the  second  that  out  ineil 
crossed  the  parapet  they  came  under  a hot  fire  from 
all  directions,  chiefly  from  machine  guns,  and  were 
held  up  at  the  first  rush,  when  they  had  at  once  to 
take  what  cover  they  could  find  in  the  long  grass  and 
the  folds  of  the  ground.  It  was  obviously  im- 
possible to  make  any  further  progress  without  a fresh 
artillery  preparation,  so  the  attacking  troops  were 
ordered  to  get  back  as  opportunity  offered. 

I’he  company  of  the  39th  Garhwalis  was  led  b}^ 
2nd  Lieutenant  liana  Jodha  Jang  with  great  courage, 
which,  coupled  with  his  gallantry  on  a subsequent 
occasion,  gained  him  the  Military  Cross. 

The  casualties  of  the  2/2nd  Gurkhas  were:  3 
killed,  18  V oundcd,  and  2 missing  ^ while  the  39th 
during  the  day  lost  4 men  killed,  1 British  officer, 
2 Garlnv  ali  officers  and  40  men  wounded,  26  men  being 
missing. 

Gur  inabilit}"  to  attain  the  whole  objective  was 
attributed  to  the  following  chief  causes  : — 

(1)  The  fact  that  the  wire  was  uncut  in  front  of 
the  Leicesters  and  2/3rd  Gm’khas. 

(2)  The  unfavourable  wind  and  weather  con- 
ditions. These  induced  a thick  fog  between  our  line 
and  that  of  the  enemy,  which  lasted  over  an  hour, 
and  prevented  all  observation  of  the  progress  of  the 
attack.  It  hampered  our  men  instead  of  the  Germans, 
and  caused  several  of  the  lines  of  assault  to  lose  their 
direction  owing  to  its  density.  The  gas  also  recoiled 
and  added  to  the  congestion  in  the  trenches  by 
forcing  our  men  back.  This  led  to  a delay  in  getting 
up  reserves,  as  messengers  could  not  circulate 
freely. 

In  conclusion,  the  words  of  Brigadier-General 


GALLANTP.Y  OF  ALL  RANKS 


425 


Blackader,  Commanding  tho  Garhwal  Brigade,  may 
be  quoted ; — 

“ I would  bring  to  notice  the  gallant  conduct  and 
fine  spirit  that  animated  all  ranks  of  the  assaultin 
battalions.  They  did  all  that  was  possible,  and 
sufficient  testimony  is  the  number  of  dead  and 
wounded  that  lay  in  front  of  the  German  wire  which 
barred  their  further  advance.” 


to  c3 


CHAPTER  XXIIl 

THE  BATTLE  OF  LOOS — Continued 

Attack  by  the  Bareilly  Brigade — Effects  of  our  gas  on  the  2nd  Black 
Watch — Enemy’s  lines  penetrated  up  to  the  Moulin  du  Pi^tre — 
(lallantry  of  all  units  engaged — Captains  Park  and  Buchan,  2nd 
Black  Watch,  win  the  I).S.O. — Enemy  reoccupies  front-line  trenches — 
5Sth  Rifles  having  advanced  contrary  to  orders,  General  Norie  left 
without  reserve — Our  troops,  outflanked  on  both  sides,  compelled 
to  retire — Heavy  losses  of  troops  engaged — Remarks  by  Generals 
Jacob  and  Norie — Causes  of  failure  of  attack — Remarks  by  Sir  John 
French  and  Sir  Douglas  Haig. 

We  must  now  turn  to  the  operations  of  the  Bareilly 
Brigade  under  the  command  of  Brigadier-General 

C.  Norie. 

As  before  mentioned,  the  order  of  battalions  from 
right  to  left  was  as  follows:  l/4th  Black  Watch, 
69th  Punjabis  and  2nd  Black  Watch  in  the  front 
line,  with  the  33rd  Punjabis  and  58th  Rifles  in  reserve. 

At  6 a.m.  on  the  25th  September,  1915,  two  minutes 
after  the  explosion  of  our  mine,  which  was  situated 
at  a distance  of  about  130  yards  from  the  trench 
occupied  by  the  2nd  Black  Watch,  the  assaulting 
infantry  advanced  with  a rush. 

The  2nd  Black  Watch,  under  Major  Wauchope, 

D. S.O.,  who  were  to  leeward  of  the  Brigade  front, 
received  the  full  effects  of  our  gas,  which  was  at  once 
blown  back  across  the  parapet.  A number  of  men 
were  disabled  by  this  unlucky  occurrence,  but  the 
remainder  raced  out  of  sight  into  the  pall  of  smoke 


OUR  GAS  RECOILS  427 

which  hid  them  alike  from  our  view  and  that  of  the 
enemy. 

No.  1 Company,  under  Captain  W.  Wilson,  got 
across  with  few  casualties  and  occupied  the  enemy’s 
trench.  Meeting  with  little  opposition,  they  pressed 
on,  the  wire  having  been  thoroughly  disposed  of  by 
our  guns.  No.  2 Company  under  Captain  Park  and 
No.  3 under  Captain  Denison  followed  close  on  their 
heels,  leaving  No.  4 under  Captain  Buchan  to  bring 
up  ammunition,  tools,  etc.  With  No.  3 Company 
went  Major  Wauchope. 

By  7 a.m.  Captains  Park  and  Denison  had  secured 
the  left  flank  of  their  advance  and  double-blocked  the 
German  trenches.  No.  4 Company,  under  Captain 
Buchan,  although  the  last  to  start,  had  caught  up 
and  pushed  on  for  the  Moulin  du  Pietre  and  the 
enemy’s  second  line  of  trenches,  pressing  back  the 
Germans  as  they  advanced. 

Major  Wauchope  now  established  his  Head 
Quarters  in  the  German  first  line,  and  along  the 
whole  front  of  his  battalion  the  enemv  was  being 
steadily  driven  back  on  to  his  second  position.  This 
was  reported,  and  arrangements  were  made  for  the 
left  to  be  held  by  a battalion  of  the  60th  Brigade  of 
the  3rd  Corps,  as  that  flank  was  dangerously  exposed 
for  a distance  of  some  600  yards.  The  69th  Punjabis 
were  meantime  doing  good  work  on  the  right,  and 
some  of  the  58th  Rifles  also  came  up,  and  together 
all  fought  their  way  towards  the  Moulin  du  Pietre. 

A number  of  officers  and  men  of  the  2nd  Black 
Watch  had  been  overcome  by  the  gas  before  they 
reached  the  German  front  line,  and  by  7 a.m.  12 
officers  out  of  20,  as  well  as  a large  number  of  men, 
had  been  put  out  of  action. 


428 


THE  I5ATTLE  OE  LOOS 


III  order  iiiiinediately  to  close  as  much  as  possible 
of  the  gap  of  600  yards  which  existed  between  Cajitain 
Buchan  and  the  left  company,  Subadar  Tika  Khan 
of  tlie  58th  Regiment,  by  Major  Wauchope’s  orders, 
took  his  Double  Company  out  of  the  second  line, 
which  was  overcrowded,  and  lining  a ditch  which 
ran  back  in  the  required  dhection,  filled  up  about 
180  yards. 

Moving  to  the  right.  Major  Wauchope  found 
Colonels  Ridgway  (33rd  Punjabis)  and  Walker  (1 /4th 
Black  Watch),  and  with  them  came  to  the  conclusion 
that  unless  the  Garhwal  Brigade  as  a whole  succeeded 
in  getting  forward,  the  4th  Black  Watch,  whose  right 
hank  was  exposed,  would  be  unable  to  hold  on. 
At  this  moment,  however,  some  of  the  2/8th  Gurkhas 
were  seen  on  the  right,  and  it  was  hoped  that  that 
flank  was  fahly  secm’e.  'To  make  doubly  sure.  Colonel 
IValker  kept  the  l/4th  Black  Watch  in  a trench  in 
rear  of  the  2/8th,  while  Colonel  Ridgway  remained 
where  he  was,  the  33rd  thus  forming  a central 
reserve  against  a possible  attack  from  either  flank. 

The  enemy  was  now  keeping  up  a very  severe 
shell  and  rifle  fire  and  casualties  were  numerous. 

At  1 1 a.m.  the  situation  was  very  mixed.  Captain 
Buchan,  with  about  80  men,  was  holding  the  enemy’s 
second  line  opposite  the  Moulin.  To  his  left  rear, 
200  men  of  the  58th  Rifles  held  about  180  yards  of 
the  same  line,  while  in  his  right  rear  were  parties  of 
the  58th,  69th,  and  33rd.  Lieutenant  Meldrum, 
with  about  80  of  the  2/8th  Gurkhas,  was  holding  the 
ground  immediately  on  Captain  Buchan’s  right, 
while  a short  distance  behind  him  were  most  of  the 
4th  Black  Watch. 

At  about  this  time  the  first  touch  was  established 


OUR  TROOPS  RETIRE 


429 


with  the  GOth  Brigade,  when  a detachment  of  the 
12th  Rifle  Brigade  took  over  the  blocks  established 
by  Captain  Park  on  the  left  of  the  German  first  line. 
They  further  extended  from  the  enemy’s  front-line 
trench  towards  the  Moulin,  one  company  being  placed 
in  a natural  ditch  by  Major  Wauchope. 

Captain  Park  reorganized  his  men  and  moved 
towards  the  right  of  the  Moulin  du  Pietre,  but  before 
he  had  got  half-way,  saw  our  troops  retiring. 

The  cause  of  this  retirement  was  threefold. 

(1)  The  left  of  the  line  was  blocked  by  Captain 
Buchan’s  party,  but  there  was  no  natural  feature 
in  his  rear  to  give  protection,  and  the  Germans  broke 
through  the  gap  on  his  left. 

(2)  The  right  of  the  Brigade  was  unguarded 
except  by  a few  of  the  2/8th  Gurkhas,  v'ho  had 
gallantly  fought  their  way  through  to  a point  on 
the  right  of  the  Moulin  and  to  the  right  front  of  the 
69th.  This  small  party  held  on  while  the  enemy  was 
trying  to  get  round  them. 

(3)  The  heavy  losses  of  officers  made  reorganiza- 
tion very  difficult,  while  the  crushing  rifle  fire  and 
bombing  which  were  kept  up  by  the  enemy  rendered 
it  almost  impossible  to  take  up  a new  position 
immediately  in  rear. 

About  11.30  a.m.  the  Germans  made  a powerful 
counter-attack,  bombing  and  pouring  in  on  our  right 
flank  which  gave  way  after  a brave  but  vain  attempt 
to  stem  the  flood.  The  troops  in  front  of  the  Moulin 
were  now  attacked  from  their  right  rear,  and  shortly 
afterwards  those  on  the  left  found  themselves  almost 
cut  off,  with  the  result  that  each  section  bad  to  give 
ground  in  order  to  preserve  a possible  line  of  retreat. 

The  gap  on  the  left  of  the  line  appears  to  liave 


430 


THE  BATTLE  OF  LOOS 


been  caused  by  the  non-appearance  of  the  remaining 
companies  of  the  12th  Rifle  Brigade,  which  were 
intended  to  fill  the  opening  between  the  company 
which  Maj  or  Wauchope  had  placed  in  a ditch  running 
towards  the  Moulin  and  the  58th  Rifles.  Had  this 
gap  been  filled,  it  was  believed  that  the  left  flank 
would  have  been  secure,  but  before  noon,  when  the 
retirement  commenced.  Major  Wauchope  saw  no 
signs  of  the  advance  of  the  rest  of  the  12th  Rifle 
Brigade,  and  the  bombs  of  the  one  company  which 
was  in  the  liiie  had.  run  out  at  a very  early  stage. 
The  bombs  also  of  the  Bareillv  Brigade  were  soon 
expended,  and  the  intense  fire  kept  up  by  the  enemy 
prevented  further  supplies  from  being  brought  up. 

The  result  was  that  from  the  moment  the  German 
counter-attack  commenced,  we  were  outbombed. 
One  officer  reported : “ We  held  the  flanks  until  all 
our  bombs  were  finished,  using  in  the  process  35 
German  bombs.”  Another  states  : “ The  men  were 
most  ready  to  make  a series  of  stands  during  the 
retirement,  but  whenever  a stand  was  prolonged, 
the  Germans  came  bombing  up  from  trenches  on 
either  flank.”  Again:  “The  two  companies  of  the 
Rifle  Brigade  apparently  relied  on  their  Brigade 
bombers  both  for  bombers  and  supplies  of  bombs, 
and  when  pressed  by  German  bombing  parties,  were 
unable  to  resist  them,  having  few,  if  any,  trained 
bombers  or  bombs.  They  were  driven  from  the 
‘ blocks  ’ they  had  taken  over.” 

The  German  re-action  was  pressed  with  the 
utmost  vigour  and  method  from  the  front  and  both 
flanks.  A number  of  the  enemy  still  lurked  in  the 
trenches  which  we  had  captured,  but  had  not 
sufficiently  searched.  These  men  now  fired  into 


SITUATION  AT  NOON 


431 


our  troops  from  behind,  and  appear  to  have  singled  out 
officers,  for  our  loss  in  this  respect  was  very  heavy^ 

At  about  noon  the  situation  was  as  follows. 

On  the  right  of  the  Moulin  du  Pietre  no  British 
troops  remained,  all  having  been  forced  back. 
Those  in  the  centre  were  slowly  retiring  with  their 
right  rear  threatened.  The  troops  on  the  left, 
opposite  the  Moulin,  consisting  chie%  of  2nd  Black 
Watch  and  58th  Rifles,  were  still  holding  on,  but 
the  Germans,  in  consequence  of  the  retirement  of 
the  12th  Rifle  Brigade,  were  able  to  pour  fire  into 
them  from  trenches  in  their  left  rear.  By  12.30  p.m. 
they  were  pushed  out  towards  them  right  rear,  both 
flanks  were  m the  ah?  and  the  direct  line  of  retreat 
was  almost  cut.  Lt-Colonel  Davidson-Houston,  of 
the  58th  Rifles,  and  Captain  Buchan,  2nd  Black 
Watch,  then  together  carried  out  the  retirement. 

This  delicate  operation  was  most  successfully 
and  steadily  performed,  the  men  halting  and  fii’ing 
at  intervals,  until  finally,  most  of  them  got  back  into 
our  front  line  on  both  sides  of  Winchester  Road, 
the  light  casualties  during  this  movement,  in  spite 
of  the  heavy  and  accurate  fire  of  the  enem}^  being 
due  to  the  steadiness  of  the  men  and  the  skill  with 
which  the  operation  Avas  conducted. 

Major  Wauchope,  who  had  been  half  stunned  by 
a bomb,  but  was,  as  always,  resolute  to  remain  in 
action,  was  the  last  to  retire.  With  him  were  eight 
of  the  2nd  Black  Watch,  and  the  party,  closelv 
followed  by  bombs  and  rifle  fire,  reached  our  front 
trench  by  about  1.30  p.m. 

The  losses  of  the  2nd  Black  Watch  in  officers 
were  very  heavy,  a large  number  occurring  diming 
the  first  15  minutes  of  the  attack.  These  were : — 


432 


THE  BATTLE  OF  LOOS 


Killed : Captain  A.  C.  Denison,  Lieutenants 
Balfoiir-Melville,  Henderson,  Sotlieby,  and  Macleod. 
To  these  must  be  added  10  officers  wounded,  making 
a total  of  15  out  of  20  actuall3"  in  action. 

In  the  ranks : killed,  38  ; wounded,  261 ; missing, 
49.  Total  of  all  ranks,  363. 

Captains  Park  and  Buchan  were  ver}'^  prominent 
during  the  fighting,  and  received  the  D.S.O.  for  their 
conspicuous  gallantr}".  Captain  Park  led  his  company 
throughout  with  the  greatest  dash,  personally 
dicectiiig  the  bombing  parties  in  continuous  hand- 
to-hand  lighting  for  four  hoiu’s,  diu-ing  whicli  he 
drove  the  enemy  back  about  400  yards  along  two 
lines  of  trench  and  established  three  blocks,  which 
he  held  until  he  was  relieved. 

This  officer  again  distinguished  himself  on  the 
8f  h October.  On  the  previous  day  the  enemy  was 
discovered  to  l)e  mining  close  under  our  parapet. 
3die  tunnelling  compan\y  with  the  bravery  whicli 
has  so  often  been  displayed  by  them,  managed  to 
explode  one  of  the  mines  at  the  very  last  moment, 
in  fact,  the  sound  of  tamxiing  was  heard  at  the  time, 
indicating  that  the  mine  would  very  shortly  have 
been  blown  up  by  the  enemy.  A few  hours  later 
the  Germans  blew  up  another  mine,  and  at  about 
5 a.m.  two  more  within  20  yards  of  our  parapet, 
much  of  which  in  front  of  No.  2 Company  of  the 
2nd  Black  Watch  was  destroyed. 

Captain  Park  and  about  50  men  were  half  buried 
in  the  debris,  three  men  being  killed,  but  the  remainder 
were  got  out,  and  with  the  supports,  rushed  to  the 
broken-down  parapet,  which  they  held  in  spite  of 
heavy  rifle  and  shrapnel  fire.  A German  bombing 
XiarW,  advancing  out  of  one  of  the  mine  craters. 


THE  69th  PUNJABIS 


433 


was  di’iven  back  and,  owing  to  the  steady  fire  kept 
up  by  Captain  Park’s  company,  the  enemy  made  no 
further  attack. 

Captain  Buchan  showed  consxDicuous  gallantry 
throughout  the  action  on  the  25th  September.  At  the 
commencement,  when  he  and  his  men  were  suffering 
from  the  effects  of  gas,  he  rallied  and  led  them  on 
over  three  lines  of  trenches,  his  company  being  the 
first  to  enter  the  enemy’s  position  near  the  Moidin 
du  Pietre.  He  only  rethed  when  the  troops  on  both 
flanks  had  been  forced  back  by  a counter-attack 
and  he  himself  had  been  wounded. 

The  foregoing  account  has  been  principalh' 
concerned  with  the  doings  of  the  2nd  Black  Watch, 
mention  only  being  made  of  other  units  where 
necessary  to  make  a connected  story. 

The  69th  Punjabis  w^ere  on  the  right  of  the 
Highlanders.  This  regiment,  after  seeing  service 
in  Egypt  and  Gallipoli,  arrived  in  France  on  the  29th 
May,  1915,  joining  the  Indian  Corps  on  the  5th  June. 
Their  losses  commenced  at  once,  for  on  the  next  day 
two  of  a party  of  officers.  Major  Copeland,  Second 
in  Command,  and  Lieutenant  Dill,  the  Adjutant, 
who  went  to  see  the  trenches  of  the  Meerut  Division, 
were  caught  by  shell  fire  on  their  way  back  and 
killed. 

On  the  25th  September,  when  a bouquet  of  day 
signals  was  sent  up  at  5.50  a.m.,  marking  the 
commencement  of  our  gas  attack.  No.  1 Double 
Company  under  Major  Bingham  and  2nd  Lieutenant 
Geary,  and  No.  4 under  Lieutenants  Moberley  and 
Gray,  were  standing  ready,  and  at  6 a.m.  the  assault 
was  launched. 

The  second  line,  consisting  of  No.  2 Double 

2 r 


434 


THE  BATTLE  OF  LOOS 


Compan}’,  under  Captain  Nelson,  on  the  right,  and 
No.  3,  under  Lieutenant  Brooke,  on  tlie  left,  followed 
close  in  rear,  and  with  them  went  the  Commanding 
Officer,  Major  Stansfekl,  and  the  Adjutant,  Lieu- 
tenant Lumby. 

The  right  of  No.  1 Compaity  came  under  machine- 
gun  fire,  but  the  line  advanced  with  great  elan,  and 
biu’sting  through  the  enemy’s  front  system,  took 
a machine  gun  and  joined  hands  with  the  2nd 
Black  Watch,  2nd  Lieutenant  Geary  (I.A.R.O.) 
being  very  conspicuous  by  the  dash  with  which  he 
led  his  men. 

No.  4 Company  was  temporarily  held  up  by 
a party  of  Germans,  who  were,  however,  quickly 
disposed  of  with  the  bayonet ; and  the  company 
swept  on. 

Lieutenant  Brooke  was  wounded  shortly  after 
the  advance  commenced,  but  his  company,  though 
left  without  a British  officer,  went  straight  on  in 
support  of  No.  4.  Lieutenant  Lumby,  on  reaching 
the  eneni3’’s  front  line,  saw  some  Germans  working 
along  towards  the  centre,  hotly  pmsued  by  Captain 
Nelson’s  bombers.  While  helpuig  to  round  them 
up.  Lieutenant  Lumby  was  very  severely  wounded 
in  the  leg,  which  had  eventually'  to  be  amputated. 

Shortly  afterwards  Major  Stansfeld  was  mortally 
wounded  by  a bomb,  while  leading  Nos  2 and  3 
Companies,  and  by  his  death  the  regiment  lost,  in 
the  language  of  Brigadier-General  Norie,  “ an  ex- 
ceptional Commanding  Officer.” 

In  quick  succession.  Captain  Nelson  and 
Lieutenants  Moberley  and  Eraser  (I.A.R.O.)  were 
then  killed.  These  casualties  left  the  battalion  with 
only  four  officers  still  in  action,  namely.  Major 


LOSSES  OF  THE  69th  PUNJABIS  435 


Bingham,  Lieutenants  Gulland  and  Gray,  and  2nd 
Lieutenant  Miller-Sterling  (I.A.R.O.).  Amongst  the 
Indian  officers,  as  well  as  in  the  ranks,  the  casualties 
had  been  very  heavy. 

Still  the  battalion  held  on  to  its  position  near 
the  Moulin  du  PiMre  until  forced  to  retire  by  the 
causes  which  have  already  been  described. 

The  retnement  was  greatly  facilitated  by  the 
pluck  of  Subadar  Muhammad  Khan  and  Jemadar 
Sardar  Khan,  who  took  up  a position  in  the  centre 
communication  trench  where  they  made  a block,  from 
the  cover  of  which  they  held  back  the  enemy  and 
prevented  him  from  pressing  too  closely  on  the  heels 
of  their  comrades. 

Lieutenant  Gulland,  the  regimental  machine- 
gun  officer,  had  been  wounded  earlier  in  the  day, 
but  refused  to  leave.  In  order  to  cover  the  retire- 
ment, he  held  on  to  the  end  in  the  fimthest  trench 
captured  by  us.  With  him,  amongst  others, 
remained  his  orderly,  Sepoy  Ku’pa,  and  together  this 
gallant  pair  fought  to  the  last  cartridge,  when  they 
were  rushed  and  captured. 

The  retirement  was  conducted  by  Major  Bingham 
with  Lieutenants  Gray  and  Miller-Sterling.  Major 
Bingham,  who  had  led  the  attack  throughout  with 
great  gallantry,  was  mentioned  in  despatches,  as 
was  also  Major  Stansfeld  the  Commanding  Officer, 
who  was  attached  from  the  74th  Punjabis. 

The  losses  of  the  69th  were  : — 

Killed : Major  Stansfeld,  Captain  Nelson,  Lieu- 
tenant Moberly,  2nd  Lieutenant  Fraser,  3 Indian 
officers  and  36  men. 

Wounded : 3 British,  6 Indian  officers  and  261 
other  ranks. 


430 


'L’HE  BATTLE  OF  LUOS 


iVJissiiig  and  a prisoner  : Lieutenant  CTiilland. 

JMissing  : 34  other  ranks. 

I'otal : 348  out  of  a strength  of  663  of  all  ranks 
actually  engaged. 

The  l/4th  Black  Watch  (Territorials)  had  3 and 
4 Double  Companies  in  the  front  line  under  Captains 
O.  S.  Moodie  and  Couper  respectively.  In  the  old 
support  line,  about  30  yards  in  rear,  was  No.  2 
Double  Company  commanded  by  Captain  Campbell, 
and  behind  them  again  was  No.  1 Double  Company 
under  Captain  N.  Cl  Walker. 

At  6 a.m.  the  front  line  went  over  the  parapet, 
and  at  the  same  moment  Major  Tarleton,  the  Adju- 
tant, was  wounded  as  he  was  cheering  on  the  men. 

Nos  1 and  2 Companies  then  crossed  and  followed 
closely  in  rear  of  the  leaders.  With  them  went  the 
Commanding  Officer,  Lt-Colonel  H.  Walker,  C.M.G., 
and  the  Second  in  Command,  Major  Tosh.  In 
crossing  over  to  the  German  front  line,  the  latter  was 
hit  by  a bullet  and  fell.  Sergeant  Petrie  immediately 
ran  to  his  help  and  was  carrying  him  towards  our 
trench  on  his  l)ack  when  Major  Tosh  was  again 
wounded,  and  this  time  mortally,  by  a fragment 
of  shell. 

As  No.  2 Company  went  over  the  parapet, 
Captain  Duncan  was  hit,  both  his  legs  being  broken. 
A few  minutes  before  this,  2nd  Lieutenant  Bruce  of 
the  same  company  had  been  wounded. 

Nos  3 and  4 Companies  got  on  well,  the  enemy 
making  very  slight  resistance,  and  the  front  line  was 
taken  with  little  difficulty. 

The  enemy’s  snipers  were  extremely  active 
throughout  this  day’s  fighting, *and  it  was  obvious 
that  officers  were  being  singled  out  by  them. 


HEAVY  LOSSES  OF  OFFTCERS  437 


Oiir  losses  in  the  ranks  in  captnring  the  front 
trench  were  light,  bnt  Captain  Wallcer  and  Lieutenants 
Steven  and  S.  L.  Watson  were  all  wounded  at  this 
point,  and  were  subsequently  retm'iied  as  missing, 
believed  killed.  About  the  same  time  Captain 
Campbell  was  wounded  and  missing,  while,  to  add 
to  the  misfortunes  of  the  battalion,  2nd  Lieutenant 
Anderson,  who  was  second  in  command  of  the 
Brigade  bombers  in  reserve,  was  killed  by  a shell 
in  our  own  trench. 

The  front  line  quickly  settled  with  the  bayonet 
such  of  the  enemy  as  had  not  been  disposed  of  by 
our  bombardment,  and  who  still  resisted,  but  these 
were  few.  For  the  most  part  the  Germans 
surrendered,  and  palefaced  batches  of  them,  still 
with  their  hands  up,  were  marched  back  to  our  lines. 

Generally  speaking,  the  prisoners  were  young, 
strongly  built  men,  but  they  begged  abjectly  for 
mercy.  There  were  also  a few  older  men  among 
them  who  scowled  at  their  captors,  but  otherwise 
did  not  seem  very  much  upset  by  their  position. 
The  prisoners  were  taken  charge  of  in  some  cases 
by  Highlanders  and  in  others  by  GmLlias  grinning 
broadly  with  pleasm’e  and  pride. 

The  bombers  rapidl}^  went  along  the  line,  searching 
the  dug-outs  for  concealed  Germans,  and  then  the 
two  companies,  joined  by  2nd  Lieutenant  Cunning- 
ham with  some  of  No.  2 Company,  pressed  on  towards 
the  enemy’s  next  line,  headed  by  Captains  Moodie 
and  Air.  The  mist  was  still  thick  and  it  was  very 
difficult  to  keep  the  right  direction.  Frequently 
dim  forms  loomed  up  out  of  the  fog  and  were,  just 
in  time,  recognized  as  some  of  the  Indian  troops. 

d’he  German  reply  to  our  guns,  which  at  first 


438 


THE  BATTLE  OF  LOOS 


had  been  ven^  slight,  was  now  seriously  to  be  reckoned 
with.  The  ground  between  their  line  and  the  British 
was  being  accmatcly  searched  by  then-  artillery, 
while  a barrage  of  shrapnel  prevented  the  arrival 
of  any  further  reinforcements  on  our  side.  Our 
artillery  unfortunate^  appeared  to  be  inadequate 
to  deal  with  this  fire. 

A small  number  of  men  lost  dmection  in  the 
mist,  and  moving  too  much  to  the  left,  found  them- 
selves mixed  with  Indians  and  held  up  opposite  the 
Moulin  du  Pietre.  The  main  body  of  the  battalion 
reached  a trench  at  a distance  of  about  50  yards  from 
the  mill,  and  advantage  was  taken  of  the  cover  to 
reorganize  and  rest  the  men,  many  of  whom  at  once 
produced  their  pipes  and  began  to  smoke. 

No.  1 Compaii}"  was  still  pushing  on  in  support 
of  No.  2,  and  in  crossing  the  enemy’s  second  line, 
Lieutenant  L.  Wilson  and  2nd  Lieutenant  Watson 
were  wounded,  which  left  only  Captain  McIntyre 
with  the  company.  Colonel  Walker  arrived  at  the 
same  time  and  gave  orders  for  the  men  on  the  left 
to  be  brought  over  to  the  right.  At  that  moment 
Captain  McIntyre  was  wounded,  but  with  great 
pluck,  he  managed  to  carry  on  for  two  hours  more. 
No.  1 Company  then  lined  a hedge  and  dug  a trench 
in  support  of  the  advanced  companies. 

Nos  3 and  4 Companies,  after  taking  the  German 
first  position,  which  comprised  about  five  lines  of 
trench,  advanced  over  the  open  tow^ards  the  second 
position,  at  a short  distance  from  which  they  began 
to  dig  themselves  in.  With  them  were  the  following 
officers.  Captains  Couper,  Moodie,  Air,  Lieutenant 
Sturrock  and  2nd  Lieutenant  Williamson. 

In  spite  of  the  search  made  by  the  bombers  as 


WANT  OF  REINFORCEMENTS  439 


each  successive  line  was  taken,  it  was  now  evident 
that  some  of  the  eneni}^  still  liu-ked  in  the  captimed 
trenches.  One  after  the  other  the  officers  were 
wounded  by  shots  fired  from  the  rear,  until  Captain 
Air  was  the  only  officer  still  uninjiu’ed.  It  was 
discovered  that  these  losses  were  due  to  the  presence 
of  a party  of  six  snipers,  who  w^ere  at  once  rounded 
up,  and  the  harassment  ceased. 

Captain  Air  sent  back  repeated  requests  for  rein- 
forcements and  ammunition,  but  with  the  exception 
of  one  subaltern  of  the  2nd  Black  Watch,  who  came 
up  with  about  30  men,  no  supports  an'ived.  A 
number  of  the  rifles  had  now  jammed,  owing  to  being 
clogged  with  mud,  and  our  bombs  gave  out. 

Simultaneously  the  enemy  surged  forward  in 
masses  and  our  advanced  trench  was  hidden  in  the 
smoke  of  their  exploding  bombs.  In  the  absence  of 
substantial  reinforcements  the  position  was  untenable, 
and  Captain  Air  ordered  his  few  remaining  men  to 
retire.  Almost  as  he  gave  the  command,  he  was 
wounded.  Earlier  in  the  day  an  attempt  had  been 
made  to  establish  communication  betAveen  our  OAvn 
and  the  German  front  line,  but  as  fast  as  the  wire 
was  laid,  it  was  cut  by  shell  fire. 

Something  had  to  be  done,  and  that  at  once,  so 
Colonel  Walker,  Avhose  entne  Staff  was  now  out  of 
action,  liimseK  started  to  cross  to  our  front  trench  to 
bring  up  reinforcements.  In  this  gallant  attempt 
he  fell  mortally  wounded. 

Shortly  afterwards  a retirement  took  place  along 
the  whole  line  of  the  Brigade,  and  by  1 p.m.  the 
remnants  of  the  battalion  had  got  back  into  our 
front  trenches. 

The  l/4th  Black  Watch  lost  heavily  on  this 


440 


THE  BATTLE  OF  LOOS 


occasion,  but  nobly  sustained  the  liigh  reputation 
which  this  line  Territorial  battalion  had  made  for 
itseK. 

Killed  : Lt-Colonel  ^Yalker,  Major  Tosh 

and  2nd  Lieutenant  Anderson. 

Wounded  : 8 officers. 

Missing,  believed  killed  : 4 officers,  amongst 

whom  was  the  gallant  Captain  Au\ 

Missing  : 5 officers,  including  Captain  Moodie. 

In  the  ranks,  7 were  killed,  141  wounded,  8 
missing,  making  a total  casualty  list  of  20  officers 
and  2.35  men  out  of  a strength  on  going  into  action 
of  22  officers  and  423  other  ranks.  'J'his  gives  a 
percentage  of  0'52,  a terrible  price  to  pay,  but  as  the 
Regimental  War  J)iary,  in  the  true  soldierly  spirit, 
remarks,  “ It  had  l)een  a grand  advance,  but  at 
a great  cost.  We  had  forced  the  enemy  to  turn 
on  many  of  his  heaviest  pieces  against  us  and  forced 
him  to  bring  up  ver}^  large  reserves.  Attacks  were 
made  at  other  parts  of  the  line  that  day,  and  the 
enemy’s  reserves  had  to  be  drawn  off.” 

As  soon  as  the  2nd  Black  Watch  advanced  to 
the  attack,  the  58th  Rifles,  under  Lt-Colonel  Cl 
Davidson-Houston,  D.S.O.,  moved  up  and  occupied 
the  trenches  which  they  had  evacuated,  as  directed 
in  operation  orders.  In  the  front  line  were  No. 
4 Double  Company  under  Captain  McKenzie  and 
No.  2 under  Lieutenant  NicoUs,  the  former  on  the 
right. 

In  support  were  No.  3 Double  Company  under 
Ca]3tains  Harcourt  and  Flagg,  and  No.  1 under  Captain 
Wardell  and  2nd  Lieutenant  Deane-Spread. 

In  Brigade  operation  orders  it  was  distinctly 
laid  down  that  the  battalion  v'as  not  to  move  beyond 


ADVANCE  OF  THE  58th  PJFLES  441 

our  own  front  line  without  definite  instructions, 
unless  the  2nd  Black  Watch  were  in  urgent  need  of 
assistance  and  communication  with  Brigade  Head 
Quarters  had  been  broken.  Brigadier- General  Norie 
remarks,  “Although  the  2nd  Battalion  Royal 
Highlanders  were  in  no  urgent  need  of  assistance 
and  although  communication  with  Brigade  Head 
Quarters  was  intact,  the  Officer  Commanding  took 
his  regiment  across  in  support  of  the  2nd  Battalion 
Royal  Highlanders.  This  action  added  to  the 
subsequent  confusion  which  resulted  in  front  of  the 
Moulin.” 

The  orders  were  clear  and  left  no  loophole  for 
doubt.  For  some  reason,  which  wall  probably  never 
be  known,  as  Colonel  Davidson-Houston,  a most 
gallant  and  competent  Commanding  Officer,  lost 
hiib  life  in  the  liattle,  the  battalion  crossed  the  parapet 
at  6.15  a.m.,  as  noted  in  the  Regimental  Diary,  “ in 
support  of  the  2nd  Black  Watch.” 

No.  2 Double  Company  pushed  on  through  the 
enemy’s  front  line  to  the  bend  of  Winchester  Road, 
where  Lieutenant  Nicolls  was  killed. 

No.  4 Double  Company  lost  its  commander  soon 
after  crossing  the  German  trench,  as  Captain 
McKenzie  was  mortally  wounded  at  that  point. 
Second  Lieutenant  Durnford  took  the  company 
on  to  a distance  of  about  200  yards  behind  the 
eneni}^  s first  trench,  where  he  proceeded  to  con- 
solidate his  position. 

No.  2 Company  had  met  with  heawv^  fire  and  the 
men,  left  without  a British  officer,  fell  back  upon 
No.  4. 

The  sujDport  companies  now^  came  up  and  pushed 
through,  accompanied  by  Colonel  Davidson-Houston. 


442 


THE  BATTLE  OF  LOOS 


On  reaching  the  bend  of  the  road,  aliont  100  yards 
in  front  of  Lieutenant  Dnrnford,  they  took  cover 
for  a space  in  the  enemy’s  communication  trench, 
and  then  advancing,  nrade  good  their  position  on 
a line  to  the  left  and  within  200  yards  of  the  Moulin 
du  Pietre. 

Casualties  had  been  numerous,  for  the  enemy  kept 
up  a continual  and  well-directed  fii-e  of  every 
description,  but  the  58th  held  on,  and  from  this 
moment  until  the  time  of  the  hostile  counter-attack, 
in  common  with  the  remainder  of  the  advanced 
portion  of  the  Brigade,  devoted  their  attention  to 
consolidating  them  hold  on  the  German  second  line, 
and  endeavouring  to  oust  the  enemy  from  the  Moulin. 

At  8.50  a.m.  an  artillery  observing  officer  reported 
that  men  of  the  58th  could  be  seen  running  forward 
against  the  Moulin,  but  this  message  was  not  received 
at  Brigade  Head  Quarters  until  10  a.m.  All  unit? 
were  then  informed  that  the  Dehra  Dun  Brigade 
would  attempt  to  reach  the  high  ground  betweei 
Haut  Pommereau  and  La  Cliqueterie  on  the  Auberf 
Ividge,  but,  as  has  been  seen  earlier,  the  attack  conic 
not  develope,  owdng  to  the  congested  state  of  th< 
trenches,  until  it  was  too  late  to  be  of  any  avail 
the  enemy  meantime  having  reoccupied  his  front  line. 

Now  was  the  critical  point  of  the  action,  am 
everything  depended  on  the  gap  between  the  58tl 
in  front  of  the  Moulin  and  the  enemy’s  front  liii' 
being  filled,  but  this  could  not  be  accomplished  i] 
the  absence  of  a full  battalion  of  the  60th  Brigade 
wdiose  co-operation  w^as  relied  on. 

General  Norie,  it  must  be  remembered,  was  lef 
at  the  supreme  moment  without  his  Brigade  reserve 
owing  to  the  advance  of  the  58th  Rifles  contrary  t( 


LT-COL  DAVIDSON-HOUSTON 


443 


orders.  Had  the  58th,  as  was  intended,  still  been 
at  his  disposal  in  our  trenches,  he  could  have  used 
them  to  fill  the  gap  on  the  left  and  the  position 
might  possibly  have  been  saved.  Even  this,  however, 
is  extremelv  doubtful,  for  the  German  counter-attack 
had  succeeded  in  getting  round  the  right  of  the 
Bareilly  Brigade. 

As  before  recorded,  a detachment  of  the  12th 
Rifle  Brigade  took  up  a position  covering  about  150 
jmrds  of  the  gap,  but  being  very  ill  provided  with 
bombs,  were  compelled  to  retire.  The  58th  held  out 
as  long  as  their  bombs  lasted  and  then  joined  in 
the  general  retirement  of  the  Brigade. 

It  was  apparently  during  this  movement  that 
Lt-Colonel  Davidson-Houston  met  his  death,  for 
it  has  been  noted  that  at  least  part  of  the  operation 
was  directed  by  him  in  co-operation  with  Captain 
Buchan  of  the  2nd  Black  Watch.  The  circumstances 
of  his  death  have  never  been  ascertamed,  but,  as 
General  Norie  records,  “ He  was  a Commanding 
Officer  of  unusual  value,”  and  his  end  was  certainly 
as  gallant  as  his  life. 

The  losses  of  the  58th  Rifles  were  : — 

Killed : Captain  Flagg  and  Lieutenant  Nicolls. 

Wounded : Captain  Wardell. 

Wounded  and  Missing : Lt-Colonel  Davidson- 
Houston  and  Captain  McKenzie. 

Wounded  and  a prisoner  : Captain  Harcourt. 

Missing : Lieutenants  Milligan  and  Deane- 
Spread. 

Of  the  Indian  officers,  one  was  wounded,  one 
wounded  and  missing,  and  three  missing,  of  whom 
one,  Subadar  Bhag  Singh,  was  afterwards  ascertained 
to  be  a prisoner. 


444 


TRE  BATTLE  OF  LOOS 


Of  otlier  ranks,  40  were  killed,  105  wounded  and 
100  were  missino;. 

O 

Lt-Colonel  Davidson-Houston  and  Lieutenant 
Nicolls  were  mentioned  in  despatches. 

4’o  describe  in  detail  the  part  played  by  the 
33id  Punjabis  would  involve,  to  a great  extent, 
repetition  of  the  foregoing  accounts.  As  soon  as 
the  l/4th  Black  ^Vatch  advanced,  the  33rd  took  their 
place  in  our  front  trench. 

At  6.37  a, in.  No.  2 Company  under  Major  Graham 
crossed  over  and  set  to  work  to  consolidate  the  trench 
captured  liy  the  Highlanders.  Here  they  found  a 
company  of  the  58th  Rifles  under  Ca])tain  Harconrt 
already  engaged  in  the  same  task,  and  u ere  shortl}^ 
afterwards  joined  by  the  Commanding  Officer, 
Lt-('olonel  Ridgway  with  two  more  companies. 

As  was  the  case  wdth  the  other  units,  the  battalion 
became  divided  and  mixed  with  others,  but  No. 
2 Company  and  part  of  No.  4 reached  the  German 
line  near  the  Moulin  du  Picdre,  v^iere  they  held  on 
until  their  bombs  were  exhausted  and  their  line  of 
retreat  was  threatened,  eventually  rething  wdth  the 
remainder  of  the  Brigade. 

Their  losses  w’ere  : — 

Killed  : Captains  MaeCall  and  Price,  Lieutenant 
Grasett. 

Wounded : Lt-Colonel  Ridgway  and  Captain 
Vincent. 

Missmg  : Maj  or  Kelly. 

Of  the  Indian  officers,  Subadar-Major  Bahadur 
Khan  and  Jemadar  Akbar  Ali  Avere  killed,  3 Avere 
Avounded  and  a similar  number  Avere  missing. 

In  the  ranlvs  the  casualties  amounted  to  18 
killed,  161  Avounded  and  69  missing. 


GENERAL  JACOB’S  REMARKS 


445 


Lt-Golonel  Ridgway  and  Major  Graham  were 
mentioned  in  despatches. 

General  Norie  records  that  he  lost  an  admirable 
Staff  officer  in  Captain  Hewett,  \^'ho  was  killed  while 
going  forward  to  ascertain  how  the  situation  was 
developing. 

The  casualties  of  the  Brigade  amounted  to  1413, 
while  those  of  the  Lahore  and  Meerut  Divisions 
together  reached  the  large  total  of  3973,  made  up 
as  follows  : — 

British  officers  156  ; Indian  officers  44  ; other 
ranks,  British  1891  ; other  ranks,  Indian  1882. 

It  is  always  difficult  to  form  any  reliable  estimate 
of  the  enemv’s  losses  when,  as  in  the  case  of  this 
action,  the  ground  captured  has  to  be  evacuated, 
but  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  our  bombardment 
and  the  subsequent  hand-to-hand  fighting  caused 
heavy  casualties  in  the  German  ranks.  In  addition 
to  these,  2 officers  and  over  200  men  were  captured, 
as  also  were  several  machine  guns.  The  balance 
of  gain  and  loss  must  be  determined  in  cool  perspective 
by  that  historian,  whoever  he  may  be,  who  ultimately 
describes  the  Western  Campaign  as  a whole. 

Major-General  Jacob,  Commanding  the  Meerut 
Division,  made  the  following  remarks  on  the  behaviour 
of  the  troops  on  this  most  trying  day. 

“ The  outstanding  feature  in  the  operations  is  the 
extraordinary  keenness,  spirit,  elan  and  dash  shown 
by  all  units.  It  was  very  marked  in  the  period 
preceding  the  day  fixed  for  the  attack,  and  the  way 
all  ranks  worked  to  make  the  operations  a success 
was  most  gratifying.  The  vigour  with  which  the 
different  battalions  made  the  assault  left  no  doubt 
as  to  then  determination  to  get  through  the  German 


446 


THE  BATTLE  OF  LOOS 


lines  at  all  costs.  The  charge  made  by  the  2/8th 
Gurkhas  and  2nd  Leicesters  in  the  Garhwal  Brigade 
and  by  the  2nd  Black  Watch,  69th  Punjabis  and 
l/4th  Black  Watch  in  the  Bareilly  Brigade  could 
not  have  been  finer.  It  was  this  keenness  and  spirit 
which  caused  some  units  to  overlook  their  first 
objective  and  to  go  too  far,  with  the  result  that  some 
of  them  were  cut  off  and  wiped  out.” 

With  regard  to  the  work  of  the  technical  troops 
from  the  Commanding  Ro^^al  Engineer  downwards, 
General  Jacob  reported  that  the  manner  in  which 
the  whole  programme  of  work  during  the  preliminar}' 
operations  was  carried  out  proved  the  high  state  of 
efficiency  reached  by  the  Sappers  and  Miners  and 
the  Pioneers  : “No  praise  can  be  too  high  for  the 
A\  ork  they  have  done  throughout  the  war.” 

He  concludes  by  remarking  that  the  evacuation 
of  the  wounded  and  the  preparations  for  this  work 
were  carried  out  perfecth^  reflecting  great  credit  on 
Colonel  J.  J.  Russell,  A.H.M.S.,  and  the  officers  of 
the  R.A.M.C.  and  I.M.S.  He  also  mentions  the  skill 
and  energy  shown  b}^  Captain  Frost,  Supply  and 
Transport  Corps,  in  organizing  and  working  the 
tramways  system,  which  enabled  the  wounded  to  be 
removed  so  quickly  and  safely. 

The  reader  will  now  have  gathered  that  the 
attack  was  carried  out  with  the  greatest  gallantry, 
but  a doubt  will  have  arisen  in  his  mind  as  to  whether 
the  effect  of  this  gallantry  was  not  dissipated  by  lack 
of  prudence  in  pushing  on  too  far  without  first 
consolidating  the  captured  positions. 

The  key  to  the  question  lies  in  the  remarks  of 
Brigadier-General  Norie,  Commanding  the  Bareilly 
Brigade,  in  which  he  mentions,  as  one  of  the  causes 


REASONS  FOR  FAILURE  OF  ATTACK  447 


of  the  failure  to  hold  the  salient  won,  the  too  rapid 
advance  of  the  Brigade  to  the  enemy’s  second  line. 
This  he  describes  as  unfortunate,  but  adds,  “ So 
strongly  had  a continued  offensive  been  insisted  upon 
that  it  is  not  surprising  that  troops  who  alread}^ 
were  so  full  of  offensive  spirit  should  have  been 
misled  into  going  forward  too  fast  and  too  far.  In 
doing  so  they  omitted  thoroughly  to  examine  the 
enemy’s  trenches  for  lurking  Germans,  they  did  not 
sufficiently  deal  with  possible  approaches  for  counter- 
attacks, and  they  outstripped  the  Brigades  on  theh 
right  and  left.” 

Smce  the  battle  of  Neuve  Chapelle  no  opportunity 
had  been  lost  of  impressing  on  the  troops  the  necessity 
of  pressing  forward  when  opposition  was  found  to 
be  slight.  In  the  Meerut  Division  operation  order 
issued  on  the  20th  September,  the  following 
instructions  were  given. 

“ The  immediate  objective  of  the  assault  is  the 
general  line  of  the  road  from  M,  36.  a.  3.  4.  to  M. 
30.  c.  7.  9.  and  thence  to  the  enemy’s  front  parapet 
at  M.  30.  a.  7.  6.,  and  is  to  include  tlie  capture  of  all 
the  enemy’s  front  and  supporting  lines  on  that  front. 
Assaulting  troops  are  not  to  delay  in  the  enemy’s 
front  line  trenches,  but  will  push  on  and  capture  the 
supportmg  lines.  Bodies  of  infantry  are  not  to  halt 
if  portions  of  the  line  are  held  up  but  will  press  on 
towards  their  objective.  If  the  opposition  of  the 
enemy  is  unshaken  the  assaulting  troops  will  consoli- 
date the  captured  position  and  will  extend  their 
flanks  by  vigorous  bomb  attacks  along  all  flank 
trenches.  ...  If  the  opposition  is  slight  full  advantage 
of  the  situation  is  to  be  taken  with  a view  to  {a) 
breaking  completely  the  enemy’s  line  opposite  our 


U8 


THE  BATTLE  OF  LOOS 


own  front  and  capturing  his  supjiorting  batteries 
in  rear  of  liis  position ; (b)  taking  immediate 

advantage  of  the  weakening  of  the  enemy’s  opposition 
whicli  will  follow  the  success  of  onr  main  offensive 
in  the  South,  and  assisting  this  offensive  by  turning 
the  La  Bassec  defences  from  the  North.” 

Such  were  the  instructions  transmitted  from  the 
I st  Army  to  the  assaulting  troops  through  the  medium 
of  Divisional,  Brigade,  and  llegimental  orders. 

Viewed  dispassionately  in  the  light  of  subsequent 
events,  it  ajipears  to  be  impossil^le  to  fix  any  blame 
for  the  non-success  of  the  operations  on  the  troops. 
'They  did  their  part  most  gallantly  and  paid  the  cost 
themselves.  Perhaps,  had  the  front  line  of  the  attack 
allowed  prudence  to  get  the  better  of  courage,  they 
might  have  stayed  longer  to  consolidate  the  front 
and  support  lines  when  captured,  but  it  must  be 
remembered  that  the}^  had  every  right  to  believe  that 
their  advance  would  be  adecpiately  supported.  That 
this  was  not  the  case  is  undeniable,  but  the  failure 
to  support  was  the  result,  not  of  want  of  forethought 
or  skill  on  the  part  of  those  responsible,  but  of  the 
congestion  in  the  front  line  and  communication 
trenches,  largely  due  to  the  effect  of  our  own  gas, 
which  prevented  the  advance  of  the  Dehra  Dun 
Brigade  until  too  late  to  be  of  any  avail. 

\yhether,  in  view  of  the  strength  of  the  position 
held  by  the  enemy,  this  moderate  addition  to  our 
forces  would  have  sufficed  to  enable  the  assault  to 
captme  and  hold  the  German  second  line  is  one  on 
which  competent  opinions  differ.  It  must  be  noted 
that  the  operation  orders  laid  down  that  the  Lahore 
Division,  which  was  holding  a part  of  our  front,  and 
the  20th  Division  on  our  left  were  onlv  to  advance 


SIR  JOHN  FRENCH’S  DESPATCH  449 


when  the  Meerut  Division  had  reached  a point 
beyond  the  enemy’s  second  line  of  trenches.  To 
attempt  to  solve  this  question  is  to  invade  the  realms 
of  speculation  and  could,  in  the  absence  of  more 
complete  information  as  to  the  enemy’s  strength 
and  dispositions,  lead  to  no  fruitful  conclusion. 

The  final  judgment  of  the  success  or  otherwise 
of  the  operations  must  be  left  to  those  in  a position 
hereafter  to  review  the  situation  as  a whole. 

Sir  Douglas  Haig  concluded  his  report,  dated 
26th  September,  1915,  with  these  words  : — 

“ The  General  Officer  Commanding  1st  Army 
wishes  to  express  his  appreciation  of  the  good  work 
done  by  all  ranks  and  his  gratification  at  the  good 
progress  made  by  the  1st  and  4th  Corps.  Also, 
though  the  opposition  North  of  the  canal  prevented 
great  progress  of  subsidiary  attacks,  the  G.O.C. 
is  very  pleased  with  the  manner  in  which  the  1st,  3rd, 
and  Indian  Corps  carried  out  the  role  assigned  to 
them  of  retaining  the  enemy  on  then  front.” 

Sir  John  French,  in  his  despatch  dated  the  15th 
October,  1915,  describes  the  operations  of  the  Indian 
Corps  as  a subsidiary  attack,  designed  with  the  object 
of  distracting  the  enemy’s  attention  and  holding 
his  troops  to  then  ground.  Further : “ Portions  of 
the  1st  Corps  assaulted  the  enemy’s  trenches  at 
Givenchy.  The  Indian  Corps  attacked  the  Moulin 
du  PiHre,  while  the  3rd  Corps  was  directed  against 
the  trenches  at  Le  Bridoux.  These  attacks  started 
at  daybreak  and  were  at  first  successful  all  along  the 
line.  Later  in  the  day  the  enemy  brought  up  strong 
reserves,  and  after  hard  fighting  and  vaiiable  fortunes, 
the  troops  engaged  in  this  part  of  the  line  reoccupied 
their  original  trenches  at  nightfall.  They  succeeded 

2 G 


450 


THE  BATTLE  OF  LOOS 


adinkably,  however,  in  fulfilling  the  role  allotted 
to  them,  and  in  holding  large  numbers  of  the  enemy 
away  from  the  main  attack.” 

The  casualties  of  the  Corps  up  to  the  1st  October, 
1915,  were  as  under  : — 


* 


British  officers 

Killed. 

. 267 

Wounded. 

628 

Missing. 

86 

Indian  officers 

. 100 

322 

50 

Other  ranks,  British 

. 1734 

8,103 

2088 

Other  ranks,  Indian 

. 2289 

13,715 

3131 

Total 

. 4390 

22,768 

5356 

other  deaths 


3 

6 

V 

594 


603 


CHAPTER  XXIV 


THE  CORPS  LEAVES  FRANCE  FOR  OTHER  THEATRES 

OF  WAR 

Indian  Corps  front  in  October — Enemy’s  mining  operations  near  Givenchy — 
Indian  Army  reserves — Failure  of  system  admitted — Inferior  quality 
of  reinforcements — Remarks  of  Sir  John  French — Regiments  in 
France  reinforced  by  drafts  from  battalions  in  India — Danger  of  this 
practice — Deficiency  of  suitable  officer  reinforcements — Consequent 
gradual  deterioration  of  the  Corps — Orders  received  for  the  Corps  to 
move  to  other  theatres  of  war — Corps  relieved  by  the  10th  November 
— Message  from  Indian  Cavalry  Corps — Special  order  by  Sir  John 
French — Last  units  of  the  Corps  leave  Marseilles  on  the  26th  December, 
1915 — Message  from  His  Majesty  the  King-Emperor. 

At  the  commencement  of  October,  1915,  the  Indian 
Corps  front  extended  for  a distance  of  10,825  yards  ; 
the  19th  Division  ran  on  the  right  from  the  La 
Bassee  Canal  to  Farm  Corner  and  the  line  was  con- 
tinued northwards  by  the  Lahore  Division  as  far  as 
Sunken  Road.  The  Meerut  Division  had  been 
withdrawn  to  refit  after  the  heayj^  fighting  of  the 
25th  September,  but  on  the  1st  October  the  Bareillj* 
Brigade  was  brought  up  to  relieve  Sirhind  in  the 
front  line,  the  latter  moving  back  into  Army  reserve. 
The  weather  for  the  greater  part  of  the  month  was 
fine  and  cold,  varied  b}^  short  spells  of  mist  and  light 
rain. 

On  the  4th  October  a redistribution  of  the 
Corps  on  the  same  front  was  completed.  By  this 
disposition  the  Meerut  Division  held  the  southern 


452 


THE  COEPS  LEAVES  FEANCE 


portion  of  the  line  with  the  right  of  the  Bareilly 
Brigade  resting  on  the  La  Bassee  Canal ; the  centre 
of  the  front  was  occupied  liy  the  19th  Division,  and 
the  northern  section  bv  Lahore,  with  the  left  of  the 
Jnllundur  Brigade  on  Sunken  Eoad. 

The  month  passed  without  any  events  of  special 
importance.  The  usual  mining  and  counter-mining 
operations  continued  on  Givenchy  Eidge,  which  w'as 
pockmarked  in  every  direction  by  the  craters  formed 
by  previous  explosions. 

At  8.20  p.m.  on  the  7th  October  the  first  German 
mine  was  blown  up,  followed  bj^  others  at  4.50  a.m., 
4.55  a.m.  and  4.57  a.m.  on  the  8th.  Each  of  these 
explosions  was  preceded  by  heavy  artillery  and 
Minenwerfer  fire  on  our  support  line,  and  was  followed 
by  intense  rifle  grenade  and  rifle  fii’e.  Our  parapet 
was  breached  in  several  places,  but  the  casualties 
were  slight,  amounting  only  to  some  25  in  all,  of 
whom  the  majority  were  wounded.  The  gallant 
behaviour  of  Captain  Park  and  No.  2 Company  of 
the  2nd  Black  Watch  on  this  occasion  has  already 
been  described. 

The  question  of  reinforcements  for  the  Indian 
Corps  had  from  the  commencement  been  a source 
of  constant  anxiety  to  Sh  James  Willcocks,  and  by 
this  time  maters  had  come  to  a head.  The  Indian 
Eeserve  organization  has  now  been  subjected  to  a 
thorough  and  practical  test,  and  is  admitted  by  the 
highest  authorities  to  have  failed  completely.  There 
is,  then,  no  reason  to  enter  into  argument  on  the 
subject,  and  it  is  only  necessary  to  explain  the  verj^ 
grave  consequences  produced  by  the  retention, 
against  the  oft-repeated  advice  of  those  in  a position 
to  judge,  of  an  obsolete  and  dangerous  system. 


THE  INDIAN  RESERVE  SYSTEM  453 


The  Corps  landed  in  France  with  a reserve  of 
10  per  cent,  available  to  fill  gaps  in  the  ranks.  Before 
it  reached  the  front,  this  reserve,  owing  to  sickness, 
and  the  weeding  out  of  unfit  men,  had  practically  been 
exhausted,  leaving  no  immediately  available  rein- 
forcements in  France.  The  casualty  lists  at  once 
commenced  to  swell,  and  battalions  were  reduced  to 
a dangerous  degree. 

Owing  to  the  fighting  strength  of  British  regi- 
ments in  India  being  fixed  at  the  low'  figure  of  844, 
they  were  also  affected,  as  for  them  too,  at  first, 
reinforcements  w'ere  w'holly  inadequate. 

As  a result  of  the  experience  gained  in  this  war, 
tw'o  indisputable  facts  stand  out. 

(а)  None  but  the  very  best  class  of  Indian  troops 
is  fit  for  European  warfare,  and  then  only  when  led 
by  a sufficient  number  of  trained  British  officers  and 
stiffened  by  British  units. 

(б)  As  a general  rule,  an  Indian  soldier  of  over 
40  years  of  age  is  unfit  for  service  in  the  field,  and 
many  wdio  can  speak  with  authority  put  the 
limit  at  35  years.  Under  the  present  system  men 
may  serve  until  they  attain  an  aggregate  of  25 
years’  service  wdth  the  Colours  and  in  the  Reserve, 
when  they  become  entitled  to  a pension  of  Rs.  3 
per  mensem.  The  natural  result  is  that  men 
are  too  often  allow'ed  to  serve  on,  wffien  quite 
unfit,  for  the  sole  purpose  of  qualifying  for 
pension. 

The  Indian  units  were,  generally  speaking,  of  the 
very  best  class,  and  had  it  been  possible  to  maintain 
them  at  their  original  level  wdth  a satisfactory 
supply  of  British  offices,  they  could  have  continued 
indefinitely  to  play  then  part  in  Europe.  The 


454 


THE  CORPS  LEAVES  FRANCE 


extension  of  the  war  had,  however,  by  its  in- 
numerable calls  on  the  Indian  Arm^y  rendered  this 
impossible. 

'Jlie  first  appearance  of  the  Corps  in  the  front  line 
was  on  the  22nd  October,  1914.  In  twelve  days,  i.e. 
on  the  3rd  November,  the  casualty  list  of  the  Indian 
units  alone  amounted  to  44  British,  33  Indian  officers 
and  1808  of  other  ranks.  By  the  1st  December  the 
total  had  increased  to  133  British,  95  Indian  officers 
and  4735  other  ranks. 

The  importance  of  immediate  reinforcements  of 
a suitable  type  will  be  readily  understood  when  it  is 
remembered  that  the  fighting  strength  of  the  Indian 
units  of  the  two  Divisions  at  this  period  amounted 
only  to  9500  rifles,  with  1700  sabres  of  the  Secun- 
drabad  Cavalry  Brigade. 

How  did  the  Indian  system  cope  with  this  grave 
crisis  ? 

At  the  commencement  of  December,  1914,  the 
Officer  Commanding  the  Indian  Base  Depot  at 
Marseilles  reported  that  a large  number  of  men  who 
had  arrived  as  reinforcements  had,  on  inspection, 
been  found  unfit  for  service.  The  total  of  such  men 
on  this  occasion  came  to  331.  These  were  divided 
into  four  classes  : — 

A.  68  pronounced  unfit  for  service  in  Europe  on 
medical  grounds  by  a Board  of  Medical  Officers. 

B.  32  pronounced  temporarily  unfit. 

C.  181  pronounced  unfit  by  Depot  Commanders 
on  military  grounds  as  distinct  from  medical,  i.e.  old 
age,  weakness,  miserable  physique,  etc. 

D.  50  unfit  for  lack  of  training.  These  were 
recruits  of  under  6 months’  service  who  had  not  fired 
a miisTcetry  course. 


GRAVE  SITUATION 


455 


The  men  of  Class  C.  were  mostly  reservists  who 
had  been  absent  from  the  Colours  for  varying  periods, 
and  were  nearly  all  old  men  with  20  or  more  years’ 
service,  entirely  incapable  of  undergoing  the  rigours 
of  a winter  campaign  in  Eimope.  A story  was  current 
at  the  time  that,  at  the  inspection  of  this  class,  an 
aged  man  was  asked  whether  he  felt  fit  and  keen.  He 
replied  that  when  he  left  Bombay,  by  the  mercy  of 
God,  he  had  one  upper  tooth  left.  Putting  his 
fingers  in  his  mouth,  he  removed  the  one  tooth  and 
presented  it  for  examination. 

Glass  A.  were  at  once  returned  to  India,  and 
Class  B.  went  later.  Class  C.,  as  far  as  possible, 
were  employed  on  lines  of  communication.  The 
training  of  Class  D.  was  undertaken  at  the  Base 
Depot. 

In  addition  to  these,  94  men  who  actuallv  reached 
the  Corps  were  found  unfit  for  service  on  account  of 
age,  'physical  disability,  and  an  absence  of  military 
spirit. 

So  grave  was  the  situation  that  Sir  John  French 
felt  compelled  to  suggest  that,  unless  men  of  the  best 
quality  were  available  to  reinforce  the  Indian  units 
in  the  field,  it  would  be  preferable  to  withhold 
reinforcements  altogether,  as  inferior  drafts  not  only 
served  no  useful  purpose,  but  were  an  actual  en- 
cumbrance to  the  army. 

At  the  commencement  of  Januarj^  1915,  Sir  John 
French  further  placed  on  record  the  fact  that  876  men 
in  all  had  been  found  unfit,  amounting  approximatel}^ 
to  one-sixth  of  the  reinforcements  received  up  to 
that  time.  He  noted  further  that,  in  addition  to 
these,  a considerable  number  of  the  reinforcements 
sent  were  unsatisfactory,  as  being  far  below  the 


456  THE  CORPS  LEAVES  FRANCE 

standard  of  military  trainine;  and  knowledge  de- 
manded  by  the  present  war.  Apart  from  the  useless 
expense  involved  in  transporting,  equipping  and 
supplying  inferior  cLafts,  they  were  not  only  a 
source  of  actual  danger  in  the  field  themselves,  but 
tended  to  lower  the  efficienc}^  of  those  with  whom 
they  were  placed  in  contact. 

Towards  the  end  of  Januarjy  1915,  Sir  James 
Willcocks  was  able  to  report  that  the  reinforcements 
then  arriving  from  India  were  mostly  of  a very  good 
quality.  By  this  time  a new  system  was  being 
tried,  and  the  drafts  consisted  partly  of  detachments 
from  other  regiments  in  India,  while  no  reservist  of 
over  15  years’  service  was  then  being  sent  to  France, 
d’o  continue  this  method  indefinitely  was  obviously 
out  of  the  question,  as  it  would  have  entailed  the 
depletion  by  degrees  of  the  regiments  on  which 
depended  the  defence  of  India  and  the  maintenance 
of  internal  order.  The  improved  quality  of  these 
tlrafts,  therefore,  so  far  from  proving  the  elasticity 
of  the  military  organization,  clearly  indicated  the 
probability  that  India  woidd  soon  eease  to  send 
satisfactor}^  reinforcements,  while  at  the  same  time 
many  of  the  best  regiments  stUl  remaining  in  India 
would  liave  suffered  bv  furnishing  those  reinforce- 
ments. 

Various  other  expedients  were  tried  later.  Men 
of  Military  Police  Corps  and  of  the  local  troops  of 
Indian  Chiefs  were  included  in  the  drafts,  but  the 
result  merely  proved  that  the  whole  system  had 
failed  to  stand  the  stress  of  war,  the  sole  purpose  for 
which  it  had  been  created. 

A further  and  a very  grave  question  was  the 
supply  of  officers.  The  establishment  of  Britisli 


deterioration  of  the  corps  457 

officers  in  an  Indian  regiment  is  13,  including  the 
medical  officer.  The  losses  of  British  officers  from 
the  commencement  were  very  heavy,  to  illustrate 
which  the  case  of  one  regiment  may  be  quoted. 
This  regiment  during  its  service  in  France  was 
officered  by  no  less  than  70  individuals.  Many  of 
these  officers  came  from  other  regiments  in  India 
which  could  ill  afford  to  lose  them  ; others  were  from 
the  Indian  Army  Reserve  of  Officers,  who,  gaUant 
though  they  were,  lacked  experience  and  training,  and 
frequently  knowledge  of  the  language  spoken  in  the 
regiment.  All  battahons  were  thus  heavily  handi- 
capped, as  the  officers  and  men  for  the  most  part  were 
utterly  unknown  to  each  other.  This  bore  especially 
heavily  on  the  Gurkha  battalions,  the  men  of  which 
speak  no  language  but  their  own,  and  are  therefore 
particularly  dependent  on  their  British  officers.  These 
officers  are  required  to  pass  an  examination  in  the 
language  before  they  can  be  permanently  appointed 
to  a regiment. 

Sufficient  has  perhaps  been  said,  for  in  the  face 
of  the  admission  of  the  authorities  tliat  the  system 
has  completely  broken  down,  the  point  requires  no 
labouring. 

The  result  was  soon  seen.  Little  by  little  the 
Corps  deteriorated  until,  after  the  lighting  on  the 
25th  September,  following  so  closely  on  Neuve 
Chapelle,  Ypres,  and  the  heavy  losses  in  May,  it 
was  felt  that  the  breaking  point  had  been  reached. 
Battalions  had  now  become  mere  frameworks, 
skeletons  of  their  former  selves,  held  together  only 
by  the  few  officers  and  men  of  tried  experience  who 
still  remained.  How  many  these  numbered  can  be 
gathered  from  the  fact  that  on  the  2nd  October 


458 


THE  CORPS  LEAVES  FRANCE 


the  casualties  to  date  of  Indian  units  were  as 
follows  : — 

British  officers,  483  ; Indian  officers,  478  ; other 
ranks,  19,748;  total,  20,709. 

Again,  to  take  the  instance  of  two  battalions. 
The  59tli  Rifles  landed  in  France  in  1914  with  a 
strength  of  13  British,  18  Indian  officers,  and  810 
other  ranks.  Bv  the  commencement  of  November, 
1915,  no  British,  and  only  4 Indian  officers  and  75 
men  were  serving  with  the  battalion  who  had  not  been 
absent  through  wounds  or  sickness  for  over  ten  days. 

The  47th  Sikhs,  to  apply  the  same  test,  had  no 
British  or  Indian  officers  and  only  28  men  left. 

For  some  time  past  rumours  had  been  current 
of  the  impending  transfer  of  the  Corps  to  other 
theatres  of  war  less  remote  from  its  natural  base. 
It  was  therefore  without  sm’prise  that  information 
was  received  on  the  31st  October  that  the  Indian 
Corps  would  be  required  to  embark  at  Marseilles  in 
the  near  future,  leaving  behind  it  in  France  the  19th 
Division  which  was  to  join  the  11th  Corps,  the  five 
Territorial  battalions  and  the  4th  King’s  (Liverpools), 
which  belonged  to  the  Special  Reserve,  as  well  as 
the  headquarters  Divisional  Artillery  and  3 Brigades 
R.F.A.  (18-pounder)  of  the  Lahore  Division.  The 
1 1th  Corps  was  to  take  over  the  front  held  by  the 
Lahore  and  Meerut  Divisions. 

On  the  4th  November  the  relief  of  the  two  Indian 
Divisions  by  the  llth  Corps  commenced,  and  on  the 
6th  the  Meerut  Division  left  the  trenches  for  the  last 
time,  concentrating  in  the  new  billeting  area  north 
east  of  Aire,  round  Thiennes,  Boeseghem,  and  Mor- 
becque. 

On  the  7th  November  the  following  entrained  for 


TOTAL  CASUALTIES 


459 


Marseilles: — The  Garhwal  Brigade,  2/ 2nd  Gurkhas, 
107th  Pioneers  and  the  working  battalion,  followed 
on  the  8th  by  the  4th  Cavalr3^  On  the  9th  the  Corps 
head  quarters  moved  to  Norrent  Fontes  from  Merville. 

By  nightfall  on  the  10th  the  Indian  Corps  had 
been  completely  relieved  from  the  line,  which  it 
had  held  so  long  and  so  valiantly. 


Abstract  of  Casttalties  up  to  the  19th  Novesiber,  1915. 


British  units — 

Killed. 

Wounded. 

Missing. 

other 

deaths. 

Total. 

Officers  . , 

124 

363 

37 

? 

524 

Other  ranks 

1806 

8388 

2089 

12,283 

Total 

1930 

8751 

2126 

- 

12,807 

Indian  units — 

British  officers  . 

1.50 

294 

49 

3 

496 

„ other  ranks 

4 

34 

- 

9 

47 

Indian  officers  . 

103 

336 

50 

6 

495 

„ other  ranks 

2345 

14,221 

3148 

661 

20,375 

Total 

2602 

14,885 

3247 

679 

21,413 

Staff- 

British  officers  . 

2 

8 

- 

- 

10 

„ other  ranks 

1 

15 

- 

- 

16 

Indian  officers  . 

- 

- 

- 

- 

— 

„ other  ranks 

4 

2 

- 

- 

, 6 

Grand  Total 

4539 

23,661 

5373 

679 

34,252 

These  figm’es 

represent  the 

casualties 

of  1 

Indian  Corps  proper,  and  do  not  include  those  of 
units  temporarily  attached,  such  as  the  8th,  19th, 
49th  and  51st  Divisions.  Figures  showing  deaths 
from  disease  or  wounds  of  British  units  are  not 
immediately  available. 

In  comparing  the  casualties  it  must  be  remembered 


400 


THE  CORPS  T.EAVES  FRANCE 


tliat  the  fighting  strengths  of  British  and  Indian 
units  were  not  the  same.  British  units  had  28 
officers  and  816  other  ranks.  Indian  units  had 
only  13  British  officers,  including  the  medical  officer, 
17  Indian  officers  and  723  other  ranks.  On  the 
other  hand,  in  number  the  Indian  battalions  largely 
exceeded  the  British  units.  From  the  date  of  its 
completion  at  the  front  to  the  commencement  of 
January,  1915,  on  an  average,  the  Corps  consisted 
of  G British  and  20  Indian  Infantry  units.  From 
January  to  the  departure  of  the  Corps  it  comprised 
12  Ib'itish  and  20  Indian  regiments. 

Ovciiig,  however,  to  the  fiiictuations  of  casualties 
and  the  vagaries  of  the  Indian  Reserve  system,  the 
Indian  battalions  were  seldom,  if  ever,  as  a whole  up 
to  their  full  fighting  strength.  For  these  reasons  it 
has  been  found  impossible  at  ])resent  to  calculate 
with  any  sufficient  degree  of  acciu’acy  the  per- 
centages of  losses  of  the  British  and  Indian  units. 
This  will  onlv  be  feasible  at  the  conclusion  of  the  war, 
when  full  data  will  be  available. 

On  tlie  19th  November  the  following  telegram 
was  received  from  the  Indian  Cavalry  Corps  : — 

“ All  ranks  of  the  Indian  Cavalry  Corps  desire  to 
convey  their  best  wishes  to  their  comrades  of  the 
Indian  Corps,  to  wish  them  the  best  of  luck  in  the 
future  and  to  express  their  admiration  of  their 
gallantr}"  and  staunchness  on  many  memorable 
occasions,  and  throughout  long  months  of  strenuous 
fighting  under  trying  conditions,  in  which  the 
honour  and  reputation  of  the  Indian  Army  have  been 
so  splendidly  maintained,  and  which  will  acquire 
added  lustre  in  whatever  circumstances  the  gallant 
Indian  Corps  may  find  itself.” 


SIR  JOHN  FRENCH’S  MESSAGE 


461 


To  this  message  from  soldiers  to  soldiers,  the 
following  reply  was  sent : — 

“We,  officers,  N.C.O.s  and  men  of  the  Indian 
Corps  send  our  best  thanks  to  our  coimades  of  the 
Indian  Cavalry  Corps  for  then*  kind  words  of  farewell, 
and  for  their  appreciation  of  our  endeavom  to  do  our 
duty  dm’ing  the  past  year.  We  wish  them  the  best  of 
luck,  and  know  that  when  the  opportunity  comes  they 
will  worthily  uphold  the  best  traditions  of  the  Indian 
Army  and  add  to  the  reputation  they  have  already 
earned.” 

On  the  22nd  November  the  following  special 
order  of  the  day  was  issued  by  Field-Marshal  Sh' 
John  French  : — 

“ On  the  departm’e  of  the  Indian  Corps  from  my 
command,  under  which  you  have  fought  for  more 
than  a year,  I wish  to  send  a message  of  thanks  to 
all  officers,  non-commissioned  officers  and  men  for 
the  work  you  have  done  for  the  Empne.  From  the 
time  you  reached  France  you  were  constantly 
engaged  with  the  eneni}^  until  the  end  of  last  year. 
After  a few  weeks’  rest  you  retiumed  to  the  trenches, 
and  since  then  3mu  have  continually  held  some 
portion  of  the  front  line,  taking  part  in  the  important 
and  successful  engagements  of  Neuve  Chapelle  and 
of  Richebourg,  and  in  the  heavy  fighting  at  the  end  of 
September.  The  Lahore  Division  was  also  engaged 
in  the  severe  actions  near  Ypres  in  April  and  May. 
That  your  work  has  been  hard  is  proved  by  the 
number  of  your  casualties.  The  British  troops  of  . 
the  Corps  have  borne  themselves  in  a manner  worthy 
of  the  best  traditions  of  the  armj^ 

“ The  Indian  Corps  have  also  shown  most  praise- 
worthy courage  under  novel  and  tr^dng  conditions. 


462 


THE  CORPS  LEAVES  FRANCE 


both  of  climate  and  of  fighting,  and  have  not  only 
upheld,  but  added  to,  the  good  name  of  the  army 
which  they  represent.  This  is  all  the  more  praise- 
worthy in  view  of  the  heavy  losses  amongst  British 
ofiicers  having  deprived  the  Indian  ranks  of  many 

trusted  leaders  whom  they  knew  well  and  of  the  fact 

«/ 

that  the  drafts  necessary  to  maintain  your  strength 
have  frequently  had  to  be  drawn  from  regiments 
quite  unconnected  with  the  units  they  were  sent  to 
reinforce.  You  have  done  yoiu'  work  here  well,  and 
are  now  being  sent  to  another  place  where  an  un- 
scrupulous enemy  has  stirred  up  strife  against  the 
King-Emperor.  I send  you  all  my  good  wishes  for 
success  in  the  part  you  will  now  be  called  on  to  play 
in  this  great  war.  I thank  you  for  the  services  you 
have  rendered  while  under  my  command,  and  trust 
that  the  united  efforts  of  the  AUies  may  soon  bring 
the  enemy  to  his  knees  and  restore  peace  to  the 
world.” 

By  the  30th  November  the  last  troops  of  the 
Meerut  Division  had  entrained  for  Marseilles,  fol- 
lowed on  the  9th  December  by  the  first  detachments 
of  the  Lahore  Division.  By  an  order  from  General 
Head  Quarters  issued  on  the  8th  December  the 
Indian  Aimiy  Corps  ceased  to  exist  as  such.  On  the 
26th  December,  1915,  the  last  transport  conveying 
troops  of  the  Indian  Corps  left  Marseilles. 

Owing  to  the  fact  that  the  troops  entrained  by 
driblets  and  that  they  embarked  for  the  most  part 
at  night,  there  were  no  demonstrations  on  such  a 
scale  as  those  which  greeted  the  arrival  of  the  Indians 
in  1914  ; but  wherever  the  troop  trains  stopped  en 
route,  the  stations  were  crowded  with  warm-hearted 
French  people  who  showed  in  the  clearest  manner 


HIS  MAJESTY’S  MESSAGE  463 

their  deep  appreciation  of  the  work  performed 
during  the  past  13  months. 

On  the  25th  November  a parade  of  representatives 
of  the  Indian  Corps  was  held  at  Chateau  Mazinghem, 
at  which  the  following  message  of  His  Majesty  the 
King-Emperor  to  the  British  and  Indian  troops  of 
the  Indian  Army  Corps  in  France  was  read  by  the 
Prince  of  Wales  : — 

“ Officers,  Non-Commissioned  Officers  and  men 
of  the  Indian  Army  Corps. 

“ More  than  a year  ago  I summoned  you  from 
India  to  fight  for  the  safety  of  My  Empire  and  tlm 
honom  of  My  pledged  word  on  the  battlefields  of 
Belgium  and  France.  The  confidence  which  I then 
expressed  in  your  sense  of  duty,  your  courage  and 
your  chivalry  you  have  since  then  nobly  justified. 

“ I now  require  your  services  in  another  field  of 
action,  but  before  you  leave  France  I send  My  dear 
and  gaUant  Son,  the  Prince  of  Wales,  who  has  shared 
with  My  Armies  the  dangers  and  hardships  of  the 
campaign,  to  thank  you  in  My  name  for  your  services 
and  to  express  to  you  My  satisfaction. 

“ British  and  Indian  conu-ades-in-arms,  yoius  has 
been  a fellowship  in  toils  and  hardships,  in  courage 
and  endurance  often  against  great  odds,  in  deeds 
nobly  done  and  days  of  memorable  conflict.  In  a 
warfare  waged  under  new  conditions  and  in  particu- 
larly trymg  circumstances,  you  have  worthily  up- 
held the  honour  of  the  Empire  and  the  great  traditions 
of  My  Army  in  India. 

“ I have  followed  your  fortunes  with  the  deepest 
interest  and  watched  your  gallant  actions  with 
pride  and  satisfaction.  I mourn  with  you  the  loss 
of  many  gallant  officers  and  men.  Let  it  be  your 


464 


THE  CORPS  LEAVES  FRANCE 


consolation,  as  it  was  then  pride,  that  they  freely 
gave  their  lives  in  a just  cause  for  the  honour  of  then 
Sovereign  and  the  safety  of  My  Empire.  They  died 
as  gallant  soldiers,  and  I shall  ever  hold  then  sacrifice 
in  grateful  remembrance.  You  leave  France  with 
a just  ])ride  in  honourable  deeds  already  achieved  and 
with  my  assured  confidence  that  your  proved  valour 
and  experience  will  contribute  to  finther  victories 
in  the  new  fields  of  action  to  which  you  go. 

“ 1 pray  God  to  bless  and  guard  you,  and  to  bring 
you  back  safely,  when  the  final  victory  is  won,  each 
to  his  own  home — there  to  be  welcomed  wdth  honour 
among  his  own  people.” 


CONCLUSION 

On  re-reading  the  chapters  in  which  it  has  been 
attempted  to  re-tell  the  story  of  the  Indian  Corps  in 
Flanders,  the  writers  are  most  acutely  conscious  of 
their  failure  to  reconstruct  as  it  deserves  that  long 
and  harrowing  tale  of  anguish  and  heroism.  Indeed, 
it  is  not  easy  to  conceive  of  any  literary  resources 
which  could  faithfully  describe  the  fortunes  of  any  of 
those  Corps  belonging  to  the  British  Expeditionary 
Force  which  supported  the  terrible  winter  campaign 
of  nineteen  hundred  and  fourteen.  Each  Corps 
deserves  and  requires  a separate  historian.  The 
account  of  the  Indian  Corps,  which  has  been 
attempted  in  the  above  pages,  has  no  claim  to  be 
called  popular.  The  distinguished  General  who  took 
the  Corps  to  France  has,  it  is  understood,  in  prepara- 
tion a volume  of  reminiscences,  to  be  published  after 
the  war,  of  which  it  may  be  anticipated  that  his 
trenchant  pen  and  vigorous  character  will  find 
expression  in  a piquant  treatment  of  many  episodes. 
But  the  plan  proposed  to  themselves  by  the  authors, 
and  it  is  hoped  conscientiously  carried  out,  has 
excluded  a method  of  treatment,  the  interest  of 
which  would  depend  upon  the  constant  presentment 
of  dramatic  incidents.  They  have  rather  attempted, 
to  the  best  of  their  powers,  the  task  of  preparing  a 
record,  both  continuous  and  complete,  of  all  the 
Indian  Corps  did— whether  at  any  given  moment  it 

2 H 


466 


CONCLl'SION 


was  little  or  nincli — during  the  unforgettable  days 
in  which  it  played  so  great  a part.  Nor  is  it  perhaps 
difficult  to  defend  the  method  and  principle  of 
description  which  have  been  adopted. 

Each  year  of  the  war  has  produced  countless 
acts  of  heroism  amongst  individuals,  and  battles 
valiantly  sustained  by  our  Armies.  The  year 
nineteen  hundred  and  fourteen  witnessed,  in  the 
summer  months,  the  anguish  of  the  great  retreat  and 
the  glorious  vicissitudes  of  the  Marne.  Successive 
campaigns  were  rendered  alike  soml)re  and  immortal 
by  the  battles  of  Neuve  Chapelle,  Loos,  the  Aubers 
Ridge  and  Festubert.  Perhaps  the  red  dawn  of 
^'ictory  rose  first  in  the  blood-drenched  and  shell- 
pitted  fields  of  the  Somme.  And  even  as  we  ^vrite, 
immense  British  and  French  Armies,  in  that  greatest 
struggle  of  all  which  is  the  sequel  of  the  Somme 
Battle,  are  making  what  may  prove  to  be  the  final 
attempt  to  expel  the  enemy  from  the  soil  of  France. 
Each  of  these  struggles  deserves — and  it  may  be 
supposed  that  in  the  fullness  of  time  it  will  receive — 
its  own  equipped  historian  : Non  carehit  vate  sacro. 
But  we  make  bold  to  think  that  the  master  historian 
of  all — to  whose  task  it  will  one  day  fall  to  disentangle 
and  place  in  perspective  the  complex  and  baffling 
narrative  of  the  British  campaigns  in  France — will 
assign  some  special  niche  of  glorj-  to  those  who  sus- 
tained the  desperate  defensive  w^arfare  which  filled 
up  the  interval  betw  een  the  battle  of  the  Marne  and 
the  battle  of  Neuve  Chapelle. 

It  is  true  that  the  general  public  has  now  realized 
the  decisive  and  critical  natiue  of  the  first  battle  of 
Yp  res  ; but  it  is  open  to  grave  doubt  whether  it  has 
ever  realized  how"  anxious  was  every  month,  and 


CONCLUSION 


4G7 


indeed  every  week  and  day,  dirring  which  the  long- 
drawn  battle  lines  deployed  from  the  Aisne  to  the 
sea.  When  this  movement  on  oiu’  side  first  began, 
it  is  evident  that  our  higher  Command  was  hopeful 
that  it  might  be  possible  to  outflank  the  enemy,  and 
to  tium  then-  Aisne  positions.  But  even  if  this 
attempt  had  seemed  to  them  as  difficult,  and  indeed 
hopeless,  as  it  appears  in  the  light  of  the  comparative 
resom’ces  of  the  combatants  as  we  know  them  to-day, 
it  would  still  have  been  necessary  to  make  the 
attempt  in  order  to  prevent  the  enemy  doing  so. 
From  the  moment  that  the  movement  began,  it  was 
hardly  ever  certain,  and  sometimes  for  considerable 
periods  it  seemed  highly  improbable,  that  the  enemy 
could  be  pinned  to  their  ground.  Many  most  gallant 
offensives  have  been  described  in  the  preceding 
pages.  But  in  the  early  stages  of  the  struggle  they 
were  always  local,  and  always  essentially  defensive 
in  their  character.  He  who  records  them  and  he 
who  reads  them  must  alike  be  struck  by  the  complete 
hopelessness  of  these  valiant  attempts  so  cheerfully 
and  so  constantly  made.  When  it  is  said  that  they 
were  hopeless,  it  is  not  of  course  intended  that  each 
of  them  did  not  make  an  important,  if  not  always 
a distinguishable,  contribution  to  the  ultimately 
successful  defensive ; but  it  is  meant  that  the 
enterprises  must  have  seemed  over  and  over  again 
tragically  hopeless  to  the  individuals  who  spent  their 
lives  upon  them.  And  as  we  read  of  them  in  cold 
print,  years  afterwards,  nothing  is  more  poignant 
than  to  observe  that  the  hero  of  one  struggle,  after 
incredible  escapes,  is  the  victim  of  another  ; and  that 
if  he  escapes  the  second,  inevitable  death  overtakes 
him  in  the  third.  A close  study  of  the  diaries  of 


468 


CONCLUSION 


this  period  leaves  on  the  mind  the  impression,  at 
once  vague  and  extremely  vivid,  of  constant  Homeric 
fighting,  disclosing  at  every  moment  deeds  of  in- 
dividual valour  which  were  never  equalled,  nor 
approached,  bj"  the  heroes  whom  Homer  has  made 
immortal.  And  to  those  who  realize  how  great  is 
the  confusion  of  trench  warfare,  particularly  at 
night,  how  the  attention  of  each  individual  is  neces- 
sarily given  to  his  own  fortunes  and  not  to  tlie 
deeds  of  liis  comrades,  it  is  a tragic  reflection  that  so 
many  heroes  worthy  of  any^  distinction  whicli  could 
embellish  valour,  or  of  any  glory  which  could  mitigate 
death,  liave  perished  without  a record  and  without 
a witness.  No  research,  hovever  careful,  among 
diaries,  no  inquhies  among  survivors,  be  the  chronicler 
never  so  industrious,  can  complete  or  half  complete 
the  Holl  of  Honour.  We  can  only  accept  and 
reverently  record  the  fact  of  death.  And  where  a 
soldier  has  died  on  the  field  of  battle  for  his  eountry, 
perhaps  no  decoration  could  add  to — and  no  descrip- 
tion further  ennoble — that  which  he  has  done.  But 
the  universal  experience  of  all  ages  has  shown  that 
a rare  and  precious  consolation  is  afforded  to  father 
and  mother,  to  wife  and  child  of  the  dead,  by?"  reading 
and  understanding,  as  far  as  it  may  be  understood, 
how  and  in  what  adventure  the  fallen  died.  Believing 
this  to  be  true,  we  have  throughout  made  it  our  first 
and  principal  object,  at  whatever  risk  of  weariness, 
to  rescue  from  forgetfulness  the  name  of  British 
or  Indian  soldiers  of  every  rank,  whose  ascertained 
deeds  have  entitled  them  to  be  counted  among  the 
immortals. 

Much  discussion  took  place  when  it  was  first 
announced  that  Indian  soldiers  were  to  be  employed 


CONCLUSION 


469 


in  France  as  to  whether  the  decision  was  judicious. 
Many  high  authorities  felt  grave  doubts  upon  this 
question  ; and  nothing  was  more  noticeable  to  those 
who  joined  the  Staff  at  Marseilles  than  that  some  of 
its  most  experienced  members  believed  that  they 
were  taking  part  in  a very  liazardous  experiment. 
And  it  was  a hazardous  experiment.  Even  in  its 
infancy  this  war  made  it  clear  that  the  human 
material  engaged  in  it  was  to  be  more  hardly  tried 
than  the  soldiers  of  any  nation,  in  any  war  in  the 
world’s  history,  have  ever  been  tried.  It  was 
already  evident  that  the  war  was  one  certain  to  make 
supreme  demands  even  upon  European  troops  fight- 
ing in  a quarrel  which  in  the  main  they  have  under- 
stood, and  wfiiich  was  so  presented  as  to  make  a 
strong  moral  appeal  to  their  duty  and  their  patriot- 
ism. No  man  could  be  bold  enough  to  predict 
the  result  of  flinging  Oriental  troops  into  these 
horrible  scenes,  in  a pitiless  climate,  to  lose  life 
and  limb  in  a quarrel  remote  from  their  own 
experiences,  uninsphed  by  fears  on  behalf  of  their 
own  people,  or  even  of  their  own  property.  It  was 
thought  necessary  to  give  six  months’  training  in 
England  to  the  superb  raw  material  which  formed 
the  first  Canadian  Division  ; and  many  months  were 
allowed  to  pass  before  it  seemed  desirable  to  send  a 
Territorial  Division  as  a unit  to  France.  And  yet 
those  who  knew  the  Indian  soldier  best  were  con- 
fident, however  sudden  his  immersion  into  the  Great 
War  might  l)e,  that  his  traditions,  his  loyalty  and  his 
sense  of  duty  would  carry  him  through.  And  they 
did. 

But  in  fact  the  discussion  is  futile  as  to  whether 
the  experiment  was  risky  or  not,  just  as  it  is  tedious 


470 


CONCLUSION 


to  insist  upon  the  admitted  risks  undertaken  by 
Mr.  Asquith’s  Government  when  the  British  Ex- 
peditionary Force  was  sent  to  France.  In  each  case 
a hazardous  experiment  was  undertaken  by  a great 
nation  which  was  concerned  to  defend,  bv  the  best 
available  methods,  however  hazardous,  its  own 
security  and  the  existence  of  its  Allies.  At  the 
moment  when  the  Indian  Corps  was  detailed  for 
service  in  France  the  very  existence  of  the  Empire 
required  that  the  experiment  should  be  made.  If 
a quarter  only  of  those  who  landed  in  France  had 
stood  fii’in,  and  the  rest  had  lied,  it  woidcl  still  have 
l)een  worth  u Idle  to  despatch  the  whole  for  the  sake 
of  that  quarter.  The  cool  and  high  coimage  of  Lord 
French,  the  laconic  and  soldierly  quality  of  his  de- 
spatches, obsciu’ed  to  some  extent  the  intensity  of 
the  crisis  which  existed  at  the  moment  when  the 
Indian  Corps  began  to  arrive  at  Marseilles.  He  who 
wishes  to  form  an  opinion  upon  the  opportune- 
ness of  the  Indian  contribution  should  reflect  how 
swiftly  the  first  arrivals  Avere  rushed  into  the  firing 
line  ; how  short  was  the  period  of  concentration 
conceded  to  General  Willcocks ; and  how  imperious 
was  the  necessity  which  flung  Indian  Sappers  and 
Miners  into  the  streets  of  Neuve  Chapelle  as  assaulting 
infantry. 

It  is  clear,  when  once  it  is  realized  that  decisions 
in  these  matters  must  be  conditioned,  first  upon 
necessity,  and  secondly  upon  the  resources  available 
to  meet  necessity,  that  it  would  haA^e  been  right  to 
make  the  experiment  even  if  it  had  Avholly  failed. 
But  in  fact  the  exiDcriment  almost  Avholly  suc- 
ceeded. 

The  time  has  not  yet  come  when  any  judicious 


CONCLUSION 


4T1 


purpose  can  be  served  by  explaining  the  qualifica- 
tion to  the  claim  that  in  the  main  the  Indian  troops 
engaged  arose,  with  rare  and  intrepid  courage,  to 
the  height  of  the  crisis  which  summoned  them  to  the 
trenches  of  Flanders. 

It  is  unnecessary  to  point  out — for  every  one 
knows  it— -how  much  the  Indian  troops  owed  to 
their  British  officers,  and  to  the  British  regiments 
with  which  they  were  brigaded.  Indeed  nothing 
is  more  profoundly  touching  than  the  esprit  de  corps, 
animating  all  ranks,  which  forbids  them  to  ax^portion 
credit  as  between  British  and  Indian  regiments. 
They  were  coadventurers  and  gallant  comrades. 
They  trod  together  the  Valley  of  the  Shadow  of 
Death.  It  is  in  this  way  that  they  conceived  of 
their  owm  relationship,  and  so  it  may  be  left. 

But  a singular  tribute  must  be  paid  to  the 
British  officers  serving  in  Indian  regiments.  The 
relationship  between  such  an  officer  and  his  men  is 
of  a very  special  kind.  In  no  army  in  the  world  are 
the  relations  between  officer  and  private  on  a more 
admirable  and  soldierly  basis  than  in  the  British 
Army.  But  there  are  in  this  matter  some  features 
in  the  Indian  Army  which  are  quite  unique.  Among 
the  private  soldiers,  and  even  among  the  Indian 
officers,  the  degree  of  dependence  upon  the  officer  is 
on  the  whole  greater  than  is  known,  or  periiax^s  has 
ever  been  known,  in  any  army  in  the  world.  And 
side  by  side  with  that  dependence,  there  has  grown 
up  on  the  part  of  the  British  officer,  how^ever  young 
he  may  be,  the  habit  and  frame  of  mind  of  a father, 
and  sometimes,  wffien  the  occasion  requhes  it,  even 
more  the  habit  and  frame  of  mind  of  a mother.  Each 
officer  looks  upon  his  men  as  his  children.  This  was 


472 


CONCLUSION 


the  sph’it  ill  ii  hicli  a subaltern  poet  adckessed  the 
fathers  of  his  fallen  men  : — 

“ You  were  only  their  fathers ; 

I was  their  officer.” 

Compared  with  the  officer  of  a British  regiment,  the 
Jh’itish  officer  in  an  Indian  regiment  must  contend 
against  many  drawbacks.  He  misses  the  common 
sense  of  humour,  the  common  outlook  upon  life,  and 
the  common  store  of  inherited  associations  which  a 
Britisli  officer  has  witli  men  of  British  blood.  He 
does  not  inevitably  think,  as  a British  officer  in  a 
Britisli  regiment  instinctively  and  in  the  very  moment 
of  crisis  thinks,  of  the  same  things  at  the  same  moral 
and  psychological  angle.  And  this  community  of 
range  counts  for  much  in  times  when  human  nature 
is  racked  and  tortmed.  At  such  moments  the  Eton 
boy  and  the  slum  recruit  often  discover  a common 
point  of  view  derived  from  obscure  affiliations  which 
can  neither  be  explained  nor  even  analyzed.  The 
most  intuitive  and  S3mipathetic  British  officer  of  an 
Indian  battalion  can  never  be  quite  sime  whether 
his  outlook  upon  events,  where  those  events  have 
transcended  theh  experience  and  his,  retains  any 
contact  with  that  of  his  men.  East  is  stiU  East ; 
W'est  is  still  West. 

But  if  a British  officer  in  an  Indian  regiment  is 
at  a disadvantage  in  these  respects,  he  receives  in 
exchange  much  which,  for  the  purpose  of  fashioning 
an  admirable  military  mstrument,  must  be  put  in  the 
other  scale.  If  he  is  the  right  sort  of  officer  (and 
they  nearly  all  are),  his  men  bestow  upon  him,  almost 
from  the  day  he  is  gazetted,  a degree  of  respect  and 
a depth  of  loyalty  which  bring  responsibility  to  the 

* Lieutenant  Hodgson.  M.C. 


CONCLUSION 


473 


most  volatile  and  maturity  to  the  most  bojdsh. 
And  there  springs  from  this  mutual  relationship  an 
atmosphere  of  all  others  the  most  fruitful  in  gallant 
enterprises.  The  British  officer  knows  that  his  men 
will  obey  an  order  because  he  gives  it,  because  he 
sets  the  example,  and  because  therefore  (so  the 
simple  reasoning  goes)  it  must  be  for  the  best.  And 
the  Indian  soldier  yields  the  same  unquestioning 
obedience  to  a trusted  officer  which  a bov  who  has 

K/ 

a profound  affection  and  admiration  for  his  father 
gives  to  the  admonitions  of  tha.t  father.  It  is,  there- 
fore, no  exaggeration  to  say  that  when  the  Corps 
landed  in  Marseilles,  every  battalion  wms  superbly 
officered,  and  this  circumstance  was  rightly  relied 
upon  by  those  who  believed  that  the  x\rmy  would 
rise  to  the  extreme  demands  so  shortly  to  be  made 
upon  it.  And  as  long  as  each  unit  retained  a fan- 
proportion  of  those  British  officers  who  had  sailed 
with  it  from  India,  and  who  still  seemed  to  afford 
some  connecting  link  with  home,  the  battalions 
retained,  even  amid  the  terrible  surroundings  of 
Flanders,  an  astonishing  degree  of  self-confidence, 
resilience  and  esprit  de  corps.  But  a far  higher 
trial  came  later.  A blood}^  toll  was  soon  taken  of 
the  British  officers.  The  Germans  were  quite  acute 
enough  to  realize  the  vital  part  which  they  played 
in  the  Indian  Arniy.  The  machine  gunners  and 
snipers  received  urgent  orders  in  this  regard. 

And  so  the  roil  of  officers  who  lost  their  lives  or 
Avere  hopelessly’  maimed  grew  ever  and  ever  longer. 

It  soon  happened  that  many  battalions  lost  every 
officer  Avho  in  far-away  India  had  instructed  them  in 
the  military  art,  and  who,  in  the  eyes  of  the  Indian 
troops,  v\  ere  all  that  remained  to  remind  them,  A\  ith 


474 


CONCLUSION 


familiar  authority,  of  their  homes  and  their  duty. 
They  felt  them  bereavement  as  orphans,  old  enough 
to  realize  their  sorrow,  feel  it.  Every  ingenuity  and 
every  conceivable  resource  were  exhausted  by  the 
authorities  in  the  attempt  to  supply  new  officers  to 
take  the  place  of  the  fallen.  A constant  succession 
of  gallant  young  gentlemen  was  di’afted  from  India 
and  from  home  to  fill  the  gaps  in  the  ranks.  But 
it  was  not  possible  to  keep  pace  completely  with  the 
losses.  And  even  where  the  numbers  were  forth- 
coming, there  was  hardly  leisime  to  establish  in  the 
necessary  degree  acquaintance  and  confidence.  This 
would  have  mattered  comparatively  little  in  a British 
regiment.  Provided  his  officer  is  competent,  con- 
siderate, and  brave,  the  British  soldier  can  support 
many  changes  and  substitutions  in  his  commands. 
No  such  adapta,bility  can  be  expected,  and  little  is 
in  fact  found,  among  the  Indian  battalions.  Fore- 
most, therefore,  among  the  trials  and  the  difficulties 
which  the  Indian  troops  had  to  bear,  and  to  whicl 
in  the  main  they  proved  stoically  equal,  were  tin 
cruel  losses  of  officers  to  whom  they  had  become 
devoted,  and  whom  they  had  been  in  the  habit  o 
following  through  any  dangers  to  any  objective. 

This  question  has  been  much  discussed,  whethe 
India  has  on  the  whole  made  the  contribution  t 
the  necessities  of  the  Empire  which  might  have  bee: 
expected  from  her  teeming  populations  and  he 
great  resources.  It  would  be  difficult  to  argue  thai 
if  everythmg  had  been  clearly  realized  at  the  begir 
ning  of  the  war,  it  would  have  been  impossible  t 
train  and  equip  more  soldiers  in  India.  And 
seems  certain  that  almost  an  unlimited  contributic 
was,  and  is,  available  in  India  for  labour  or  garrisc 


CONCLUSION 


475 


battalions.  But  it  must  not  be  forgotten  that  the 
very  decision  to  employ  so  many  Indian  troops 
immediately  on  active  service  removed  very  many 
of  those  who,  and  who  alone,  were  ava.ilable  for  the 
purposes  of  instructing  recruits  ; and  it  is  equally 
important  to  remember  that  ever  growing  numbers 
of  British  recruits  were  at  that  very  time  in  the  most 
urgent  and  indeed  critical  need  of  officers  for 
training  purposes.  It  was  decided,  and  rightly 
decided,  that  the  ffi’st  and  paramount  duty  of  the 
British  Government  was  to  provide  instruction  for 
the  new  British  Armies.  And  in  the  first  few  months 
of  the  struggle  everything  was  properly  sacrificed 
to  this  view.  Thus,  on  the  outbreak  of  war,  there 
were  about  550  officers  of  the  Army  in  India  on  leave 
in  this  country.  All  of  them  were  immediately 
borrowed  by  the  War  Office  to  help  in  the  work  of 
organizing  the  new  Armies.  From  the  beginning  of 
the  war  until  the  end  of  nineteen  hundi’ed  and  sixteen, 
over  2600  British  officers  have  been  drawn  from 
India  for  Imperial  purposes,  apart  from  those  who 
accompanied  their  units  abroad.  And  the  total 
number  of  British  officers  in  India  when  war  broke 
out  was  less  than  5000.  On  the  outbreak  of  war, 
the  Indian  Army  Reserve  of  Officers  consisted  of 
forty  members.  It  consists  to-day  of  over  2200, 
of  whom  800  are  on  active  service.  Apart  from  the 
Indian  Army  Reserve  of  Officers,  commissions  have 
been  given  in  the  Indian  Army  to  271  cadets  from 
Quetta  and  Wellington,  where  military  schools 
modelled  upon  Sandhurst  have  been  established 
since  the  war  began.  These  facts  are  recalled 
because,  in  considering  and  appraising  the  effort 
which  India  has  made,  it  is  very  important  to  bear 


47G 


CONCLUSION 


in  mind  that  she,  like  the  rest  of  the  Emph’e,  was 
called  upon,  on  the  outbreak  of  war,  for  an  immense 
effort  of  improvisation ; that  improvisation  was, 
from  the  nature  of  the  case,  more  difficidt  for  her  than 
for  any  other  part  of  the  Empire  ; and  that  in  carry- 
ing out  the  task  of  improvisation,  her  imperious  needs 
were  at  every  stage  subordmated  by  the  com- 
pulsion of  events  to  those  of  others.  To  these 
conditions  it  must  be  added — familiar  as  the  observa- 
tion must  be  to  all  readers — that  tlie  martial  races 
of  India  do  not  by  any  means  form  an  overwlielming 
proportion  of  the  total  population  of  India.  A 
brief  account  and  analysis  of  the  fighting  races 
living  in  this  great  peninsula  is  contained  in  an 
appendix  to  this  Histor}*.  It  is  not  necessary  here 
to  carry  the  comparison  into  details,  but  it  is  sufficient 
to  point  out  that  before  the  war  many  competent 
observers  were  of  opinion  that  among  two  or  three 
of  the  most  illustrious  soldier  races  of  India  recruiting 
had  been  pushed  as  far  as  was  likely  to  prove  in  long 
perspective  expedient  or  fruitful. 

It  is  not  maintained  that  the  fullest  possible  use 
has  been  made  of  the  human  reserves  of  India. 
'I’lie  cpiestion  is  too  large  to  be  argued  here,  and  it  is 
only  distantly  relevant  to  the  subject  of  this  work. 
But  the  critic,  in  measuring  what  India  has  done, 
should  never  forget  the  extreme  difficulty  occasioned 
by  the  shortage  of  officers  who  could  speak  tlie 
necessary  languages.  StiU  less  should  he  forget  the 
absolute  irrelevance  of  comparisons  and  homilies 
based  upon  the  total  population  of  the  country. 

It  is  possible  that  later  writers  will  answer  the 
criticisms  which  have  been  brought  by  saying  that  an 
autocratic  conqueror  of  India,  who  was  preparing 


CONCLUSION 


477 


for  war  as  Germany  was  preparing,  could  and  would 
have  made  incomparably  more  of  the  resources  of 
India  than  was  made  by  Great  Britain.  But  he  may 
equally  decide,  in  the  light  of  the  difficulties  referred 
to  above,  that  the  contribution  of  India  on  its  purely 
military  side  has  been  of  surprising  importance,  and 
as  great  as  could  have  been  provided,  during  a period 
of  aU-round  improvisation,  by  an  Imperial  Govern- 
ment which  had  neglected  all  preparations  for 
continental  warfare.  Indian  troops  have  fought 
with  heroic  endurance  in  France,  in  Egypt,  at  Aden, 
on  the  Suez  Canal,  in  Gallipoli,  in  East  Africa,  in 
West  Africa  and  in  Mesopotamia.  They  were  the 
first  of  the  overseas  troops  to  man  with  untried 
qualities  the  sodden  trenches  of  Flanders.  They 
furnished  the  first  bulwark  of  British  East  Africa. 
They  flung  back  the  first  Turkish  attack  on  the  Suez 
Canal.  The  Army  in  Mesopotamia,  alike  in  its 
failimes  and  its  triumphs,  was  in  the  main  an  Indian 
Army  based  upon  India.  Nearly  five  hundred 
thousand  men — British  and  Indian — have  left  India 
since  the  war  began  to  take  part  in  one  theatre  or 
another,  though  before  the  war  the  whole  Indian 
Army  only  amounted  to  two  hundred  and  thirty-six 
thousand  men.  All  the  units  of  the  Indian  forces 
have  been  kept  supplied  with  drafts,  and  on  the 
whole,  after  the  first  collapse,  with  efficient  drafts. 
The  establishments  of  the  cavahy  regiments  in 
India  have  been  increased  by  20  per  cent,  and  the 
establishments  of  the  infantry  regiments  by  40  per 
cent.  New  units  have  been  created,  drawn  only 
partly  from  the  classes  or  races  which  were  recruited 
before  the  war  ; and  nearly  thirty  thousand  Indians 
of  all  classes  have  become  associated  in  one  capacity 


478 


CONCLUSION 


or  another  with  the  Medical  Services  overseas. 
Nor  should  the  admirable  work  often  done  by  the 
Imperial  Service  Troops  be  omitted  from  this  survey. 
The  Mysore  and  Patiala  Lancers  and  the  Bikanh 
Camel  Corps  are  serving  in  Egj^pt.  The  Jodhpur 
Lancers  did  good  work  in  France.  The  Kashmh 
Ilifles,  the  Jhind  Infantry  and  the  Faridlcot  Sappers 
were  specially  praised  by  General  Smuts  in  East 
Africa.  The  Maler  Kotla  Sappers  in  Mesopotamia 
will  not  soon  be  forgotten  in  companies  where  brave 
Engineers  meet. 

Enough  has  been  said  to  show  that  too  ready 
assent  must  not  be  given  to  the  more  sweeping 
criticisms  directed  at  those  responsible  for  military 
policy  in  India.  The  topic  has  been  considered  in 
this  chapter  at  some  length,  for  it  is  by  no  means 
irrelevant  to  the  fortunes  of  the  Indian  Corps  in 
Flanders.  The  power  of  making  good  the  wastage 
of  officers  and  of  sending  drafts  in  substitution  for 
casualties  depended  greatly  upon  the  demands  which 
were  being  simultaneously  pressed  upon  India  from 
other  quarters.  Whatever  view  is  taken  of  this 
larger  question,  the  belief  is  confidently  expressed 
by  the  authors  that  every  future  military  historian 
will  do  justice  to  the  sufferings  and  to  the  stamina 
of  those  Indian  troops  who  took  part  in  the  Great 
Flanders  Campaign.  In  an  earlier  part  of  this  work 
it  was  stated  that  they  were  destined  to  a fate  as 
devastating  as  that  which  overtook  the  first  British 
Expeditionary  Force.  About  twenty-four  thousand 
men  formed  the  two  divisions  which  landed  at  Mar- 
seilles. In  less  than  a year  more  than  thirty  thousand 
drafts  were  sent  from  India  to  replace  casualties. 
In  other  words,  in  about  eight  months  six  thousand 


CONCLUSION 


479 


more  troops  were  despatched  for  the  single  purpose  of 
replacing  the  killed,  the  wounded  and  the  sick  than  the 
force  contained  when  it  landed.  And  the  Corps,  the 
original  personnel  of  which  had  been  so  completely 
wiped  out,  was  afterwards  sent  to  Mesopotamia, 
where  it  added,  if  possible,  to  its  glory,  and  made 
further  and  bitter  sacrifices  in  health  and  life. 

Their  achievements  in  this  field  must  be  left  for 
others  to  describe.  Our  task  is  completed.  We 
have  traced  the  fortunes,  alike  in  failure  and  success, 
of  the  brave  men  who  fought  among  the  chivalry  of 
France  and  Britain — equals  by  the  side  of  equals — 
agamst  the  German  legions  which  swarmed  upon 
Calais  in  the  winter  of  nineteen  hundred  and  fourteen. 
Ma}^  those  who  survive  live  long  to  keep  alive  bv 
their  memories  the  traditions  of  martial  ardour  in 
India.  And  upon  the  heroic  dead  may  the  earth  rest 
lightlv. 


APPENDIX  1 


DESCRIPTION  OF  THE  INDIAN  ARMY 

Before  this  w^ar  Indian  troops  had  proved  their  loyalty 
and  ’w'orth  in  many  other  parts  of  the  v^orld  -where  smaller 
issues  were  involved — in  China,  Egypt,  the  Sudan,  Ashanti, 
Somaliland  and  the  Aden  Hinterland,  as  well  as  in  numerous 
Indian  Frontier  operations — but  never,  sinee  the  Indian 
Mutiny,  had  their  loyalty  been  put  to  such  a test  as  in  the 
crisis  of  1914,  ndiich  menaced  the  very  existence  of  the 
Empire  itself. 

For  the  first  time  Indians  were  called  upon  to  fight  in 
Europe  in  a “ White  Man’s  War.”  The  manner  in  which 
the  call  to  arms  from  Britain  was  answered  from  India, 
disclosing  a brotherhood  which  seemed  not  only  strange  but 
incomprehensible  to  the  apostles  of  “ Kultur,”  has  been 
already  described. 

It  will  be  as  well  to  correct  at  once  a misconception 
which  arose  at  the  commencement  of  the  war  as  to  the 
status  of  the  Indian  Army.  It  was  evident  from  many 
remarks  which  appeared  in  English  newspapers  that  the 
Indian  Anmy  was  believed  to  consist  of  volunteers  whose 
services  for  the  war  were  placed  at  the  disposal  of  the 
Empire  by  the  Ruling  Chiefs  of  India. 

Certainly  the  Indian  troops  were  and  are  volunteers, 
but  in  precisely  the  same  way  as  the  British  Army,  prior 
to  the  introduction  of  compulsory  service,  was  composed 
of  volunteers.  They  are,  however,  regular  troops,  bound 
by  an  oath  of  allegiance  to  serve  their  Sovereign  under  any 
circumstances  and  in  any  part  of  the  world.  With  the 
exception  of  a small  force  of  Ipiperial  Service  troops,  the 

2 I 


482  DESCRIPTION  OF  THE  INDIAN  ARMY 


Indian  regiments  which  fought  in  Europe  were  as  much 
soldiers  of  the  King  as  any  regiment  of  Guards,  and  equally 
bound  to  obey  his  orders.  They  were  ordered  to  come  to 
Europe,  and  they  came.  It  is  the  spirit  in  which  they  came, 
not  the  fact  of  their  coming,  which  compels  our  esteem  and 
admiration. 

The  purpose  of  this  Appendix  is  to  give  a brief  and 
simple  account  of  the  various  peoples  from  which  the  units 
of  the  Indian  Army  Corps  were  drawn  and  the  different 
forces  which  they  compose. 

It  has  been  well  said  that  the  natives  of  India  are 
“ Warriors  by  tradition  and  descent.”  The  saying  is  on 
the  whole,  but  not  entirely,  true.  Certain  classes  and 
tribes  appear  to  be  quite  without  physical  courage  and  unfit 
for  any  military  service,  and  among  them  may  be  found 
some  of  the  finest-looking  people  of  India.  This  would 
naturally  render  any  system  of  universal  military  service 
unsuitable  to  the  country  ; but  such  a system  would  be 
as  unnecessary  as  it  is  unsuitable,  the  bulk  of  the  people 
of  India  being  brave  and  warlike  men  to  whom  military 
service  is  a source  of  great  honour  and  prestige,  looked  upon 
by  them  as  affording  the  most  fitting  career  open  to  a man, 
whatever  his  birth  or  rank. 

A clear  and  accurate  description  of  the  various  classes 
of  Indian  soldiers  is  a matter  of  some  difficulty.  It  cannot 
be  dealt  with  completely  by  reference  to  race,  locality  or 
regiment.  There  are  other  matters  necessary  to  consider, 
such  as  caste,  religion,  custom,  temperament,  and  tradition ; 
and  there  is  so  much  consequent  overlapping  of  features 
and  characteristics,  that  scientific  or  methodical  treatment 
of  the  subject  is  scarcely  possible.  For  the  present  purpose 
it  may  suffice  to  say  that  the  organization  of  the  Indian 
Army  is  based  mainly  on  considerations  of  race,  religion, 
and  locality.  Thus,  we  have  soldiers  of  distinct  races: 
the  Rajputs,  Pathans,  Jats,  and  Gurkhas;  of  various 
religions : the  Sikhs,  Hindus,  and  Mahomedans ; of  different 
localities : the  Mahrattas,  Dogras,  Madrasis,  and  Punjabis, 
although  it  can  hardly  be  said  that  any  of  these  should  be 


DESCRIPTION  OF  THE  INDIAN  ARMY  483 


exclusively  so  classified.  The  matter  may,  perhaps,  be 
made  fairly  clear  by  the  following  short  account  of  some 
of  the  principal  classes  and  types  of  fighting  men  found 
in  the  Indian  Army. 

The  Sikhs  may  with  justice  be  considered  the  most 
important  class  among  our  Indian  soldiers.  Not  only  are 
they  the  best  known  to  Englishmen  of  all  the  fighting  men 
of  India,  with  the  possible  exception  of  the  Gurkhas,  but 
they  bulk  more  largely  than  any  other  class  in  the  Indian 
Ai-my.  The  Sikhs  are  not,  strictly  speaking,  a distinct 
race  : they  are  really  a community,  bound  together  by  a 
spiritual  tie,  the  Sikh  religion.  Amongst  them  there  are 
a variety  of  sub-divisions  of  widely  divergent  origin. 
Thus  the  Jats  are  descended  from  the  Scythians,  the 
Khattris  from  the  Aryans,  while  the  Mazbis,  from  whom  the 
Pioneer  Regiments  are  largely  recruited,  are  of  aboriginal 
ancestry. 

The  home  of  the  Sikh  is  the  Punjab.  He  is  generally 
a fine  tall  man  of  strong  physique  and  stately  bearing, 
with  the  manly  virtues  inculcated  by  his  religion  strongly 
developed.  Tobacco  is  forbidden  to  him.  His  hair  is 
never  cut,  being  worn  coiled  up  on  the  top  of  the  head, 
while  his  beard  is  drawn  back  over  his  ears  and  tucked  under 
his  turban ; this  is  large  and  often  surmounted  by  a steel 
quoit  with  a razor-like  edge,  which  can  be  thrown  with 
great  force  and  accuracy. 

The  chief  traits  of  the  Sikhs  are  a love  of  military 
adventure  and  a desire  to  make  money,  a combination 
which  has  led  them  to  accept  military  or  police  service  in 
Burma,  China,  Africa  and  other  countries  beyond  the  seas. 

In  the  Sikh  wars  of  1846  and  1849  they  fought  the 
British  in  a manner  wFich  compelled  admiration  for  their 
militaiy  genius  and  prowess,  displaying  soldierly  qualities 
of  the  highest  order.  Since  the  annexation  of  the  Punjab 
in  the  latter  year,  they  have  been  our  loyal  adherents, 
and  it  speaks  volumes  for  the  personality  of  the  British 
officer  that  within  eight  years  after  the  war  of  1849  the 
Sikhs  were  fighting  by  our  side  in  the  Indian  Mutiny. 


484  DESCRIPTION  OF  THE  INDIAN  ARMY 


Three  elass  regiments  of  Sikhs  formed  part  of  the 
Indian  Corps  in  France,  the  15th  Ludhiana  Sikhs,  the  47th 
Sikhs,  and  the  34th  Sikh  Pioneers.  The  community  was, 
however,  largely  represented  also  in  the  27th,  33rd,  69th, 
and  89th  Punjabis,  and  the  57th,  58th,  and  59th  Rifles,  in 
whieh  the  Sikh  companies  varied  from  one  to  four. 

The  Jats  mostly  come  from  the  Punjab,  Rajputana, 
Agra,  and  Oudh.  They  are  a thoroughbred  race,  generally 
considered  to  be  of  the  same  stock  as,  or  closely  allied  to, 
the  Rajputs.  In  one  characteristic,  however,  they  greatly 
differ  from  the  latter.  The  Rajput  disdains  every  employ- 
ment or  profession  except  that  of  bearing  arms  ; the  Jat 
is  generally  a landowner  engaged  chiefly  in  agriculture, 
a kind  of  manual  labour  especially  despised  by  the  haughty 
Rajput.  By  religion  the  Jats  are  Hindus.  In  appearance 
they  are  tall,  large-limbed,  and  handsome,  and  they  are 
usually  rcmarkalfle  for  their  toughness  and  capacity  for 
enduring  the  greatest  fatigue  and  privation.  They  are 
considered  very  fine  horse-soldiers.  In  the  Mutiny  they 
distinguished  themselves  greatly  against  the  rebels,  and 
they  have  since  served  iis  well  in  Afghanistan  and  other 
places. 

The  only  class  regiment  of  Jats  in  the  Indian  Corps  was 
the  6th  Jats. 

The  inhabitants  of  the  North-West  Frontier  of  India 
are  practically  entirely  and  purely  Musalman.  From  these 
parts  come  the  Pathans,  represented  in  the  Indian  Army 
Corps  by  a varying  number  of  companies  in  the  40th 
Pathans  and  other  units,  such  as  the  27th  and  33rd  Punjabis, 
and  the  57th,  58th,  and  59th  Rifles.  The  Pathans  are 
divided  into  innumerable  clans  and  are  said  to  be  of 
Semitic  descent,  even  going  so  far  as  to  .call  themselves 
“ Beni  Israel  ” (Children  of  Israel),  and  their  claim  is 
borne  out  by  their  features,  which  are  distinctly  of  a Jewish 
type. 

The  Pathan  is  a tall  handsome  man,  as  a rule  built  in 
an  athletic  mould.  His  easy  but  swaggering  gait  speaks 
of  an  active  life  among  the  mountains,  where  he  engages 


DESCRIPTION  OF  THE  INDIAN  ARMY  485 


in  constant  feud,  frequently  hereditary,  which  makes  him 
what  he  is,  an  ideal  raider  or  skirmisher,  full  of  dash,  but 
often  wanting  in  cohesion  and  power  of  steady  resistanee, 
unless  led  by  British  officers. 

The  Afridis  come  from  the  Peshawar  border,  the  Khyber 
Pass,  and  the  surrounding  district.  They  are  members 
of  a Pathan  tribe,  probably  of  Rajput  origin.  Intensely 
democratic  and  independent  in  their  own  home,  they  make 
splendid  soldiers  under  good  leadership,  excelling,  like 
other  hillmen,  as  skirmishers.  It  has  been  said  that  the 
Afridi  has  the  viees  and  virtues  of  all  Pathans  in  an  enhanced 
degree.  Casual  observers  indeed  have  ascribed  to  him  more 
vices  than  virtues,  depicting  him  as  ruthless,  treaeherous 
and  avarieious ; but  Sir  Robert  Warburton,  who,  with  his 
eighteen  years’  intimate  acquaintance  with  this  race, 
may  be  aceepted  as  an  authority  on  the  matter,  writes 
thus : — 

“ The  Afridi  lad  from  his  earliest  childhood  is  taught 
by  the  cireumstances  of  his  existence  and  life  to  distrust 
all  mankind,  and  very  often  his  near  relations,  heirs  to 
his  small  plot  of  land  by  right  of  inheritance,  arc  his 
deadliest  enemies.  Distrust  of  all  mankind,  and  readiness 
to  strike  the  first  blow  for  the  safety  of  his  own  life,  have 
therefore  become  the  maxims  of  the  Afridi.  If  you  can 
overcome  this  mistrust,  and  be  kind  in  Avords  to  him,  he 
will  repay  you  by  great  devotion,  and  he  will  put  up  with 
any  punishment  you  like  to  give  him,  except  abuse.”  * 

The  Dogras  are  Hindus  from  the  district  lying  between 
the  rivers  Chenab  and  Sutlej  on  the  slopes  of  the  Western 
Himalayas.  Their  classification  is  rather  geographical 
than  racial.  They  are  mostly  men  of  high  caste  and  of 
considerable  strength  of  character.  They  are  noted  for 
their  calm  courage  and  obedience  to  orders,  and,  as  a rule, 
are  thoroughly  reliable  in  moments  of  peril.  In  appearance 
they  somewhat  resemble  the  Sikhs,  but  are  rather  less  in 
height,  more  sparely  built,  and  of  fairer  complexion  than 
most  Indians. 

* “ Eighteen  Year.;  in  the  Khyber,'’  up.  o42-3. 


486  DESCRIPTION  OF  THE  INDIAN  ARMY 


The  only  Dogra  regiment  with  the  Indian  Corps  was  the 
41st,  but  the  elass  was  represented  by  companies  in  other 
battalions. 

Although  the  129th  Baluchis  took  a prominent  part  in 
much  of  the  fighting,  the  name  is  a misnomer,  as  the  genuine 
Baluchi  is  not  now  enlisted.  The  129th  consists  of  2 
companies  of  Punjabi  Musalmans,  3 of  Mahsuds,  3 of  other 
Pathans. 

The  Gurkhas  are  the  sturdy  hilhnen  of  Nepal,  probably 
better  known,  by  name  at  least,  to  the  average  Efiglishman 
than  any  other  class  of  Indian  soldier.  They  are  a mixture 
of  Mongol  and  Rajput,  the  former,  as  can  easily  be  perceived 
from  their  features,  predominating.  Their  appearance  is 
so  distinctive  and  so  uniform  that  it  has  been  said  that  they 
look  as  if  they  had  been  issued  from  the  quaidermaster’s 
stores.  In  many  ways  they  resemble  the  Japanese,  being 
usually  little  more  than  five  feet  in  height,  but  they  are  of 
much  sturdier  build  and  differ  from  the  Japanese  in 
expression. 

There  is  much  about  the  Gurkha  which  especially  appeals 
to  the  British  soldier ; his  friendliness,  cheeriness,  and 
adaptability  make  him  easier  to  get  on  with  than  other 
classes.  The  present  trench  warfare  is  the  very  antithesis 
of  the  Gurkha’s  idea  of  fighting.  A born  shikari,  he  is  in 
his  glory  in  hill  or  jungle  operations  where  his  sporting 
instincts  can  have  fidl  play  and  he  has  plenty  of  elbow  room. 
His  native  weapon  is  the  kukri,  a long  curved  knife  with  a 
keen  cutting  edge  and  a heavy  back.  With  this  he  can 
cut  down  a tree  or  a man,  or  sharpen  a pencil  with  equal 
skill. 

A number  of  Gurkha  battalions  served  with  the  Corps 
in  France,  namely,  the  1st  Battalion  1st  King  George’s 
Own  Gurkha  Rifles,  the  2nd  Battalion  2nd  King  Edward’s 
Own,  the  2nd  Battalion  3rd  Queen  Alexandra’s  Own,  the 
1st  Battalion  4th,  the  2nd  Battalion  8th,  and  the  1st 
Battalion  9th  Gurkha  Rifles. 

The  Garhwalis  are  inhabitants  of  Garhwal,  in  the 
Himalayas,  to  the  west  of  Nepal.  They  so  closely  resemble 


DESCRIPTION  OF  THE  INDIAN  ARMY  487 


their  neighbours,  the  Gurkhas,  that  they  have  frequently 
been  confused  with  them.  Although  they  are  not  generally 
so  thick-set  and  muscular  as  the  Gurkhas,  their  resemblance 
is  emphasized  by  their  similar  uniforms  and  weapons, 
including  the  kukri.  It  is  said  they  sometimes  complain 
that  their  heroic  deeds  go  to  swell  the  credit  of  the  Gurkhas, 
in  consequence  of  the  confusion  between  the  two  races 
and  the  common  ignorance  of  their  separate  identity.  They 
are  capable  of  great  endurance  and  can  exist  for  long  periods 
without  food  or  drink. 

The  Garhwalis  were  represented  in  France  by  the  1st 
and  2nd  Battalions  39th  Garhwal  Rifles. 

The  Mahrattas  come  from  the  Central  Provinces,  the 
Deccan,  and  the  Konkan.  They  are  comparatively  small 
men,  without  the  elegant  proportions  and  strength  of  the 
Sikh  and  Pathan  or  the  sturdiness  of  the  Gurkha,  but  with 
very  fine  constitutions  and  a tremendous  capacity  of 
endurance,  which  keep  them  fit  for  service  under  conditions 
which  woidd  disable  most  men.  The  3rd  Sappers  and 
Miners,  the  107th  Pioneers,  and  the  125th  Rifles  each 
contained  a small  element  of  this  class. 

The  Musalmans,  or  soldiers  of  the  Mahomedan  faith, 
come  from  various  districts  of  India,  their  different  classes 
being  distinguished  generally  by  reference  to  their  respective 
localities.  Thus,  we  have  the  Punjabi  Musalmans,  Madrasi 
Musalmans,  Hindustani  Musalmans,  Deccani  Musalmans, 
and  others.  Of  these  the  Punjabi  Musalmans  may  be 
considered  the  most  important,  at  least  as  regards  numbers. 
Coming,  as  the  Musalmans  do,  from  various  races,  their 
quality  is  not  uniform,  but  they  are  good  all-round  soldiers 
with  an  attachment  to  their  officers  which  is  proverbial. 
They  may,  on  the  whole,  be  said  to  be  steady  and  reliable 
rather  than  brilliant  in  any  particular  respect. 

From  such  men  as  those  described  above,  and  a few 
other  classes  of  less  importance  numerically,  the  Indian 
Forces  have  been  raised.  Passing  over  the  irregular  forces 
of  the  great  Indian  Chiefs,  with  which  we  need  not  concern 
ourselves  for  the  present  purpose,  we  have  the  Regular 


488  DESCRIPTION  OP  THE  INDIAN  ARMY 


Indian  Amiy  and  the  Imperial  Serviee  Troops,  eomposed 
of  natives  of  India.  The  fonner  are  direetly  employed  by 
the  Government  of  India  ; the  latter  are  speeially  raised 
and  maintained  by  Indian  rulers  themselves  and  are  kept 
distinet  from  their  ordinary  troops,  in  order  that  they  may 
be  plaeed  at  the  disposal  of  the  Government  when  oeeasion 
requires. 

The  Freneh  appear  to  have  been  the  first  Europeans 
to  raise  Indian  regiments  during  their  short  period  of 
aseendancy  in  the  middle  of  the  eighteenth  eentury.  The 
English  East  India  Company  soon  followed  their  example, 
and  by  1759,  two  years  after  the  battle  of  Plassey,  had  about 
six  regidar  Indian  battalions  in  Madras,  and  a few  years 
later,  similar  eorps  in  Bombay  and  Bengal.  These 
“ Presidency  Armies  ” grew  and  developed  during  the  wars 
of  the  later  part  of  the  eentury,  and  by  1795,  when  a general 
reconstruction  of  the  Indian  forces  took  place,  we  find  about 
24,000  such  troops  in  Bengal,  a similar  number  in  Madras, 
and  9000  in  Bombay,  including  infantry,  cavalry,  and 
artillery.  A further  reorganization  and  renumbering  took 
place  in  1824.  During  this  period  and  up  to  the  Mutiny 
of  1857  these  forces  again  and  again  rendered  us  good 
service,  not  only  in  India  itself,  but  in  many  places  overseas, 
especially  during  the  Napoleonic  Wars.  As  early  as  1762, 
Indian  troops  from  Madras  assisted  in  the  capture  of 
Manila  ; in  1797,  forces  from  Madras  and  Bengal  helped 
at  the  capture  of  Ceylon  ; and  in  1801  Bombay  infantry 
were  with  us  in  Egypt.  For  nearly  a century  prior  to  the 
Mutiny,  Indian  soldiers  had  served  us  so  well  and  had  shown 
such  loyalty  and  attachment  to  their  English  officers,  that 
it  was  difficult  to  credit  the  news  of  their  revolt  in  1857. 
On  the  whole,  in  fact,  the  Indian  armies  remained  loyal, 
the  Mutiny  being  practically  confined  to  the  soldiers  of 
Bengal.  The  armies  of  Madras  and  Bombay  generally 
stood  by  us  ; so  did  the  Sikhs  and  Gurkhas  ; whilst  Pathans 
and  Punjabis  came  freely  to  our  assistance.  It  may 
indeed  be  doubted  whether  the  bulk  of  the  Bengal  soldiery 
were  themselves  essentially  disloyal.  They  appear  rather 


DESCRIPTION  OF  THE  INDIAN  ARMY  489 


to  have  been  misled  and  seduced  from  their  loyalty  by  a 
few  unprincipled  leaders. 

The  Mutiny,  with  its  consequent  transfer  of  India  to 
the  Crown,  resulted  in  a remodelling  of  the  Indian  forces, 
or  rather,  in  the  formation  of  a new  Royal  Army  in  place 
of  the  Company’s  Army.  The  part  taken  in  the  Mutiny 
by  the  native  artillery  of  Bengal  determined  the  Government 
to  restrict  the  employment  of  Indians  as  artillerymen  in  the 
future  to  a very  few  light  mountain  batteries.  The  cavalry, 
with  some  exceptions  in  Madras,  was  organized  on  the 
“ Silladar  ” system,  the  main  principle  of  which  is  that 
the  trooper  provides  his  own  horse,  uniform,  and 
equipment,  with  the  exception  of  firearms,  and  receives 
considerably  higher  pay  than  a soldier  of  the  Non- 
Silladar  Cavalry.  This  system  has  been  found  to  appeal 
to  the  best  classes  of  horsemen  and  to  produce  splendid 
cavalr}^ 

As  regards  the  Army  generally  one  of  the  most  important 
questions  to  be  settled  was  whether  there  should  be  “ class 
regiments,”  or  “class  companies”  and  “ class  squadrons,” 
that  is,  whether  a regiment  should  consist  solely  of  one 
race,  or  members  of  one  religion,  or  whether  the  different 
companies  only  of  a regiment  should  be  so  uniformly 
constituted.  In  the  old  army,  men  of  various  races  or 
creeds  were  mixed  in  a manner  which  was  not,  at  this 
later  time,  considered  advisable.  Ultimately,  most  of  the 
regiments  became  elass-company  regiments,  the  Gurkha, 
Brahman,  Rajput,  Dogra,  Jat,  and  some  of  the  Sikh 
regiments  remaining  cntirel}’  homogeneous.  So  we  find, 
in  several  of  the  Punjabi  and  Sikh  regiments,  distinct 
companies  of  Punjabi  Musalmans,  Pathans,  Sikhs,  Dogra s, 
and  Afridis  ; in  Mahratta  regiments,  distinct  companies 
of  Mahrattas  and  Musalmans ; in  Baluchi  regiments, 
distinct  companies  of  Mahsuds  and  other  Pathans,  and 
Punjabi  Musalmans  ; and  other  similar  combinations. 

Since  the  Mutiny,  many  changes  and  reforms  in  the 
administration  of  the  Army  have  been  carried  out.  In 
1895  the  three  Presidency  Armies,  i.c.  those  of  Bengal, 


490  DESCRIPTION  OF  THE  INDIAN  ARMY 


Madras,  and  Bombay,  each  with  separate  administration 
and  Commander-in-Chief,  were  abolished,  being  replaced  by 
four  Lieutenant-Generals’  commands  with  a Commander- 
in-Chief  of  the  whole.  These  reforms  were  carried  on  and 
developed  by  Lord  Kitchener  during  his  term  as 
Commander-in-Chief  in  India  from  1902  to  1909.  He 
abolished  the  old  system  of  five  commands,  and  at  the 
present  day  there  are  two  Armies,  the  Northern  and  the 
Southern,  each  commanded  by  a Lieutenant-General  with 
his  own  staff,  the  supreme  command  of  the  whole  Indian 
forces  being  vested,  under  the  Governor-General  in  Council, 
in  the  Commander-in-Chief,  assisted  by  the  Head  Quarters 
Staff. 

The  Regular  Indian  Army  is  now  composed  of  39 
regiments  of  Cavalry  and  139  battalions  of  Infantry, 
besides  Mountain  Artillery  and  Sappers  and  Miners, 
numbering  in  all  about  160,000  Indian  ranks.  The  system 
of  enlistment  is  entirely  voluntary,  recruits  being  admitted 
between  the  ages  of  16  and  25,  their  height  and  measure- 
ments varying  for  different  services.  The  number  of 
applicants  for  service  is  frequently  in  excess  of  the  vacancies, 
especially  in  the  Silladar  Cavalry. 

The  superior  officers  in  every  Indian  regiment  are 
British.  The  highest  rank  of  the  Indian  officers  in  Cavalry 
regiments  is  the  Risaldar-Major,  who  is  the  confidential 
adviser  of  the  British  Commandant  in  matters  relating 
to  the  Indian  ranks.  He  may  be  likened  to  our  rank  of 
Major.  Next  come  the  Risaldars  and  Ressaidars,  of  whom 
there  are  seven  in  a regiment,  answering  roughly  to  our 
Captains.  Each  half  squadron  has  its  Jemadar,  who  may 
be  described  as  the  Indian  Lieutenant,  an  officer  of  this 
rank  also  acting  as  Woordie-Major,  or  Indian  Adjutant. 
Immediately  below  these  come  the  Kot  Daffadar,  or 
Quartermaster-Sergeant,  who  is  the  senior  noncommis- 
sioned officer,  and  other  Daffadars  or  Sei’geants. 

In  the  Infantry  and  other  branches  the  corresponding 
officers  are  the  Subadar-Major,  Subadars,  the  Jemadars, 
of  whom  one  is  the  Indian  Adjutant,  the  Havildar-Major, 


DESCRIPTION  OF  THE  INDIAN  ARMY  491 


the  Quartermaster-Havildar,  Havildars  or  Sergeants,  and 
the  Naiks  or  Corporals. 

A private  in  the  Cavalry  is  called  a Sowar  and  in  the 
Infantry  a Sepoy. 

The  other  great  force  of  Indian  troops  upon  which  we 
can  rely  in  our  hour  of  need  consists  of  soldiers  of  the 
great  Feudatory  Chiefs  of  India,  specially  designed  for 
Imperial  purposes,  and  known  as  the  Imperial  Service 
Troops.  They  are  raised  and  maintained  by  the  Indian 
mlers,  and  are  composed  entirely  of  Indian  officers  and  men 
of  the  State  to  which  the  particular  corps  belongs,  although 
British  officers  assist  in  such  matters  as  training  and  equip- 
ment. They  had  their  origin  in  1885,  in  consequence 
of  the  fear  of  an  attack  by  Russia  on  the  North-West 
Frontier,  at  a time  when  the  Indian  Army  had  been 
reduced  after  the  Afghan  War.  The  danger  of  the  situation 
impressed  the  Indian  rulers  with  the  necessity  of  being 
ready  to  assist  the  Government  of  India  in  its  defence. 
The  Nizam  of  Hyderabad  placed  his  troops  at  the  disposal 
of  the  Government  and  offered  to  contribute  a large  sum 
of  money  for  the  purpose  of  Imperial  defence.  Other 
rulers  followed  suit,  the  result  of  the  movement  being  that 
almost  every  State  of  any  size  contributed  a quota  to  the 
Imperial  Service  Troops.  The  ready  manner  in  which 
these  forces  were  placed  at  the  disposal  of  the  Government 
at  the  commencement  of  the  present  war  demonstrates 
strongly  their  great  importance  to  the  Empire  whieh  they 
had  already  served  so  well  in  China,  Somaliland,  Chitral, 
Tirah,  and  other  parts  of  the  world. 

Three  decorations  are  especiall}^  reserved  for  the  Indian 
ranks. 

1.  “ The  Order  of  British  India,”  conferred  on  Indian 
commissioned  officers  for  long,  faithful,  and  honourable 
service,  has  two  classes,  which  carry  with  them  the  titles 
of  “ Sardar  Bahadur  ” and  “ Bahadur  ” respectively. 

2.  “ The  Indian  Order  of  Merit,”  given  for  personal 
bravery,  irrespective  of  rank  or  service.  It  is  divided  into 
three  classes,  advancement  to  a higher  class  being  granted 


492  DESCRIPTION  OF  THE  INDIAN  ARMY 


to  a man  who  is  already  in  possession  of  the  next  lower 
class  on  again  distinguishing  himself.  Each  class  of  both 
these  orders  carries  with  it  extra  monthly  pay. 

3.  “ The  Indian  Distinguished  Service  Medal,”  which 
is  awarded  for  individual  instances  of  distinguished  service 
in  peace  or  on  active  service. 


APPENDIX  II 


HEALTH  OF  THE  INDIAN  TROOPS  IN  FRANCE 

It  was  feared  that  the  rapid  transition  from  the  dry, 
Avami  climate  of  India  to  the  cold  and  damp  of  Flanders 
would  lead  to  a great  increase  of  sickness  among  the  troops, 
both  British  and  Indian.  These  fears  happily  proved  to 
be  unfounded. 

In  peace  time  a daily  average  of  3 per  1000  of  admissions 
to  hospital  was  calculated  as  a probable  standard  for  w'ar 
conditions.  In  practice,  it  was  found  to  work  out  at  2 
per  1000,  and  as  improvements  were  made  in  our  method 
of  trench  warfare,  in  the  shape  of  better  dug-outs  and  the 
draining  of  trenches,  even  this  average  tended  to  decrease. 

This  remarkable  result  must  be  largely  ascribed  to  the 
skill  and  self-sacrificing  zeal  of  the  Royal  Army  Medical 
Corps  and  the  Indian  Medical  Service,  under  the  command 
of  Colonel  (now'  Brigadier-General)  W.  W.  Pike.  C.M.G., 
D.S.O.,  R.A.M.C. 

The  work  of  the  medical  branch  of  the  Service  is  not 
one  which  comes  very  prominently  into  the  limelight. 
Its  chief  reward  is  found  in  the  admiration  and  gratitude 
of  the  troops  over  w'hose  health  and  general  w'ell-being  the 
medical  officers  keep  such  careful  w'atch. 

It  was  expected  that  pulmonary  affections,  such  as 
pneumonia  and  bronchitis,  would  be  common,  but  these, 
as  well  as  malaria  and  dysentery,  were  rare,  while  gastric 
diseases  due  to  changes  of  food  and  water  were  almost 
unknown. 

Influenza  and  trench  fever  occurred  among  the  Indians 
in  much  the  same  proportion  as  amongst  the  British.  The 


494  HEALTH  OF  THE  INDIAN  TROOPS 


former,  however,  were  rather  more  prone  to  “ trench 
feet  ” than  the  latter ; on  the  other  hand,  they  were 
practically  free  from  that  new  and  insidious  disease  of  the 
trenehes.  Albuminuria,  although  the  British  in  the  same 
area  suffered  to  a considerable  degree. 

Sanitation  has  been  defined  as  the  art  of  practically 
applying  the  laws  of  hygiene  to  individual  environments. 
Conservancy  is  that  branch  of  sanitation  which  deals  with 
the  disposal  of  waste  products.  Now,  as  hygiene  is  the 
science  of  health  maintenance,  it  is  obvious  that  the 
sanitation  of  an  army  in  the  field  is  a vital  factor  in  milita  ry 
efficiency. 

Those  who  have  lived  in  India,  even  for  a short  period, 
learn  intuitively  the  elements  of  sanitation.  Deprived 
of  the  conveniences  of  modem  civilization,  they  must 
adopt  the  more  primitive  methods  of  sanitation  and 
conservancy  for  their  own  comfort  as  well  as  health. 

Indians  are  being  daily  educated  in  these  matters, 
and  in  regiments,  owing  to  the  class  of  men  and  the  dis- 
cipline involved,  sanitation  had  reached  a high  standard 
before  the  war.  All  ranks  of  the  Indian  Army  Corps 
therefore  entered  the  field  with  a sound  working  knowledge 
of  the  important  questions  of  sanitation  and  conservancy. 
They  not  only  maintained  but  improved  the  standard,  as 
was  shown  by  the  health  of  the  troops  under  very  trying 
and  novel  conditions  of  climate  and  surroundings. 

Further  adjuncts  to  health  were  introduced,  such  as 
drying  rooms  for  clothes,  laundries,  and  baths. 

In  the  summer  of  1915,  when  the  fly  pest  was  at  its 
worst,  a Special  Commission  was.  sent  to  France  by  the 
British  Museum  to  investigate  the  causes  and  advise  as 
to  its  prevention.  In  a subsequent  circular  the  Commission 
specially  commented  on  the  good  efforts  of  the  Indian  Army 
Corps  to  combat  this  plague,  in  the  following  words : 
“ The  Commission  desires  to  express  its  admiration  of  the 
able  and  energetic  manner  in  which  potential  breeding- 
places  of  flies  have  been  dealt  with  throughout  the  area 
occupied  by  the  Indian  Corps.” 


HEALTH  OF  THE  INDIAN  TROOPS  495 


This  incident,  small  perhaps  in  itself,  sufficiently 
indicates  the  work  done  and  the  importance  attached  to 
sanitation  by  all  branches  of  the  Medical  Service  with  the 
Indian  Army  Corps. 

The  method  of  dealing  with  the  wounded  in  trench 
warfare  necessitated  much  consideration,  and  all  existing 
systems  had  to  be  revised  and  adapted  to  the  new 
conditions. 

It  must  be  remembered  that  the  almost  continuous 
shell  fire  made  the  task  of  the  removal  of  wounded  a very 
difficult  and  dangerous  operation,  and  the  success  with 
which  it  was  carried  out  speaks  for  the  bravery,  devotion, 
and  skill  of  the  Medical  Service  on  which  the  onus  of  the 
work  devolved. 

During  the  first  few  months  after  the  arrival  of  the 
Indian  Corps, -the  following  were  the  arrangements  in 
force. 

The  wounded  were  attended  in  the  trenches  by  the 
regimental  medical  officers,  assisted  by  two  men  per 
company  of  the  battalion,  who  carried  such  of  the  patients 
as  were  unable  to  walk,  when  a chance  offered,  to  the 
Regimental  Aid  Posts  which  v'ere  situated  in  the  safest 
positions  procurable,  at  a short  distance  in  rear  of  the 
trenches. 

Next  came  the  posts  known  as  Field  Ambulances,  each 
of  which  was  divided  into  Bearer  and  Tent  sections.  The 
bearers  went  forward  with  a small  personnel,  mostly  with 
horsed  ambulances,  until  they  got  into  touch  with  the 
Regimental  Aid  Posts,  when  they  established  positions 
known  as  Advanced  Dressing  Stations,  to  which  the  wounded 
were  transferred  by  stretcher-bearers  as  rapidly  as  possible. 
Thence,  after  the  first  field  dressings  had  been  inspected 
and,  if  necessary,  readjusted,  the  wounded  were  removed 
to  the  Dressing  Stations  established  two  or  three  miles  in 
rear  of  the  trenches  by  the  Tent  Divisions  of  the  Field 
Ambulances.  In  rear  -again  of  the  Dressing  Stations  were 
the  Clearing  Hospitals,  with  their  attendant  columns  of 
motor  ambulances. 


496  HEALTH  OF  THE  INDIAN  TROOPS 


At  daybreak  reports  were  collected  of  the  number  of 
wounded  in  the  Dressing  Stations,  after  which  the  motor 
ambulances  eonveyed  them  to  the  Clearing  Hospitals  on 
the  line  of  rail.  Here  the  wounded  were  carefully  attended 
to,  and  those  fit  to  travel  were  got  ready  for  the  journey  by 
train  to  the  base  and  thence  by  hospital  ships  to  oversea 
hospitals. 

The  weak  link  in  this  chain  was  the  necessity  for 
transporting  the  wounded  by  hand  between  the  Aid  Posts 
and  the  Advanced  Dressing  Stations, 

A few  months  after  the  arrival  of  the  Corps,  the  Royal 
Engineers  laid  a light  trolley  line  from  a point  about  2000 
yards  in  rear  to  the  firing  line,  for  the  purpose  of  taking 
supplies  up  at  night.  This  line  was  under  the  charge  of 
Captain  Frost,  Supply  and  Transport  Corps,  to  whose  good 
service  in  this  connection  during  the  action  of  the  25th 
September,  1915,  referenee  has  already  been  made. 

The  ti-ucks  were  then  adapted  for  the  carriage  of 
stretchers,  and  after  taking  supplies  to  the  front  line,  they 
returned  with  the  wounded  from  the  First  Aid  Posts.  This 
system  presented  two  great  advantages. 

(1)  The  more  rapid  and  comfortable  removal  of  the 
wounded, 

(2)  Saving  of  labour,  as  four  to  six  bearers  could 
manage  four  wounded  men  on  a truck,  instead  of  at  least 
four  liearers  to  carry  each  wounded  man. 

On  one  occasion  2300  wounded  were  transported  by 
this  method  in  twenty-four  hours. 

Since  those  days  light  railways  have  been  laid  in  many 
places  along  the  line,  and  experience  has  improved  the 
method,  but  it  is  believed  that  the  Indian  Corps  can  claim 
to  be  the  pioneers  in  this  direction. 

The  adoption  of  a standard  system  of  evacuation  of 
wounded  is  due  to  the  initiative  of  Colonel  Pike,  the 
Deputy  Director  of  Medical  Services  with  the  Indian  Corps. 
After  consulting  all  the  medical  officers  on  this  important 
subject,  Colonel  Pike  drafted  a pamphlet  entitled,  “Regi- 
mental Medical  Aid  in  Trench  Warfare,”  which  was 


HEALTH  OF  THE  INDIAN  TROOPS  497 


published  in  the  R.A.M.C.  Journal  and  stills  holds  its  place 
as  a guide  in  any  form  of  stationary  warfare. 

In  this,  as  in  all  his  strenuous  work,  Colonel  Pike,  who 
has  since  been  awarded  the  C.M.G.  for  his  invaluable 
services,  was  most  ably  assisted  by  Captain  F.  D. 
Cunningham,  R.A.M.C.,  to  whom  the  Corps  in  general  and 
the  Head  Quarters  Staff  in  particular  owe  a debt  of  gratitude 
for  his  never-failing  skill  and  kindly  attention. 

Two  circumstances  have  prevented  the  mention  of 
more  than  a very  few  instances  of  the  wonderlid  gallantry 
and  devotion  to  duty  displayed  by  the  Medical  Services  of 
the  Indian  Corps.  Space  was  limited,  and  great  difficulty 
was  experienced  in  obtaining  particulars  of  individual 
acts. 

The  official  list  of  rewards  for  services  in  France  granted 
to  all  ranks  of  the  Indian  Medical  Services  (excluding 
R.A.M.C.)  contains  the  names  of  seventy-six  recipients, 
and  for  each  instance  of  bravery  or  devotion  which  has 
met  with  recognition,  there  were  numbers  of  unrecorded 
cases. 

This  list  includes  the  humble  Kahar  or  stretcher-bearer 
of  the  Field  Ambulance.  The  silent  heroism  of  these  men 
has  been  remarkable  in  every  war  in  which  Indian  troops 
have  been  engaged.  Unarmed  and  unwarlike,  they  have 
gone  al:)out  their  work  on  the  battlefields,  meeting,  many 
of  them,  the  death  from  which  they  sought  to  save  others, 
looking  for  no  reward  save  the  knowledge  of  duty  well 
performed.  However  great  the  danger,  the  writers  have 
never  heard  of  a single  case  in  which  a Kahar  flinched  from 
his  duty.  They  were  all  heroes. 

To  these  men  and  to  the  gallantry  and  self-devotion 
of  the  regimental  stretcher-bearers  is  due  the  fact  that  so 
few  wounded  were  abandoned  upon  the  battlefields.  The 
Indian  Corps  will  never  forget  the  debt  it  owes  to  these 
courageous  men. 

As  an  instance  of  the  spirit  which  animated  these 
humble  servants  of  the  Empire,  the  following  is  worthy  of 
record.  At  the  commencement  of  the  battle  of  Neuve 


o 


K 


498  HEALTH  OF  THE  INDIAN  TROOPS 


Chapelle  an  officer  of  the  Royal  Engineers  relates  that  he 
saw  two  Kahars  earrying  a wounded  man  on  a streteher 
under  fire.  As  they  were  passing,  one  of  the  Kahars  was 
badly  Avounded  by  shrapnel.  He  had  just  suffieient 
strength  left  to  sign  to  his  felloAv  Kahar  not  to  drop  the 
streteher.  They  plaeed  it  gently  on  the  ground  and  then  this 
brave  man  eollapsed  in  a heap.  As  Captain  Bird,  the  offieer 
who  relates  the  story,  remarks,  “ Perhaps  it  was  only  a 
small  episode,  but  it  shows  you  what  the  Kahars  are.” 

Finally,  as  regaixls  the  arrangements  in  the  field  and 
in  the  hospitals,  ashore  and  afloat,  for  the  due  observance 
by  Indian  soldiers  of  their  religious  customs,  a short 
extract  from  an  interview  with  the  heroic  Subadar  Mir 
Dast,  V.C.,  reported  in  the  Times  of  India,  carries  the 
weight  of  high  authority. 

In  reply  to  a question  as  to  whether  the  feeding  arrange- 
ments were  satisfactory,  the  Subadar  is  reported  to  have 
made  the  following  remarks  : — 

“ The  feeding  arrangements  were  excellent ; they  left 
nothing  to  be  desired.  We  got  all  we  wanted  and  our 
religious  susceptibilities  were  scrupulously  respected.  The 
Hindu  soldiers  had  their  own  cooking  arrangements 
according  to  their  own  fashion  ; and  so  had  the  Mahomedan 
soldiers.  It  is  this  arrangement  which  has  made  the  lot 
of  the  Indian  soldier  so  happy  in  the  battlefield.  Even 
in  hospitals  our  religious  feelings  are  strictly  guarded, 
and  we  have  full  liberty  and  every  facility  in  respect  of 
observing  the  prayer  times,  etc.  In  respect  of  this,  so 
far  as  the  Pavilion  Hospital  * is  concerned,  we  are  thankful 
to  Colonel  Campbell  and  Colonel  Macleod  for  their  great 
kindness  to  us.” 

The  magnitude  of  the  task  of  the  medical  officers  can 
be  grasped  from  the  figures  of  wounded  of  the  British  and 
Indian  units.  Up  to  the  10th  November,  1915,  these 
amounted  to  23,627.  To  this  total  must  be  added  the 
number  of  sick  who  required  attention.  For  these  the 
figures  are  not  readily  available,  but  they  can  hardly  have 


* At  Brightoo. 


HEALTH  OF  THE  INDIAN  TROOPS  499 

amounted  to  less  than  18,000  during  the  same  period, 
at  the  daily  rate  of  2 per  1000. 

In  addition  to  these  cases,  the  medical  officers  had 
to  grapple  with  the  heavy  work  of  sanitation  and  con- 
servancy , as  well  as  the  inoculation  of  the  troops  against 
typhoid  fever. 


APPENDIX  III 


THE  INDIAN  SOLDIERS’  FUND 

No  history  of  the  Indian  Corps  in  Flanders  would  be 
complete  Avithout  an  account,  however  brief,  of  the  work 
of  the  Indian  Soldiers’  Fund  which  owes  its  inception  to 
the  Order  of  St  John  of  Jerusalem,  whose  Sovereign  Head 
and  Patron  is  His  Majesty  the  King-Emperor. 

The  Fund  was  inaugurated  on  the  1st  October,  1914, 
when  a Committee  was  formed  under  the  chairmanship  of 
Sir  John  Hewett,  the  members  being  ladies  and  gentlemen 
who,  from  their  connection  ivith  India  in  an  official  or 
private  capacity,  were  anxious  to  do  everything  possible 
to  assist  our  Indian  troops  in  their  severe  trials  in  Europe  ; 
with  these  were  associated  some  distinguished  members  of 
different  Indian  communities. 

Lord  Curzon  of  Kedleston  very  generously  provided 
a Head  Quarters  by  giving  the  free  use  of  his  residence, 
No.  1,  Carlton  House  Terrace. 

The  original  objects  of  the  Fund  were  threefold. 

(1)  To  maintain  the  Lady  Hardinge  Hospital  at 
Brockenhurst  Park. 

(2)  To  supply  comforts  of  all  kinds  to  all  hospitals  in 
Great  Britain  and  France  in  which  Indian  wounded  were 
treated. 

(3)  To  supplement  the  clothing  and  comforts  supplied 
by  Government  to  Indian  troops  on  service. 

From  the  very  inauguration  of  the  Fund  the  late 
Lord  Roberts  took  the  liveliest  interest  in  its  welfare,  and 
its  Head  Quarters  was  one  of  the  last  places  visited  by  him 
before  his  final  journey  to  France. 


THE  INDIAN  SOLDIERS’  FUND  501 


Appeals  for  subscriptions  were  made  to  the  general 
public  and  to  various  bodies,  with  the  result  that  up  to 
the  20th  November,  1915,  donations  totalling  £151,762  had 
been  received.  A leading  part  in  this  work  was  taken  by 
the  City  Sub-Committee,  with  Mr.  C.  C.  McLeod,  formerly 
a well-known  resident  of  Calcutta,  as  chairman.  With  such 
zeal  did  this  Committee  work  that,  although  many  of 
the  great  commercial  houses  in  London  and  elseAvhere 
had  already  been  approached,  a sum  of  over  £45,000 
has  been  obtained,  and  subscriptions  still  continue  to 
come  in. 

In  addition  to  cash,  the  British  public  made  most 
generous  gifts  of  clothing,  amounting  to  some  200,000 
garments.  These  were  dealt  with  by  the  Warehouse 
Committee  under  Lady  Sydenham,  as  also  were  the 
comforts,  of  which  a large  supply  was  received.  A 
working-party  Sub-Committee  was  fiu’ther  formed  under 
the  Hon.  Gertrude  Kinnaird,  with  Doctor  Carter  as 
Secretarj^ 

The  widespread  sympathy  felt  for  the  Indian  troops 
is  well  illustrated  by  the  various  classes  of  persons  who 
assisted  in  this  work.  Amongst  these  were  invalids,  a 
society  of  blind  girls,  old-age  pensioners,  lonely  people 
in  remote  cottages,  and  large,  well-equipped  working 
parties  in  cities  under  the  leadership  of  the  Majmress. 
These  working  parties,  in  addition  to  the  bales  sent  direct 
to  hospitals,  supplied  44,000  articles,  such  as  shirts,  belts, 
mufflers. 

The  self-sacrificing  spirit  in  which  the  Committee 
and  their  assistants  carried  on  their  work  is  proved  by  the 
fact  that  the  expenditure  on  Head  Quarters  establishment 
amounted,  up  to  the  15th  November,  1915,  to  0‘75  of  the 
receipts  and  1‘36  of  the  expenditure. 

As  regards  object  (1)  mentioned  earlier,  a hospital 
named  after  the  late  Lady  Hardinge  of  Penshurst  was 
established  by  the  kindness  of  Mrs.  Morant  in  Brockenhurst 
Park  near  Southampton.  The  building  was  erected  by 
the  State  under  the  advice  of  Sir  Havelock  Charles  and 


502  THE  INDIAN  SOLDIERS’  FUND 


Colonel  Horrocks.  It  accommodated  500  patients,  want 
of  space  alone  preventing  an  extension  to  650  beds. 

The  hospital  was  staffed  by  ten  retired  officers  of  the 
Indian  Medical  Service,  under  Lt-Colonel  Perry,  C.I.E. 
The  nursing  staff  consisted  of  a matron  and  assistant- 
matron  with  nineteen  nurses  specially  chosen  for  their 
knowledge  of  the  languages  and  requirements  of  Indian 
patients.  Their  work  was,  strictly  speaking,  not  that 
of  nursing,  but  of  general  supervision  and  control. 

The  hospital  was  opened  on  the  20th  January,  1915,  and 
the  number  of  patients  treated  up  to  the  20th  November, 
1915,  was  1863. 

The  mortality  was  kept  down  to  the  surprisingly  lov/ 
figure  of  1 per  cent.,  a striking  evidence  of  the  skill  and 
care  exercised  in  dealing  with  such  large  numbers  of 
patients,  the  majority  of  whose  wounds  were  septfe  on 
admission. 

By  the  kindness  of  Sir  James  Clarke,  sixty  members  of 
the  St  John  Ambulance  Brigade  were  engaged  in  work 
at  the  hospital,  all  menial  service  being  performed  by  Indian 
servants. 

The  conveyance  of  sick  or  wounded  Indians  with  the 
greatest  possible  comfort  and  despatch  was  facilitated  by 
the  gracious  gift  of  a motor-ambulance  by  Their  Majesties 
and  by  the  generous  offer  of  a motor-ambulance  convoy 
of  fifty  vehicles  by  Mr.  Arthur  du  Cros,  M.P.,  the  Hon. 
Gideon  Murray  and  others,  who  also  promised  to  equip 
and  maintain  the  convoy.  To  deal  with  this  branch,  a 
Motor  Sub-Committee  was  formed  under  the  chairmanship 
of  Lord  Norreys.  The  convoy  commenced  work  in  France 
on  the  1st  March,  1915,  and  performed  most  valuable  service. 
The  total  number  of  patients  carried  up  to  November, 
1915,  was  approximately  50,000. 

In  addition  to  the  Lady  Hardinge  Hospital,  comforts 
were  supplied  by  the  Fund  to  eight  other  similar  institu- 
tions in  England,  twenty  in  France,  one  in  Alexandria, 
and  also  to  nine  hospital  ships. 

The  extent  and  variety  of  the  work  can  be  judged 


THE  INDIAN  SOLDIERS’  FUND  503 


by  the  following  figures,  taken  at  random,  of  articles 
supplied  : — 


Socks  78,000 

Balaclava  caps  12,000 

Cigarettes  22,000,000 
Gramophones  40 

Religious  books  7000 


Handkerchiefs 

Sweets 

Envelopes 

Periscopes 

Footballs 


85.000 

125.000  lbs. 

850.000 
2000 

130 


The  well-being  of  Indian  prisoners  of  war  was  also  not 
overlooked.  Up  to  November,  1915,  the  Committee  were 
in  possession  of  the  names  of  500  prisoners  in  Germany, 
and  General  Sir  Alfred  Gaselee  undertook  the  work  of 
representing  the  Fund  in  association  with  the  Prisoners 
of  War  Committee. 

The  first  step  was  to  ensure  that  the  prisoners  had  a 
proper  supply  of  clothing.  Accordingly,  a Red  Cross 
kit-bag  was  sent  by  name  to  each  prisoner.  These  bags 
contained  a useful  assortment  of  underwear  and  comforts. 
An  additional  supply  of  clothing  was  also  despatched  and 
acknowledgments  of  receipt  duly  arrived. 

Every  week  consignments  of  480  tins  of  condensed  milk, 
100  lbs.  of  sweets,  and  10,000  cigarettes  were  sent  off 
and  duly  reached  their  destination.  Arrangements  were 
also  made,  through  Switzerland,  for  the  supply  of  bread. 
For  Brahman  and  other  prisoners,  whose  caste  restrictions 
prevented  their  eating  bread  prepared  by  Europeans, 
material  was  furnished  to  enable  them  to  bake  their  own 
supply. 

The  Committee  have  acknowledged  their  obligations  to 
numerous  subscribers,  not  only  to  those  who  have  given 
money,  but  also  to  many,  themselves  in  poor  circumstances, 
who  have  sent  gifts  of  garments  and  comforts  ; also  to  the 
War  Office  and  India  Office  and  to  the  St  John  Ambulance 
Association  in  India,  which  latter  has  been  of  the  greatest 
assistance  in  many  ways. 

The  Fund  received  most  grateful  acknowledgments  from 
Sir  James  Willcocks  and  Lt-General  Rimington,  and  its 


504 


THE  INDIAN  SOLDIERS’  FUND 


elforts  evoked  the  heartfelt  gratitude  of  the  Indian  Forces 
in  France  and  elsewhere. 

The  writers  can  testify  that  it  was  impossible  to  visit 
the  trenches,  billets  or  hospitals  without  meeting  at  every 
turn  evidence  of  the  solicitude  with  which  the  comfort  and 
well-being  of  the  Indian  soldier  were  considered  in  every 
detail. 

There  can  be  no  doubt  that  the  excellent  health  enjoyed 
by  the  Indian  troops,  contrary  to  all  expectation,  must  be 
greatly  ascribed  to  the  devoted  work  of  the  Committee  of 
the  Indian  Soldiers’  Fund  and  their  assistants. 


INDEX 


Abbay,  Capt.  M.  J.  N.,  47th  Sikhs, 
wounded  at  Neuve  Chapelle,  261 
Abbott,  Lieut  G.  D.,  1st  Batt. 
Connaught  Rangers,  killed  in  the 
attack  on  2/2nd  Gurkha  Rides, 
81,  84 

Abdul  Wahah,  Havildar,  59th  Rides, 
at  the  battle  of  Givenchy,  164; 
honours  conferred  on,  164 
Abdulla  Khan,  Sowar,  34th  Poona 
Horse,  at  Festuhert,  133;  awarded 
the  I.D.S.M.,  134 

Acworth,  Capt.  D.  H.,  55th  (attached 
57th)  Rides,  at  the  action  of 
Festuhert,  125-126  ; awarded  the 
M.C.,  127  ; wounded  at  the  2nd 
battle  of  Ypres,  287 
Adair,  Capt.  F.  W.,  129th  Baluchis, 
at  the  1st  battle  of  Ypres,  32  ; 
mortally  wounded,  39,  40 
Adam  Khan,Subadar,  129th  Baluchis, 
at  the  1st  battle  of  Ypres,  33 ; 
killed  at  the  battle  of  Givenchy,  144 
Aeroplanes,  lack  of,  by  the  British, 
68  ; German,  brought  down  inside 
the  British  lines,  107,  326  ; Indian 
soldiers’ attitude  towards,  107-108  ; 
reconnaissance  by,  140,  209,  217, 
218,  288  ; the  enemy’s  communi- 
cations destroyed  by,  220 
Afridis,  the,  drst  casualties  of,  24  ; 
heroism  of,  at  the  1st  battle  of 
Ypres,  37,  in  theactionof  Festuhert, 
125-126,  in  the  German  counter- 
attack at  Givenchy,  193,  195 ; 
account  of,  485 

Agnew,  2nd  Lieut  J.  W.,  1st  Batt. 
Highland  Light  Infantry,  killed  at 
the  battle  of  Festubert.  372  I 


Aid  Posts.  See  Hospitals 
Air,  Capt.  C.  A.,  l/4th  Black  Watch 
(Territorials),  at  the  battle  of  Loos, 
437,  438,  439 ; wounded,  439 ; 
missing,  believed  killed,  440 
Aire,  458 

Akbar  Ali,  Jemadar,  33rd  Punjaliis, 
killed  at  the  battle  of  Loos,  444 
Alderson,  Lt-Gcn.  E.  A.  H.,  at  the 
2nd  battle  of  Yines,  285 
Alexander,  Capt.  R.  D.,  2/3rd 

Gurkha  Rifles,  wounded  in  the 
attack  of  13th  Nov.  1914,  98,  100; 
refuses  to  be  rescued,  99  ; taken 
prisoner,  99 

Alexandria,  the  Lahore  Division  re- 
embarks from,  14 

Allardice,  Lieut  C.  McD.,  14th 
(attached  47th)  Sikhs,  at  Neuve 
Chapelle,  262  ; killed  at  the  2nd 
battle  of  Ypres,  297 
Allen,  Lt-Col  J.  W.,  commands  4th 
Batt.  King’s  (Liverpool)  Regt 
at  the  2nd  battle  of  Ypres,  317  ; 
his  able  leadership  rewarded,  317 
Allenby,  General  E.  H.  H.,  commands 
the  Cavalry  Corps,  21,  42 ; his 
commendation  of  the  57th  Rifles 
and  129th  Baluchis,  41  ; commands 
the  5th  Corps,  397 

Almond,  Lieut  R.  L.,  R.E.,  killed  in 
the  attack  on  Neuve  Chapelle,  55, 
60 

Alsace-Lorraine,  the  French  advance 
into,  checked,  339 

Alston,  Capt.  R.  C.  W.,  1st  Batt. 
Highland  Light  Infantry,  directs 
the  assault  of  15th  June  1915,  379 
Amar  Singh,  Havildar,  9th  Bhopals, 
awarded  the  I.D.S.M.,  59 
Ambala  Cavalry  Brigade,  their  share 


506 


INDEX 


in  the  German  counter-attack  at 
Givenchy,  182,  190 
Amir  Mahomed,  Risaldar,  20th 
Deccan  Horse,  rescued  by  Capt. 
Ross  at  Givenchy,  181 
Anderson,  Capt.  B.  E.,  59th  Rifles,  at 
the  battle  of  Givenchy,  162, 163, 164 
Anderson,  Lt-Gen.  Sir  Charles,  K.C.B., 
commands  the  Meerut  Division,  9, 
11,  65,  147,  250,  278,  369;  com- 
mends the  conduct  of  his  troops, 
103,  192,  249  ; concurs  in  General 
Jacob’s  decision,  246  ; his  estimate 
of  German  dead  at  Neuve  Chapelle, 
255  ; his  dispositions  at  Festubert, 
350  ; succeeds  Sir  James  Willcocks 
in  command  of  the  Indian  Corps, 
395 

Anderson,  Lieut  C.  H.,  Ist  Batt. 
Highland  Light  Infantry,  at  the 
battle  of  Givench3^  155,  156; 

missing,  157,  161 

Anderson,  2nd  Lieut  F.  K.,  l/4th 
Black  Watch  (Territorials),  killed 
at  the  battle  of  Loos,  437,  440 
Anderson,  Lt-Col  H.  L.,  commands 
the  9th  Bliopals,  52 ; mortally 
wounded  in  the  attack  on  Neuve 
Chapelle,  52,  59 

Anderson,  Lt-Col  W.  C.,  2/6th 

(attached  1/1  st)  Gurkha  Rifles, 
at  Neuve  Chapelle,  259,  at  the  2nd 
Ijattle  of  Ypres,  316,  318,  329,  at 
the  battle  of  Festubert,  372 ; 
awarded  the  C.M.G.,  329 
Anti-aircraft  guns  join  the  Corps, 
134 

Armentieres,  42,  206,  212,  396 
Army  Corps,  positions  held  by  the 
1st,  206,  the  2nd,  42-44,  206,  the 
3rd,  23,  206,  .397, the  4th,  208,  378, 
379,  the  5th,  206,  397 
Arques,  the  Lahore  Division  goes 
into  billets  at,  20 

Arras,  operations  of  the  French  at, 
207,  356  ; an  area  of  operations  in 
Sept.  1915,  396,  397 
Arsla  Khan,  Subadar,  57th  Rifles, 
at  the  1st  battle  of  Ypres,  35,  at  the 
battle  of  Givenchy,  195,  196,  at 
the  2nd  battle  of  Ypres,  197 ; 
honours  awarded  to,  35,  197 


Artillery  ammunition,  shortage  of, 
273-275,  289  ; increase  in  supply 
of,  396,  401 

Artillery  observation  posts,  lack  of, 
at  the  2nd  battle  of  Ypres,  289 
Artillery,  Royal.  See  Royal  Artillery 
Asbir  Rana,  Lce-Naik,  l/4th  Gurkba 
Rifles,  gains  the  I.D.S.M.,  389-390 
Atal,  Major  P.  P.,  medical  officer 
129th  Baluchis,  at  the  action  of 
Festubert,  136;  killed,  136 
Atkinson,  Lieut  J.  C.,  59th  Rifles,  at 
the  battle  of  Givenchy,  164  ; killed, 
164,  167 

Atma  Singh,  Naik,  57th  Rifles,  at  the 
2nd  battle  of  Ypres,  300-301  ; 
awarded  the  I.O.M.,  301 
Aubers,  village,  occupied  by  the 
enemy,  213 

Aubers  Ridge,  the  importance  of,  42, 
43,68,208,212,  213-214,442;  an 
objective  at  the  battle  of  Festubert, 
340,  341 

Ayub  Khan,  Naik,  129th  Baluchis, 
wonderful  adventures  of,  380-383  ; 
his  daring  rewarded,  383 


B 

Badan  Singh,  Risaldar,  Poona  Horse, 
at  Givenchy,  rewarded,  181 

Badawa  Singh,  Subadar,  57th  Rifles, 
killed  at  the  2nd  battle  of  Ypres, 
300 

Badham,  Lieut  L.  C.,  1st  Batt. 
Connaught  Rangers,  at  the  1st 
battle  of  Ypres,  85,  302  ; wounded 
at  the  2nd  battle  of  Ypres,  301  ; 
awarded  the  M.C.,  301-302 

Badlu,  Havildar,  6th  Jat  Light 
Infantry,  awarded  the  I.D.S.M., 
104 

Bagot-Chester,  Lieut  W.  G.,  2/3rd 
Gurkha  Rifles,  leads  an  assault  at 
Loos,  406 ; his  experiences  406- 
408,  410,  411  ; mentioned  in 
despatches,  408 

Bahadur  Khan,  Subadar-Major,  33rd 
Punjabis,  killed  at  the  battle  of 
Loos,  444 

Bahadur  Pun,  Sepoy,  2/8th  Gurkha 


INDEX 


507 


Rifles,  at  the  battle  of  Loos, 
41&-420 

Bahadur  Thapa,  Havildar,  2/3rd 
Gurkha  Rifles,  at  Neuve  Chapelle, 
22L-225  ; awarded  the  I.O.M.,  225 

Bailey,  Capt.  P.  H.  H.,  34th  Pioneers, 
his  services  during  the  relief  of  the 
French  cavalry,  44-45 ; severely 
wounded,  45 

Bailleul,  21,  22 

Baillie-Hamilton,  Capt.  A.  B.  1st 
Batt.  Seaforth  Highlanders,  at 
Neuve  Chapelle,  233 

Bainbridge,  Lieut  D.,  57th  Rifles, 
gassed  at  the  2nd  battle  of  Ypres, 
299 

Baker,  Lieut  F.  S.  A.,  4th  Batt. 
Seaforth  Highlanders,  wounded  in 
the  counter-attack  at  Givenchy, 
187 

Baker,  Colour-Sergt  F.  R.  J.,  1st 
Batt.  Seaforth  Highlanders,  buried 
in  a shell  hole,  7th  Nov.  1914,  86 

Bakshi  Singh,  Sepoy,  15th  Sikhs,  at 
the  2nd  battle  of  Ypres,  323 ; 
awarded  the  I.O.M.,  323 

Baldwin,  Capt.  H.  L.  C.,  58th  Rifles, 
at  the  action  of  Festubert,  119; 
killed,  119,  124 

Balfour-Melville,  Lieut  J.  E.,  2nd 
Black  Watch,  killed  at  the  battle 
of  Loos,  432 

Baliram,  Sepoy,  ]/39th  Garbwal 
Rifles  (attached), at  Neuve  Chapelle. 
256  ; awarded  the  I.D.S.M.,  256 

Ballinger,  2nd  Lieut  F.  A..  4th  Batt. 
King’s  (Liverpool)  Regt,  at  the 
battle  of  Festubert,  370-371  ; 
killed,  371 

Baluchis,  the  129th  Duke  of  Con- 
naught’s Own,  composition  of, 
486  ; previoTis  fighting  experience 
of,  39 ; form  part  of  the  Ferozepore 
Brigade,  10,  38,  211,  278  ; attached 
to  the  2nd  Cavalry  Division,  22, 
25,  30  ; the  second  Indian  Batt. 
to  enter  the  trenches,  22 ; their 
share  in  the  1st  battle  of  Ypres,  25, 
28-29,  30,  32-33,  37-39,  299,  in  the 
action  of  Festubert,  115,  118,  120, 
in  the  battle  of  Givenchy,  141,  144, 
162,  167,  175,  176,  19-1,  in  the  2nd 


battle  of  Ypres,  290,  298-299, 
305,  315  ; commander  of,  32,  118  ; 
commended,  38-39,  41  ; wonderful 
adventures  of  a Naik  of  the,  380- 
383 ; lose  their  medical  officer, 
136 

Baluchis,  title  of,  for  the  129th,  a 
misnomer,  486 

Bamberger,  Capt.  C.  D.  W.,  R.E., 
killed  at  the  battle  of  Givenchy, 
151,  154 

Bampton,  2nd  Lieut  J.  A.  H., 
I.A.R.O.  (attached  2/8th  Gurkha 
Rifles),  wounded  at  the  battle  of 
Loos,  417,  421 

Banks,  Capt.  P.  d’A.,  the  Guides 
(attached  57th  Rifles),  killed  at 
the  2nd  battle  of  Ypres,  299-300 ; 
devotion  of  his  orderly  to,  300 
Bannatine-Allason,  Major-Gen.  R., 
commands  the  Ist  (51st)  Highland 
Division  (Territorials),  343 
Bareilly  Bi'igade,  the,  commanders  of, 
12,  1 16,  200,  212,  215  ; composition 
of,  12,  212,  279,  377,  385;  positions 
held  by,  66,  107,  189,  276,  277, 
363,  393,  451-452 ; trenches  of, 
bombed,  107,  108  ; part  taken  by, 
in  the  battle  of  Neuve  Chapelle, 
215,  217,  253,  at  the  battle  of 
Festubert,  344,  346-351,  358,  361, 
at  the  battle  of  Loos,  400,  405,  418, 
423,  426-447  ; relieves  the  Sirhind 
Brigade,  451 

Barlow,  Major  C.  P.,  2/8th  Gurkha 
Rifles,  during  the  attack  of  the 
30th  Oct.  1914,  71-72,  73  ; severely 
wounded,  71,  72,  74 
Barr,  Lce-Corpl  A.,  1st  Batt.  High- 
land Light  Im'antry,  rewarded, 
171 

Barry,  Lieut  D.  D.,  1st  Batt. 
Highland  Light  Infantry,  at 
Givenchy,  169;  cai^tured,  169 
Barstow,  Lieut  A.  E.,  Adjutant 
15th  Sikhs,  shoots  ten  Germans 
at  the  battle  of  Givenchy,  143 
Barton,  Capt.  F.  H.,  2/2nd  Gurkha 
Rifles,  killed,  2nd  Nov.  1914,  80 
Barwell,  Major  E.  E.,  57th  Rifles, 
killed  at  the  first  battle  of  Ypres, 
I 33-34,  39 


508 


INDEX 


Bastian,  2nd  Lieut  S.,  4th  Batt. 
Seaforth  Highlanders,  killed  at  the 
battle  of  Festubert,  346 
Bates,  Sergt  J.,  1st  Batt.  Manchester 
Regt,  gains  the  D.C.M.  at  the 
2nd  battle  of  Ypres,  292 
Battye,  Capt.  B.  C.,E-.E.,  at  the  battle 
of  Givenchy,  143-144  ; invents  the 
system  of  “ double  block,”  166 
Bavaria,  the  Crown  Prince  of,  holds 
La  Bassee,  43 

Beall,  Major  E.  M.,  4th  Batt.  King’s 
(Liverpool)  Regt,  at  the  2nd 
battle  of  Ypres,  317  ; awarded  the 
D.S.O.,  317  ; wounded,  330 
Beattie-Crozier,  Capt.  P.,  IHth  Sikhs 
(attached),  at  the  battle  of  Festn- 
bert,  367  ; mortally  wounded, 
368 

Beau  Puits,  an  objective  at  the  battle 
of  Festubert,  357 
Beau  Sejour,  205 

Becher,  Major  IJ.  S.,  2/2nd  Gurkha 
Ritie.s,  killed  in  a counter-attack, 
79 

Bedford  Regt,  the,  reinforces  the 
2/8th  Gurkhas,  74 

Bell,  Capt.  M.  A.  R..  54th  Sikhs, 
killed  at  the  battle  of  (fivenchy, 
192 

Bell,  Co.-Sergt-Major  R.,  1st  Batt. 
Highland  Light  Infantry,  at  the 
2nd  battle  of  Ypres,  325  ; awarded 
the  H.C.M.,  325 

Bellewaarde  Farm,  an  objective  at 
the  battle  of  Loos,  397 
Bennett,  C.apt.  H.,  2/3rd  Gurkha 
Rifles,  missing  after  the  action  of 
13th  Nov.  1914,  100 
Berceaux,  Rue  des,  214 
Beresford,  Major  P.  W.,  l/3rd  London 
Regt,  gassed  at  the  battle  of 
Loos,  422 

Berkshire  Regt,  the,  their  share  in 
the  battle  of  Neuve  Chapelle,  223 
Bernhardi,  Gen.  F.  von,  his  opinion 
of  the  Indian  Empire,  2 
Bethell,  Capt.  L.  A.,  10th  (attached 
2/2nd)  Gurkha  Rifles,  his  experience 
with  No.  1 Co.  at  the  “ Orchard,” 
186 

Bethune,  42,  43,  140,  148 


Bhag  Singh,  Subadar,  58th  Rifles, 
missing  after  the  battle  of  Loos, 
443  ; a prisoner,  443 
Bhagat  Singh,  Havildar,  107th 
Pioneers,  awarded  the  I.R.S.M., 
130 

Bhakat  Sing  Rana,  Havildar,  2/4th 
Gurkha  Rifles,  at  the  2nd  battle 
of  Ypres,  329;  awarded  the  1.0. M., 
330 

Bhan  Singh,  Sepoy,  the  Guides 
(attached  57th  Rifles),  severely 
wounded  at  the  2nd  battle  of 
Ypres,  300  ; his  devotion  to  his 
officer,  300  ; decoratioas  conferred 
on,  30,0 

Bhim  Sing  Thapa,  Subadar,  2/3rd 
Gurkha  Rifles,  at  Neuve  Chapelle, 
226;  awarded  the  I.O.M.,  226; 
at  the  battle  of  Loos,  409 
Bhopal,  the  Begum  of,  financial 
assistance  of,  5 

Bhopal,  the  Heir- Apparent  of,  volun- 
teers for  active  service,  4 
Bhopal  Infantry,  the  9th,  form 
part  of  the  Ferozepore  Brigade, 
10,  211,  278;  their  share  in 
the  1st  battle  of  Ypres,  28-29, 
in  the  attack  on  Neuve  Chapelle, 
51,  .52,  56-57,  58,  in  the  action 
of  Festubert,  115,  118,  120,  121, 
in  the  battle  of  Givenchy,  176,  192, 
193-195,  in  the  2nd  battle  of  Ypres, 
290,  315,  319;  casualties  of,  59, 
319,  320  ; leave  for  Egypt,  377 
Bhure  Singh,  Subadar -Major,  9th 
Bhopals,  awarded  the  I.D.S.M. 
for  gallantry  in  the  attack  on 
Neuve  Chapelle,  .59 
Biez,  Bois  du,  223,  276  ; situation  of 
the,  50,  68, 214 ; an  objective  at  the 
battle  of  Neuve  Chapelle,  234, 
238,  243,  247,  248,  250,  252,  255, 
260,  264,  267,  at  the  battle  of 
Festubert,  342,  344  ; the  enemy’s 
murderous  fire  from,  263,  350 
Biez,  Ferme  du,  an  objective  in  the 
battle  of  Festubert,  341,  342 
Bikanir,  the  Maharaja  of,  volunteers 
for  active  service,  4 ; arrives  at 
Marseilles,  65 

Bingham,  Gen.  the  Hon.  C.  E., 


INDEX 


509 


commands  the  4th  Cavalry  Brigade, 
21 

Bingham,  Major  W.  H.,  69th  Punjabis, 
at  the  battle  of  Loos,  433,  435 ; 
mentioned  in  despatches,  435 
Bird,  Capt.  C.  A.,  R.E.,  at  the  battle 
of  Givenchy,  186-187  ; mining 
operations  of,  in  Jan.  1916,  203 
Bu'ley,  Sergt  F.,  Madras  Volunteer 
Rifles  (attached  Signal  Co.),  at 
the  2nd  battle  of  Ypres,  310 ; 
awarded  the  D.C.M.,  310 
Black,  Pte  R.,  1st  Batt.  Highland 
Light  Infantry,  at  the  battle  of 
Givenchy,  169;  awardedtheD.C.M., 
169 

Black,  Capt.  W.,  Adjutant  58th 
Rifles,  undertakes  a reconnaissance 
on  30th  Oct.  1914,  75;  kiUed,  75 
Black  Watch,  the  2nd  Batt.,  forms 
part  of  the  Bareilly  Brigade, 
12,  212,  279  ; carries  out  a raid 
on  9th  Nov.  1914,  89  ; part  taken 
by,  in  the  action  of  Festubert, 
115, 116, 120, 123, 131,  at  the  battle 
of  Givenchy,  187,  188,  191,  193, 
in  the  battle  of  Festubert,  350, 
351,  in  the  battle  of  Loos,  405, 
426,  431,  432,  433,  434,  439,  440- 
441  ; gallantry  of  individual 
members  of  the,  124,  351-352 ; 
casualties  of,  352, 431-432  ; affected 
by  our  own  gas  at  Loos,  426,  427  ; 
commended  by  Gen.  Jacob,  446  ; 
gallantry  of  No.  2 Co.  on  8th  Oct. 
1915,  432-433,  452 
Black  Watch,  the  4th  Batt.  (Terri- 
torials), forms  part  of  the  Bareilly 
Brigade,  212,  279  ; their  share  in 
the  battle  of  Neuve  Chapelle,  253, 
in  the  battle  of  Festubert,  351, 
in  the  battle  of  Loos,  405,  416, 
418,  419,  420,  426,  428,  436-440, 
444 ; casualties  of,  347,  440 ; 
commended  by  Gen.  Jacob,  446 
Blackader,  Lt-Col  C.  G.,  commands 
2nd  Batt.  Leicestershire  Regt, 
at  the  battle  of  Givenchy,  149, 
151  ; commands  the  Garhwal 
Brigade,  200,  211,  215,  279;  his 
commendation  of  the  troops  at 
Loos,  424-425 


Blackader  Trench,  350 
Blendercques,  20 

Bliss,  Major  C.,  1/lst  Gurkha  Rifles, 
at  the  battle  of  Givenchy,  171, 
172,  173  ; killed,  173 
Block,  method  of  constructing  a,  166 
Boeschepe,  280 
Boeseghem,  458 
Boesinghe,  396 

Boileau,  Major  E.  R.  P.,  2/2Ed 
Gurkha  Rifles,  in  the  counter- 
attack at  Givenchy,  186-187  ; 
promoted  to  brevet  Lt-Col  for 
services  at  Neuve  Chapelle,  251 
Bois  de  Pommereau,  situation  of, 
214 

Bois  du  Biez.  See  Biez,  Bois  du 
BoR,  Ferme  du,  an  objective  at  the 
battle  of  Festubert,  366,  367,  369, 
370 

Bois  Grenier,  397 

Bois,  Rue  du,  101,  147,  190,  363  ; 
shelled  by  the  enemy,  204,  342, 
347  ; an  objective  at  the  battle 
of  Neuve  Chapelle,  248 
Bombing  schools,  establishment  of, 
279-280 

Bombs,  deficiency  in  quality  and 
quantity  of,  in  1914,  69,  118,  167, 
170,  171,  173,  187,  188.  189  ; effect 
of  rain  and  mud  on,  at  Festubert, 
364 ; insufficiency  of,  at  Loos, 
430 

Boyd,  Pte  — , 2ud  Batt.  Black  Watch, 
in  the  action  of  Festubert,  124  ; 
awarded  the  D.C.M.,  124 
Brakspear,  Lt-Col  W.  R.,  2/3rd 
Gurkha  Rifles,  carries  out  an 
assault  on  the  13th  Nov.  1914, 
96-100  ; heroism  of,  98,  99,  409  ; 
at  the  battle  of  Loos,  406,  409  ; 
killed,  409,  410 

Brevet  Colonelcies  & Lt-Colonelcies. 

See  Decorations  and  Honours 
Brewery,  the,  at  Neuve  Chapelle, 
fighting  around, 224,  225  ; Sappers 
and  Miners  shelled  out  of,  239-240 
Brewery  Road,  the,  191 
Brewster,  Lce-Corpl  J.  S.,  l/3rd 
London  Regt,  gains  the  D.C.M.  at 
Neuve  Chapelle,  235 
Brind,  Capt.  R.  M.,  37th  (attached 


510 


INDEX 


41st)  Dogras,  machine-gun  ofncer  , 
at  Festubert,  awarded  the  M.C., 
355 

Brisbane,  Col.-Sergt  Robt,  1st  Batt. 
Highland  Light  Infantry,  at  the 
battle  of  Givenchy,  169 ; captured, 
169 

Brodhurst,  Major  B.  M.  L.,  l/4th 
Gux'kha  Rifles,  at  the  battle  of  I 
Givenchy,  155-156,  158 ; at  the  1 
2nd  battle  of  Ypres,  316 ; killed, 
316  ! 

Brooke,  Lieut  A.  S.,  69th  Punjabis,  ! 
at  the  battle  of  Loos,  434  ; 
wounded,  434 

Brooks,  Pte  L.  C.,  1st  Batt.  Highland 
Light  Infantry,  gains  the  D.C.M.  i 
at  Neuve  Chapelle,  265  j 

Brown,  Capt.  A.  M.,  47th  Sikhs,  in  ! 
the  attack  on  Neuve  Chapelle,  | 
56 ; wounded  at  the  battle  of 
Givenchy,  184 ; killed  at  the  j 
battle  of  Neuve  Chapelle,  261  j 
Brov'n,  2nd  Lieut  H.  M.,  2nd  Batt.  i 
Leicestershire  Regt,  killed  at  the 
battle  of  Festubert,  360  I 

Browne,  Major  H.  E.,  47th  Sikhs,  | 
wounded  in  the  attack  on  Neuve  | 
Chapelle,  59  j 

Browne,  Capt.  R.  G.,  1st  Batt.  - 
Manchester  Regt,  at  Neuve  Cha-  j 
pelle,  260  ; wounded,  260  | 

Browne,  Lieut  M.  W.,  2nd  Batt.  I 
Leicestershire  Regt,  killed  at  the  1 
battle  of  Loos,  414 
Browne,  Lieut  R.  B.,  34th  Sikh 
Pioneers,  wounded  during  the 
relief  of  the  French  Cavalry,  45 
Browning,  Lieut  C.  S.,  129th  Baluchis,  { 
wounded  at  the  battle  of  Givenchy,  j 
143,  144 

Browning,  Capt.  E.  R.  L.,  1st  Brah- 
mans (attached  2/8th  Gurkha 
Rifles),  wounded  at  the  battle  of 
Loos,  417,  421 

Brownlow,  Lieut  W.  L.,  2nd  Batt. 
Black  Watch,  killed  at  the  battle 
of  Festubert,  352 

Bruce,  Lieut  the  Hon.  D.,  2nd  Batt. 
Seaforth  Highlanders,  at  Neuve 
Chapelle,  234 

Bruce,  Major  J.  M.,  107th  Pioneers, 


killed  in  the  action  of  Festubert, 
130 

Bruce,  2nd  Lieut  J.  P.,  l/4th  Black 
Watch  (Territorials),  wounded  at 
the  battle  of  Loos,  436 
Bruce,  Lieut  W.  A.  McC.,  59th 
Rifles,  at  the  battle  of  Givenchy, 
163-164  ; killed,  164,  167  ; devo- 
tion of  his  men  to,  165 
Brunker,  Major-Gen.  J.  M.  S., 
commands  the  Sirhind  Brigade,  11, 
139 ; succeeded  by  Col  W-  G. 
Walker,  200 

Brunskill,  Lieut  G.  S.,  47th  Sikhs, 
his  daring  reconnaissance,  60-63  ; 
severely  w'ounded,  63,293;  awarded 
the  M.C.,  63,  293 ; at  the  2nd 
battle  of  Ypres,  293 
Bryce,  2nd  Lieut  S.,  7th  Dragoon 
Guards,  wounded  and  missing  at 
the  battle  of  Givenchy,  183-184 
Buchan,  Capt.  E.  N.,  1st  Batt. 
Manchester  Regt,  gassed  at  the 
2nd  battle  of  Ypres,  291 
Buchan,  Capt.  J.,  2nd  Batt.  Black 
Watch,  at  the  battle  of  Loos,  427, 
428 ; carries  out  a successful 
retirement,  431,  443  ; gallantry  of, 
432,  433 ; awarded  the  D.S.O., 
432 ; wounded,  433 
Buckingham,  Pte  W.,  2nd  Batt. 
Leicestershire  Regt,  his  conspicuous 
valour  at  Neuve  Chapelle,  231-232  ; 
aw  arded  the  V.C.,  232;  killed,  232 
Buckland,  Capt.  G.  C.  B.,  2/8th 
Gurkha  Rifles,  in  the  action  of 
Festubert,  121-122  ; awarded  the 
D.S.O.,  122  ; at  the  battle  of  Loos, 
415,  417,  418,  419,  420 
Budhiman  Gmrung,  Sepoy,  2/3rd 
Gurkha  Rifles,  experiences  of,  at 
the  battle  of  Loos,  407-408 
Bull,  Capt.  G.  S.,  58th  Rifles,  in  the 
action  of  Festubert,  119-120,  131 
Bullard,  Lieut  E.  G.,  Indian  Postal 
Service,  death  of,  390 
Buller,  Lieut  F.  E.,  R.E.,at  the  action 
of  Festubert,  135  ; wounded  while 
rescuing  a private,  135 ; awarded 
the  M.C.,  135 

Bundi,  the  Maharao  Rana  of,  financial 
assistance  of,  5 


INDEX 


511 


Burke,  Capt.  T.  C.,  1/lst  Gurkha 
Rifles,  at  the  battle  of  Givenchy, 
167-168  ; killed,  168 
Burma  Infantry,  the  93rd,  joins  the 
Indian  Corps,  402 

Burn,  Capt.  A.  H.,  59th  Rifles, 
severely  wounded  at  the  battle 
of  Neuve  Chapelle,  263 
Burton,  Capt.  G.  W.,  2/39th  Garhwal 
Rifles,  408 

But  Singh,  Lce-Xaik,  47th  Sikhs,  his 
daring  seizure  of  a German  notice- 
board,  390-391 

Butha  Sing  Kegi,  Havildar,  2/39th 
Garhwal  Rifles,  at  the  battle  of 
Xeuve  Chapelle,  222;  awarded  the 
I.O.M.,  222 

Buxton,  Lieut  V.,  2nd  Batt.  Leices- 
tershire Regt,  at  the  battle  of 
Xeuve  Chapelle,  230 
Byng,  Gen.  J.,  commands  the  3rd 
Cavaky  Division  at  the  1st  battle 
of  Ypres,  29 

C 

Cailloux,  Rue  de,  204 
Cairo,  impression  made  by  the 
Indian  troops  in,  14 
Callaghan,  Capt.  G.  F.,  1st  Batt. 
Connaught  Rangers,  in  the  action 
of  Festubert,  118 ; at  the  2nd 
battle  of  Ypres,  303 ; wounded, 
303  ; awarded  the  M.C.,  303 
Cameron,  Capt.  W.  H.  V.,  1st  Batt. 
Highland  Light  Infantry,  at  the 
battle  of  Givenchj^  171  ; believed 
killed,  171 

Cameron  Highlanders,  the,  timely 
arrival  of,  at  Givenchy,  179 
Cammell,  Lieut  G.  A.,  R.F.A.,  at 
Xeuve  Chapelle,  228 ; wounded, 
228 ; rescued  by  Lce-Corpl  V. 
Thompson,  228-229  ; awarded  the 
D.S.O.,  229 

Campbell,  Capt.  E.  V.,  l/4th  Black 
Watch  (Territorials),  at  the  battle 
of  Loos,  436 ; wounded  and 
missing,  437 

Campbell,  Lieut  F.  C.  G.,  Adjutant, 
40th  Pathans,  at  the  2nd  battle 
of  Ypres,  294 


Canadian  Aidillery,  the,  valuable 
assistance  of,  at  Ypres,  315,  327 
Canadian  Division,  the,  their  gallantry 
at  the  2nd  battle  of  Ypres,  283- 
284  ; their  share  in  the  battle  of 
Festubert,  369,  in  the  assault  of 
15th  June  1915,  378 
Carden,  Major  J.  R.,  commands  the 
15th  Sikhs  during  the  relief  of  the 
French  cavalry,  46 ; at  the  2nd 
battle  of  Ypres,  322 ; mortally 
wounded,  322 

Carmichael,  Pte  J.,  1st  Batt.  High- 
land Light  Infantry,  his  attempt 
to  rescue  an  officer  at  Givenchy, 
171  ; awarded  the  D.C.M.,  171 
Carnegy,  Major-Gen.  P.  M.,  commands 
the  Jullundur  Brigade,  11,  140; 
directed  to  secure  Givenchy,  176 ; 
invalided,  200 

Cassels,  Major  K.  S.,  2/8th  Gurkha 
Rifles,  on  the  30th  Oct.  1914,  73  ; 
in  the  action  of  Festubert,  120, 
121,  123;  wounded,  123,  129 
Castilia,  the,  arrives  at  Marseilles, 
15 

Casualties,  at  the  1st  battle  of  Ypres, 
28,  39  ; during  the  relief  of  the 
French  cavahy,  49  ; in  the  attack 
on  Xeuve  Chapelle,  59-60 ; of 
the  Corps  up  to  3rd  Xov.  1914, 
64  ; while  taking  over  the  line 
from  the  British,  74  ; during  the 
attack  on  the  2/2nd  Gurkhas, 
83-85 ; in  the  attack  on  7th  Xov. 
1914,  87  ; in  the  raids  by  the 
Garhwal  Rifles  and  2nd  Black 
Watch,  88,  89  ; id"  the  action  of 
13th  Xov.  1914,  100  ; in  a raid  by 
the  6th  Jats,  103,  104  ; from  sick- 
ness, compared  with  those  of 
British  ranks,  106 ; caused  by 
German  trench  mortars,  107,  108  ; 
at  the  action  of  Festubert,  123, 
124,  129,  130  ; xip  to  1st  Dec.  1914, 
139,454;  at  the  battle  of  Givenchy 
144,  154,  16],  167,  174,  179, 

183-184,  192 ; up  to  31st  Dec. 
1914,  199;  up  to  1st  Feb.  1915, 
204  ; at  the  battle  of  Xeuve 
Chapelle,  236,  251,  262-263,  266- 
267,  268 ; up  to  1st  April  1915 


512 


INDEX 


275  ; at  the  2nd  battle  of  Ypres, 
287,  296,  297,  299-300,  301,  303, 
319-320,  325,  329,  330,  332,  333  ; 
up  to  1st  May  1915,  336;  at  the 
battle  of  Festubert,  342,  346,  351, 
352,  353,  354,  357,  360,  361,  371, 
372-373,  375 ; up  to  1st  July 
1915,  384 ; up  to  31st  Aug. 
1915,  393  ; at  the  battle  of  Loos, 
410,414,421 , 424, 431-432,435-436, 
440,  443,  444,  445 ; from  enemy 
mining  operations  at  Givenchy, 
452 ; up  to  2nd  Oct.  1915, 

458  ; up  to  19th  Kov.  1915, 

4.59  ; remarks  on.  469-460,  478- 
479 

Cats,  Mont  des,  22,  280 

Cavalry,  the,  of  the  Indian  Corps, 
associated  with  British  Cavalry 
at  the  1st  battle  of  Ypres,  21-41  ; 
line  held  by,  42-44  ; strength  of, 
at  the  2nd  battle  of  Ypres,  332  ; 
their  part  iji  tlie  battle  of  Festu- 
bert,  341.  See  also  Cavalry,  tlie 
4th ; Deccan  Horse ; Jodhpur 
Lancers;  Lancers, the  15th;  Poona 
Horse  ; Secundrabad  Cavalry  Bri- 
gade 

Cavalry,  the  4th,  forms  part  of  the 
Meerut  Division,  12,  279  ; at 
Givenchy,  190  ; entrain  for  Mar- 
seilles, 458-4.59 

Chadwick,  Corpl  E.,  E.E.,  attached 
Lahore  Signal  Co.,  at  Neuve 
Chapellc,  258 ; awarded  the 
D.C.M.,  257-258 

Chagatta,  Colour-Havildar,  -jrd  Saj)- 
pers  and  Miners,  in  the  raid  of 
15th-16th  Nov.  1914,  103-104; 
at  the  battle  of  Neuve  Chapelle, 
231  ; decorations  conferred  on, 
103-104,  231 

Chamberlain,  Pte  W.  0.,  2nd  Batt. 
Leicestershire  Eegt,  in  the  action 
of  Festubert,  awarded  the  D.C.M., 
130 

Champagne,  success  of  the  French  in, 
205  ; lesson  learned  from  the  offen- 
sive in,  207  ; the  area  of  opera- 
tions in  Sept.  1915,  396-397 

Champain,  Lt-Col  H.  B.,  commands 
]/4th  Gurkha  Rifles,  his  commen- 


dation of  Subadar-Major  Senbir 
Gurung,  389 
Champs  de’;Cercettes,  20 
Chapelle  St  Roch,  156-157 ; an 
objective  on  15th  June  1915,  378 
Chapigny,  66,  277 
Chateau  Mazinghem,  463 
Chattel!,  Pte  E.  W.,  2nd  Batt. 
Leicestershire  Regt,  awarded  the 
D.C.M.,  130 

Chet  Sing,  Subadar,  2/2nd  Gurkha 
Rifles,  killed  in  the  attack  of  the 
2nd  Nov.  1914,  79 

Chetwode,  Gen.  .Sir  P.  W.,  Bt, 
commands  the  5th  Cavalry  Brig- 
ade, 21 

Chitral,  the  Mehtar  of,  loyalty  of,  6 
Christopher,  Capt.  L.  de  L.,  40th 
Pat  bans,  killed  at  the  2nd  battle  of 
Ypres,  295 

Clarke,  Capt.  R.  J.,  8th  Rajputs 
(attached  l/39th  Garhwal  Rifles), 
at  the  battle  of  Neuve  Chapelle, 
233  ; killed,  236 

Clarke,  Lieut  H.  S.,  57th  Rifles,  at 
the  1st  battle  of  Ypres,  31  ; missing, 
31 

Clifford,  Pte  W.,  1st  Batt.  Highland 
Light  Infantry,  wins  the  D.C.M.  at 
Neuve  Chapelle,  265 
Clifford,  2nd  Lieut  W.  H.  R.,  2/2nd 
Gurkha  Rifles,  at  the  battle  of 
Neuve  Chapelle,  243 
Coates,  Lieut  A.  D.,  4th  Batt. 
London  Regt.,  killed  at  the  2nd 
battle  of  Ypre.s,  320 
Cockburn,  Capt.  R.,  4th  Batt. 
Suffolk  Regt,  wounded  at  the 
battle  of  Neuve  Chapelle,  262 
Cockburn,  Lieut  C.  J.,  6th  Jat,  in 
the  action  of  Festubert,  122 ; 
awarded  the  M.C.,  122  ; killed  in 
Mesopotamia,  121 

Coffin,  Lt-Col  C.,  R.E.,  C.R.E., 
Lahore  Division,  278  ; at  the  2nd 
battle  of  Ypres,  312 
Cold  well,  Sergt  H.,  1st  Batt.  Con- 
naught Rangers,  in  the  action  of 
Festubert,  135  ; at  the  2nd  battle 
of  Ypres,  135-136,  302 ; honours 
conferred  on,  135,  302;  killed 
136 


INDEX 


513 


Collias,  Pte  J.  D.,  gains  the  at 

the  2n(l  battle  ol'  Ypres,  .311 

Collin-s,  Capt.  L.  P.,  l/4th  thirkhar 
Rifles,  at  Neuve  Chapelle,  259, 
266  ; awarded  the  D.S.O.,  259  ; 
wounded  at  the  2nd  battle  of 
Ypres,  318 

Collins,  Lieut  V.  D.  B.,  2/2nd 
Gurkha  Rities,  killed  at  the  battle 
of  Festubert,  345 

Colomb,  Lce-Corpl  G.  F.,  4th  Batt. 
London  Regt,  at  the  2nd  battle 
of  Ypres,  320 ; awarded  the  D.C.M., 
320 

Combe,  Capt.  S.  B.,  47th  Sikhs, 
wounded  at  the  battle  of  Neuve 
Chapelle,  261 

Companion  of  the  Bath.  See  Decora- 
tions and  Honours 

Companion  of  the  Order  of  St 
Michael  and  St  George.  See 
Decorations  and  Honours 

Connaught  Rangers,  the,  1st  Batt. 
forms  part  of  the  Ferozepore 
Brigade,  10,  211  ; 2nd  Batt.  joins 
the  Indian  Corps,  201  ; commander  j 
of,  21  ; attached  to  the  1st  Cavalry  | 
Division,  21  ; 1st  Batt.  of  the 
Indian  Corps  to  enter  the  trenches, 
22  ; their  part  in  the  1st  battle 
of  Ypres,  24,  26,  28,  299  ; in  the 
attack  on  the  2/2nd  Gurkhas,  80, 
81,  85  ; at  the  action  of  Festubert, 
115-118,  120;  in  the  battle  of 
Givenchy,  141-144,  148,  176,  192, 
193  ; in  the  2nd  battle  of  Y^^pi’es, 
287,  290-291,  301-303,  30.5,  316; 
casualties  of,  84-85,  303 ; coura- 
geous conduct  of  a sergeant  and 
four  men  of,  135 ; specially  com- 
mended, 334-335 

Conneau,  Gen.,  commands  French 
Cavalry,  42,  44 

Connell,  2nd  Lieut  S.  D.,  1st  Batt. 
Manchester  Regt,  .at  Festubert, 
135 ; killed,  135 ; mentioned  in 
despatches,  135 

Cooch  Behar,  the  Maharaja  of,  his 
brother  volunteers  for  active 
service,  4 

Cook,  Pte  C.,  7th  Dragoon  Guards, 
assists  in  the  rescue  of  a sepoy  of  I 


the  .58th  Rities,  131 ; awarded  the 
D.C.M.,  1.34 

Cook,  Capt.  J.  R.,  47  th  Sikhs 
(attaclied),  killed  at  the  2nd  battle 
of  Y'pres,  297 

Copeland,  Major  F.,  69th  Punjabis, 
killed  on  arrival  at  the  Front,  433 

Cormack,  Capt.  H.  S.,  47th  Sikhs, 
wounded  at  the  battle  of  Neuve 
Chapelle,  261 

Corse-Scott,  Lieut  E.  J.,  Adjutant, 
2/2nd  Gurkha  Rifles,  his  part  in  the 
attack  of  the  2nd  Nov.  1914,  81  ; 
awarded  the  M.C.  at  Neuve 
Chapelle,  244 

Couper,  Capt.  C.  M.,  l/4th  Black 
Watch  (Territorials),  at  the  battle 
of  Loos,  436,  438 

Cour  d’Avou6,  392  ; an  objective 
at  the  battle  of  Festubert,  366, 
369 

Courtrai,  railway  station,  attacked  by 
aeroplanes,  220 

Cowan,  Lieut  .1.  R.,  1st  Batt. 
Highland  Light  Infantry,  at  Giv- 
enchy, 169 ; at  Neuve  Chapelle, 
266 ; mentioned  in  desjjatches, 
266 ; wounded  at  the  battle  of 
Festubert,  362 

Ci’aig,  Lieut  J.  Mac  A .,  57th  (attached 
58th)  Rifles,  killed  in  a counter- 
attack on  30th  Oct.  1914,  75 

Cramer-Roberts,  Capt.  M.  T.,  l/4th 
Gurkha  Rifles,  at  the  battle  of 
Givenchy,  156-159  ; severely 
wounded,  160,  161  ; awarded  the 
D.S.O.,  160 

Crawhall,  Lieut  N.  G.,  1st  Batt. 
Manchester  Regt,  wounded  at 
the  2nd  battle  of  Ypres,  291 

Creagh,  Capt.  L.,  1st  Batt.  Manchester 
Regt,  killed  in  the  counter-attack 
at  Givenchy,  179 

“ Crescent  ” Trench,  the,  254,  3.50 

Croix  Barbee,  363,  390 

Crosse,  Lieut  E.  C.  M.,  2nd  Batt. 
Leicestershire  Regt,  mortally 
wounded  at  the  battle,  of  Festubert, 
360 

Crown  Prince  of  Germany,  the,  his 
army  at  Verdun,  397 

Cruikshank,  Capt.  A.  H.  P.,  34th 

2 L 


514 


INDEX 


Sikh  Pioneers  (attached),  at  the 
action  of  Festubert,  117-118 
Cuinchy,  140,  176 

Cnnninghani,  2nd  Lieut  R.  C.,  l/4th 
Black  Watch  (Territorials),  at  the 
battle  of  Loos,  437 
Cunningham,  Capt.  F.  D.,  R.A.M.C., 
497 

Cuthbert,  Major  T.  W.,  4th  Batt. 
Sealorth  Highlanders,  at  Neuve 
Chapelle,  247  ; wounded,  247  ; 
awarded  the  D.S.O.,  247 


D 

Dalbahadur  Rana,  Subadar,  2/2nd 
Gurkha  Rifles,  in  the  attack  on 
2nd  Nov.  1914,  80 

Dalip  Singh,  Sapper,  gains  the  1.0. M. 
in  the  attack  on  Neuve  Chapelle, 
57 

Dalkesar  Gurung,  Subadar,  2/3rd 
Gurkha  Rifles,  in  the  attack  on 
13th  Nov.  1914,  98-100  ; wounded 
at ’Neuve  Chapelle,  100;  honour’s 
conferred  on,  100 

Dalmahoy,  Capt.  J.  F.  C.,  40th 
Pathans,  wounded  four  times  at 
the  2nd  battle  of  Ypres,  295 ; 
killed,  295 

Dangwa  Ramola,  Lce-Naik,  l/39th 
Garhwal  Rifles,  wounded  at  Neuve 
Chapelle,  256 ; awarded  the 
T.D.S.M.,  256 

Daniell,  Capt.  J.  A.  S.,  15th  Sikhs, 
at  the  battle  of  Festubert,  367 

Darwan  Sing  Negi,  Naik,  l/39th 
Garhwal  Rifles,  his  conspicuous 
bravery  in  the  action  of  Festubert, 
126-127  ; awarded  the  V.C.,  127 

Davidson,  Capt.  D.  B.,  2/8th  Gurkha 
Rifles,  wounded  in  the  attack  on 
30th  Oct.  1914,  71  ; missing,  74 

Davidson,  2nd  Lieut  H.  S.,  1st  Batt. 
Highland  Light  Infantry,  killed  at 
the  battle  of  Festubert,  362 

Davidson,  Major  S.  R.,  47th  Sikhs, 
in  the  attack  on  Neuve  Chapelle, 
52,  53,  55 ; recognition  of  the 
services  of,  56 

Davidson-Houston,  Lt-Col  C.  E.  D., 


58th  Rifles,  at  the  action  of 
Festubert,  123,  124,  131 ; at  the 
battle  of  Loos,  431,  440-443 ; 
awarded  the  D.S.O.,  124;  wounded 
and  missing,  443  ; mentioned  in 
despatches,  444 

Davis,  Capt.  C.  T.,  107th  Pioneers, 
wounded  in  the  action  of  Festubert, 
130 

De  Lisle,  Gen.  H.  cle  B.,  commands 
the  1st  Cavalry  Division,  21 
De  Pass,  Lieut  F.  A.,  34th  Poona 
Horse,  gallantry  of,  in  the  action 
of  Festubert,  132-134 ; killed, 
134  ; awarded  the  V.C.,  134 
Deacon,  Major  H.  R.  G.,  1st  Batt. 
Connaught  Rangers,  at  the  2nd 
battle  of  Ypres,  306, 307,  309,  316  ; 
decorations  conferred  on,  306 
Deane,  Capt.  H.  R.,  R.A.M.C.,  2nd 
Batt.  Leicestershire  Regt,  killed 
at  the  battle  of  Loos,  414 
Deane-Spread,  2nd  Lieut  F.  B., 
I.A.R.O.  (attached  58th  Rifles), 
at  the  battle  of  Loos,  440 ; missing, 
443 

Deccan  Horse,  the  20th,  at  the  battle 
of  Givenchy,  181  ; casualties  of, 
184 

Decorations  and  Honours,  recipients 
of — 

Brevet  Colonelcies  and  Lieut- 
Colonelcies.  See  Boileau,  Major 
E.  R.  P.  ; Davidson,  Major  S.  R. ; 
Richardson,  Lt-Col  H.  L.  ; Swiney, 
Lt-Col  E.  R.  R. 

Companion  of  the  Bath  (C.B.). 
See  Jacob,  Col  C.  W.  ; Ormsby, 
Lt-Col  V.  A.  ; Ronaldson,  Lt-Col 
R.  W.  H.  ; Widdicombe,  Lt-Col 

G.  T. 

Companion  of  the  Order  of  St 
Michael  and  St  George  (C.M.G.). 
See  Allen,  Lt-Col  J.  W.  ; Ander- 
son, Lt-Col  W.  C.  ; Gunning, 
Lt-Col  0.  G.  ; MacFarlane,  Lt- 
Col  M. ; Pike,  Col  W.  W. ; Ritchie, 
Lt-Col  A.  B. ; Tribe,  Lt-Col  W. 

Distinguished  Conduct  Medal 
(D.C.M.).  See  Barr,  Lce-Corpl 
A.  ; Bates,  Sergt  J.  ; Bell, 
Sergt-Major  R.  ; Birley,  Sergt 


INDEX 


F. ; Black,  Pte  R.  ; Boyd,  Pte  — ; 
Brewster,  Lce-Corpl  J.  S.  ; Brooks, 
Pte  L.  C.  ; Carmichael,  Pte  J. ; 
Chadwick,  Corpl  R.  ; Chamber- 
lain, Pte  W.  0.  ; Chatten,  Pte 
E.  W.  ; Clifford,  Pte  W.  ; 
Coldwell,  Sergt  H.  ; Collins,  Pte 
J.  D.  ; Colomb,  Lce-Corpl  G. 
P. ; Cook,  Pte  C.  ; Dervin,  Corpl 
J.  ; Drummond,  Sergt  J.  ; Duffy, 
Pte  J.  ; Ehren,  Lce-Corpl  A.  E.  ; 
Elmer,  Pte  W.  ; Eoister,  Sergt 
P.  ; Gurdon,  Corpl  W.  ; Hill, 
Pte  G.  ; Holman,  Pte  J.  ; House, 
Sergt-Major  A.  G.  ; Humphries, 
Lce-Corpl  E.  ; Hunter,  Corpl 
A.  ; Keitley,  Corpl  R.  ; Kelly, 
Lce-Corpl  T.  ; Kennedy,  Sergt- 
Major  J.  ; McIntosh,  Pte  J.  ; 
Muir,  Lce-Corpl  J. ; Murray, 
Sergt-Major  C.  A.  ; Newman, 
Sergt  F.  ; Oakes,  Pte  C.  ; 
Porter,  Sergt  J. ; Richardson, 
Pte  F.  ; Ruckledge,  Sergt  H.  E.  ; 
Sones,  Pte  P.  E.  ; Staunton,  Sergt 
G.  W.  ; Steeples,  Pte  J.  ; Stewart, 
Pte  D. ; Stewart,  Lce-Corpl  J.  ; 
Swan,  Pte  T.  ; Taylor,  Pte  J.  ; 
Thompson,  Lce-Corpl  V. ; Venters, 
Pte  A. ; Vincent,  Lce-Sergt  M. 

Distinguished  Service  Order 
(D.S.O.).  See  Beall,  Major  E.  M.  ; 
Buchan,  Capt.  J. ; Buckland,  Capt. 
G.  C.  B. ; CammeII,Lieut  G.  A. ; Collins, 
Capt.  L.  P. ; Cramer-Roberts,  Capt. 
M.  T.  ;Cuthbert,MajorT.W. ; David- 
son-Houston,Maj  or  C.  E.D. ; Deacon, 
Major  H.  R.  G.  ; Dill,  Capt.  R.  F.  ; 
Douie,  Capt.  F.  M.  ; Dundas, 
Major  P.  H.  ; Gordon,  Lt-Col  H. ; 
Hannyngton,  Major  J.  A. ; Hut- 
chinson, Lt-Col  C.  A.  R.  ; Ingham, 
Capt.  J.  P.  M.  ; Irwin,  the  Rev. 
Ronald ; Kisch,  Capt.  F.  H.  ; 
Lewis,  Major  F.  ; Lodwick,  Capt.’ 
J.  T.  ; Maxwell,  Major  W.  F.  ; 
Norie,  Major  F.  H. ; Park,  Capt. 
M.  E.  ; Payne,  Capt.  R.  L.  ; Roe, 
Capt.  C.  D.  ; Romilly,  Capt.  F.  H. ; 
Ross,  Capt.  A.  C.  ; Stewart,  Capt. 
W.  P.  ; Taylor,  Capt.  J.  ; Torrie, 
Capt.  C.  J.  ; Wicks,  Capt.  H.  W.  ; 


515 

Willans,  Major  T.  J.  ; Wilson, 
Capt.  W.  C. 

Indian  Distinguished  Service 
Medal  (I.D.S.M ).  See  Abdulla  Khan, 
Sowar  ; Amar  Singh,  Havildar  ; 
Asbir  Rana,  Lce-Naik ; Badan 
Singh,  Risaldar  ; Badlu,  Havildar  ; 
Baliram,  Sepoy ; Bhan  Singh, 
Sepoy  ; Bhagat  Singh,  Havildar  ; 
Bhure  Singh,  Subadar-Major ; 
Chagatta,  Colour  - Havildar  ; 
Dangwa  Ramola,  Lce-Naik ; 
Deotinarain  Newar,  Rifleman ; 
Diwan  Sing  Padhujar,  Havildar; 
Fateh  Jang,  Subadar ; Fateh 
Khan,  Sowar ; Fateh  Singh, 
Sepoy ; Firman  Shah,  Sowar ; 
Gajbir  Bisht,  Rifleman  ; Gambhir 
Smg  Bohra,  Havildar ; Ganda 
Singh,  Sepoy ; Ganga  Charan 
Dixit,  Subadar ; Ganpati  Thapa, 
Rifleman ; Garbha  Sing  Gurung, 
Rifleman  ; Ghulam  Hussein,  Sepoy; 
Gujar  Singh,  Sapper  ; Guman  Sing 
Negi,  Jemadar ; Haidar  Ali,  Sepoy: 
Harnam  Singh,  Sepoy  ; Hashmat 
Dad  Khan,  Subadar  ; Ishar  Singh, 
Sepoy ; Ismail  Khan,  Subadar ; 
Jai  ^ Singh,  Sapper ; Jawarihu 
Negi,  Rifleman;  Kassib,  Sepoy; 
Kedar  Sing  Rawat,  Subadar  ; 
Khamba  Sing  Gurung,  Rifleman ; 
Khan  Zaman,  Naik  ; Labh  Singh, 
Subadar ; Lafar  Khan,  Sepoy ; 
Lai  Sher,  Sepoy;  Lai  Singh, 
Sepoy  ; Mangal  Singh,  Jemadar  ; 
Puran  Sing  Thapa,  Jemadar ; 
Patiram  Kunwar,  Rifleman  ; Phal- 
man  Gurung,  Rifleman;  Ranjir 
Sing  Pandir,  Havildar ; Ram- 
pershad_  Thapa,  Naik  ; Ran  Baha- 
dur Sahi,  Rifleman  ; Risal,  Sepoy  ; 
Said  Ahmed,  Sepoy ; Sapuram 
Singh,  Sepoy  ; Sar  Mast,  Havildar  ; 
Sarain  Singh,  Sepoy  ; Sueha  Singh, 
Havildar  ; Sucha  Singh,  Sepoy  ; 
Sundur  Singh,  Sepoy ; Ujagar  Singh’ 
Sepoy  ; Usman  Khan,  Sepoy 
Indian  Order  of  Merit  (I.O.M.). 
See  Abdul  Wahab,  Havildar  ; Arsla 
Khan,  Subadar;  Atma  Singh. 
Naik;  Ayub Khan,  Naik;  Bahadur 


51G 


INDEX 


Thapa,  Havildar ; Bakshi  Riugh, 
Sepoy ; Bliakat  Sing  Rana, 
Havildar ; Bliiin  Sing  Tliapa, 
Subadar  ; But  ha  Sing  Negi, 
Havildar  ; Cbagatta,  Coloiir-  Hav- 
ildar  ; Dalip  Singh,  Sapper  ; Host 
Mahomed,  Havildar ; Gagna, 
Havildar  ; Ganibhir  Sing  Gurung, 
Subadar-Major ; Gangabir  Gurung, 
Jemadar ; Gane  Gurung,  Ritle- 
man  ; Ganesh  Sing  Sajwan,  RiHe- 
man ; Gbulam  Mahomed,  Havildar  ; 
Harak  Sing  Gharti,  Lce-Naik  ; Hari 
Parshad  Thapa,  Havildar  ; Harnam 
Singh,  Subadar ; Harnam  Singh, 
Snb-Asst-Surgeon ; Hastobir  Roka, 
Ritleman  ; Jai  Lai,  Havil- 
dar ; Jaman  Sing  BLsht,  Naik ; 
Jagtea  Pun,  Ritleman  ; Jahandad 
Khan,  Subadar  ; Jhaman  Sing 
Khattri,  Lce-Naik ; Jiwa  Khan, 
Sapper  ; Kalamu  Bisht,  Rifleman  ; 
Karam  Singh,  Havildar ; Lehna 
Singh,  Jemadar  ; Madhu,  Sowar  ; 
Mangal  Smgh,  Havildar  ; Mangal 
Singh,  Lce-Naik  ; Manjit  Gurung, 
Rifleman ; Mehar  Sing  Khattri, 
Subadar ; Mir  Hast,  Subadar ; 
Natha  Singh,  Subadar ; Nikka 
Singh,  Havildar ; Pala  Singh, 
Havildar  ; Partiman  Gurung,  Rifle- 
man ; Raji  Khan,  Sepoy ; Ram- 
kishan  Thapa,  Rifleman ; Rur 
Singh,  Sepoy ; Sankaru  Gusain, 
Lce-Naik  ; Sarbjit  Gurung,  Suba- 
dar ; Sardar  Singh,  Duffadar  ; 
Senbir  Gurung,  Subadar-Major ; 
Shaikh  Abdul  Rahman,  Sapper ; 
Shanka  Rao,  Duffadar ; Sher 
Singh,  Subadar ; Shibdhoj  Mai, 
Jemadar  ; Tota  Singh,  Lce-Naik; 
Ujir  Sing  Gurung,  Rifleman ; 
Wazir  Sing  Burathoki,  Rifleman  ; 
Zarif  Khan,  Sepoy 

Knight  Commander  of  the  Bath 
(K. C. B. ).  See Watkis,Lt-Gen. H. B. B. 

Knight  Grand  Cross  of  St  Michael 
and  St  George  (G.C.M.G.)-  Nee 
iyillcocks,  Gen.  Sir  James 

Legion  of  Honour,  Officers  of  the. 
See  Deacon,  Major  H.  R.  G.  ; 
Willcocks,  Gen.  Sir  James 


Medaille  Militaire.  See  Flynn, 
Corpl  '1'. 

Military  Cross  (M.C.).  See  Ac- 
worth,  Capt.  D.  11.  ; Arsla  Khan, 
Subadar  ; Badham,  IJeut  L.  C.  ; 
Blind,  Capt.  R.  M.  ; Brunskill, 
Lieut  G.  S.  ; Buller,  Lieut  F. 
E.  ; Callaghan,  Capt.  G.  F.  ; 
Deedes,  Lieut  R.  B.  ; Drysdale, 
Lieut  A.  E.  ; Dhan  Sing  Negi, 
Subadar ; Fowler,  Lieut  E.  K.  ; 
Griftith-Griffin,  Lieut  F'.  M.  ; 
Hawinda,  Havildar  ; Henderson, 
Lieut  G.  S.  ; Hobart,  Capt.  P.  C. 

S.  ; Indar  Singh,  Havildar  ; Irwin, 
the  Rev.  R.  ; Kelly,  Capt.  E.  H.  ; 
Laing,  Capt.  R.  ; Lane,  Capt.  J. 

T.  H.  ; Lumb,  Capt.  F.  G.  E.  ; 
McSwiney,  Lieut  H.  F,  C.  ; 
Malla  Singh,  Subadar  ; Mankelow, 
Lieut  A.  H.  ; Manson,  Lieut 
C.  C.  E.  ; Martin,  Capt.  G.  D.  ; 
Mein,  Lieut  D.  B.  ; Moore,  Capt. 
H.  A.  ; Munn,  Lieut  F.  L.  R.  ; 
Murray,  Lieut  R.  G.  H.  ; Nain 
Sing  Chanwarh,  Subadar-Major  ; 
Nosworthy,  Capt.  F.  P.  ; Pancham 
Sing  Mahar,  Jemadar ; Pyper, 
2nd  Lieut  J.  R.  ; Sangram  Sing 
Negi,  Jemadar  ; Scobie,  Lieut 
J.  A.  M.  ; Steven,  Lieut  S.  H.  ; 
Trail,  Capt.  W.  S.  ; Wood,  Capt. 
C.  A. 

Order  of  British  India.  See  Arsla 
Klian,  Subadar  ; Fateh  Sing  Newar, 
Subadar  ; Gambhir  Sing  Gurung, 
Subadar-Major  ; Gunpat  Mahadeo, 
Subadar ; Harnam  Singh,  Suba- 
dar ; Jagat  Sing  Rawat,  Subadar  ; 
Nain  Sing  Chinwarh,  Subadar- 
Major 

Russian  Cross  of  the  Order  of  St 
George.  See  Chagatta,  Colour- 
Havildar ; Coldwell,  Sergt  H.  ; 
Dalkesar  Gurung,  Subadar ; Jai 
Singh,  Subadar  ; Smyth,  Lieut  J. 
G. 

Russian  Medal  of  St  George.  See 
Abdul  Wahab,  Havildar ; Bhan 
Singh,  Sepoy;  Duffy,  Pte  T.  ; 
Finegan,  Sergt  T.  P.  ; Gillan, 
Bandsman  T.  ; Kharakbir  Pun, 


INDEX 


517 


Rifleman ; Bluktiara,  Sepoy ; 
Murphy,  Sergfc  P.  ; Reilly,  Lce- 
Corpl  R.  ; Rupdhan  Pun,  Naik  ; 
Wazir  Sing  Burathoki,  Rifleman 
Victoria  Cross.  See  Buckingham, 
Pte  William  ; Darwan  Sing  Negi, 
Naik ; De  Pass,  Lieut  F.  A.  ; 
Finlay,  Lce-Corpl  D.  ; Gobar 
Sing  Negi,  Rifleman ; Khudadad 
Khan,  Sepoy ; Kulbir  Thapa, 
Rifleman  ; Mir  Bast,  Subadar  ; 
Smith,  Corpl  Issy  ; Smyth,  Lieut 
J.  G. 

Deedes,  Lieut  R.  B.,  31st  Punjabis 
(attached  57th  Rifles),  at  the  battle 
of  Givenchy,  194 ; at  the  2nd 
battle  of  Ypres,  300,  301  ; awarded 
the  M.C.,  194,  301 

Dehra  Dun  Brigade,  the,  commanders 
of,  11,  200,  211,  215,  399  ; compo- 
sition of,  11-12,  211,  278,  385,  402  ; 
portion  of  line  occupied  by,  66 ; 
part  taken  by,  at  the  battle  of 
Givenchy,  147,  148,  152,  153,  185, 
188,  189,  190,  at  the  battle  of 
Neuve  Chapelle,  215,  217,  234,  243, 
246,  248,  250,  251,  252,  258,  264, 
267,  at  the  battle  of  Festubert, 
344,  345,  348-351,  356,  358,  363, 
374,  at  the  battle  of  Loos,  400, 
405,  410,  423,  442 ; relieves  a 
Brigade  of  the  8th  Division,  277  ; 
position  held  by,  in  Sept.  1915. 393 

Denison,  Capt.  A.  C.,  2nd  Batt. 
Black  Watch,  at  the  battle  of  Loos, 
427  ; killed,  432 

Deotinarain  Newar,  Rifleman,  l/4th 
Gurkha  Rifles,  gains  the  I.D.S.M. 
at  the  2nd  battle  of  Ypres,  331 

Dervin,  Corpl  J.,  1st  Batt.  Manchester 
Regt,  gains  the  D.C.M.  at  the  2nd 
battle  of  Ypres,  292 

Des  Layes,  river,  214,  243-244,  245, 
246,  247,  250,  264 

Despatches,  officers  mentioned  in. 
See  Bagot-Chester,  Lieut  W.  G.  ; 
Bingham,  Major  W.  H.  ; Connell, 
Lieut  S.  D.  ; Cowan,  Lieut  J.  R.  ; 
Dalkesar  Gurung,  Subadar ; David- 
son-Houston,  Lt-Col  C.  E.  D.  ; 
Graham,  Major  R.  B.  ; Grant, 
Capt.  H.  A.  : Grigg,  Capt.  H.  tl.  ; 


I Halswelle,  Capt.  W.  ; Harington, 
I Lieut  H.  R.  ; Hill,  Lt-Col  E.  R.  ; 
I Knight,  Capt.  G.  M.  ; Liiflrott, 
j Lieut  E.  C.  ; Macandrew,  Lieut 
j I.  M.  ; Mackain,  Capt.  J.  F.  ; 
j Nicolls,  Lieut  J.  0.  ; Norie,  Lt- 
' Col  C.  ; Ridgway,  Lt-Col  R.  T. 
I.  ; Robson,  Lieut  R.  G.  G.  ; 
Sarbjit  Gurung,  Subadar  ; Seton- 
Browne,  Lieut  M.  W.  ; Stansfeld, 
Major  H.  H.  G.  ; Stewart,  Capt. 
W.  P.  ; Tarrant,  Capt.  H.  S.  ; 
Taylor,  Major  G.  H.  ; Tillard, 
Major  A.  B.  ; Wheeler,  Lieut  E.  O. 
Devon  Regt,  the,  in  the  attack  on 
2/2nd  Gurkhas,  70,  71,  74 
Dhan  Sing  Negi,  Subadar,  l/39th 
Garhwal  Rifles,  gains  the  M.C.  at 
Festubert,  128 

Dholpur,  the  Maharaj  Rana  of, 
loyalty  of,  4 

j Dill,  Lieut  J.  R.,  Adjutant,  69th 
Punjabis,  killed  on  arrival  at  the 
I Front,  433 

Dill,  Capt.  R.  F.,  129th  Baluchis, 
wounded  at  the  1st  battle  of  Y^pres, 
j 39  ; awarded  the  D.S.O.,  40 
[ Distinguished  Conduct  Medal.  Sec 
Decorations  and  Honours 
Distinguished  Service  Order.  See 
Decorations  and  Honours 
i Diwan  Suig  Padhujar,  Havildar, 

! 39th  Garhwal  Rifles,  awarded  the 
I I.D.S.M.,  88 
I Dixmude,  206 

! Dobbie,  Lt-Col  C.  F.,  commands  the 
9th  Bhopals  in  the  attack  on  Neuve 
Chapelle,  51 

Dogra  Regiment,  the  41st,  forms  part 
, of  the  Bareilly  Brigade,  12,  212, 
279 ; pai’t  taken  by,  at  the  1st 
! battle  of  Y^’pres,  24,  34-35,  37,  in 
the  action  of  Festubert,  116,  124, 
in  the  battle  of  Givenchy,  152, 
187,  191,  194,  in  the  battle  of 
Festubert,  347,  350-351,  353-355  ; 
suffer  from  frostbite,  106  ; casu- 
alties of,  354  ; leave  France,  391 
Dogras,  the,  account  of,  485-486 
Don,  railway  junction,  damaged  by 
aeroplanes,  220 ; projected  advance 
on,  340 


518 


INDEX 


Dost  Mahomed,  Havildar,  59th 
Rides,  gains  the  I.O.M.  at  the 
battle  of  Givenchy,  165-166 
Douai,  railway  junction,  damaged  by 
aeroplanes,  220  ; its  importance  to 
the  Germans,  397 
Double  block,  system  of,  166 
Douie,  Capt.  F.  M.,  R.E.,  M.C., 
gains  the  D.S.O.  at  the  battle  of 
Festubert,  373 
Douve,  river,  23 

Dragoon  Guards,  the  7th,  at  the  battle 
of  Givenchy,  180-183 ; casualties 
of,  183 

Drake-Brockman,  Lt-Col  D.  H., 
2/39th  Garhwal  Rides,  at  the  battle 
of  Neuve  Chapelle,  224 ; at  the 
battle  of  Festubert,  344  ; at  the 
battle  of  Loos,  422-423 
Drummond,  Major  E.  G.,  2/3rd 
Gurkha  Rides,  kdled  in  the  assault 
of  13th  Nov.  1914,  98,  100 
Drummond,  Sergt  J.,  2nd  Batt. 
Black  Watch,  gains  the  D.C.M.  in 
the  action  of  Festubert,  131 
Drysdale,  Lieut  A.  E.,  47th  Sikhs, 
at  the  2nd  battle  of  Ypres,  297  ; 
awarded  the  M.C.,  297 
“ Duck’s  Bill,”  the,  at  the  battle  of 
Loos,  398,  403,  413 ; portion  of 
trench  so  called,  403  ; held  by  the 
l/3rd  Londons,  404,  405,  406 
Dudley,  Capt.  D.,  6th  Jat  Light 
Infantry  (attached),  killed  at  the 
battle  of  Festubert,  345 
Dudley,  Capt.  L.  G.,  6th  Jat  Light 
Infantry,  killed  in  the  action  of 
Festubert,  122 

Duff,  Capt.  B.  O.,  1/lst  Gurkha 
Rides,  killed  dming  the  attack  of 
the  7th  Nov.  1914,87 
Duffus,  Lt-Col  E.  J.,  R.F.A.,  at  the 
battle  of  Festubert,  131 
Duffy,  Pte  J.,  1st  Batt.  Highland 
Light  Infantry,  gains  the  D.C.M.  at 
Neuve  Chapelle,  265 
Duffy,  Pte  T.,  Transport  driver,  1st 
Batt.  Connaught  Rangers,  gains 
the  Russian  Medal  of  St  George 
at  the  2nd  battle  of  Ypres,  302- 
303 

Duhan,  Major  F.  T.,  57th  Rides 


(attached),  killed  at  the  2nd  battle 
of  Ypres,  299-300 

Duncan,  Capt.  P.  F.,  l/4th  Black 
Watch  (Territorials),  wounded  at 
the  battle  of  Loos,  436 
Dundas,  Major  P.  H.,  6th  Jat  Light 
Infantry,  carries  out  a successful 
raid  on  the  15th-16th  Nov.  1914, 
101-103;  awarded  the  D.S.O. , 
103 ; severely  wounded  in  the 
action  of  Festubert,  120-121,  122 
Dundas,  Major  W.  L.,  2/3rd  Gurkha 
Rides,  wounded  at  the  battle  of 
Givenchy,  150-151,  154 
Durgia  Gurung,  Subadar,  l/4th 
Gurkha  Rides,  killed  at  the  battle 
of  Neuve  Chapelle,  259 
Durnford,  2nd  Lieut  C.  M.,  I.A.R.O. 
(attached  58th  Rides),  at  the  battle 
of  Loos,  441-442 

E 

Edwards,  Major  J.  G.,  2/8th  Gurkha 
Rides,  at  Givenchy,  183 
Egerton,  Brig-Gen.  R.  M.,  com- 
mands the  Ferozepore  Brigade, 
10, 118, 141,  211,  278,  287,  309  ; his 
dispositions  in  the  action  of 
Festubert,  120,  125,  129-130 
Ehren,  Lce-Corpl  A.  E.,  4th  Batt. 
London  Regt,  at  the  2nd  battle  of 
Ypres,  320-321  ; awarded  the 
D.C.M.,  320 

Elliott,  Major  R.  W.  S.,  2/8th  Gurkha 
Rides  (attached),  killed  in  the 
action  of  Festubert,  129 
Elliott-Lockhart,  Lt-Col  P.  C. , 
commanding  59th  Rides,  mortally 
wounded  at  Neuve  Chapelle,  262- 
263 

Elmer,  Pte  W.,  4th  Batt.  King’s 
(Liverpool)  Regt,  wins  the  D.C.M. 
at  the  2nd  battle  of  Ypres,  317-318 
Engineers,  Royal.  See  Royal  Engin- 
eers 

Estaires,  206,  341  ; road  from  La 
Bassee  to,  101,  212,  214,  217,  342, 
350,  393 

Etlinger,  Capt.  H.,  acting  Adjt,  9th 
Bhopals,  mortally  wounded  at  the 
2nd  battle  of  Ypre.s,  319 


INDEX 


519 


Evans,  Lce-Corpl  IS.  W.,  2nd  Batt. 
Leicestershii-e  Regt,  his  devotion 
to  Lt-Col  Morris  at  Loos,  417 
Evans,  Capt.  W.  J.,  1/lst  Gurkha 
Rifles,  wounded  at  the  2ud  battle 
of  Ypres,  318 

F 

Farm  Corner,  451 

Fasken,  Major-Gen.  C.  G.  M.,  com- 
mands the  19th  Division,  385 
Fateh  Jang,  Subadar,  57th  Rifles,  at 
the  battle  of  Givenchy,  196 ; 
awarded  the  I.D.S.M.,  196 
Fateh  Khan,  Sowar,  34th  Poona 
Horse,  assists  Lieut  De  Pass  in 
blowing  up  the  enemy’s  barricade, 
133  ; awarded  the  I.D.S.M.,  134 
Fateh  Sing  Newar,  Subadar,  2/2nd 
Gurkha  Rifles,  in  the  attack  of  2nd 
Nov.  1914,  80-81 ; honour  con- 
ferred on,  81 

Fateh  Singh,  Sepoy,  45th  Sikhs,  at 
the  battle  of  Festubert,  364-365 ; 
awarded  the  I.D.S.M.,  366 
Fauquissart,  43,  66,  385 
Ferme  du  Biez.  See  Biez,  Ferme  du 
Ferme  du  Bois.  See  Bois,  Ferme  du 
Ferozepore  Brigade,  the,  commander 
of,  10,  118,  141,  211  ; composition 
of,  10,  211,  278,  377,  385  ; entrains 
for  Cairo,  14 ; re-embarks  at 
Alexandria,  14;  marches  to  Bailleul, 
22  ; with  the  Cavalry  Corps  near 
Messines,  44  ; relieved  by  the  8th 
British  Division,  101 ; 34th  Poona 
Horse  takes  over  trenches  from, 
132  ; jDosition  of,  at  the  battle  of 
Givenchy,  141-144,  147-148,  162, 
17.5,  176,  189,  192,  at  Neuve 
Chapelle,  268,  276,  at  the  2nd 
battle  of  Ypres,  287-291,  298,  301, 
305,  308,  311,  314-315,  319  ; with- 
drawn to  Ouderdom,  326  ; position 
held  by,  in  Sept.  1915,  393 
Festubert,  70,  147,  176,  186,  192; 
wealmess  of  the  British  line 
opposite,  109  ; retirement  to,  after 
Givenchy,  173,  181,  183 
Festubert,  the  Action  of,  115-135; 
result  of,  132  ; lessons  learnt  from, 
132 


Festubert,  the  Battle  of,  337-375  ; 
instructions  for,  340-342  ; result  of, 
357 

Field  Ambulances.  See  Hospitals 

Finegan,  Sergt  T.  P.,  1st  Batt. 
Connaught  Rangers,  decoration 
conferred  on,  for  gallantry  at  the 
2nd  battle  of  Ypres,  302 

Finlay,  Lce-Corpl  David,  2nd  Black 
Watch,  wins  the  V.C.  at  the  battle 
of  Festubert,  351-352 ; killed  in 
Mesopotamia,  352 

Fiimis,  Capt.  H.  C.,  15th  Sikhs 
(attached),  368 

Firman  Shah,  Sowar,  34th  Poona 
Horse,  assists  Lieut  De  Pass  in 
blowing  up  the  enemy’s  barricade, 
133  ; awarded  the  I.D.S.M.,  134 

Fisher,  Lieut  G.  T.,  2/3rd  Gm-kha 
Rifles,  wounded  at  the  battle  of 
Loos,  409,  410 

Fitzmaurice,  Lieut  M.  A.  R.  G.,  21st 
Co.  Sappers  and  Miners,  severely 
wounded  in  the  attack  on  Neuve 
Chapelle,  55 

Flagg,  Capt.  A.,  58th  Rifles  (attached), 
at  the  battle  of  Loos,  440  ; killed, 
443 

Fleurbaix,  212 

Flynn,  Corpl  T.,  1st  Batt.  Coimaught 
Rangers,  awarded  the  Medaille 
Militaire  for  gallantry  at  the  2nd 
battle  of  Ypres,  302 

Foister,  Sergt  P.,  2nd  Batt.  Leicester- 
shire Regt,  in  the  action  of 
Festubert,  130 ; awarded  the 
D.C.M.,  130 

Forbes,  Capt.  L.,  57th  Rifles,  at  the 
1st  battle  of  Ypres,  31-35  ; severely 
wounded,  35,  39 

Forrester,  Capt.  R.  E.,  2nd  Batt. 
Black  Watch,  carries  out  a raid 
on  9th  Nov.  1914,  89 

Fortuin,  284 

Foster,  Capt.  T.  F.  V.,  1st  Batt. 
Connaught  Rangers,  wounded  at 
the  2nd  battle  of  Ypres,  287 

Fournes,  43,  340 

Fowler,  Lieut  E.  K.,  57th  Rifles, 
at  the  1st  battle  of  Ypres,  36 ; 
wounded,  36,  39 ; awarded  the 
M.C.,  36 


520 


INDEX 


I'Vayei',  Lieut  L.  R.,  l.A.K.O. 
(attached  GUtli  i'unjal)i.s),  killed  at 
the  battle  of  Loos,  434,  435 

Fraser,  Lt-Col  T.,  R.E.,  arranges  for 
the  disembarkation  of  the  Indian 
Corps,  14 

Frelinghien,  23 

French,  the,  them  warm  reception  of 
the  Indian  Corps,  16,  19,  65 ; 
reinforce  the  British  at  the  1st 
battle  of  Ypres,  37  ; relieved  by 
the  Jullundur  Brigade,  44,  140 ; 
a Territorial  Batt.  of,  operates 
with  the  Ferozeporc  Brigade,  141  ; 
the  Indian  Corps  ordered  to  assist, 
145 ; position  and  heroism  of, 
at  the  battle  of  Givenchy,  148, 
17&-178,  193,  195 ; their  success 
in  Champagne,  205-206  ; method 
of  attack  employed  by,  207-208  ; 
effect  of  asphyxiating  gas  on, 
283,  304,  305,  306,  323-324  ; part 
taken  by,  in  the  2nd  battle  of 
Ypres,  285-331  ; their  offensive 
towards  Lens,  339-310,  356; 

increase  their  output  of  artillery 
ammunition,  396 ; lino  held  by, 
in  Sept.  1915,  396  ; their  apjireci- 
ation  of  the  work  of  the  Indian 
Corps,  462-463 

French,  Field  Marshal  Sir  John, 
extracts  from  and  allusions  to 
despatches  of,  23-24,  83,  145-146, 
197-198,  207,  220,  242,  269,  270- 
271,  283,  284,  339,  374-375,  449- 
450 ; his  commendation  of  the 
Indian  troops,  47-48,  60,  132,  139- 
140,  461-462 ; his  orders  at 

Givenchy,  146-147  ; congratulates 
the  Highland  Light  Infantry,  174  ; 
utilizes  experiences  gained  from 
French  operations,  218  ; his  cable 
to  the  Viceroy  of  India  after  Yeuve 
Chapelle,  273 ; his  consideration 
for  Indian  Musalmans,  384  ; his 
remarks  on  the  inferiority  of 
reinforcements  for  the  Indian 
Corps,  455-456 

French  Territorial  Regts,  reinforce 
Gen.  VVatkis  at  Givenchy,  176, 
177,  195 

Fromelles,  66,  339,  341 


Frontier  Force.  See  Rifles,  The  57th 
(Wilde’s) ; Rilles,  The  58th 
(Vaughan’s) ; Rilles,  The  59th 
(Scinde) 

Frost,  Capt.  F.  D.,  Supply  and 
Transport  Corps,  at  the  battle  of 
Loos,  446,  496 

Fry,  2nd  Lieut  S.  G.,  I.A.R.O. 
(attached  1/lst  Gurkha  Rifles), 
at  the  2nd  battle  of  Ypres,  318; 
one  of  two  unwounded  officers ; 
319  ; killed  at  the  battle  of  Festu- 
bert,  371 

G 

Gagna,  Havildar,  at  the  1st  battle 
of  Ypres,  35, 36  ; severely  w'ounded 
36  ; awarded  the  I.O.M.,  36 
Gaisford,  Lieut  L.,  58th  Rifles, 
killed  in  the  action  of  Festubert, 
124 

Gajbn  Bisht,  Rilicman,  l/9th  Gurkha 
Rifles,  awarded  tliel.D.S.M.,  100 
Gajjan  Singh,  Havildar,  47th  Sikhs, 
at  the  battle  of  Neuve  Chapelle, 
262 

Gajjan  Singh,  Subadar,  15th  Sikhs, 
killed  at  the  battle  of  Neuve 
Chapelle,  267 

Gambhir  Sing  Bohra,  Havildar,  l/9th 
Gurkha  Rifles,  aw'arded  the 
I.D.S.M.  at  Neuve  Chapelle,  249 
Gambhir  Sing  Gurung,  Subadar- 
Major,  2/3rd  Gurkha  Rifles,  at 
Neuve  Chapelle,  226  ; honours  con- 
ferred on,  226 

Gamble,  2nd  Lieut  R.  S.,  1/lst 
Gurkha  Rifles  (attached),  missing 
after  the  battle  of  Festubert,  37 1 
Ganda  Smgh,  Sepoy,  19th  Punjabis, 
at  the  battle  of  Festubert,  364- 
365  ; awarded  the  I.D.S.M.,  366 
Gandj',  2nd  Lieut  G.  J.,  2nd  Batt. 
Leicestershire  Regt,  killed  at  the 
battle  of  Festubert,  360 
Gane  Gurung,  Rifleman,  2/3rd  Gurkha 
Rifles,  cheered  by  British  troops, 
225;  awarded  the  I. O.M.,  225 
Ganesh  Sing  Sajwan,  Rifleman,  39th 
Garhwal  Rifles,  rescues  a wounded 
man,  88  ; awarded  the  I.O.M.,  88 


INDEX 


521 


Ganga  Ciiaran  Dixit,  Subadar,  21st 
Co.  8appers  and  Miners,  wounded 
in  the  attack  on  Neuve  Cliapeilc, 
59;  awarded  the  I.D. IS. M.,  59 

Gangabir  Gui-ung,  Jemadar,  l/4th 
Gurkha  Rifles,  gahis  the  I.O.M. 
at  the  battle  of  Neuve  Chapelle, 
266 

Ganpati  Thapa,  Rifleman,  2/3T’d 
Gm-kha  Rifles,awarded  thel.  D.  (S.  M. , 
100 

Gapaard,  25 

Garbha  Sing  Gurung,  Rifleman,  i/4tli 
Gurkha  Rifles,  gains  the  I.D.S.M., 
389-390 

Gardiner,  Major  A.,  R.E.,  commands 
20th  Co.  Sappers  and  Aliners  at 
Givenchy,  160 

Garhwal  Brigade,  the,  commanders 
of,  12,  200,  211,  215,  279  ; com- 
position of,  12,  211,  279,  385 ; 
portion  of  line  occupied  by,  66  ; 
part  taken  by,  in  the  battle  of 
Givenchy,  147,  148,  193,  in  the 
battle  of  Neuve  Chapelle,  215,  217, 
220-229,  233,  243,  246,  253,  260, 
in  the  2nd  battle  of  Ypre.s,  276, 
in  the  battle  of  Festubert,  343,  344, 
356,  361,  363,  in  the  battle  of  Loos, 
393,  400,  405,  413,  414,  428,  446  ; 
entrains  for  Marseilles,  459 

Garhwal  Rifles,  the  1st  and  2nd 
Batts,  39th,  when  raised,  129  ; 
form  irart  of  the  Garhwal  Brigade, 
12,  211,  279 ; successful  raids 
carried  out  by,  87-88,  96-100 ; part 
taken  by,  in  the  action  of  Festubert, 
123, 124-127,  in  the  battle  of  Neuve 
Chapelle,  218,  220-224,  227-230, 
235-237,  248-249,  255-256,  258, 
in  the  battle  of  Festubert,  342, 
344,  358,  360,  in  the  battle  of 
Loos,  405,415,  422-424  ; casualties 
of,  100,  228,  223-224,  236,  342, 
360,  424 ; two  Victoria  Crosses 
awarded  to,  129 

Garhwalis,  the,  account  of,  486-487 

Garrett,  Capt.  S.,  4th  Batt.  Suffolk 
Regt,  killed  at  the  battle  of  Neuve 
Chapelle,  262 

Gas,  asphyxiating,  employed  by  the 
enemy  at  Ypres,  283-284  ; effects 


of,  298,  304-305,  306,  323  ; false 
information  of  a proposed  attack 
by,  391  ; first  used  by  the  British 
at  the  battle  of  Loos,  398-399, 
402-405  ; a failure  on  the  Indian 
Corps  front,  398-399,  403,  405, 
412,  426 

Geary,  2nd  Lieut  H.  V.,  l.A.R.O. 
(attached  69th  Punjabis),  at  the 
battle  of  Loos,  433,  434 

Gcdge,  2nd  Lieut  C.  D.,  l/3rd  London 
Regt,  killed  at  the  battle  of  Loos, 
422 

George  V.,  King,  visits  tlic  Indian 
Corps,  107,  137-138  ; his  farewell 
message  to  the  Corps,  463-464  ; 
Patron  of  the  Indian  Soldiers’ 
Fund,  500 

George,  Lieut  F.  R.,  1st  Batt. 
Connaught  Rangers,  in  the  attack 
on  the  2/2nd  Gurkhas,  84  ; killed,  85 

Germans,  tlie,  their  conce^kion  of 
India,  B3;  their  miscalcidations, 
2-3,  109,  382 ; their  elaborate 
system  of  espionage,  32,  359-360  ; 
their  terror  of  the  Indians,  53,  63, 
102-103 ; reasons  for  their  in- 
activity at  the  end  of  Nov.  1914, 
108-109  ; their  superiority  in  guns, 
trench  mortars,  etc.,  107-108,  112- 
113,325-326;  ruses  employed  by, 
151-152,  159,  222,  258-259  ; com- 
pelled to  divert  troop.s  from  the 
Eastern  front,  206  ; heavy  losses 
of,  at  Neuve  Chapelle,  254-255, 
269,  at  Loos,  445  ; strengthen 
their  defences  after  Neuve  Chapelle, 
274-275,  355,  396 ; instances  of 
brutality  of,  330,  407,  411-412; 
attempt  to  bribe  Ayub  Khan,  382  ; 
ill-timed  visit  of,  to  the  trenche.s, 
402 

Ghantu  Sing,  Jemadar,  2/39th 
Garhwal  Rifles,  killed  at  the  battle 
of  Neuve  Chapelle,  223 

Ghulam  Hussein,  Sepoy,  129th 
Baluchis,  his  rescue  of  Major 
Holbrooke,  298-299  ; awarded  the 
l.D.S.M.,  299 

Ghulam  Mahomed,  Havildar,  129th 
Baluchis,  at  the  1st  battle  of  Ypres, 
40  ; awarded  the  I.O.M.,  41 


522 


INDEX 


Gib,  Major  H.  A.,  takes  over  com- 
mand of  dltli  iSilih  Pioneers,  45 

Gibbs,  2nd  Lieut  T.  K.,  1st  Batt. 
Highland  Light  Infantry,  at  Neuve 
Chapelle,  264 

Gilchrist,  Capt.  E.  C.,  59th  Rifles, 
mortally  wounded  at  the  battle  of 
Givenchy,  164,  167 

Gillan,  Bandsman  T.,  1st  Batt. 
Connaught  Rangers,  gains  the 
Russian  Medal  of  St  George  at 
the  2nd  battle  of  Ypres,  302 

Givenchy,  42,  43,  66,  70,  101,  107, 
109,  140,  206  ; strategical  import- 
ance of,  176,  at  the  battle  of 
Neuve  Chapelle,  248,  at  Festubert, 
339,  340,  357,  at  Loos,  397,  449 ; 
enemy’s  mining  operations  at, 
452 

Givenchy,  battle  of,  141-174 ; 
German  counter-attack  at,  175- 
198 

“ Glor}^  Hole,”  the,  section  of  trench 
known  as,  363 

Gobar  ISing  Negi,  Rifleman,  2/39th 
Garliwal  Rifles,  his  heroism  at 
the  battle  of  Neuve  Chapelle,  223  ; 
posthumously  awarded  the  V.C., 
223 

Godewaersvelde,  280 

Gopal  Sing  Rawat,  Subadar,  2/2nd 
Gurkha  Rifles,  Elled,  2nd  Nov. 
1914,  79 

Gordon,  Lt-Col  H.,  2nd  Batt. 
Leicestershire  Regt,  at  the  action  of 
Festubert,  129;  at  Neuve  Chapelle, 
236;  awarded  the  D.S.O.,  130; 
wounded  at  the  battle  of  Loos, 
412,  414 

Gordon,  Lt-Col  J.  L.  R.,  commands 
15th  Ludhiana  Sikhs,  46  ; wounded 
during  the  relief  of  the  French 
Cavalry,  46 

Gordon,  Capt.  R.  S.,  57th  Rifles,  in 
the  1st  battle  of  Ypres,  34  ; killed, 
34,  39 

Gordon  Highlanders,  the,  at  the  1st 
battle  of  Ypres,  44,  45 

Gough,  Gen.  H.  de  la  P.,  commands 
the  2nd  Cavalry  Division  at  the 
1st  battle  of  Ypres,  21,  37  ; inspects 
and  thanks  the  129th  Baluchis,  38 


Graham,  Major  R.  B.,33rd  Punjabis, 
at  the  battle  of  Loos,  444,  445 
Grant,  Lt-Col  A.,  2/Sth  Gurkha 
Rifles  (attached),  commands  an 
attack  at  Givenchy,  182 
Grant,  Capt.  H.  A.,  2nd  Batt. 
Leicestershire  Regt,  killed  in  the 
action  of  Festubert,  130 ; men- 
tioned in  despatches,  130 
Grasett,  Lieut  E.  B.,  33rd  Punjabis, 
killed  at  the  battle  of  Loos,  444 
Gray,  Lieut  E.  H.,  69th  Punjabis, 
at  the  battle  of  Loos,  433,  434- 
435 

Gray,  Lt-Col  F.  W.  B.,  commands 
the  57th  Rifles,  21 ; severely 
wounded  at  the  1st  battle  of 
Ypres,  27 ; at  the  battle  of 
Givenchy, 193 

Grenades,  rifle  and  hand,  first  issued, 
86 ; a supply  of  Hales’,  issued, 
108 

Grenay,  396 

Griffith,  Lt-Col  C.  R.  J.,  1st  Batt. 
Bedfordshire  Regt,  leads  a counter- 
attack on  30th  Oct.  1914,  74 
Grifiith- Griffin,  Lieut  F.  M.,  129th 
Baluchis,  gains  the  M.C.  at  the 
2nd  battle  of  Ypres,  299 
Grigg,  Capt.  H.  H.,  l/3rd  Gurkha 
Rifles,  wounded  at  the  battle  of 
Neuve  Chapelle,  226 ; mentioned 
in  despatches,  226 ; killed  at  the 
battle  of  Festubert,  361 
Grimshaw,  Capt.  R.  W.  W.,  34th 
Poona  Horse,  at  the  action  of 
Festubert,  132 ; wounded  at 
Givenchy,  184 

Grosvenor,  Lord  Hugh,  commands 
a squadron  of  the  1st  Life  Guards 
at  the  1st  battle  of  Ypres,  30 
Guards  Brigade,  the,  at  the  battle 
of  Festubert,  366-367 
Gujar  Singh,  Sapper,  gains  the 
l.D.S.M.  at  the  2nd  battle  of 
Ypres,  311 

Gujar  Singh,  Subadar,  58th  Rifles, 
wounded  in  the  action  of  Festubert, 
124 

Gulland,  Lieut  J.  P.,  69th  Punjabis, 
taken  prisoner  at  the  battle  of 
Loos,  435,  436 


INDEX 


523 


Gumaii  Sing  Negi,  Jemadar,  l/39th  | 
Garhwal  Rifles,  wounded  at  Keuve  , 
Chapelle,  256,  awarded  thel.D.S.M., 
256 

Gunning,  Lt-Col  0.  G.,  35th  (attached 
47th)  Sikhs,  at  the  battle  of 
Givenchy,  175,  181  ; at  Neuve 
Chapelle,  262 ; awarded  the  C.M.G., 
262 

Gunpat  Mahadeo,  Subadar,  in  the 
attack  on  Neuve  Chapelle,  57  ; 
honour  conferred  on,  57 
Gurdon,  Corpl  W.,  Sleerut  Signal 
Co.,  gahis  the  D.C.M.  at  the  battle 
of  Neuve  Chapelle,  257 
Girrkha  Regiments,  field  equipment 
for,  6 ; serving  with  the  Indian 
Corps,  486 

1st  Batt.  1st  King  George’s  Own 
Gurkha  Rifles,  the,  form  part 
of  the  Sirhind  Brigade,  11,  211, 

278  ; part  taken  by,  in  the  battle 
of  Givenchy,  167-168,  171,  172, 
at  Neuve  Chapelle,  259,  264,  267, 
at  the  2nd  battle  of  Ypres,  307, 
316,  318-319,  328,  at  the  battle  of 
Festubeid,  350,  363,  369,  371,  372  ; 
casualties  of,  174,  319,  329,  372 

2nd  Batt.  2nd  Kmg  Edward's 
Own  Gurkha  Rifles,  the,  form  part 
of  Dehra  Dun  Brigade,  12,  211, 
278 ; heavily  attacked  2nd  Nov. 
1914,77-89;  situat  ion  a nd  c ondition 
of  trenches  occupied  by,  77-78  ; 
bravery  displayed  by,  83 ; part 
taken  by,  in  the  battle  of  Givenchy, 
152,  167,  185,  186-187,  190-191, 
in  the  battle  of  Neuve  Chapelle, 
243-244,  in  the  battle  of  Festubert, 
344-345,  347,  350,  in  the  battle 
of  Loos,  423 ; commended  by 
Gen.  Jacob,  251 ; casualties  of, 
79-80,  83,  251,  345,  424 ; entrain 
for  Marseilles,  459 

2nd  Batt.  3rd  Queen  Alexandra’s 
Own  Gurkha  Rifles,  the,  form  part 
of  the  Garhwal  Brigade,  12,  211, 

279  ; heavily  shelled  on  arrival 
at  the  Front,  67  ; assist  in  a raid 
on  the  13th  Nov.  1914,  96-100; 
their  share  in  the  battle  of 
Givenchy,  150-154,  in  the  battle 


of  Neuve  Chapelle,  220,  223, 
224-227,  236-237,  254-255,  258, 
260-261,  in  the  battle  of  Festubert, 
358,  360,  in  the  battle  of  Loos, 
405-412,  422 ; distinguish  them- 
selves at  Givenchjq  153-154,  at 
Loos,  410  ; the  first  battalion  to 
enter  Neuve  Chapelle,  225  ; suffer 
from  malaria,  106-107  ; casualties 
of,  100,  154,  361,  410 

1st  Batt.  4th  Gurkha  Rifles,  the, 
form  part  of  the  Sh'hind  Brigade, 

11,  211,  278  ; machine  guns  for, 
6 ; part  taken  by,  in  the  battle 
of  Givenchy  155-161,  169-171, 
in  the  2nd  battle  of  Ypres,  308- 
309,  316,  317-318,  328,  330,  at  the 
battle  of  Festubert,  363,  367,  369, 
370,  372 ; position  of,  in  July 
1915,  385  ; casualties  of,  161,  174, 
266,  330,  371 

2nd  Batt.  8th  Gurkha  Rifles,  the, 
form  part  of  the  Bareilly  Brigade, 

12,  212  ; of  the  Garhwal  Brigade, 
279  ; their  terrible  experience  on 
the  29th-30th  Oct.  1914,  69-74, 
at  Loos,  417-421  ; position  of, 
and  part  taken  bv,  in  the  action 
of  Festubert,  116“  120,  121,  122, 
131,  in  the  German  counter-attack 
at  Givenchy,  175,  182,  in  the 
battle  of  Festubert,  342,  344,  363, 
in  the  battle  of  Loos,  405,  413, 
415—421,  422,  428,  429;  bring  up 
ammunition  at  Neuve  Chapelle, 
249 ; commended  by  Major-Gen. 
Jacob,  446 

1st  Batt.  9th  Gurkha  Rifles,  the, 
form  part  of  Dehra  Dun  Brigade, 
11,  211,  278;  position  held  by, 
in  the  attack  on  2/2nd  Gurkhas, 
81-82;  part  taken  by,  in  the  battle 
of  Givenchjq  153,  187,  193,  at 
Neuve  Chapelle,  243,  244,  245, 
249,  in  the  battle  of  Festubert, 
345,  348,  in  the  battle  of  Loos, 
423 ; casualties  of,  251  ; com- 
mended by  Major-Gen.  Jacob,  251 
Gurkhas,  the,  disabilities  of,  in  the 
trenches,  from  shortness  of  stature, 
70,  74 ; their  heavy  losses  in 
olBcers,  73,  74  ; their  skill  with 


524 


INDEX 


the  kukri,  8,  169,  486;  take 
charge  of  German  prisoners,  437  ; 
account  of,  486 

Guthrie-Smith,  Lieut  11.  C.,  1st 

Batt.  Highlanrl  Light  Infantry, 
blown  up  at  the  battle  of  Givenchy, 
171 

Gwalior,  the  Maharaja  of,  loyalty  of, 
4 ; financial  asshtance  of,  5 


H 

Hack,  Capt.  G.  E.,  1st  Batt.  \ 
Connaught  Rangers,  killed  in  the  i 
attack  on  the  2/2ncl  Gurkhas,  84  1 

Haidar  Ali,  Sepoy,  40th  I’athans,  i 
gains  the  l.H.iS.M.  at  the  2nd 
ijattle  of  Ypres,  295 

Haig,  Gen.  Sir  Dougla.s,  operation.s 
under,  at  Givenchy,  149,  189-190  ; 
takes  over  the  line  held  by  the 
Indian  Corps,  192 ; his  orders 
at  the  battle  of  Neuve  Chapelle, 
215-217  ; his  appreciation  of  the 
work  of  the  Indian  Corps  at  Neuve 
Chapelle,  271-272;  directed  to 
carry  out  an  attack  by  the  4th 
Corps,  339  ; his  secret  instructions 
for  the  battle  of  Festubert,  340 ; 
commands  the  1st  i\rmy  at  the  i 
battle  of  Loos,  396  ; his  report  on 
the  battle  of  Loos,  449  ' 

Haking,  Major-Gen.  R.  C.  B.,  | 
commands  1st  Division,  1st  Corps,  j 
189  ! 

Halswelle,  Capt.  W.,  1st  Batt.  | 
Highland  Light  Infantry,  at  Neuve  I 
Chapelle,  264—265  ; mentioned  in 
despatches,  266 

Hampe-Vmcent,  Capt.  P.  C.,  mortally 
wounded  at  the  1st  battle  of  Ypres, 
27,  28,  39 

Hannyngton,  Major  J.  A.,  129th  | 
Baluchis,  at  the  1st  battle  of  ! 
Ypres,  32  ; at  the  2nd  battle  of  ; 
Ypres,  298  ; awarded  the  D.S.O., 
299 

Harak  Sing  Gharti,  Lce-Naik,  2/3rd 
Gurkha  Rifles,  gains  the  1.0. M. 
at  Neuve  Chapelle,  226 

Ilarcourt,  Capt.  C.  B.,  58th  Rifles 


(attached),  at  the  battle  of  Loos, 
440,  444  ; wounded  and  a prisoner, 
443 

Hardinge  of  Penshurst,  Baron.  See 
Viceroy  of  India 

Hari  Parshad  Thapa,  Havildar,  2/8th 
Gurkha  Rifles,  gains  the  I.O.M. 
in  the  action  of  Festubert,  122 
Harington,  Lieut  H.  R.,  l/8th  (Actg 
Adjt  2/8th)  Gurkha  Rifles,  wounded 
at  the  battle  of  Loos,  417,  421 
Harnam  Singh,  Sepoy,  19th  Punjabis, 
gains  the  I.D.S.M.  at  the  battle  of 
Festubert,  364-365,  366 
Harnam  Singh,  Subadar,  47th  Sikhs, 
at  Neuve  Chapelle,  261 ; gains  the 
I.O.M.  in  the  action  at  Festubert, 
261  ; posthumously  honoured,  261 
Harnam  Singh,  Sub-Asst-Surg.,  34th 
Sikh  Pioneers,  gains  the  I.O.M.  in 
the  action  of  Festubert,  117 
Harris,  Lieut  J.  E.,  2nd  Batt. 
Leicestershire  Regt,  wounded  at 
the  battle  of  Givenchy,  154 
Hartwell,  Capt.  B.,  2/8th  Gurkha 
Rifles,  killed  in  the  attack  on  30th 
Oct.  1914,  72,  74 

Hartwell,  Capt.  J.  R.,  Adjutant, 
l/4th  Gurkha  Rifles,  woujided  at 
the  2nd  battle  of  Ypres,  316 
Harvey,  Lt-Col  W.  J.  St  J.,  2nd 
Balt.  Black  Watch,  at  the  action 
of  Festubert,  120,  131  ; commands 
the  Dehra  Dun  Brigade,  399 
Hashmat  Dad  Khan,  Subadar,  107th 
Pioneers,  awarded  the  I.D.S.M., 
130 

Hastobir  Roka,  Rifleman,  2/2nd 
Gurkha  Rifles,  gains  the  I.O.M. 

I at  Neuve  Chapelle,  247 
Haut  Pommereau,  an  objective  at 
the  battle  of  Loos,  398,  423,  442 
Haw'ke,  Corpl  A.,  1st  Batt.  Highland 
Light  Infantry,  gallant  rescue  of, 
at  Neuve  Chapelle,  265 
Hawinda,  Havildar,  58th  Rifles, 
gains  the  M.C.  at  the  battle  of 
Festubert,  119 

Hayes-Sadler,  Lieut  E.  J.  B.,  20th 
Co.  Sappers  and  Miners,  at  Neuve 
Chapelle,  54  ; killed,  .54,  60 
Hayes-Sadler,  Capt.  E.  R.,  2/8th 


INDEX 


r.25 


Gurkha  Eihes,  killed  in  the  attack 
on  the  30th  Oct.  1014,  70-71,  72, 
74 

Hazebrouck,  280,  294 

Hebbert,  Lieut  P.  B.,  Gth  -Tat  Light 
Infantry,  severely  wounded  at  the 
battle  of  Festubert,  345 

Heelis,  Capt.  J.  R.,  Adjutant,  1st 
Batt.  Manchester  Regt,  wounded 
at  the  2nd  battle  of  Ypres,  293- 
294 

Henderson,  Lieut  G.  B.,  15th 
Ludhiana  Sikhs,  w^ounded  during 
the  relief  of  the  French  Cavalry, 
46 

Henderson,  Lieut  G.  M.  H.,  1st 
Batt.  Highland  Light  Infantry, 
wounded  at  the  battle  of  Festubert, 
362 

Henderson,  Lieut  G.  S.,  1st  Batt. 
Manchester  Regt,  gains  the  M.C. 
at  the  2nd  battle  of  Ypres,  305, 
306 

Henderson,  Lieut  N.  C.,  2nd  Batt. 
Black  Watch,  killed  at  the  battle 
of  Loos,  432 

Herbert,  2nd  Lieut  H.  B.,  1/lst 
Gurkha  Rifles  (attached),  killed  at 
the  battle  of  Festubert,  371 

Her  lies,  42,  208 

Hewett,  Capt.  H.  W.  O’C.,  Staff 
officer,  killed  at  the  battle  of  Loos, 
445 

Hewitt,  Lieut  H.  T.,  1st  Batt. 
Connaught  Rangers,  wounded  in 
the  attack  on  the  2/2nd  Gurkhas, 
84 

Heyland,  Lieut  A.  A.,  1/lst  Gurkha 
Rifles  (attached),  killed  at  the 
battle  of  Festubert,  371 

Highland  Division,  the  1st  (after- 
wards 51at),  Territorials,  join 
the  Indian  Corps,  343  ; share  of, 
in  the  battle  of  Festubert,  369  ; 
transferred  to  the  4th  Corps,  376  ; 
their  assault  on  the  15th  June 
1915,  378 ; rejoin  the  Indian 
Corps,  379  ; relieved  by  the  Lahore 
Division,  385 

Highland  Light  Infantry,  1st  Batt., 
the,  forms  part  of  the  Sirhind  i 
Brigade,  11,  211,  278,  remains  in  1 


Egypt,  14  ; arrives  at  Marseilles, 
14  ; part  taken  bj’,  in  the  battle  of 
Givenchy,  155-156,  159-160,  168- 
169,  171-174.  in  the  battle  of 
Iseuve  Chapelle,  258-259,  263- 
266,  in  the  2nd  battle  of  Ypres, 
307,  316,  321,  324-325,  328,  330, 
in  the  battle  of  Festixbert,  362, 
363,  366-370,  372,  in  the  assault 
of  15th  June  1915,  379  ; casualties 
of,  161,  171,  174,  266,  325,  330, 
362, 372-373 ; specially  commended, 
334-335 

Hill  29,  attack  on,  327-330 
Hill  60,  occupied  by  the  British,  281  ; 
importance  of,  281-282  ; re-taken 
by  the  Germans,  282 
Hill,  Lt-Col  E.  R.,  commands  1st 
Batt.  Highland  Light  Infantry  at 
Neuve  Chapelle,  263,  266  ; 

mentioned  in  despatches,  266  ; 
concurs  in  the  abandonment  of 
the  operation  of  1,5th  -June  1915, 
.379 

Hill,  Lt-Col  F.  B.,  40th  Pathans,  his 
escape  at  the  2nd  battle  of  Ypres, 
296 

Hill,  Pte  G.,  2nd  Batt.  Leicestershire 
Regt,  gains  the  D.C.M.  at  Xeuve 
Chapelle,  232 

Hill,  Lt-Col  J.,  15th  Sikhs,  at  the 
battle  of  Givenchy,  143;  at  the 
2nd  battle  of  Ypres,  309,  316  ; 
leaves  France  with  his  regt,  391 
Hindenburg,  IMarshal  von,  207 
Hinges,  chateau,  91 
Hitchins,  Lt-Col  H.  W.  E.,  1st  Batt. 
Manchester  Regt,  wounded  in 
the  German  counter-attack  at 
Givenchy,  179  ; killed  at  the  2nd 
battle  of  Ypres,  294 
Hobart,  Capt.  P.  C.  S.,  R.E.,  gains 
the  M.C.  at  Neuve  Chapelle,  231 
Hodge,  Capt.  E.  V.  H.,  medical 
officer  40th  Pathans,  at  the  2nd 
battle  of  Ypres,  287 
Hogg,  Capt.  C.  M.  T.,  l/4th  Gurkha 
Rifles,  attempts  to  rescue  a wounded 
private,  266 

Hogge,  Capt.  L.  R.,  47th  Sikhs, 
wounded  at  Neuve  Chapelle,  261 
Holbrooke,  Major  B.  F,  R.,  124th 


526 


INDEX 


Baluchis  (attached  129th),  wounded 
at  the  2nd  battle  of  Ypres, 
298 ; rescued  by  Sepoy  Ghulam 
Hussein,  298-299 
Holkar.  See  Indore,  Maharaja  of 
Hollebeke,  23,  37 

Holman,  Pte  J.,  1st  Batt.  Highland 
Light  Infantry  (attached  Signal 
Co.),  gains  the  D.C.M  at  the  2nd 
battle  of  Ypres,  311 
Home  Counties  Trench,  the,  held  by 
the  39th  Garhwal  Rifles  at  Loos, 
405 

Hore,  Capt.  P.  S.,  59th  Rifles,  killed 
at  the  battle  of  Neuve  Chapelle, 
263 

Hospitals,  offers  of  gifts  of,  5,  7 ; in 
the  field,  495  ; the  Pavilion,  498  ; 
the  Lady  Hardinge,  500,  501-502 
House,  Sergt-Major  A.  G.,  1st  Batt. 
Highland  Light  Infantry,  gains  the 
L.C.M.  at  Neuve  Chapelle,  265 
Houthem,  25 

Hoyland,  Lieut  H.,  4th  Batt.  Suffolk 
Regt,  wounded  at  the  battle  of 
Neuve  Chapelle,  262 
Hull,  Lt-Col  C.  P.  A.,  commands 
the  4th  Batt.  Middlesex  Regt, 
45-46 ; at  the  2nd  battle  of 
Ypres,  285 

Humphreys,  Major  G,  G.  P.,  129th 
Baluchis,  mortally  wounded  at  the 
1st  battle  of  Ypres,  32,  33,  39, 
40 

Humphries,  Lce-Corpl  E.,  Royal 
Scots  Fusiliers  (attached  Signal  Co. ), 
gains  the  D.C.M.  at  the  2nd  battle 
of  Ypres,  310 

Hunt,  Capt.  C.  E..  34th  Pioneers, 
at  the  battle  of  Givenchy,  158 
Hunter,  Corpl  A.,  1st  Batt.  Seaforth 
Highlanders,  gains  the  D.C.M.  at 
Neuve  Chapelle,  234 
Huskinson,  Lieut  F.  J.,  1st  Batt. 
Manchester  Regt,  wounded  at  the 
2nd  battle  of  Ypres,  291 
Hutchinson,  Lt-Col  C.  A.  R.,  41st 
Dogras,  severely  wounded  at  the 
battle  of  Festubert,  353  ; awarded 
the  D.S.O.,  355 

Hyde-Cates,  Capt.  K.,  15th  Sikhs,  at 
the  battle  of  Festubert,  363-307 


Hyderabad,  the  Nizam  of,  his  offer 
of  horses,  6 


I 

lilies,  occupied  by  tbe  enemy,  213  ; 
an  objective  at  the  battle  of 
Festubert,  341 

Imamdar,  Jemadar,  I29th  Baluchis, 
wounded  at  the  battle  of  Givenchy, 
144 

Imperial  Service  Troops,  the,  offered 
to  the  Govt  of  India,  4 ; nature 
and  composition  of,  488,  491 

Indar  Singh,  Havildar,  58th  Rifles, 
gains  the  M.C.  in  the  action  of 
Festubert,  119 

India,  her  contribution  of  fighting 
material  to  the  Empire  discussed, 
474-478;  fighting  races  of,  476, 
482-487 

Indian  Army,  the.  description  of,  481- 
492 

Indian  Army  Reserve  of  Officers,  the, 
475 

Indian  Army  Reserve  Organization, 
faUm’e  of  the,  452-457 

Indian  Associations,  loj^'al  messages 
and  offers  of  assistance  from,  7 

Indian  Cavalry  Corps,  the,  congratu- 
latory farewell  message  of,  460 

Indian  Chiefs,  the,  active  assistance 
of,  4-8  ; irregular  forces  of,  487  ; 
Imperial  Service  troops  of,  488 

Indian  Distinguished  Service  Medal, 
492.  See  also  Decorations  and 
Honours  ■ 

Indian  Expeditionary  Force,  the, 
composition  of,  4,  10-12,  66,  201, 
210-212,  217-219,  376-377,  483- 
487 ; mobilization  of,  9,  13 ; 

disembarkation  of,  14-17 ; com- 
mendation of  the  work  of,  47-48, 
60,  132,  197-198,  332-336,  374- 
375,  424-425,  445-446,  449-450, 
460-464 ; fighting  strength  of, 
106,  203,  377,  454 ; reinforce- 
ments for,  200,  394,  454-4.58 ; 
training  and  equipment  of,  200- 
202;  reorganization  of,  277-279, 


INDEX 


527 


384-385,  451-452 ; casualties  of, 
see  Casualties 

Indian  Marine,  the  Royal.  See 
Royal  Indian  Marine 
Indian  Medical  Service,  the,  gallant 
and  devoted  work  of,  446,  493-499 
Indian  officers,  designation  of,  490- 
491 

Indian  Order  of  Merit,  the,  491. 

See  also  Decorations  and  Honours 
Indian  Relief  Fund,  the,  generous 
contributions  to,  5,  8 
Indian  soldiers,  loyalty  and  tenacity 
of,  8,  9,  55-56,  69,  109,  188-189, 
469 ; camaraderie  between  the 
British  and,  10,  109-110,  123-124, 
241,  248,  266—267,  471  ; affection 
of,  for  their  British  officers,  39-40, 
74,  110-111,  300,  471-472;  legen- 
dary achievements  of,  63 ; hard- 
ships and  disabilities  of,  in  the 
field,  38,  68-69,  108,  121,  132,  140, 
168,  180,  189,  367-368,  402 
Indian  Soldiers’  Fund,  the,  its  origin, 
object  and  work,  107,  500-504 
Indore,  the  Maharaja  of,  financial 
assistance  of,  5 ; his  offer  of 
horses,  5-6 

Ingham,  Capt.  J.  P.  M.,  1st  Batt. 
Connaught  Rangers,  gains  the 
D.S.O.  at  the  2nd  battle  of  Ypres, 
305-306 

Inglis,  Lieut  C.  N.  D.,  I.A.R.O. 
(attached  2/8th  Gurkha  Rifles), 
killed  at  the  battle  of  Loos,  415 
421 

Inglis,  Capt.  D.,  Adjutant,  l/4th 
Gurkha  Rifles,  killed  at  the  battle 
of  Givenohj',  156,  158,  161 
Innes,  Lieut  I.  C.,  2/2nd  Gurkha 
Rifles,  in  the  attack  of  2nd  Nov 
1914,79 

Inskip,  Capt.  R.  D.,  59th  Rifles,  shell- 
shocked at  the  battle  of  Neuve 
Chapelle,  263 

Irvine,  Capt.  G.  B.  C.,  9th  Bhopals, 
wounded  in  the  attack  on  Neuve 
Chapelle,  59 

Irwin,  the  Rev.  Ronald,  Regtl 
Chaplain,  2nd  Batt.  Leicestershire 
Regt,  his  heroism  in  France  and 
Mesopotamia,  414-415;  severely 


wounded,  415 ; honours  awarded 
to.  415 

Ishar  Singh,  Sepoy,  34th  Sikh 
Pioneers,  gains  the  I.D.S.M.  in  the 
action  of  Festubert,  117 

Isinail  Khan,  Subadar,  21st  Co. 
Sappers  and  Miners,  gains  the 
I.D.S.M;  in  the  attack  on  Neuve 
Chapelle,  59 

Ismail  Khan,  Havildar,  21st  Co. 
Sappers  and  Miners,  wounded  at 
the  battle  of  Neuve  Chapelle, 
240-241  ^ 

Ivy,  2nd  Lieut  B.,  1st  Batt.  Highland 
Light  Infantry  (attached),  wounded 
and  missing  at  the  battle  of  Festu- 
bert, 372 


J 

Jacob,  Col  C.  W.,  commands  the 
Debra  Dun  Brigade,  200,  211,  215, 
243, 278  ; reasons  for  his  retirement 
at  Neuve  Chapelle,  246;  his 
skilful  leadership,  247,  251  ; his 
commendation  of  the  4th  Seaforth 
Highlanders,  247-248  ; causes  mili- 
tating against  his  advance  on  the 
11th  March  1915,  249-250;  his 
Brigade  relieved  by  Sirhind,  250- 
251 ; his  commendation  of  the 
2/2nd  and  l/9th  Gurkha  Rifles, 
251  ; appointed  a C.B.,  251  ; 
commands  the  Meerut  Division’ 
399 ; his  report  on  the  action  at 
Loos,  403 ; his  commendation  of 
the  troops  at  Loos,  445-446 

Jagat  Sing  Rawat,  Subadar,  l/39th 
Garhwal  Rifles,  in  the  action  of 
Festubert,  128  ; honours  conferred 
on,  128 

Jagtea  Pun,  Rifleman,  2/2nd  Gurkha 
Rifles,  gains  the  I.O.M.  at  Neuve 
Chapelle,  247 

Jahandad  Khan,  Subadar,  killed  at 
the  2nd  battle  of  Ypres,  296 ; 
posthumously  awarded  the  I O M ’ 
296  ■ ” 

Jai  Lai,  Havildar,  6th  Jat  Light 
Infantry,  awarded  the  I.O.M,,  104 


528 


INDEX 


Jai  Singh,  Sapper,  gains  the  T.D.S.M. 

at  tlie  2ncl  battle  of  Ypres,  1 
Jai  Singli,  Snbadar,  37th  (attaclied 
41st)  Dogras,  wounded  at  the 
battle  of  Festubert,  354  ; decora- 
tion conferred  on,  355 
Jaman  Sing  Bisht,  Naik,  2/39th 
Garhwal  Eifles,  gains  the  I.O.M. 
at  Neuve  Chapelle,  222 
Jamieson,  Major  G.  A.,  9th  Bliopals, 
in  the  attack  on  Neuve  Chapelle, 
56,  58  ; wounded  in  the  2nd  battle 
of  Ypres,  319 ; killed  in  Mesopo- 
tamia, 319 

Jamnagar,  the  Jam  of,  his  offer  of 
horses,  6 

Jaora,  the  Nawab  of,  loyalty  of,  4 
Jardine,  Capt,  C.  H.,  9th  Bhopals 
(attached),  at  the  battle  of  Gi- 
venchy, 194-195 

Jarrett,  Major  H.  C.  D.,  19th  Punjabis 
(attached  57th  Rides),  at  Givenchy, 
193 

J.arvis,  Capt.  C.,  20th  Deccan  Horse, 
wounded  at  the  battle  of  Givenchy, 
184 

Jat  Light  Infantry,  the  6th,  form 
part  of  Dehra  Dun  Brigade,  12, 
278,  of  the  Bareilly  Brigade,  212  ; 
reinforce  the  l/9th  Gurkhas  on 
2nd  Nov.  1914,  82  ; raid  carried 
out  by,  on  15th-16th  Nov.  1914, 
101  ; heavily  attacked  on  21st 
and  22nd  Nov.  1914,  107,  108  ; 
part  taken  by,  in  the  battle  of 
Festubert,  116,  118,  120,  122,  in 
the  battle  of  Givenchy,  152-153, 
187,  188,  193,  in  the  battle  of  Fes- 
tubert, 345  ; casualties  of,  104,  122, 
123  ; leave  France,  391 
Jats,  the,  origin  and  account  of,  483, 
484' 

Jawarihu  Negi,  Rifleman,  1 /39th 
Garhwal  Rifles,  gains  the  I.D.S.M. 
at  Neuve  Chapelle,  256 
Jenkins,  Capt.  G.  H.,  4th  Batt. 
King’s  (Liverpool)  Regt,  wounded 
at  the  battle  of  Festubert,  369 
Jharnan  Sing  Khattri,  Lce-Naik, 
l/9th  Gurkha  Rifles,  awarded  the 
I.O.M. , 100 

Jit  Sing  Giu'ung,  Subadar,  1/lst 


Gurklia  Rifles,  at  Festubert,  371- 
372 

Jiwa  Khan,  Sapper,  1st  Sappers 
and  Miners,  at  Festubert,  373 
Jodhpur,  the  Maharaja  of,  volunteers 
for  active  service,  4 ; arrives  at 
Marseilles,  65 

Jodhpur  Lancers,  the,  arrive  at  the 
Front,  66 ; at  Givenchy,  182  ; 
casualties  of,  184 

Johnson,  Capt.  A.  E.,  1/lst  Gurkha 
Rifles,  ■wounded  at  the  2nd  battle 
of  Ypres,  329 

Johnson,  Brig-Gen.  C.  E.,  commands 
the  Dehra  Dun  Brigade,  11  ; 
succeeded  by  Col  C.  W.  Jacob,  200 
Johnson,  Brig-Gen.  F.  E.,  R.A., 
C.R.A.  Lahore  Division,  278 
Johnstone,  2nd  Lieut  C.  P.,  1st  Batt. 
Highland  Light  Infantry,  wounded 
at  the  2nd  battle  of  Ypres,  330 
Jones,  Capt.  L.  J.,  9th  Bhopals,  at 
the  attack  on  Neuve  Chapelle, 
51  ; wounded  and  missing,  59 
Jullundur  Brigade,  the,  composition 
of,  11,  210,  277,  385  ; commanders 
of,  11,  200,  210;  entrains  for 
Cairo,  14 ; takes  over  ground 
from  the  French  Cavalry,  44  ; 
commended  by  Sir  John  French, 
47-48  ; portion  of  line  occupied  by, 
66 ; relieved  by  the  8th  British 
Division,  101  ; relieves  the  French 
at  Givenchy  and  Cuincliy,  140 ; 
takes  part  in  the  battle  of  Givenchy, 
155,  162, 180, 182, 190,  in  the  battle 
of  Neuve  Chapelle,  243,  247,  248, 
250,  252,  258,  259,  263,  264,  265, 
268,  276,  in  the  2nd  battle  of 
Ypres,  286,  289,  291,  298,  307,  311, 
316,  326  ; relieves  a portion  of  the 
2nd  Division  1st  Corps,  202  ; 
relieves  the  Garhwal  Brigade,  343 ; 
position  of,  in  Oct.  1915, 452 

K 

Kahars.  See  Stretcher-bearers 
Kalamu  Bisht,  Rifleman,  l/39th 
Garhwal  Rifles,  at  the  action  of 
Festubert,  126 : awarded  the 
I.O.M.,  126 


INDEX 


Kale  Singh,  Lce-Naik,  47th  Sikhs,  his 
daring  seizure  of  a German  notice- 
board,  390-391 

Kapur  Singh,  Jemadar,  o7th  Rifles, 
at  the  1st  battle  of  Ypres,  35 
Karam  Singh,  Havildar,  58th  Rifles, 
awarded  the  76 

Kashmu’,  the  Maharaja  of,  financial 
assistance  of,  5 

Kassib,  Sepoy,  129th  Beluchis,  at 
the  1st  battle  of  Ypres,  40 ; 
awarded  the  I.D.S.M.,  41 
Keary,  Major-Gen.  H.  D’U.,  com- 
mands the  Garhwal  Brigade,  12  ; 
congratulated  on  his  work  at 
Givenchy,  154,  at  Ypres,  334 ; 
commands  the  Lahore  Division, 
200,  267,  277,  280,  307,  327,  331  ; 
his  narrow  escape  at  Ypres,  288  ; 
his  report  on  the  operations  at 
Ypres,  333-334 

Kedar  Sing  Rawat,  Subadar,  l/39th 
Garhwal  Rifles,  at  Neuve  Chapelle, 
229;  awarded  the  I.D.S.M.,  229 
Keitley,  Corpl  R.,  2nd  Batt.  Leices- 
tershire Regt,  at  Neuve  Chapelle, 
232  ; awarded  the  D.C.M.,  232 
Kelly,  Capt.  E.  H.,  R.E.,  in  a raid 
on  the  15th-16th  Nov.  1914,  101- 
102;  awarded  the  M.C.,  103 
Kelly,  Major  H.  H.,  33rd  Runjabis, 
missing  after  the  battle  of  Loos,  444 
Kelly,  Lce-Corpl  T.,  1st  Batt.  Con- 
naught Rangers,  attempts  to  rescue 
Lieut  George,  85 ; awarded  the 
D.C.M.,  85 

Kemball,  Major  A.  G.,  31st  Punjabis 
(attached  2/8th  Gurkha  Rifles), 
wounded  at  the  battle  of  Loos,  416, 
421 

Kennedy,  Capt.  G.  S.,  1/lst  Gurkha 
Rifles,  at  the  battle  of  Givenchy, 
172-173  ; killed  at  Neuve  Chapelle, 
267 

Kennedy,  Sergt-Major  J.,  2nd  Batt. 
Black  Watch,  at  the  battle  of 
Festubert,  123,  131  ; awarded  the 
D.C.M.,  131 

Kenny,  Capt.  W.  G.  S.,  l/39th 
Garhwal  Rifles,  at  the  battle  of 
Neuve  Chapelle,  227 ; killed,  228, 
236 


529 

Kent,  Lieut  L.  H.,  R.E.,  directs  the 
gas  attack  at  Loos,  400 
Kerr,  Lieut  H.  R.  G.,  1st  Batt. 
Highland  Light  Infantry,  156 ; 
killed  at  the  battle  of  Givenchy, 
157,  161 

Khamba  Sing  Gurung,  Rifleman, 
1/lst  Gurkha  Rifles,  gains  the 
I.D.S.M.  at  Ypres,  319 
Khan  Zaman,  Naik,  32ud  Lahore 
Divl  Signal  Co.,  at  Neuve  Chapelle, 
227  ; awarded  the  I.D.S.M.,  227 
Kharakbir  Pun,  Rifleman,  2/3rd 
Gurkha  Rifles,  at  Neuve  Chapelle, 
226-227  ; w'ounded,  226  ; awarded 
the  Russian  Medal  of  St  George, 
227 

Khudadad  Khan,  Sepoy,  129th 
Baluchis,  the  first  Indian  soldier 
to  receive  the  V.C.,  40 
Khyber  Agency,  the,  loyalty  of  the 
tribes  of,  6 

Khyber  Rifles,  the,  loyalty  of,  6 
King’s  (Liverpool)  Regt,  4th  Batt. 
See  Liverpool  Regt,  4th  Batt. 
King's 

Ku'kaldy,  2nd  Lieut  C.  H.,  2nd  Batt. 
Seaforth  Highlanders,  killed  at 
Neuve  Chapelle,  234 
Kirpa,  Sepoy,  69th  Punjabis,  at  Loos, 
435  ; taken  prisoner,  435 
Kirpa  Singh,  Jemadar,  57th  Rifles, 
killed  at  the  2nd  battle  of  Ypres, 
300 

Kisch,  Capt.  E.  H.,  R.E.,  at  the 
battle  of  Givenchy,  164,  166,  at 
the  second  battle  of  Ypres,  313- 
314 ; wounded  in  France  and 
Mesopotamia,  314 ; awarded  the 
D.S.O.,  314 

Kishangarh,  the  Maharaja  of,  volun- 
teers for  active  service,  4 
Kitchener  of  Khartoum,  Earl,  his 
announcement  of  the  departure 
of  two  Indian  Divisions  for  France, 
13  ; prescience  of,  93 
Klein  Zillebeke,  30 
Knatchbull,  Major  R.  N.,  2nd  Batt. 
Leicestershire  Regt,  wounded  at 
the  battle  of  Givenchy,  154 
Knight,  Cajjt.  G.  M.,  1st  Batt. 
Highland  Light  Infantry,  at  the 

2 M 


530 


INDEX 


battle  of  Givenchy,  156,  at  Neuve 
Chapelle,  264 ; mentioned  in 
despatches,  266 

Knight  Commander  of  the  Bath. 
See  Decorations  and  Honom's 

Knight  Grand  Cross  of  St  Michael 
and  St  George.  See  Decoratioas 
and  Honours 

Knox,  2nd  Lieut  B.,  1st  Batt. 
Highland  Light  Infantry,  at  Neuve 
Chapelle,  264 

Kuki’i,  the  Gurkha  weapon,  8,  169 ; 
various  uses  of,  486 

Kulbir  Thapa,  Ritieman,  2/3rd 
Gui'kha  Rifles,  his  deeds  of  heroism 
at  Loos,  410-411  ; wounded,  410  ; 
awarded  the  V.C.,  411 


L 

La  Bassee,  43,  67,  101,  148,  212,  214, 
217,  252,  342,  350,  357,  363,  393  ; 
held  by  the  Cro^vn  Prince  of 
Bavaria,  43 ; protected  by  the 
Aubers  Ridge,  340 ; operations 
in  area  of,  in  Sept.  1915,  397,  398 

La  Bass6e  Canal,  42,  43,  140,  148, 
176,  192,  206,  451,  452 

La  Briqiie,  305,  307,  311,  314,  316 

La  Cliqueterie, farm,  253;  anobjective 
at  the  battle  of  Festubert,  342,  at 
the  battle  of  Loos,  398,  423,  442 

La  Cordomierie,  farm,  341 

La  Gorgue,  280 

La  Hue,  253 

La  Quinque  Rue,  70,  147,  152,  168, 
204,  357,  383 

La  Russie,  an  objective  at  the  battle 
of  Festubert,  344 

La  Tourelle,  an  objective  in  the  battle 
of  Festubert,  357 

Labh  Singh,  Subadar-Major,  107th 
Pioneers,  awarded  the  I.D.S.M., 
130 

Lachman  Gurung,  Lce-Naik,  bomber, 
l/4th  Gurkha  Rifles,  gains  the 
I.D.S.M.  at  the  battle  of  Festubert, 
388-390 

Lady  Hardinge  Hospital.  See  Hos- 
pitals 

Lifar  Khan,  Sepoy,  129th  Baluchis, 


gains  the  I.D.S.M.  at  the  1st 
battle  of  Ypres,  40,  41 
Lahore  Division,  the,  mobilization  of, 
9 ; commanders  of,  147,  200, 
277 ; composition  of,  10-11,  115, 
277-278,  343,  385;  arrival  of, 
at  Suez,  13 ; disembarkation  of, 
at  Marseilles,  15 ; entrains  for 
Orleans,  19-20 ; part  taken  by, 
in  the  1st  battle  of  Ypres,  21,  in 
the  relief  of  the  French  cavalry, 
44,  66,  in  the  action  of  Festubert, 
115,  134,  at  the  battle  of  Givenchy, 
147,  148,  155-174,  175,  190,  at  the 
battle  of  Neuve  Chapelle,  267-268, 
at  the  2nd  battle  of  Ypres,  277, 
280,  281,  285-288,  290-291,  315, 
342,  at  the  battle  of  Festubert, 
341,  358,  at  the  battle  of  Loos, 
392-393,  399,  401 ; reinforced  by 
the  Meerut  Division,  139  ; position 
held  b3q  in  Feb.  1915,  204; 
incorporated  with  Plumer’s  Force, 
325 ; rejoins  the  Indian  Corps, 
332,  342 ; strength  of,  before  and 
after  the  2nd  battle  of  Ypres,  332  ; 
relieves  the  Meerut  Division  in 
the  trenches,  336 ; casualties  of, 
at  Festubert,  357,  at  Loos,  445  ; 
strength  of,  in  June  1915,  377  ; 
operation  of,  on  15th  June  1915, 
378 ; relieves  the  Highland  Division, 
385;  position  of,  in  Aug.  1915, 
390,  in  Oct.  1915,  451-452;  front 
held  by,  taken  over  by  the  11th 
Corps,  458  ; three  Brigades  R.F.A. 
of,  remain  in  France,  458  ; entrains 
for  Marseilles,  462 

Laing,  Capt.  R.,  2nd  Batt.  Seaforth 
Highlanders,  gains  the  M.C.  at 
Givenchy,  187-188,  192 
Lai  Sher,  Sepoy,  129th  Baluchis, 
gains  the  I.D.S.IVL  at  the  1st 
battle  of  Ypres,  40,  41 
Lai  Singh,  Sepoy,  15th  Ludhiana 
Sikhs,  gains  the  I.D.S.M.  at  the 
battle  of  Festubert,  364-366 
Lancers,  the  I5th,  form  part  of  the 
Lahore  Division,  11,  278  ; aiuive 
at  Marseilles,  16 ; reinforce  the 
Jullundur  Brigade,  48 
Lane,  Capt.  J.  T.  FI.,  l/39th  Garhwal 


INDEX 


531 


Rifles,  gains  the  M.C.,  at  the  battle 
of  Festubert,  127 
Langemarck,  283,  314,  328 
Langle,  De  Cary,  Gen.,  commands  the 
French  in  Champagne,  205 
Lansdowne  Post,  363 
Laventie,  43,  383 
Layes,  River.  See  Des  Layes 
Le  Bridoux,  an  objective  at  the  battle 
of  Loos,  449 
Le  Gheir,  23 

Le  Gros,  Monsieiu'  Henri,  interpreter 
to  the  6th  Jats,  391 
Le  Pdly,  captui’ed  by  the  Royal 
Irish  Regt,  208 
Le  Plant  in,  135,  180,  392 
Lecky,  Brig-Gen.  R.  St  C.,  R.A., 
C.R.A.  Meerut  Division,  279 
Lee,  Capt.  H.  N.,  59th  Rifles,  killed 
at  the  battle  of  Givenchy,  164,  167 
Legion  of  Honour,  Officers  of  the. 

See  Decorations  and  Honours 
Lehna  Singh,  Jemadar,  40th  Pathans, 
gains  the  I.O.M.  at  the  2nd  battle 
of  Ypres,  296 

Leicestershire  Regt,  the,  2nd  Batt., 
forms  part  of  the  Garhwal  Brigade,  ! 
12,  211,  279;  share  of,  in  the  j 
action  of  Festubert,  129-130,  in  , 
the  battle  of  Givenchy,  150-154,  i 
in  the  battle  of  Neuve  Chapelle,  j 
218,  224,  227,  229,  230-233,  236,  I 
254,  266,  in  the  battle  of  Festubert,  | 
358,  360,  361,  in  the  battle  of  ! 
Loos,  405,  409,  412-414,  420,  422  ; j 
casualties  of,  151,  360,  414;  com-  j 
mended  by  Major-Gen.  Jacob,  446  j 
Leith -Ross,  Capt.  W.,  55th  (attached  i 
57th)  Rifles,  at  the  battle  of  j 
Givenchy,  193  j 

Lekh  Ram,  Subadar,  6th  Jats,  killed  j 
at  the  battle  of  Festubert,  345  j 
Lemon,  Lieut  R.  L.,  30th  Punjabis  | 
(attached  l/39th  Garhwal  Rifles),  I 
wounded  at  Neuve  Chapelle,  229, 
236  I 

Lempriere,  Lt-Col  H.  A.,  7th  j 
Dragoon  Guards,  killed  during  | 
counter-attack  at  Givenchy,  180-  | 
181,  183  i 

Lens,  396  ; French  offensive  towards,  i 
339,  356  I 


Lentaigne,  Capt.  E.  C.,  l/4th  Gurkha 
Rifles,  wounded  at  the  2nd  battle 
of  Ypres,  318 

Leslie,  Lt-Col  G.  A.  J.,  R.E.,  C.R.E. 

Meerut  Division,  279 
Lewis,  Major  F.,  2nd  Batt.  Leicester- 
shire Regt,  wounded  at  the  battle 
of  Loos,  412;  awarded  the  D.S.O., 
412 

Lewis,  Lieut  H.  V.,  129th  Baluchis, 
at  the  1st  battle  of  Ypres,  33 ; 
wounded,  39  ; his  eonfidence  in  the 
loyalty  of  Naik  Ayub  Khan,  380 
Life  Guards,  the,  at  the  1st  battle  of 
Ypres,  30 

Ligny-le-Grand,  212,  253 ; an  ob- 
jective at  the  battle  of  Festubert, 
341,  342 

Ligny-le-Petit,  118  ; an  objective  at 
the  battle  of  Festubert,  342 
Lille,  42,  208,  213,  339;  offensive 
towards,  checked,  67  ; the  Aubers 
Ridge  a key  to,  214,  340  ; wireless 
installation  at,  attacked  by  aero- 
planes, 220 ; panic  at,  after  the 
battle  of  Neuve  Chapelle,  269 ; 
attempt  to  cut  German  communi- 
cations at,  397 

Lind,  Capt.  A.  G. , 5Sth  Rifles,  wounded 
at  the  battle  of  Festubert,  119, 
124 

Liptrott,  Lieut  E.  C.,  1st  Sappers  and 
Miners,  participates  in  a successful 
raid,  101-103 ; mentioned  in 
despatches,  103  ; killed,  103 
Liverpool  Regt,  the  4th  Batt.  King’s 
(Special  Reserve),  forms  part  of 
the  Sirhind  Brigade,  211,  278; 
its  part  in  the  battle  of  Neuve 
Chapelle,  264,  317,  in  the  2nd 
battle  of  Ypres,  287,  316,  317, 
328,  330,  331,  at  the  battle  of 
Festubert,  350,  363,  366,  369, 
370 ; specially  commended,  334, 
335  ; casualties  of,  240,  287,  317, 
330,  369  ; remains  in  France,  458 
Livingstone,  Capt.  G.,  l/3rd  London 
Regt,  at  Neuve  Chapelle,  235 
Lloyd,  2nd  Lieut  R.  A.,  4th  Batt. 
King’s  (Liverpool)  Regt.,  killed  at 
the  2nd  battle  of  Ypres,  317 
Lodwick,  Capt.  J.  T.,  2/3rd  Gurkha 


532 


INDEX 


Rit30s,  at  Neuve  Ciiapelle,  255 ; 
perishes  iu  the  Persia,  255 
London  Rcgt,  the  l/3rd  Batt. 
(Territorials),  forms  part  of  the 
Garhwal  Brigade,  211,  279;  its 
share  in  the  battle  of  Neuve 
Chapelle,  220,  224,  229,  233,  235, 
236,  in  the  battle  of  Festubert, 
358,  360,  in  the  battle  of  Loos, 
403,  405,  406,  422 ; sutlers  from  our 
own  gas,  403 

London  Regt,  the,  4th  Batt.  (Terri- 
torials), joins  the  Indian  Corps, 
201  ; forms  part  of  the  Fcrozepore 
Brigade,  211,  278  ; part  taken  by, 
in  the  2ud  battle  of  Ypres,  290, 
315,  319-321  ; casualties  of,  304, 
320 

Loos,  the  battle  of,  392-450  ; instruc- 
tions for,  398,  423,  417-448 ; 

preparations  for,  399-400  ; causes 
of  failure  to  attain  the  whole 
objective  at,  424,  446-449  ; reports 
on,  449-450 
Lorgies,  43 

Loring,  Major  C.  B.,  37th  Lancers 
(attached  Poona  Horse),  killed 
at  Givenchy,  184 

Loyal  North  Lancashire  llegt,  the, 
at  Givenchy,  190 
LnyaUij,  the,  hospital  sliip,  5 
Lucas,  Lieut  H.  C.  M.,  2/2nd  Gurkha 
Rifles,  killed  in  the  attack  of  2nd 
Nov.  1914,  79 

Lumb,  Capt.  F.  G.  E.,  1 /39th  Garhwal 
Rifles,  at  the  battle  of  Festubert, 
126  ; awarded  the  M.C.,  128 
Lumby,  Lieut  A.  F.  R.,  Adjutant, 
69th  Punjabis,  severely  wounded 
at  the  battle  of  Loos,  434 
Lumsden,  Capt.  S.  A.,  4th  Batt. 
King’s  (Liverpool)  Regt,  killed  at 
the  2nd  battle  of  Ypres,  330 
Lydden,  2nd  Lieut  F.  C.,  4th  Batt. 
King’s  (Liverpool)  Regt,  mortally 
wounded  at  the  2nd  battle  of 
Ypres,  287 

Lynch,  Lieut  R.  F.,  1st  Batt. 
Manchester  Regt,  wounded  in  the 
counter-attack  at  Givenchy,  179 
Lynde,  21 

Lys,  river,  22,  23,  214 


M 

Macaudrew,  Lieut  1.  M..  McL.,  1st 
Batt.  Seaf  orth  Highlanders.wouuded 
iu  the  attack  of  the  7th  Nov. 
1914,  87 ; killed  at  the  battle 
of  Givenchy,  191  ; mentioned  in 
despatches,  192 

Macbean,  Major-Gen.  F.,  commands 
the  Bareilly  Brigade,  12,  70,  71  : 
at  the  action  of  Festubert,  116; 
at  the  battle  of  Givenchy,  175, 
180-182 ; succeeded  by  Lt-Col 
Southey,  200 

MacCall,  Cajrt.  H.  D.,  33rd  Punjabis, 
killed  at  the  battle  of  Loos,  444 
McCleverty,  Capt.  G.  M.,  2/2nd 
Gurkha  Rifles,  wounded  in  the 
attack  of  2nd  Nov.  1914,  81,  82  ; 
wounded  at  Neuve  Chapelle,  243 
McCleverty,  Capt.  R.  J.,  47th  Sikhs, 
killed  ill  the  attack  on  Neuve 
Chapelle,  53,  59 ; his  death 

avenged,  54 

McCracken,  Brig-Gcn.  F.  W.  N.,  52 
McEuen,  Capt.  J.  S.,  20tli  Deccan 
Horse,  missing  after  the  battle 
of  Givenchy,  184 

MacFarlane,  Lt-Col  M.,  commanding 
4th  Seaforth  Highlanders,  w'ounded 
at  the  battle  of  Neuve  Chapelle, 
247  ; awarded  the  C.M.G.,  247 
McGaiin,  Capt.  H.  H.  l/4th  Gurkha 
Rifles  (attached),  wounded  at  the 
battle  of  Neuve  Chapelle,  266 
Machan,  2nd  Lieut,  error  for  Maclean, 
2nd  Lieut  W.  A.,  q.v. 

McIntosh,  Pte  J.,  2nd  Batt.  Black 
Watch,  gains  the  D.C.M.  at  the 
battle  of  Festubert,  124 
McIntosh,  2nd  Lieut  J.  L.,  1st  Batt, 
Highland  Light  Infantry  (attached), 
killed  at  the  2nd  battle  of  Ypres, 
330 

McIntyre,  Capt.  R.  W.,  l/4th  Black 
Watch  (Territorials),  wounded  at 
the  battle  of  Loos,  438 
Mackain,  Capt.  J.  F.,  34th  Sikh 
Pioneers,  mortally  wounded  in  the 
action  of  Festubert,  117;  mentioned 
in  despatches,  117 

I Mackenzie,  Capt.  C.  A.  C.,  20th 


INDEX  533 


Deccan  Horse,  missing  after  the 
battle  of  Givenchy,  184 
McKenzie,  Capt.  K.  B.,  oSth  Rifles 
(attached),  wounded  at  the  battle 
of  Loos,  440,  441  ; missing,  443 
Mackie,  Capt.  G.  W.,  54th  (attached 
57th)  Sikhs,  killed  at  the  2nd  battle 
of  Ypres,  300 

Mackmillan,  Lieut  S.  A.,  I.A.R.O., 
attached  58th  Rides,  mortally 
wounded  at  the  battle  of  Festubert, 
351,  353 

McLaughlin,  Capt.  W.  P.  M.  D., 
107th  Pioneers,  wounded  in  the 
action  of  Festubert,  130 
Maclean,  Capt.  F.  A.,  129th  Baluchis, 
wounded  at  the  Ist  battle  of  Ypres, 
38,  39 

Maclean,  Lieut  L.  L.,  2/Sth  Gurkha 
Rides,  wounded  on  the  30th  Nov. 
1914,  74 

Maclean,  2nd  Lieut  W.  A.,  3rd 
(attached  1st)  Batt.  Highland 
Light  Infantry,  killed  at  the  battle 
of  Neuve  Chapelle,  264 
McLeod,  Pte  A.,  l/4th  Seaforth 
Highlanders,  gains  the  D.C.M.  at 
the  battle  of  Neuve  Chapelle,  248 
Macleod,  Lieut  L.,  2nd  Black  Watch, 
killed  at  the  battle  of  Loos,  432 
McMicking,  Lieut  N.,  2nd  Batt.  Black 
Watch,  at  the  action  of  Festubert, 
131 

McNeill,  2nd  Lieut  D.,  1st  Batt. 
Highland  Light  Infantry,  wounded 
at  the  battle  of  Festubert,  362 
Macpherson,  Lieut  D.  S.  R.,  2/8th 
Gurkha  Rides  (attached),  mortally 
wounded  in  the  action  of  Festubert, 
122,  129 

MeSwiney,  Lieut  H.  F.  C.,  2/3rd 
Gurkha  Rides,  wounded  on  the 
13th  Nov.  1914,  97-99,  100 ; 

awarded  the  M.C.,  99 
MacTier,  Major  H.  M.,  2/39th  Garhwal 
Rides,  killed  at  the  battle  of 
Neuve  Chapelle,  235,  236 
MacWatters,  Capt.  M.  R.  C.,  I.M.S., 
2/8th  Gurkha  Rides,  reports  the 
situation  on  30th  Oct.  1914,  72 
Madhu,  Sowar,  Poona  Horse,  awarded 
the  I.O.M.,  83 


Madr.as,  Zemindars  of,  their  offer  of 
horses,  7-8 

Mahon,  Capt.  A.  E.,  55th  Rides 
(attached  57th  Rides),  at  the 
battle  of  Givenchy,  194,  195; 

wounded  at  the  2nd  battle  of 
Ypres,  300 

Mahrattas,  the,  account  of,  487  ; 
representatives  of,  in  the  Indian 
Corps,  487 

Mainwaring,  Capt.  G.  R.,  l/39th 
Garhwal  Rides,  wounded  at  the 
battle  of  Neuve  Chapelle,  236 
Malla  Singh,  Subadar,  at  the  attack 
on  Neuve  Chapelle,  57-59  ; awarded 
the  M.C..  58 

Malwa,  the,  Lt-Gen.  Sir  J.  Will- 
cocks  arrives  at  Marseilles  in,  17 
Man  Sing  Bohra,  Subadar -Major, 
2/2nd  Gurkha  Rides,  killed  in  the 
attack  of  2nd  Nov.  1914,  79-80 
Manchester  Regt.,  the — 

1st  Batt.  forms  part  of  the 
Jullundur  Brigade,  11,  210,  277  ; 
their  share  in  the  action  of 
Festubert,  135,  in  the  battle  of 
Givenchy,  176-179,  195,  196,  in 
the  battle  of  Neuve  Chapelle, 
243,  259-261,  in  the  2nd  battle 
of  Ypres,  287,  290-294,  306, 
316 ; casualties  of,  179,  287, 
294  ; specially  commended,  334, 
335  ; aSected  by  our  own  gas 
at  the  battle  of  Loos,  403 
2nd  Batt.,  counter-attacks  on  the 
22nd  Oct.  1914,  43 

Mangal  Singh,  Havildar  (Jemadar), 
47th  Rides,  gains  the  I.O.M.  at  the 
2nd  battle  of  Yjjres,  307 
1 Mangal  Singh,  Jemadar,  52nd  Sikhs 
I (attached  59th  Rides),  gains  the 
I I.D.S.IM.  at  the  battle  of  Givenchy, 
j 162-163 

Mangal  Singh,  Lce-Naik,  15th  Lud- 
I hiana  Sikhs,  gains  the  I.O.M.  at 
the  battle  of  Festubert,  364-366 
Manghi,  Capt.  E.  B.,  107th  Pioneers, 
wounded  in  the  action  of  Festubert, 
130 

]\Ianjit  Gurung,  Rideman,  2/2nd 
I Gurkha  Rides,  gains  the  I.O.M.  at 
1 the  battle  of  Neuve  Chapelle,  247 


534 


INDEX 


Mankelow,  Lieut  A.  H.,  l/39th 
Garhwal  Rifles,  \^ouncled  at  the 
battle  of  Neuve  Chapelle,  236, 
255-256;  awarded  the  M.C.,  256; 
killed,  256 

Mann,  Lieut  R.  L.,  7th  Dragoon 
Guards,  wounded  and  missmg  at 
the  battle  of  Givenchy,  183-184 
Mansel,  Capt.  J.  L.,  7tli  Dragoon 
Guards,  killed  at  the  battle  of 
Givenchy,  183 

Manson,  Lieut  C.  C.  E..  I.A.R.O. 
(attached  l/4th  Gurkha  Rifles),  in 
the  reconnaissance  of  1st  July  1915, 
386-389  ; awarded  the  M.C.,  389 
Marais,  180 

Marais,  Rue  du,  an  objective  at  the 
battle  of  Festubert,  341,  358 
Mardan  Ali,  Jemadar,  58th  Rifles, 
killed  at  the  battle  of  Givenchy, 
192 

Marquillies,  German  lieadquarters  at, 
381 

Marseilles,  the  Indian  Corps  disem- 
barks at,  14-17,  65 ; reception  of 
the  troops  at,  16,  65 ; departure 
of  the  Indian  Corps  from,  462 
Martin,  Capt.  G.  D.,  9th  Bh opals, 
gains  the  M.C.  in  the  attack  on 
Neuve  Chapelle,  59 
Martin,  Capt.  H.  W.,  59th  Scinde 
Rifles,  at  the  relief  of  tlie  French 
Cavalry,  47 

Mason,  Capt.  M.  F.,  4th  Ba.tt.  Suffolk 
Regt,  wounded  at  the  battle  of 
Neuve  Chapelle,  262 
Mason,  2nd  Lieut  P.  R.  F.,  4th  Batt. 
King’s  (Liverpool)  Regt.  wounded 
at  the  2nd  battle  of  Ypres,  330 
Mastan  Singh,  Havildar,  15th  Sikhs, 
killed  at  the  battle  of  Givenchy, 
143 

Maud’Huy,  Gen.,  commands  the 
10th  Fi'ench  Army  Corps,  206 
Mauquissart,  398,  413 
Maxwell,  Lieut  C.  W.,  2/8th  Gurkha 
Rifles,  missmg  at  the  action  of 
Festubert,  129 

axwell.  Major  F.  W.,  R.E.,  com- 
mands the  Lahore  Divisional  Signal 
Co.  at  the  2nd  battle  of  Ypres,  310  ; 
awarded  the  D.S.O.,  310 


Medaille  IMilitaii’e.  See.  Decorations 
and  Honours 

Medical  Officers,  of  the  Indian  Corps, 
bravery  and  devotion  of,  107, 117, 
330 ; perfection  of  sanitary  mea- 
sures carried  out  by,  494-495 
Medical  Service,  Indian.  See  Indian 
Medical  Service 

Meerut  Division,  the,  mobilization  of, 
9 ; commanders  of,  9,  103,  399  ; 
composition  of,  11-12,  211-212, 
278-279,  385 ; embarkation  of, 

13 ; disembarks  at  Marseilles, 
65 ; arrives  at  the  Front,  66 ; share 
of,  in  the  action  of  Festubert, 
115-116,  134,  in  the  battle  of 
Givenchy,  147-153,  156,  185,  188, 
190,  193,  in  the  battle  of  Neuve 
Chapelle,  210,  247,  248,  276-277, 
280,  in  the  battle  of  Festubert, 
341,  344,  349,  350,  357-358,  363, 
in  the  battle  of  Loos,  393,  399  ; 
reinforces  the  Lahore  Division, 
139 : position  held  by,  in  Feb. 
1915,  204,  in  Aug.  1915,  390,  in 
Oct.  1915,  451,  452;  strength  of, 
in  March  1915,  210,  in  June  1915, 
377  ; relieved  by  the  Lahore 
Division,  336 ; casualties  of,  at 
Festubert,  357,  at  Loos,  445 ; with- 
drawn to  refit,  451  ; entrains  for 
Marseilles,  462 

Mehar  Sing  Khattri,  Subadar,  l/9th 
Gurkha  Rifles,  gains  the  I.O.M.  at 
the  battle  of  Neuve  Chapelle,  245 
Mein,  Lieut  D.  B.,  55th  (attached 
57th)  Rifles,  gains  the  M.C.  at  the 
2nd  battle  of  Ypres,  307 
Meldrum,  2nd  Lieut  E.  A.,  I.A.R.O. 
(attached  2/8th  Gurkha  Rifles), 
at  the  battle  of  Loos,  416,  417-418, 
428  ; killed,  419,  421 
Mellis,  Capt.  A.  R.,  1/lst  Gurkha 
Rifles  (attached),  wounded  at  the 
battle  of  Festubert,  371 
Menin,  an  objective  at  the  1st  battle 
of  Ypres,  23  ; air  raid  on,  220 
Merville,  280,  417,  459 
Messines,  23,  25,  28,  42,  85,  141 
Middlesex  Regt,  the,  4tb  Batt.  of, 
in  the  reliefof  the  French  Cavalry, 
45-46 ; reinforces  the  Connaught 


INDEX 


535 


Rangers,  85  ; retakes  the  trenches  ' 
evacuated  by  the  2/2nd  Gurkhas,  i 
86;  thi  2nd  Batt.  of,  at  Neuve  j 
Chapelle,  241-242  i 

Military  Cross.  See  Decorations  and  j 
Honours  ^ 

Miller-Sterlmg,  2nd  Lieut.  A.  E.  S.,  ' 
I.A.R.O.  (attached  69th  Punjabis), 
at  the  battle  of  Loos,  435 
Milligan,  Lieut  J.  H.,  58th  Rifles, 
missing  at  the  battle  of  Loos,  443 
Milne,  Major  J.  W.,  82nd  Punjabis, 
severely  wounded  at  the  battle  of 
Festubert,  354 

Mining  Operations,  in  Jan.  1915,  203 
Mir  Dast,  Subadar,  55th  (attached 
57th)  Rifles,  his  conspicuous 
bravery  at  the  2nd  battle  of  Ypres, 
306  ; awarded  the  V.C.,  306  ; his 
satisfaction  with  the  special  con- 
sideration shown  for  Indian  soldiers, 
498 

Moated  Grange,  farmhouse,  the,  85 
Moberley,  Lieut  H.  S.,  69th  Punjabis, 
killed  at  the  battle  of  Loos,  433, 
434,  435 

Molony,  Lieut  C.  W.,  57th  Rifles, 
wounded  at  the  1st  battle  of  Ypres, 
34,  39 

Money,  Capt.  C.  A.  G.,  129th  Baluchis, 
wounded  at  the  battle  of  Givenchy, 
144 

Money,  Capt.  H.  I.,  1/lst  Gurkha 
Rifles,  killed  at  the  battle  of 
Givenchy,  169 

Monqara,  the,  arrives  at  Marseilles, 
15 

Monro,  Sir  Charles,  commands  the  3rd 
Army,  396 

Moodie,  Capt.  0.  S.,  l/4th  Black  Watch 
(Territorials),  at  the  battle  of 
Loos,  436,  437,  438  ; missing,  440 
Moore,  Lieut  C.  F.  F.,  l/4th  Gurkha 
Rifles,  wounded  at  the  2nd  battle 
of  Ypres,  318 

Moore,  Capt.  F.  G.,  6th  Jat  Light 
Infantry,  severely  wounded  at 
the  action  of  Festubert,  122 
Moore,  Capt.  H.  A.,  l/3rd  London 
Regt,  gains  the  M.C.  at  the  battle 
of  Neuve  Chapelle,  235 
Morbecque,  458 


Morgan,  Capt.  N.  A.,  2nd  Batt. 
Leicestershire  Regt,  severely 
wounded  at  the  battle  of  Neuve 
Chapelle,  230 

Morris,  Lt-Col  G.  M.,  commands 
2/8th  Gurkha  Rifles,  severely 
wounded  in  the  attack  of  30th 
Oct.  1914,  70-71,  73,  74  ; mortally 
wounded  at  the  battle  of  Loos, 
71,415,417,  421 

Moule,  Major  H.  E.,  l/4th  Gurkha 
Rifles,  missing  at  the  battle  of 
Festubert,  371 

Moulin  Du  Pietre,  the,  strength  of 
the  enemy  at,  in  the  battle  of 
Neuve  Chapelle,  246  ; an  objective 
at  the  battle  of  Loos,  417-418,  427- 
449 

Muhammad  Khan,  Subadar,  69th 
Punjabis,  at  the  battle  of  Loos,  435 
Muir,  Capt.  A.  H.  H.,  15th  Sikhs, 
wounded  at  the  2nd  battle  of 
Ypres,  322 

Muir,  Lce-Corpl  J.,  1st  Batt.  Sea- 
forth  Highlanders,  gains  the  D.C.M. 
at  the  battle  of  Neuve  Chapelle, 
234 

Muktiara,  Sepoy,  40th  Pathans,  gains 
the  Russian  medal  of  St.  George 
at  the  2nd  battle  of  Ypres,  295 
Mullaly,  Capt.  C.  M.,  2/2nd  Gurkha 
Rifles,  at  the  battle  of  Neuve 
Chapelle,  243 ; wounded  at  the 
battle  of  Festubert,  344-345 ; 
killed,  345 

Mullaly,  Lieut  J.  C.  D.,  9th  Bhopals, 
taken  prisoner  in  the  attack  on 
Neuve  Chapelle,  52,  59 
I Mummery,  2nd  Lieut  H.  M.  S., 
1st  Batt.  Highland  Light  Infantry, 
' wounded  at  the  battle  of  Festubert , 
373 

Munn,  Lieut  F.  L.  R.,  40th  Pathans, 
at  the  2nd  battle  of  Ypres,  294- 
295  ; awarded  the  M.C.,  295 
Munshi  Singh,  Scout  Havildar,  47th 
' Sikhs,  in  a reconnaissance  on  3rd 
Nov.  1914,  60-62 

Murphy,  Sergt  P.,  1st  Batt.  Con- 
naught Rangers,  gains  the  Medal 
' of  St.  George  at  the  2nd  battle  of 
Ypres,  302 


536 


INDEX 


Murray,  Co.  Sergt-Major  C.  A.,  l/3rd 
London  Regt,  gains  the  D.C.M.  at 
the  battle  of  Neuve  Chapelle,  235 

Murray,  Capt.  J.  E.,  ]/39th  Garhwal 
Rifles  (attached),  killed  at  the 
battle  of  Neuve  Chapelle,  228,  236 

]\Inrraj',  Capt.  K.  D.  B.,  59th  Scinde 
Rifles,  severely  wounded  in  the 
relief  of  the  French  cavalry,  47 

Murray,  Capt.  R,  A.  C.,  1st  Batt. 
Seaforth  Highlanders,  mortally 
wounded  at  the  battle  of  Neuve 
Chapelle,  234 

Murray,  Lieut  R.  G.  H.,  l/9th  Gurkha 
Rifles,  gains  the  M.C.  at  the  battle 
of  Neuve  Chapelle,  245 

Murray,  Lt-Col  S.  J.,  commanding 
the  1st  Batt.  Connaught  Rangers, 
wounded  at  the  2nd  battle  of  Ypres, 
287,  303 

Murray,  Major  T.  F.,  1st  Batt. 
Highland  Light  Infantry,  at  the 
battle  of  Givenchy,  171  ; believed 
killed,  171 

Murray,  Lieut  W.  A.,  1st  Batt. 
Highland  Light  Infantry,  wounded 
at  the  battle  of  Festubert,  362 

Murraj'-Lyon,  Lieut.  D.  M.,  1st  Batt. 
Highland  Light  Infantry,  wounded 
.at  the  battle  of  Festubert,  372- 
373 

Musalman  soldiers,  description  of, 
487 

Mysore,  the  Maharaja  of,  financial 
assistance  of,  5 

N 

Nain  Sing  Chinwarh,  Subadar-Major, 
2/39th  Garhwal  Rifles,  at  Neuve 
Chapelle,  221  ; honours  conferred 
on,  221 

Nanton,  Brig-Gen.  H.  C.,  R.E.,  279 

Napier’s  Rifles.  See  Rifles,  the  125th, 
Napier’s 

Natha  Singh,  Subadar,  34th  Sikh 
Pioneers,  during  the  relief  of  the 
French  Cavalry,  45 ; in  the  action 
of  Festubert,  116;  awarded  the 
I.O.M.,  116 

Native  States,  the,  lo5'alty  and  co- 
operation of,  4-8 


Nawab  Khan,  Jemad.ar,  129th 
Baluchis,  rvounded  at  the  battle 
of  Givenchy, 144 

Nelson,  Capt.  C.,  69th  Punjabis,  at 
the  battle  of  Loos,  433-434  ; killed , 
435 

Nepal,  offers  of  assistance  from,  6 

Neuve  Chapelle,  43,  66,  147,  206, 
339  ; attack  by  Indians  on,  in  Oct. 
1914,  48,  50-64,  208,  261  ; British 
evacuate,  51,  77,  78,  208;  half- 
ruined,  213 ; bombarded  by  the 
enemy,  277  ; operations  at,  in  Sept. 
1915,397 

Neuve  Chapelle,  the  battle  of,  208- 
275  ; preparations  and  instructions 
for,  214-217,  252,  253  ; summary 
of  the  results  of,  268-275, 340 ; date 
of  the  close  of,  276  ; lessons  learned 
from,  341 

New)nan,  Sergt  F.,  l/3rd  London 
Regt,  at  Neuve  Chapelle,  235  ; 
awarded  the  D.C.M. , 235 

Nicolay,  Major  B.  U.,  l/4th  Gurkha 
Rifles,  at  Givenchy,  155,  157,  158, 
159 

Nicolay,  Major  H.  C.,  2/2nd  Gurkha 
Rifles,  killed  at  Neuve  Chapelle, 
243,  244 

Nicolls,  Lieut  J.  0.,  58th  Rifles,  at 
Loos,  440  ; killed,  441,  443 

Nikka  Singh,  Havildar,  34th  Sikh 
Pioneers,  in  the  action  of  Fes- 
tubert, 116;  awarded  the  I.O.M., 
116 

Nixon,  Capt.  C.  H.  F.,  91st  Punjabis, 
at  Festubert,  353  ; severely 
wounded,  353 

No  Man’s  Land,  nature  of  ground 
indicated  by  the  term,  68,  113, 
386 

Norie,  Major  F.  H.,  attached  2/2nd 
Gurkha  Rifles,  in  the  attack  of  the 
2nd  Nov.  1914,  81  ; wounded,  82  ; 
awarded  the  D.S.O.,  83 

Norie,  Lt-Col  C.  (Brig-Gen.), 
commands  2/2nd  Gurkha  Rifles, 
his  leadership  on  the  2nd  Nov.  1914, 
81-83 ; commended  by  Sir  John 
French,  83  ; his  services  recognized, 
83  ; commands  the  Bareilly  Brigade 
at  the  battle  of  Loos,  426,  441, 


INDEX 


442-443  ; liis  remarks  on  the  failure 
to  hold  the  salient  won,  446-447 
Norman,  Lieut  S.  S.,  1st  Batt. 
Manchester  Regt,  killed  in  the 
(derman  counter  - attack  at  Gi- 
venchy, 179 
Norrent  Fontes,  459 
Northamptonshire  Regt,  the,  their 
part  in  the  counter-attack  at 
Givenchy,  190,  191 
Nosworthy,  Capt.  F.  R,  20th  Co. 
Sappers  and  Miners,  at  Neuve 
Chapelle,  57-58,  59 ; wounded  at 
Neuve  Chapelle  and  at  Ypres,  58,  I 
60,  314 ; at  the  2nd  battle  of  ! 
Ypres,  313;  awarded  the  M.C., 
314 

Notre  Dame  de  Lorette,  battle  of, 
272 

Nott-Bower,  2nd  Lieut  C.  C.,  LA.R.O. 
(attached  2/3rd  Gurkha  Rides), 
at  the  battle  of  Festubert,  360- 
361  ; killed,  361  j 


O i 

Oakes,  Pte  G.,  2nd  Batt.  Leicester- 
shire Regt,  at  Neuve  Chapelle, 
232;  awarded  the  D.C.M.,  232  ' 

Oost  Taverne,  24,  31,  37 
“ Orchard,”  the,  at  Givenchy,  147, 
148 ; bombardment  of,  152 ; 
evacuation  of,  153,  167  ; fighting 
around,  185-193  ; mine  exploded 
under,  186 

Orchha,  the  Maharaja  of,  financial 
assistance  of,  5 ! 

Order  of  British  India,  the,  an  award  i 
for  honourable  service,  491.  tSee  ' 
nko  Decorations  and  Honours 
Orleans,  arrival  of  Indian  Divisions  ' 
at,  19,  20,  65  i 

Ormsby,  Lt-Col  V.  A.,  commands  ' 
2/3rd  Gurkha  Rides  at  the  battle  ! 
of  Neuve  Chapelle,  224,  at  the  ' 
battle  of  Loos,  409  ; appointed  a 
C.B.,  226.  j 

Orton,  Capt.  S.  B.,  l/39th  Garhwal 
Rides,  severely  wounded  in  the 
action  of  Festubert,  129 
Ouderdom,  situation  of,  280 ; i 


r,o7 


Jullundur  and  Ferozepore  Brigades 
hutted  at,  326,  332 

Ouvert,  Rue  d’,  an  objective  at  the 
; battle  of  Festubert,  357,  on  the 
15th  of  June  1915,  378 
Ovens,  Lieut  J.  R.,  1st  Batt. 

Connaught  Rangers,  killed,  85 
Owen,  Capt.  W.,  l/39th  Garhwal 
j Rides  (attached),  at  the  battle  of 
Neuve  Ghanelle,  227  ; killed,  228 
236 

P 

I 

I Padamdhoj  Gurung,  Nadr,  2/2nd 
Gurkha  Rides,  awarded  the  1.0. M. 
for  the  attack  on  the  2ud  Nov, 
1914,78 

Padday,  Capt.  W.  H.,  37th  (attached 
47th)  Sikhs,  killed  at  the  battle 
of  Givenchy,  183,  184 
PahaLsing  Gurung,  Subadar,  2/Sth 
Gurkha  Ridas,  at  the  battle  of 
Loos,  417 

Pala,  Singh,  Havildar,  .34tli  Sikh 
Pioneers,  awarded  the  l.O.M.  at 
the  action  of  Festubert,  117 
Palanpur,  the  Heir- Apparent  of, 
loyalty  of,  4 

Pancham  Sing  Mahar,  .Jemadar,  2/39th 
Garhwal  Rides,  awarded  the  M.C. 
at  Neuve  Chapelle,  223 
Paris,  Capt.  A.  L.,  R.E,,  20th  Co. 
Sappers  and  IMiners,  in  the  attack 
on  Neuve  Chapelle,  52  ; wounded 
and  missing,  54,  60 
Park,  Capt.  A.  K.,  2, '2nd  Gurkha 
Rides  (attached),  mortalh’  wounded 
at  the  battle  of  Festubert,  346 
Park,  Capt,  M.  E.,  2nd  Batt.  Black- 
Watch,  at  the  battle  of  Loos,  427, 
429,  432  •.  again  distinguishes 

him.self,  432-433,  452 ; awarded 
the  D.S.O.,  432 

Parkin,  Capt.  J.  F.,  113th  Infantry 
(attaclied  2/39th  Garhwal  Rides'), 
severely  wounded  at  the  battle  of 
Neuve  Chapelle,  222 
Partiman  Gurung,  Rideman,  2/2nd 
Gurkha  Rides,  gains  the  I.O.iM. 
at  the  battle  of  Neuve  Chapelle, 
247 


538 


INDEX 


Paterson,  Major  P.  J.,R.F.A., inventor 
of  our  trench  mortars,  104 
Pathans,  the,  account  of,  484-486  ; 
representatives  of,  in  the  Indian 
Corps,  484 

Pathans,  the  40th,  form  part  of  the 
Jullundur  Brigade,  277,  280 ; arrive 
at  the  Front  from  China,  277,  280  ; 
at  the  2nd  battle  of  Ypres,  286, 
290,  294-296,  305 ; casualties  of, 
286,  296 ; specially  commended, 
334-335 

Patiala,  the  Maharaja  of,  volunteers 
for  active  service,  4 
Patiram  Kunwar,  Rifleman,  l/4th 
Gurkha  Rifles,  gains  the  I.D.S.M. 
at  the  2nd  battle  of  Ypres,  331 
Paulson,  Capt.  P.  Z.,  1st  Batt. 
Manchester  Regt,  wounded  at  the 
2nd  battle  of  Ypres,  292 
Payne,  Capt.  R.  L.,  Ist  Batt. 
Connaught  Rangers,  in  the  attack 
on  the  2/2nd  Gurkhas,  84,  85 ; 
awarded  the  D.S.O.,  86 
Peal,  the  Rev.  J.,  Chaplam,  Connaught 
Rangers  (attached),  at  the  2nd 
battle  of  Ypres,  311 
Peploe,  Lieut  J.  R.,  2/6th  Gurkha 
Rifles,  wounded  in  the  action  of 
Festubert,  129 

Perkins,  Ma.jor  A.  C.,  40th  Pathans, 
at  the  2nd  battle  of  Ypres,  294, 
296 ; killed,  296 

Perthes,  taken  by  the  French,  205, 
218 

Peters,  Karl,  on  Germany’s  dis- 
appointments, 2 

Petrie,  Sergt  J.,  l/4th  Black  Watch 
(Territorials),  his  attempt  to  rescue 
Major  Tosh  at  Loos,  436 
Phalman  Gurung,  Rifleman,  1/lst 
Gurkha  Rifles,  gains  the  I.D.S.M. 
at  the  2nd  battle  of  Ypres,  318 
Phayre,  Capt.  R.  B.,  l/4th  Gurkha 
Rifles,  his  escape  at  Givenchy, 
170 

Picantin.  60,  383 

“ Piccadilly,”  section  of  trench  known 
as,  187 

“ Picquet  House,”  the,  held  by  the 
1st  Seaforths,  147,  171 
Pietre,  village,  246 


j Pidtre,  Moulin  du.  (See  Moulin  du 
I Pietre 

Pike,  Col  (Brig-Gen.)  W.  W.,  Deputy 
Director  of  Medical  Services,  his 
valuable  work,  378,  493-499  ; 

awarded  the  C.M.G.,  497 
Pioneer  Regts,  the,  at  Givenchy, 
148 ; commendation  of,  446  ; 
whence  recruited,  483 
The  34th  Sikh  Pioneers,  form  part 
of  the  Lahore  Division,  11,  278  ; 
take  part  in  the  relief  of  the  French 
Cavalry,  44-45, 46  ; in  the  action  of 
Festubert,  115-118,  in  the  attack 
of  16th  Dec.  1916,  143-144,  in  the 
battle  of  Givenchy,  160,  175,  at 
the  2nd  battle  of  Ypres,  309,  312  ; 
casualties  of,  49 

The  107th  Pioneers,  form  part  of 
the  Meerut  Division,  12,  279  ; take 
part  in  a counter-attack  on  30th 
Oct.  1914,  74,  in  the  action  of 
Festubert,  116,  121,  123,  127,  129, 
130;  in  the  battle  of  Givenchy, 
151,  190,  in  the  battle  of  Neuve 
Chapelle,  240,  in  the  battle  of 
Festubert,  361  ; their  trenches 
menaced,  101-102 ; casualties  of, 
130;  entrain  for  Marseilles,  459 
Pioneer  Trench,  the,  353 
“ Pipsqueak  ” shell,  406 
Pitts-Tucker,  Lieut  C.  M.,  l.-t  Batt. 
Highland  Light  Infantry,  killed  at 
the  battle  of  Givenchy,  171  ; bm  ied, 
172 

Ploegstert  Wood,  colloquial  name  for, 
22-23 

Plumer,  Lt-Gen.  Sir  Herbert,  327 ; 
commands  the  5th  Army  Corps, 
206,  326 ; the  Lahore  Division 
placed  under,  325;  his  commenda- 
tion of  the  Lahore  Division,  335  ; 
commands  the  2nd  Army,  396 
Pont  Fixe,  176,  179 
Pont  Logy,  51 

Poona  Horse,  the  34th,  their  share 
in  the  attack  on  the  2/2nd  Gurkhas, 
82 ; in  the  action  of  Festubert, 
132, 135 ; in  the  battle  of  Givenchy, 
181  ; casualties  of,  83-84,  184 
Poperinghe,  22,  280,  311  ; effects  of 
asphyxiating  gas  felt  as  far  as,  308 


INDEX  539 


Port  Arthur,  214,  217,  218,  229,  235, 
243,  252,  253,  357  ; condition  of 
trenches  near,  127  ; liombarded  by 
the  enemy,  254,  258,  277,  342  ; 
dangerous  salient  at,  269 
Porter,  Sergt  J.,  1st  Batt.  Seaforth 
Highlanders,  gains  the  D.C.M.  at 
the  battle  of  Neuve  Chapelle,  234 
Potijye,  311 

Potter,  Major  H.  W.  Pv.,  129th 
Baluchis,  at  the  1st  battle  of  Ypres, 
32,  38,  at  the  battle  of  Givenchy, 
142-144  ; missing,  145 
Pratap  Singh,  Sir,  Regent  of  Jodhpur, 
volunteers  for  active  service,  4 ; 
arrives  at  Marseilles,  65 
Price,  Lieut  R.  St  J.  L.,  33rd 
Punjabis,  killed  at  the  battle 
of  Loos,  444 

Prince  of  Wales,  H.R.H.  the.  See 
Wales,  H.R.H.  the  Prince  of 
Pringle,  Capt.  L.  G.,  1st  Batt.  High- 
land Light  Infantry,  at  the  battle 
of  Givenchy,  155-156;  missing,  161 
Prisoners  of  war,  German,  strange 
behaviour  of,  102-103 ; condition 
of,  260 ; physique  and  bearing  of, 
437 

Prisoners  of  war,  Indian,  cared  for  by 
the  Indian  Soldiers’  Fund,  503 
Pulteney,  Gen.  W.  P.,  commands 
3rd  Cavalry  Corps  at  the  1st 
battle  of  Ypres,  42,  at  the  battle  of 
Neuve  Chapelle,  206,  at  the  battle 
of  Loos,  397 

Punjabis,  the  33rd,  their  part  in  the 
battle  of  Loos,  405,  416,  418,  426, 
428,  444-445  ; casualties  of,  444 
Punjabis,  the  69th,  arrive  in  France, 
433 ; services  of,  in  Egypt  and 
Gallipoli,  433  ; replace  the  125th 
Rifles,  377  ; posted  to  the  Bareilly 
Brigade,  377  ; share  of,  in  the 
battle  of  Loos,  405,  426,  427,  428, 
433-435 ; casualties  of,  433,  434- 
435 ; commended  by  ilajor-Gen. 
Jacob,  446 

Punjabis,  the  89th,  rsplace  the  9th 
BhopaLs,  377  ; posted  to  the 
Ferozepore  Brigade,  377 
Puran  Sing  Thapa,  Jemadar,  2/3rd 
Gurkha  Rifles,  wounded  at  the 


battle  of  Neuve  Chapelle,  226 ; 
awarded  the  I.D.vS.M.,  226 
Putz,  Gen.,  commands  the  French 
army  in  Belgium,  327 
Pyper,  2nd  Lieut  J.  R.,  4th  Batt. 
London  Regt,  at  the  2nd  battle 
of  Ypres,  320  ; awarded  the  M.C., 
320 


Q 

Quhique  Rue,  La.  See  La  Quinque 
Rue 


R 

Radford,  Capt.  O.  H.,  57th  Rifles, 
wounded  at  the  2nd  battle  of 
Ypres,  299 
Radhinghem,  42 

! Railton,  Lieut  A.  T.,  4th  Batt. 
Seaforth  Highlanders,  killed  at  the 
battle  of  Festubert,  346 
Rait-Kerr,  Lieut  R.  S.,  R.E., 

wounded  in  the  attack  on  Neuve 
Chapelle,  57,  60 

Raji  Khan,  Sepoy,  129th  Baluchis, 
wounded  at  the  2nd  battle  of 
Ypres,  298  ; awarded  the  I.O.M., 
298 

Ram  Singh,  Jemadar,  57th  Rifles, 
at  the  1st  battle  of  Ypres,  34-35 
Ramazan,  Musalman  troops  enabled 
to  observe,  384 

! Ramkishan  Thapa,  Rifleman,  1/lst 
Gurkha  Rifles,  gains  the  I.O.M.  at 
the  2nd  battle  of  Ypres,  318-319 
Rampershad  Thapa,  Naik,  2/2nd 
Gurkha  Rifles,  gains  the  I.D.S.M. 
in  the  attack  of  2nd  Nov.  1914,  79 
Ran  Bahadur  Sabi,  Rifleman,  l/9th 
Gurkha  Rifles,  gains  the  I.D.S.M. 
in  the  assault  of  the  13th  Nov. 
1914,  100 

Raira  Jodha  Jang  Bahadur,  2nd 
Lieut  I.A.R.O.  (attached  l/39th 
Garhwal  Rifles),  awarded  the  M.C. 
at  the  battle  of  Loos,  424 
Ranjir  Sing  Pandir,  Havildar,  39th 
Garhwal  Rifles,  gains  the  I.D.S.M. 


540 


INDEX 


in  the  raid  of  tlie  9th-]  0th  Nov. 
1914,88 

RaiiKur  Rana,  Siibaclar,  2/8th  Gurkha 
Rifles,  at  the  battle  of  Loos,  416, 
419-421  ; taken  prisoner,  421 
Ratbaran  Gurung,  Sepoy,  2/8th 
Gurkha  Rifles,  wounded  at  the 
battle  of  Loos,  419-420 
Rathore  Haiuir  Singh,  RLsaldar, 
Poona  Horse,  wounded  in  the 
attack  on  the  2/2nd  Gurkhas,  83 
Rations,  difficulty  of  conveying,  to 
the  trenches,  47  ; brought  up  by 
the  2/8th  Gurkhas  at  Neuve 
Chapelle,  249 

Ratlara,  the  Maharaja  of,  volunteers 
for  active  service,  4 
Ravenshaw,  Lt-Col  H.  S.,  commands 
the  1st  Batt.  Connaught  Rangers, 

21 

Rawlinson,  Lt-Gen.  Sir  H.  S.,  com- 
mands the  4th  Army  Corps,  206 
Reed,  Capt.  T.,  67tli  Punjabis 
(attached  59tli  Rifles),  killed  at 
the  battle  of  Neuve  Chapelle, 
263 

Regimental  Aid  Posts.  See  Hospitals 
Reid,  Lieut  J.  L.  I.,  2/2nd  Gurkha 
Rifles,  killed  in  the  attack  of  2nd 
Nov.  1914,  80 

Reilly,  Lce-Corpl  R.,  1st  Batt. 
Connaught  Rangers,  at  the  2nd 
battle  of  Ypres,  293,  302 
Reilly,  Lieut  R.  A.,  58th  Rifles 
(attached),  killed  in  the  action  of 
Festubert,  118-119,  124 
Reinforcements,  inadequacy  of,  452- 
453  ; inferior  quality  of,  454-456  ; 
an  improvement  in  the  quality  of, 
456 

Rennick,  Lt-Col  F.,  commands  40th 
Pathans,  280 ; mortally  wounded 
at  the  2nd  battle  of  Ypres,  294 
Rewa,  the  Maharaja  of,  financial  and 
military  assistance  of,  5 
Richardson,  Pte  F.,  1st  Batt. 
Manchester  Regt,  gains  the  D.C.M. 
at  the  2nd  battle  of  Ypres,  292-293 
Richardson,  Lt-Col  H.  L.,  47th 
Sikhs,  at  the  battle  of  Neuve 
Chapelle,  262 ; promoted  to  Brevet - 
Col,  262 


' Richardson,  Capt.  J.  S.,  R.E.,  com- 
' mands  21st  Co.  Sappers  and  Miners, 
1 52  ; killed  in  the  attack  on  Neuve 

. Chapelle,  54-55,  60 
, Richebourg  L’Avoue,  66,  115,  340 
j Richebourg  St  Vaast,  249,  267  ; 
! shelled  by  the  enemy,  204,.  277 
I Ridgway,  Col  R.  T.  1.,  33rd  Pun- 
jabis, wounded  at  the  battle  of 
I Loos,  428,  444 ; mentioned  in 
i despatches.  445 

j Rifle  Brigade,  the  2nd,  at  the  battle 
1 of  Neuve  Chapelle,  223,  225,  237 
I Rifle  Brigade,  the  12th,  at  the  battle 
I of  Loos,  429,  430,  431 
Rifles,  the  57th,  Wilde’s  (Frontier 
Force),  previous  fighting  experi- 
ence of,  39;  form  part  of  the 
Ferozepore  Brigade,  10,  211,  278; 
commanders  of,  21 , 299  ; 1st  Indian 
Batt.  to  enter  the  trenches,  22 ; 
their  share  in  the  1st  battle  of 
Ypres,  21,  24,  27,  28,  30,  31,  33-37, 
299,  in  the  action  of  Festubert, 
115. 118,  120,  12.5, 136,  in  the  battle 
of  Givenchy,  141-144,  192-197,  in 
the  2nd  battle  of  Ypres,  290,  291- 
301,  305 ; rejoin  Headquarters 
after  the  1st  battle  of  Ypres,  39  ; 
casualties  of,  24,  39,  299,  301  ; 
commended,  41,  334—335  ; honours 
awarded  to,  128 

Rifles,  the  58th,  Vaughan’s,  form  part 
of  the  Bareilly  Brigade,  12,  212  ; 
their  share  in  the  attack  of  30th 
Oct.  1914,  74-76,  in  the  action  of 
Festirbert.  115,  118-120,  123-124, 
131,  in  the  battle  of  Givenchy, 
188,  191,  in  the  battle  of  Festubert, 
350-353,  in  the  battle  of  Loos, 
405,  426-428,  430,  431,  440-444; 
their  trenches  bombed,  108  ; com- 
mended, 192 ; casualties  of,  75, 
76,  124,  192,  353,  443-444 
Rifles,  the  59th,  Scinde  (Frontier 
Force),  form  part  of  the  Jallundur 
Brigade,  11,  210,  277  ; share  of, 
in  the  relief  of  the  French  cavalry, 
44, 46-47,  in  the  battle  of  Givenchy, 
157,  162-167, 175,  197,  in  the  battle 
of  Neuve  Chapelle,  259,  262-263, 
at  the  2nd  battle  of  Ypres,  290 ; 


INDEX 


541 


casualties  of,  -16,  49,  167,  260, 
262-263,  304,  458 

Rides,  the  2/60th,  at  the  battle  of 
Givenchy,  190 

Rides,  the  125th,  Napier’s,  form  part 
of  the  Sirhind  Brigade,  11,  of  the 
Bareilly  Brigade,  279  ; part  taken 
by,  at  the  battle  of  Givenchy,  170, 
at  the  battle  of  Neuve  Chapelle, 
212,  at  the  battle  of  Festubert, 
350  ; leave  for  Egypt,  377 
Rimani  Thapa,  Jemadar,  2/8th 
Gurkha  Rides,  at  the  battle  of 
Loos,  419 

Risal,  Sepoy,  6th  Jat  Light  Infantry, 
gains  the  l.  D.S.M.  in  the  raid  of 
15th-16th  Nov.  1914, 104 
Ritchie,  Lt-Col  A.  B.,  1st  Batt. 
Seaforth  Highlanders,  at  the  battle 
of  Givenchy,  185,  192 ; at  the  battle 
of  Neuve  Chapelle,  236-237 ; 
awarded  the  C.M.G.,  192 
Roberts,  Field-Marshal  Earl,  his 
visit  to  France,  90-95  ; his  speech 
to  the  troops.  92-93 ; his  prescience, 
93  ; his  warnings,  94  ; his  death, 
95 ; his  interest  in  the  Indian 
Soldiers’  Fund,  500 
Roberts,  Lieut  G.  B.,  1st  Batt. 
Manchester  Regt,  mortally 
wounded  at  the  2nd  battle  of  Ypres, 
292 

Robertson,  Lieut  J.  A.  T.,  I.A.R.O. 
(attached  2/3rd  Guikha  Rides), 
at  the  battle  of  Festubert,  360 
Robertson-Glasgow,  Capt.  A.  W., 
2/39th  Garhwal  Rides,  missing 
after  the  action  of  13th  Nov.  1914, 
100 

Robinson,  Lieut  A.  H.,  1st  Batt. 
Manchester  Regt,  wounded  at 
the  2nd  battle  of  Ypres,  291 
Robinson,  Capt.  G.  F.,  l/4th  Gurkha 
Rides  (attached),  missing  at  the 
battle  of  Festubert,  371 
Robson,  Lieut  R.  G.  G.,  R.E.,  brings 
the  drst  trench  mortar  into  action, 
104-105 ; in  the  action  of  Festu- 
bert, 125;  mentioned  in  despatches, 
127 ; killed  while  reconnoitring, 
127,  128 

Roche,  Lt-Col  H.  J.,  commands  6th 


Jat  Light  Infantry,  101-102 ; at 
the  action  of  Festubert,  120-122; 
at  the  battle  of  Givenchy,  187 

Roe,  Capt.  C.  D.,  l/4th  Gurkha 
Rides,  reconnaissance  by,  385-389 ; 
awarded  the  D.S.O.,  389 

Rogers,  Lieut  G.  S.,  l/39th  Garhwal 
Rides,  wounded  at  the  battle  of 
Festubert,  360 

Rohde,  Lieut  J.  H.,  R.E.,  killed  in 
the  attack  on  Neuve  Chapelle, 
55,  60 

Romilly,  Capt.  F.  H.,  2nd  Batt. 
Leicestershii’c  Regt,  at  the  battle 
of  Givenchy,  149-150;  at  the  battle 
of  Neuve  Chapelle,  230-231  ; 
awarded  the  D.iS.O.,  231  ; killed 
at  the  battle  of  Loos,  414 

Ronaldson,  Lt-Col  R.  W.  H.,  1st 
Batt.  Highland  Liglit  Infantry, 
at  the  battle  of  Givenchy,  155, 
158,  160,  172  ; awarded  the  C.B., 
174 

Roome’s  Trench,  bombarded  by  the 
enemy,  254 

Rose,  Capt.  A.  B.,  1st  Batt.  Man- 
chester Regt,  killed  at  the  battle 
of  Givenchy,  179 

Ross,  Capt  . A.  C.,  20th  Deccan  Horse, 
gains  the  D.IS.O.  at  the  battle  of 
Givenchy,  181 

Ross,  Major  F.  G.  C.,  2/2nd  Gurkha 
Rides,  killed  in  the  attack  of  2nd 
Nov.  1914,  79-80 

Ross,  Capt.  R.  C.,  6th  Jat  Light 
Infantry,  at  the  battle  of  Givenchy, 
153  ; leaves  France  with  the  Regt, 
391 

Roubaix,  206 ; the  Aubers  Ridge  a 
key  to,  214,  340 

Rouge  Croix,  55,  56 

Rouges  Bancs,  66 ; an  objective  at 
the  battle  of  Festubert,  339,  341, 
348 

Row,  Lieut  H.  C.,  4th  Batt.  Suffolk 
Regt,  killed  at  the  battle  of  Neuve 
Chapelle,  262 

Royal  Aimy  Medical  Corps,  the. 
valuable  work  of,  446,  493-499 

Royal  .iMtillery,  the,  in  the  Lahore 
and  Meerut  Divisions,  11,  12,  458  ; 
share  of,  in  the  1st  battle  of  Ypres, 


542 


INDEX 


37,  in  the  action  of  Festubert, 
120, 121,  123, 131-132.  in  the  battle 
of  Givenchy,  148,  156,  172,  174, 
in  the  battle  of  Neuve  Chapelle, 
212-213,  215,  218-221,  247,  252, 
269,  in  the  2nd  battle  of  Ypres, 
289,  315,  321,  325-329,  in  the  battle 
of  Festubert,  341,  344,  350,  351, 
366,  369,  371-372,  in  the  battle  of 
Loos,  399,  401,  404 ; remarkable 
escape  of  three  officers  of,  177 ; 
strength  of,  and  casualties  of,  at 
the  2nd  battle  of  Ypres,  333 ; 
assists  in  Capt.  Roe’s  reconnais- 
sance in  July  1915,  388-389 
ord  Mountain  Artillery  Brigade, 
remains  in  Egj'pt,  14 
4th  Brigade,  R.F.A.,  forms  part  of 
the  Meerut  Division,  12 
5th  Brigade,  R.F.A.,  forms  part  of 
the  Lahore  Division,  11 
9th  Brigade,  R.F.A.,  forms  part  of 
the  Meerut  Division,  12 
11th  Brigade,  R.F.A.,  forms  part 
of  the  Lahore  Division,  11 
13th  Brigade,  E.F.A.,  forms  part 
of  the  Meerut  Division,  12 
18th  Brigade,  R.F.A.,  forms  part  of 
the  Lahore  Division,  11 ; its 
part  in  the  battle  of  Givenchy, 
156 

109th  Heavy  Battery,  forms  part 
of  the  Lahore  Division,  11 
noth  Heavv^  Battery,  forms  part 
of  the  IMeerut  Division,  12 
Royal  Engmeers,  in  the  Lahore 
Division,  11  ; in  the  Meerut 
Division,  12  ; valuable  work  of,  at 
the  battle  of  Loos,  446.  See  also 
Pioneer  Regts  ; Sappers  and  Miners 
Royal  Flying  Corps,  the,  value  of 
operations  of,  at  Neuve  Chapelle, 
209-210,  220 

Royal  Indian  Marine,  the,  14 
Royal  Irish  Regt,  the,  captm'es  Le 
Pilly,  208 

Royal  Scots  Fusiliers,  the,  in  the 
attack  on  2/2nd  Gurldias,  82,  84,  86 
Royal  Sussex  Regt,  the,  2nd  Batt., 
at  the  battle  of  Givenchy,  190, 
193 

Ruckledge,  Sergt  H.  E.,  2nd  Batt. 


Leicestershh’e  Regt,  gains  the 
D.C.M.  at  the  battle  of  Neuve 
Chapelle,  232-233 

Rue  des  Berceaux,  Du  Bois,  De 
Cailloux,  La  Quinque,  Du  Marais, 
D’Ouvert,  Tilleloy.  See  s.v.  Ber- 
ceaux, Bois,  etc. 

Rundall,  Lieut  L.  B.,  1/lst  Gurkha 
Rifles,  killed  at  the  battle  of 
Givenchy,  167-168,  170 

Rupdhan  Pun,  Naik,  2/3rd  Gurkha 
Rifles,  in  the  attack  of  13th  Nov. 
1914,  100 ; his  services  rewarded, 
100 

Rur  Singh,  Sepoy,  47th  Sikhs,  gains 
the  I.O.M.  at  the  battle  of  Neuve 
Chapelle,  262 

Russell,  Col  J.  J.,  A.D.M.S.,  his 
valuable  work  at  the  battle  of 
Loos,  446 

Russian  Army,  necessity  for  assisting 
the,  207,  339 ; movements  of,  in 
April  1915,  338 

Russian  Cros.s  of  the  Order  of  St 
George.  See  Decorations  and 
Honours 

Russian  Medal  of  St  George.  See 
Decorations  and  Honours 

Ryall,  Lieut  R.  W.,  2/8th  Gurkha 
Rifles,  mortally  wounded  at  the 
battle  of  Loos,  417 

S 

Sachin,  Nawab  of,  volunteers  for 
active  service,  4 

Said  Ahmed,  Sepoy,  129th  Baluchis, 
gains  the  I.D.S.M.  at  the  1st  battle 
of  Ypres,  40-41 

St  Clair,  Capt.  the  Hon.  C.,  1st  Batt. 
Seaforth  Highlanders,  killed  at 
the  battle  of  Givenchy,  186 

St  Eloi,  22,  37 

St  George,  Lieut  and  Adjt  G.  S.  W., 
1/lst  Gurkha  Rifles,  mortally 
wounded  at  the  2nd  battle  of 
Ypres,  318 

St  Jean,  287,  288,  314 

St  Julien,  the  Canadian  Division 
retires  on,  284-285 ; a German 
aeroplane  brought  down  near,  326 

St  Sylvestre,  21 


INDEX 


543 


Sangram  Sing  Negi,  Jemadar,  2/39th 
Garhwal  Rifles,  gains  the  M.C.  at 
the  battle  of  Neuve  Chapelle,  221 
Sankaru  Gusain,  Lce-Xaik,  l/39th 
Garhwal  Rifles,  gains  the  1.0.  M. 
in  the  action  of  Festubert,  126 
Sappers  and  Miners,  their  valuable 
work,  128,  139,  148,  166,  239- 
240 ; commendation  of , 139-140,446  ; 
1st  King  George’s  Own, 

No.  3 Co. , forms  part  of  the  Meerut 
Division,  12  ; participates  in  a 
raid  on  the  15th-16th  Nov.  1914, 
101-103 ; casualties  of,  104 ; 
constructs  the  first  trench 
mortars,  104 ; operations  of, 
in  Jan.  1915,  203 

No.  4 Co.,  forms  part  of  the  Meerut 
Division,  12  ; assists  in  a raid 
on  the  13th  Nov.  1914,  96-99, 
in  the  battle  of  Givenchy,  186, 
in  the  battle  of  Festubert,  361 
The  3rd  Sappers  and  Miners, 

No.  20  Co. , forms  part  of  the  Lahore 
Division,  11 ; gallantry  of,  in 
the  attack  on  Neuve  Chapelle, 
52-54,  57-59,  at  the  battle  of 
Givenchy,  160,  162,  at  the  2nd 
battle  of  Ypres,  311-312  ; casual- 
ties of,  59,  60 

No.  21  Co.,  forms  part  of  the  Lahore 
Division,  11 ; gallantry  of,  in 
the  attack  on  Neuve  Chapelle, 
52-55,  59,  at  the  battle  of 
Givenchy,  143-144,  at  the  2nd 
battle  of  Ypres,  311-312  ; casu- 
alties of,  55,  60 

Sapping  Operations,  description  of, 
113-115 

Sapuram  Singh,  Sepoy,  15th  Lud- 
hiana Sikhs,  gains  the  I.D.S.SL  at 
the  battle  of  Festubert,  364-366 

Sar  Mast,  Havildar,  57th  Rifles, 
machine  gun  detachment,  gains 
the  I.D.S.M.  at  the  2nd  battle  of 
Ypres,  300 

Sarain  Singh,  Sepoy,  19th  Punjabis, 
gains  the  I.D.S.M.  at  the  battle 
of  Festubert,  364-366 

Sarbjit  Gurung,  Subadar,  2/8th 
Gurkha  Rifles,  at  the  battle  of  Loos, 
418,  posthumously  rewarded,  418 


Sardar  Khan,  Jemadar,  69th  Pun- 
jabis, at  the  battle  of  Loos,  435 
Sardar  Singh,  Dufiadar,  20th  Deccan 
Horse,  gains  the  I.O.M.  at  the 
battle  of  Givenchy,  181 
Saunders,  Capt.  C.  R.  E.,  4th  Batt. 
London  Regt,  mortally  wounded 
at  the  2nd  battle  of  Ypres,  320 
Savy,  Col,  commands  the  Moroccan 
Brigade,  his  heavy  losses  at  the 
2nd  battle  of  Ypres,  327 
Seale,  Capt  J.  D.,  59th  Rifles,  at  the 
battle  of  Givenchy,  162 
Scinde  Rifles,  the.  See  Rifles,  the 
59th,  Scinde 

Scobie,  Lieut  J.  A.  M.,  69th  Rifles, 
at  the  battle  of  Givenchy,  164, 
165  ; awarded  the  M.C.,  165 
Scott,  Brig-Gen.  A.  B.,  R.A.,  279 
Scott,  Capt.  T.  H.,  47th  Sikhs 
(attached),  killed  at  the  2ud  battle 
of  Ypres,  297 

Scott,  Capt.  W.  F.,  59th  Rifles,  killed 
during  the  relief  of  the  Fi-ench 
Cavalry,  46 

Scottish  Rifles,  the  2nd  Batt.,  at 
the  battle  of  Neuve  Chapelle, 
241 

Seaforth  Highlanders,  the, 

1st  Batt.  forms  part  of  the  Dehra 
Dun  Brigade,  11,  211,  278 ; 
share  of,  in  the  attack  on  the 
2/2nd  Gurkhas,  86,  in  the  battle 
of  Givenchy,  185,  187-188, 

190-192,  in  the  battle  of  Neuve 
ChapeUe,  233-234,  236,  246, 
254,  in  the  battle  of  Festubert, 
344-348,  350,  353,  in  the  battle 
of  Loos,  423 ; casualties  of, 
87,  192,  234-235,  251,  348; 
specially  commended,  188,  192 
l/4th  Batt.  (Territorials),  joins 
the  Indian  Corps,  201  ; forms 
part  of  the  Dehra  Dun  Brigade, 
211,  278 ; share  of,  in  the 
battle  of  Givenchy,  187,  in  the 
battle  of  Neuve  Chapelle,  243, 
250,  in  the  battle  of  Festubert, 
345,  346,  348,  350,  353,  in  the 
battle  of  Loos,  423  ; casualties 
of,  251  ; commendation  of, 
248 


544 


INDEX 


yecundrabad  Cavali-y  Brigade,  com- 
mander of,  66,  175  ; arrives  at  the 
Front,  66 ; lighting  strength  of, 
106 ; its  part  in  the  German 
counter-attack  at  Givenchy,  175, 
180,  190 

!8cnbir  Gurung,  Actg->Subadai--Major, 
l/-lth  Gurkha  Rifles,  takes  part 
in  a reconnaissance,  386-389 ; 
wounded,  389 ; awarded  the 
389 

Seton-Broune,  Lieut  M.  W.,  2nd 
Batt.  Leicestershii'e  Regt,  killed 
in  the  action  of  Festubert,  130  ; 
mentioned  in  despatches,  130 
Shaikh  Abdul  Rahman,  Sapper, 
gains  the  I.O.M.  at  the  battle  of 
Neuve  Ghapelle,  231 
Shanka  Rao,  Duffadar,  20th  Deccan 
Horse,  gains  the  I.O.M.  at  the 
battle  of  Givenchy,  181 
Shells,  colloquial  names  for  various  i 
kinds  of,  366,  406 

Shepherd,  Capt.  G.  A.  G.,  57th  Rifles, 
killed  at  the  battle  of  Givenchy, 
194 

Sher  Singh,  Subadar,  34th  Sikh 
i’ioneers,  gaiirs  the  I.O.M.  at  the 
relief  of  the  French  Cavalry,  45 
Shibdhoj  Mai,  Jemadar,  l/9th  Gurkha 
Rilies,  gains  the  I.O.M.  at  the 
battle  of  ISieuve  Ghapelle,  249 
Signal  Companies,  the,  with  the 
Lahore  and  Meerut  Divisions, 
11,  12;  heroism  of,  256-257,  310- 
311 

Sikh  Regiments, 

15th  Ludhiana  Sikhs,  the,  form 
part  of  the  Jullundirr  Brigade, 
11,  of  the  Sirhind  Brigade,  211, 
278 ; their  share  in  the  relief 
of  the  French  Cavalry,  44-48,  in 
the  battle  of  Givenchy,  141-145, 
in  the  battle  of  Heuve  Ghapelle, 
264,  267,  in  the  2nd  battle  of 
Ypres,  308-309,  316,  321,  323- 
324,  328,  331,  in  the  battle  of 
Festubert,  362,  363,  364,  367- 
369 ; casualties  of,  49,  324 ; 
leave  France,  391 

47th  Sikhs,  the,  form  part  of  the 
Jullundur  Brigade,  11,  210,  277 ; 


their  share  in  the  relief  of  the 
French  Cavahy,  46,  48,  in  the 
attack  on  Neuve  Ghapelle,  48, 
52-56,  59,  in  the  battle , of 
Givenchy,  148,  175,  180,  182, 
in  the  battle  of  Neuve  Ghapelle, 
243,  259,  261-262,  at  the  2nd 
battle  of  Ypres,  290,  296-298, 
305 ; earn  a reputation,  56,  297- 
298  ; position  of,  in  Nov.  1914, 
60  ; easualties  of,  49,  59,  184, 
296-297,  458 ; specially  com- 
mended, 60,  334-335 ; their 
German  souvenir,  391 
See  also  Pioneers,  the  34th  Sikh  ; 
Pioneers,  the  107th 
Sikhs,  the,  heroism  of,  at  the  1st 
battle  of  Ypres,  36-37  ; account 
of,  483-484  ; regiments  and 
representatives  of,  in  the  Indian 
Corps,  484 

i Sinclair,  Lieut  R.,  2nd  Batt.  Black 
Watch,  killed  at  the  battle  of 
Festubert,  352 

Singh,  Capt.  Indrajit,  medical  olBcer 
of  the  57th  Rilies,  at  the  battle 
of  Festubert,  136 ; posthumously 
awarded  the  M.C.,  136 
Su'hiiid  Brigade,  the,  composition  of, 
11,  211,  278,  385  ; commanders  of, 
11,  200,  211,  278,  367  ; remain 
at  Suez  to  guard  the  Canal,  14, 
66 ; arrive  at  Marseilles,  14 ; 
arrive  at  the  JAont,  139 ; part 
taken  by,  at  the  battle  of  Givenchy, 
147,  148,  155,  162,  167,  168,  175, 
176,  177,  180,  185,  188.  189,  195, 
at  the  battle  of  Neuve  Ghapelle, 
249,  251,  252,  258,  259,  263-264, 
268,  at  the  2nd  battle  of  Ypres, 
276,  286,  287,  307,  311,  314-316, 
319,  325-328,  at  the  battle  of 
Festubert,  350,  358,  361-363, 

! 366,  369,  374 ; operation  of,  on 

j the  15th  June  1915,  378  ; relieved 
j by  the  Bareilly  Brigade,  451 
I Smith,  Capt.  A.  Dallas,  2/2nd  Gurkha 
I Rifles,  at  the  battle  of  Neuve 
I Ghapelle,  243,  244  ; awarded  the 
j M.G.,  244 

! Smith,  Gorpl  Issy,  1st  Batt.  Man- 
chester Regt,  his  heroism  at  . the 


INDEX 


545 


2nd  battle  of  Ypres,  292  ; awarded 
the  V.C.,  292 

Smith-Dorrien,  Gen.  Sir  Horace, 
relieved  by  Sir  James  Willcocks, 
18,  91,  188 ; commands  the  2nd 
Army  Corps,  42,  141,  208 ; his 
commendation  of  the  Indian  troop.s, 
60, 334-335 ; attacks  near  Messines, 
141  i his  operation  orders  at  the 
2nd  battle  of  Ypres,  285-286 
Smyth,  Lieut  J.  G.,  15th  Sikhs,  368  ; i 
his  heroism  at  the  battle  of  Festu-  j 
bert,364r-366; awardedtheV.C.,366  | 
Snipers,  German,  casualties  caused  [ 
by,  46,  47,  134,  240,  386  ; hunted 
out,  48,  126,  223  ; pick  out  British 
officers,  89,  436,  439,  473 
Soden,  2nd  Lieut  L.  C.,  4th  Batt. 
King’s  (Liverpool)  Regt,  wounded  i 
at  the  2nd  battle  of  Ypres,  287  , 

Soissons,  339,  397  | 

Somme,  river,  the,  396 
Sones,  Pte  P.  E.,  4th  Batt.  Suffolk  j 
Regt,  attached  Lahore  Signal 
Co.,  gains  the  D.C.M.  at  the  battle  | 
of  Neuve  Chapelle,  257-258  j 

Sotheby,  Lieut  F.  L.  S.,  2nd  Batt.  i 
Black  Watch,  killed  at  the  battle 
of  Loos,  432 

South  Lancashire  Regt,  the,  in  the 
attack  on  Neuve  Chapelle,  51 
South  Staffordshire  R-egt,  the,  at 
the  battle  of  Givenchy,  197 
South  Wales  Borderers,  the,  at  the 
battle  of  Givenchy,  172 
Southey,  Lt-Col  (Brig-Gen.)  W.  M., 
commands  the  129th  Baluchis, 
22 ; at  the  1st  battle  of  Ypres, 
32-33,  37,  38,  39  ; at  the  action 
of  Festubert,  118-120;  commands 
the  Bareilly  Brigade,  200,  279 ; 
at  the  battle  of  Neuve  Chapelle, 
212,  215;  at  the  battle  of  Festubert, 
349,  350,  355  ; his  commendation 
of  the  troops,  356 

Sparrow,  Capt.  B.  C.,  l/39th  Garhwal 
Rifles,  killed  at  the  battle  of  Neuve 
ChapeUe,  228,  236 
Spies,  46,  48.  136 

Stack,  Capt.  E.  H.  B.,  2/8th  Gimkha 
Rifles,  mortally  wounded  in  the 
attack  of  30th  Oct.  1914,  71,  74 


Stansfeld,  Major  H.  H.  G.,  69th 
Punjabis  (attached),  mortally 
wounded  at  the  battle  of  Loos, 
434,  435  ; mentioned  in  despatches, 
435 

Staunton,  Sergt  G.  W.,  A.S.C.,  gains 
the  D.C.M.  at  the  2nd  battle  of 
Ypres,  311 

Steeirstiaate,  283 

Steeples,  Pte  J.,  2nd  Batt.  Leicester- 
shire Regt,  gains  the  D.C.M.  at 
the  battle  of  Neuve  Chapelle,  233 

Steven.  Lieut  S.  H.,  l/4th  Batt. 
Black  Watch  (Territorials),  gains 
the  M.C.  at  the  battle  of  Neuve 
Chapelle,  253 ; wounded  at  the 
battle  of  Loos,  437 

Stevens,  Lt-Col  S.  R.,  commands 
93rd  Burma  Infantry,  402 

Stewart,  Pte  D.,  2nd  Batt.  Black 
Watch,  gains  the  D.C.M.  at  the 
action  of  Festubert,  124 

Stewart,  Lce-Corpl  J.,  1st  Batt. 
Highland  Light  Infantry,  gains  the 
D.C.M.  at  the  battle  of  Neuve 
Chapelle,  265 

Stewart,  Lieut  the  Hon.  K.  A.,  2nd 
Batt.  Black  Watch,  killed  at  the 
battle  of  Festubert,  352 

Stewart,  Capt.  W.  P.,  1st  Batt.  High- 
land Light  Infantry,  gains  the 
D.S.O.  at  the  battle  of  Givenchy, 
172,  174  ; at  the  battle  of  Neuve 
Chapelle,  266 ; mentioned  in 
despatches,  266 

Story,  Capt.  H.  F.,  47th  Sikhs, 
wounded  at  the  battle  of  Neuve 
Chapelle,  261 

“Strand,”  the,  communication  trench, 
186 

Stretcher-bearers,  the,  heroism  and 
devotion  of,  287,  302,  330,  353, 
495,  497-498 

Strickland,  Lt-Col  (Brig-Gen.)  E. 
P. , commands  1st  Batt.  Manchester 
Regt,  176  ; at  the  battle  of  Given- 
chy, 177-179 ; commands  the 
JuUundur  Brigade,  200,  210,  277, 
286,  309 

Stirrdee,  2nd  Lieut  P.,  Poona  Horse, 
wmunded  in  the  attack  on  2/2nd 
Gurkhas,  84 

2n 


540 


INDEX 


Sturrock,  Lieut  B.  S.,  l/4th  Black 
Watcli  (Territorials),  a.t  the  battle 
of  Loos,  438 

Suba  Sing  Gurung,  Jemadar,  2/2nd 
Gurkha  Rifles,  in  the  attack  of 
2nd  Nov.  1914,  80 

Sucha  Singh,  Havildar,  1st  Sappers 
and  Miners,  gains  the  I.D.S.M., 
203 

Sucha  Singh,  Sepoy,  15th  Ludhiana 
Sikhs,  gains  the  I.D.S.M.  at  the 
battle  of  Festubcrt,  364-366 

Suffolk  Regt,  the,  4th  Batt.  (Terri- 
torials), joins  the  Indian  Corps, 

176,  201  ; forms  part  of  the 

Jullundur  Brigade,  210,  277  ; 

share  of,  in  the  battle  of  Givenchy, 

177,  in  the  battle  of  Neuve  Chapelle, 
259,  in  the  2nd  battle  of  Ypres, 
290 ; casualties  of,  259-260,  262, 
304 

Sundur  Singh,  Sepoy,  19th  Punjabis, 
gains  the  I.D.S.M.  at  the  battle 
of  Festubert,  364-366 

Sunken  Road,  452 ; an  objective 
at  the  battle  of  Loos,  398 

Supply  and  Transport  Corps,  the, 
landing  at  Marseilles  of  stores  for, 
16  ; value  of  the  work  of,  446 

Sutcliffe,  Lieut  H.  P.,  1/lst  Gurkha 
Rifles  (attached),  wounded  at  the 
battle  of  Festubert,  371 

Swan,  Pte  T.,  2nd  Batt.  Black  Watch, 
gains  the  D.C.M.  in  the  action  of 
Festubert,  131 

Swanston,  Lt-Col  C.  0.,  commanding 
34th  Poona  Horse,  killed  in  the 
attack  on  the  2/2nd  Gurkhas,  82, 
83 

Sweet,  Major  E.  H.,  2/2nd  Gui-kha 
Rifles,  at  the  battle  of  Neuve 
Chapelle,  243 

Svofte,  Major  E.  L.,  57th  Rifles,  at 
the  1st  battle  of  Ypres,  36 

Swiney,  Lt-Col  E.  R.  R.,  commands 
the  l/39th  Garhwal  Rifles,  at  the 
action  of  Festubert,  123,  128-129  ; 
at  the  battle  of  Neuve  Chapelle, 
227-229,  233-236 ; his  services 
rewarded,  128  ; severely  wounded, 
229,  236 ; perishes  in  the  Peisia, 
236,  255 


T 

Talbot,  Major  E.  C.,  47th  Sikhs, 
wounded  at  the  battle  of  Neuve 
Chapelle,  261  ; killed  at  the  2nd 
battle  of  Ypres,  297 
Tarleton,  Major  F.  R.,  Adjutant, 
l/4th  Black  Watch  (Territorials), 
killed  at  the  battle  of  Loos,  436 
Tarrant,  Capt  H.  S.,  1st  Batt. 
Highland  Light  Infantry,  at  the 
battle  of  Givenchy,  173,  at  Neuve 
Chapelle,  266,  at  the  2nd  battle 
of  Ypres,  305,  316,  324-325,  328  ; 
mentioned  in  despatches,  266 ; 
his  heroic  death,  324 
Tawand  Singh,  Sepoy,  47th  Sikhs, 
accompanies  Lieut  Brunskill  on  a 
reconnaissance,  62 

Tayler,  2nd  Lieut  G.  G.,  2nd  Batt. 
Leicestershire  Regt,  killed  at  the 
battle  of  Festubert,  360 
Taylor,  Lieut  A.  M.,  1st  Brahmaas, 
attached  9th  Bhopals  at  the  battle 
of  Givenchy,  193  ; attached  2/8th 
Gurkha  Rifles  at  the  battle  of 
Loos,  416,  421  ; died  of  wounds, 
416,  421 

Taylor,  Major  G.  H.,  2/39th  Garhwal 
Rifles,  carries  out  a successful 
raid,  87-88,  97  ; mentioned  in 
despatches,  88 ; participates  in  a 
second  raid,  96-100 ; missing, 
100 

Taylor,  Capt.  J.,  I.M.S.,  l/39th 
Garhwal  Rifles,  at  Neuve  Chapelle, 
235-236  ; wounded,  236 ; awarded 
the  D.S.O.,  236 

Taylor,  Pte  J.,  2nd  Batt.  Leicester- 
shire Regt,  gains  the  D.C.M.  in  the 
action  at  Festubert,  130 
Tekbahadur  Gurung,  Subadar,  2/2nd 
Gurkha  Rifles,  killed  in  a counter- 
attack, 79 

Tennant,  Lieut  C.  G.,  4th  Batt. 
Seaforth  Highlanders,  killed  at  the 
battle  of  Festubert,  346 
Tennant,  Major  E.,  20th  Deccan 
Horse,  wounded  at  Givenchy,  184 
Territorial  Regiments  of  the  Indian 
Corps,  military  value  of,  201,  343 
See  also  Black  Watch  ; Londoi^ 


INDEX 


547 


ilcgfc ; Scafortli  Highlanders ; 
Suffolk  Regt 
Thiennes,  458 

Thompson,  Lce-Corpl  V.,  2nd  Batt. 
Black  Watch,  rescues  Lieut  Cani- 
mell,  228  ; wounded,  229  ; awarded 
the  D.C.M.,  229 

Thomson,  Lieut  R.  E.  J.,  15th  Sikhs, 
mortally  wounded  at  the  battle  ’ 
of  Festubert,  368  I 

Thornton,  Lieut  R.  J.,  40th  Pathans,  ' 
wounded  at  the  2nd  battle  of  ' 
Ypres,  296  1 

Tibet,  the  Dalai  Lama  of,  his  offer  of  ! 

assistance,  6 ! 

Tika  Khan,  Subadar,  58th  Rifles,  i 
his  services  at  the  battle  of  Loos,  ! 
428  I 

Tillard,  Major  A.  B.,  l/3rd  Gurkha  j 
Rifles,  at  Neuve  Chapelle,  224 ; I 
mentioned  in  despatches,  224 
Tilleloy,  Rue,  the  58th  Rifles  hold  ' 
trenches  along  the,  405 
Tinley,  Lieut  F.  B.  N.,  20th  Deccan  j 
Horse,  wounded  at  Givenchy,  184 
Tooley,  Lieut  H.  A.,  2nd  Batt.  ; 
Leicestershire  Regt,  wounded  at  | 
the  battle  of  Givenchy,  154  i 

Torrie,  Capt.  C.  J.,  30th  Punjabi.?,  at  | 
Neuve  Chapelle,  257  ; awarded  the  I 
D.S.O.,  257  j 

Tosh,  Major  E.,  l/4th  Black  Watch  ' 
(Territorials),  mortally  wounded  at  I 
the  battle  of  Loos,  436,  440  ! 

Tota  Singh,  Lce-Naik,  34th  Sikh  I 
Pioneers,  in  the  action  of  Festubert,  j 
117  ; posthumouslv  awarded  the  | 
I.O.M.,  117  “ 

Tourcoing,  340 ; the  Aubers  Ridge  a 
key  to,  214 

Tournai,  the  Germans  move  their 
hospital  from  Lille  to,  269 
Trail,  Capt.  W.  S.,  Adjt  57th  Rifles,  * 
27  ; at  the  1st  battle  of  Ypres,  ! 
36-37  ; awarded  the  M.C.,  37  I 
Transport,  the,  fortunate  escape  of, 
at  the  battle  of  Givenchy,  195-  i 
196 ; harassing  time  of,  in  the  I 
march  fo  Ypres,  280 
Travers,  Major  R.  E.,  l/4th  Gurkha  1 
Rifles,  at  the  battle  of  Givenchy,  ' 
170  i 


Trench  mortars,  British,  by  whom 
invented  and  constructed,  104 ; 
first  used,  104-105 
Trenches,  the,  condition  of,  in  1914, 
26,  66,  68,  69-70,  75-76,  78,  174, 
183,  at  the  battle  of  Festubert, 
343,  348-349,  362-363,  at  the 
battle  of  Loos,  422-423 ; the 
enemy  pump  water  into,  127-128  ; 
comparison  between  the  French 
and  British,  140  ; the  Indians  ap- 
preciate the  necessity  of  strength- 
ening, 326  ; measure.?  taken  for 
the  improvement  of,  393,  493 
Tribe,  Lt-Col  C.  W.,  commanding 
41st  Dogras,  wounded  at  the  battle 
of  Festubert,  354  ; awarded  the 
C.M.G.,  355 ; leaves  France  with 
his  Regt,  391  ; killed,  355 
Tulloch,  Lieut  D.  de  M.  A.  L.,  1st 
Batt.  Connaught  Rangers,  in  the 
attack  of  2nd  Nov.  1914,  84,  85  ; 
killed,  85 

Turnbull,  Capt.  B.,  107th  Pioneers, 
wounded  in  the  action  of  Festubert, 
130 

Turner,  Lieut  H.  K.,  4th  Batt. 
iSuffolk  Regt.,  wounded  at  the 
battle  of  Neuve  Chapelle,  262 
Tuson,  Col  H.  D.,  at  the  2nd  battle 
of  Ypres,  321 

Tyson,  2nd  Lieut  J.  T.,  2/3rd  Gurkha 
Rifles  (attached),  at  the  battle 
of  Loos,  406,  409  ; killed,  410 


U 

Ujagar  Singh,  Sepoy,  45th  Sikhs,  at 
the  battle  of  Festubert,  364-365  ; 
awarded  the  I.D.S.M.,  366 
Ujir  Sing  Gurung,  Rifleman.  2/2nd 
Gurkha  Rifles,  gains  the  I.O.M.  at 
Neuve  Chapelle,  247 
Usman  Khan,  Sepoy,  55th  (attached 
57th)  Rifles,  at  the  1st  battle  of 
Loos,  25;  receives  the  I.D.S.M., 
25 

Ussher,  Capt.  S.,  129th  Baluchis, 
killed  at  the  battle  of  Givenchy, 
144 


548 


INDEX 


V 

Valenciennes,  important  railway 
junction  at,  ;539  ; an  objective 
at  the  battle  of  Loos,  397 

Van  Soineren,  Major  W.  W.,  47th 
Sikhs,  wounded  at  the  battle  of 
Givenchy,  184 

Vandeleur,  Capt.  A.  M.,  2nd  Life 
Guards,  at  the  1st  battle  of  Ypres, 
30 

Vaughan,  Lieut  H.  R.,  I.A.R.O. 
(attached  41st  Dogras),  wounded 
at  the  battle  of  Festubert,  353, 
354 

Vaughan,  Gen.  J.,  commands  the 
3i'd  Cavalry  Brigade  at  the  1st 
battle  of  Ypres,  22,  25 

Vaughan-Sawyer,  Capt.  G.  H.,  inter- 
preter of  the  34th  Sikh  Pioneers, 
killed  by  a sniper,  47 

Vaughan’s  Rifles,  the.  See  Rifles, 
the  58th  (Vaughan’s) 

Venour,  Lt-Col  W.  E.,  58tli  Rifles, 
killed  in  a counter-attack  on  30th 
Oct.'  1914,  75 

Venters,  Pte  A.,  2nd  Black  Watch,  at 
the  battle  of  Festubert,  124 ; 
awarded  the  D.C.M.,  124 

Vicerov  of  India,  the,  his  telegram  of 
8th  Sept.  1914,  4-8 

Victoria  Cross.  See  Decorations  and 
Honours 

Vincent,  Lce-Sergt  M.,  4th  Batt. 
King’s  (Liverpool)  Regt.,  wins  the 
D.C.M.  at  the  2nd  battle  of  Ypres, 
317 

Vincent,  Capt.  M.  H.,  33rd  Punjabis, 
wounded  at  the  battle  of  Loos, 
444 

Violaines,  the  British  driven  out  of, 
43 ; an  objective  at  the  battle 
of  Festubert,  357 

Vivian,  Lt-Col  C.  A.,  15th  Sikhs,  I 
'Killed  at  the  2nd  battle  of  Ypres,  j 
322 

Vlamertinghe,  22,  286 


W 

Wade,  Lieut  H.  W.,  9th  Bhopals 


(attached),  in  the  attack  on  Neuve 
Chapelle,  51  ; wounded  and  missing, 
59 

Wadeson,  Brig-Gen.  F.,  commands 
I the  Secundrabad  Cavaky  Brigade, 

' 66,175,180;  his  services  rewarded, 

184 

Wake,  Major  H.  St  A.,  2/8th  Gurkha 
Rifles,  in  the  trenches,  70,  71  ; 
killed,  72,  74 

Walcott,  Lieut  J.  H.  L,,  2/2nd 
Gurkha  Rifles,  in  a counter-attack, 
79 

Wales,  H.R.H.  The  Prmce  of,  visits 
the  Indian  Corps,  107 ; present 
when  King  George  inspects  the 
Corps,  137  ; delivers  the  King’s 
farewell  message,  463 

Walker,  Lt-Col  H.,  commands  l/4th 
Batt.  Black  Watch  (Territorials) 
at  the  battle  of  Loos,  428,  436, 
439  ; mortally  wounded,  439,  440 

Walker,  Capt.  N.  C.,  l/4th  Black 
Watch  (Territorials),  at  the  battle 
of  Loos,  436  ; wounded,  437 

Walker,  Brig-Gen.  W.  G.,  commands 
the  Skhind  Brigade,  200,  211, 
252,  259,  278,  327-331,  379;  his 
commendation  of  the  troops,  332 ; 
abandons  the  attack  on  the 
Ferine  du  BoLs,  367 ; his  opinion 
on  the  failure  of  the  attack  on  the 
Ferme  du  Bois,  373-374 
i Wallis,  Lieut  B.  H.,  107th  Pioneers, 

I wounded  m the  action  of  Festubert, 

! 130 

I Wallon  Cappel,  21 
I Wambeek,  25 

I Warden,  Capt.  C.  G.  V.  M.,  58th 
Rifles  (attached),  at  the  battle 
of  Loos,  440  ; wounded,  443 

Warden,  Major  W.  H.,  l/39th  Garhwal 
Rifles,  leads  an  attack  at  the  action 
of  Festubert,  125-126 ; wounded 
and  missing,  129 

Warsaw,  fall  of,  notified  from  the 
I German  trenches,  390 
j Waterfield,  Capt.  F.  C.,  15th  Sikhs 
(attached),  wounded  at  the  battle 
I of  Neuve  Chapelle,  267 ; mortafly 
wounded  at  Festubert,  308 
■ Waters,  Capt.  R.  S.,  40th  Pathans, 


INDEX 


549 


seriously  wounded  at  the  2nd  battle 
of  Ypres,  296 

Watkis,  Lt-Gen.  H.  B.  B.,  commands 
the  Lahore  Division,  9,  44,  134, 
147,  155,  175,  176 ; succeeded 

by  Lt-Gen.  Keary,  200  ; appointed 
a K.C.B.,  200 

Watson,  2nd  Lieut  A.  B.,  l/4th 
Black  Watch  (Territorials), 
wounded  at  the  battle  of  Loos, 
438 

Watson,  Lieut  S.  L.,  l/4th  Black 
Watch  (Territorials),  wounded  at 
the  battle  of  Loos,  437 
Watt,  Major  D.  M.,  2/2nd  Gurkha 
Rifles,  in  the  counter-attack  on 
Givenchy,  187  ; commands  No.  4 
Double  Co.  at  Neuve  Chapelle, 
243,  244 ; awarded  the  D.S.O., 
244  ; wounded,  244 
Wauchope,  Major  A.  G.,  2nd  Batt. 
Black  Watch,  in  the  action  of 
Festubert,  131,  in  the  German 
counter-attack  at  Givenchy,  188, 
at  the  battle  of  Loos,  428-431 
Wazir  Sing  Burathoki,  Rifleman, 
l/4th  Gurkha  Rifles,  severely 
wounded  at  Neuve  Chapelle, 
266  ; honour’s  conferred  on,  266 
Wazir  Singh,  Jemadar,  58th  Rifles, 
killed  in  the  action  of  Festubert, 
124 

Weir,  Capt.  D.  L , 2nd  Batt.  Leicester- 
shire Regt.,  commands  C Company 
at  the  battle  of  Neuve  Chapelle, 
230  ; awarded  the  M.C.,  231 
Welchman,  Lieut  J.  C.  St  G.,  l/39th 
Garhwal  Rifles,  in  the  action  of 
Festubert,  126,  at  the  battle  of 
Neuve  Chapelle,  227  ; killed,  228, 
236 

West  Kent  Regt,  the,  1st  Batt., 
good  work  of,  43 ; distinguish 
themselves  in  the  attack  on  Neuve 
Chapelle,  50-52 

West  Riding  Division,  the  49th, 
attached  to  the  Indian  Corps,  376  ; 
joins  the  2nd  Army  Corps,  380 
West  Riding  Regt,  the,  reiiiforces  the 
2/8th  Gurkha  Rifles,  74 
Westmacott,  Gen.  C.  B.,  dkects  an 
assault  on  21st  Dec.  1914,  190 


Westwater,  2nd  Lieut  J.  0.,  1st 
Batt.  Highland  Light  Infantry, 
wounded  at  the  battle  of  Festubert, 
373 

Wheeler,  Lieut  E.  0.,  R.E.,  1st 
Sappers  and  Miners,  participates 
in  a raid  on  the  15th-16th  Nov. 

; 1914,  101-103  ; mentioned  in 

I despatches,  103 

Wicks,  Capt.  H.  W.,  1st  Batt.  Sea- 
i forth  Highlanders,  at  Givenchy, 

i 192,  at  Neuve  Chapelle,  233,  234  ; 
wounded,  233-234 ; awarded  the 
D.S.O.,  234 

Widdicombe,  Lt-Col  G.  T.,  commands 
l/9th  Gurkha  Rifles  at  the  battle 
of  Givenchy,  153,  187,  at  the  battle 
of  Neuve  Chapelle,  251  ; appointed 
a C.B.,  251 

Wieltje,  287,  289 

Wilde’s  Rifles.  See  Rifles,  the  57th 

Willans,  Major  T.  J.,  57th  Rifles,  at 
the  1st  battle  of  Ypres,  31-32,  36, 
at  the  battle  of  Givenchy,  193, 
197,  at  the  2nd  battle  of  Ypres, 
299,  301  ; wounded,  299  ; awarded 
the  D.S.O.,  301 

Willcocks,  Lt-Gen.  Sir  James,  com- 
mands the  Indian  Corps,  17,  137, 
206 ; his  character  and  ability, 
17-19,  200,  201,  384.  393-395  ; his 
military  career,  17-18 ; decora- 
tions confeiTed  on,  18,  395  ; takes 
over  the  line  from  Gen.  Smith- 
Dorrien,  18,  91  ; his  orders  at 
the  action  of  Festubert,  120 ; 
translates  the  King’s  message  to 
his  troops,  138  ; conflicting  orders 
issued  to,  145-146 ; his  action 
at  Givenchy  explained,  146-147  ; 
operations  under,  at  Givenchy, 
148-174,  at  Neuve  Chapelle,  217- 
269  ; position  held  by,  in  March, 
1915,  206 ; commends  the  conduct 
of  the  2/3rd  Gurkhas,  225  ; concurs 
in  Gen.  Jacob’s  opinion  at  Neuve 
Chapelle,  246 ; vetoes  a night 
attack  on  the  Bois  du  Biez,  268  ; 
congratulates  the  Lahore  Division 
on  its  work  at  Ypres,  335-336  ; his 
instructions  for  the  battle  of 
Festubert,  341-342,  350.  367, 


550 


INDEX 


369 ; visits  f rcnclics  of  Mic  r29th 
Baluchis,  380  ; his  departure  irom 
France,  393  ; appreciation  of  his 
work,  394-395 ; his  successor, 
395 

Williamson,  2nd  Lieut  T.  C.,  l/4th 
Black  Watch  (Territorials),  at 
the  battle  of  Loos,  438 

Williamson- Jones,  2nd  Lieut  C.  E., 
1st  Batt.  Manchester  Begt, 
Avounded  at  the  2nd  battle  of  Ypres, 
291 

Willis,  Capt.  E.  S.  C.,  58th  ilifles, 
wounded  hi  the  action  of  Festubert, 
119,  124 

Wilson,  Capt.  E.  R.,  1st  Batt.  Sea- 
forth  Highlanders,  killed  in  the 
attack  on  7th  Nov.  1914,  87 

Wilson,  Lieut  L.,  1 /4th  Black  Watch 
(Territorials),  wounded  at  the  battle 
of  Loos,  438 

Wilson,  Capt.  W.,  2nd  Batt.  Black- 
Watch,  at  the  battle  of  Loos,  427 

Wilson,  Capt.  W.  C.,  2nd  Batt. 
Leicestershire  Rcgt,  at  the  battle 
of  Loos,  413  ; awarded  the  H.S.O., 
413 

Wiltshhe  Regt,  the,  1st  Batt.  of, 
good  work  of,  43  ; forced  to  retire 
at  Neuve  Chapelle,  51,  56 

Winchester  Road,  393  ; an  objective 
in  the  battle  of  Loos,  398,  431,  441 

“ Wiper’s  Express,”  the,  monster 
shells  known  as,  308 

Woevre,  the,  successful  B’rench 
operations  in,  338 

Wood,  Capt.  C.  A.,  I.M.S.,  l/4th 
Gurkha  Rifles,  awarded  the  M.C., 
330 

Wood,  Lieut  T.  P.,  2/3rd  Gurkha 
Rifles  (attached),  at  Loos,  406; 
killed,  408,  410 

Worcester  Regt,  the,  3rd  Batt.  of, 
counter-attacks  the  Germans,  43  ; 
cheeked  at  the  battle  of  Festubert, 
361 

Wornham,  2nd  Lieut  T.  H.,  1st  Batt. 
Highland  Light  Infantry,  at  Neuve 
Chapelle,  264 


Wounded,  the,  how  dealt  with,  495- 
496,  501-502 

Wright,  2nd  Lieut  C.  H.  W.,  1st  Batt. 
Highland  Light  Infantry,  wounded 
at  the  battle  of  Festubert,  373 
Wright,  Capt.  H.  S.  N.,  2/8th  Gurkha 
Rifles,  in  the  attack  of  29th'30th 
Oct.  1914,  70-71  ; killed,  72,  74 
Wulverghem,  21 

Wiirtemburg,  Duke  of,  his  reinforce- 
ments impeded  at  Neuve  Chapelle, 
220 

Wylie,  Capt.M.,  l/4th  Gurkha  Rifles, 
at  the  battle  of  Givenchy,  170, 
taken  prisoner,  170 
Wytschaete,  21,  22,  24,  28,  32 ; 
shelled  by  the  enemy,  27,  32  ; the 
57th  Rifles  retire  to,  31 

Y 

Yates,  Capt.  R.  C.  B.,  l/4th  Gurkha 
Rifles,  perishes  in  an  explosion  at 
Givenchy,  170-171 
Young,  Major  D.  C.,  2/4tIi  (attached 
2/3rd  and  l/4th)  Gurkha  Rifles, 
at  the  battle  of  Givenchy,  150, 
at  Neuve  Chapelle,  263-264  ; his 
death,  266 

Ypres,  the  key  to,  22 ; Prussian 
Guards  diverted  from,  206  ; shelled 
by  the  enemy,  287-288 
yi  )res,  the  1st  battle  of,  disposition 
for  the  attack,  25 ; account  of 
the  engagement,  25-41  ; critical 
nature  of,  466 

Ypres,  the  2nd  battle  of,  280-336 ; 
the  result  of  operations  at  Hill  60, 
281-282  ; compared  rvith  the  1st 
battle,  282 

Z 

Zandvoorde,  22  ; bombarded  by  the 
enemy,  29 

Zarif  Khan,  Sepoy,  59th  Rifles,  at 
Neuve  Chapelle,  263 ; posthu- 
mously awarded  the  I.O.M.,  263 
Zauf  Khan,  Havildar,  his  devotion  to 
his  officer,  40 


THE  END. 


PRINTED  BY  WILLIAM  CLOWES  AND  SONS,  LIMITED, 
I-.ONDOM  AND  EECCl  B5,  ENGLAND, 


Fonn  45. 


C40  C 

^ W > X 


M547 


araivether 


The  Indian  corps  in  France 


5'g|t  ^ i 


183445 


Form  47  ^ t)  .Q 


PENNSYLVANIA  STATE  LIBRARY 

Harrisburg  ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 


In  case  of  failure  to  return  the  hooks  the  borrower  agrees  to  pay  the  origrinal 
►rice  of  the  same,  or  to  replace  them  with  other  copies.  The  last  borrower  is 
leld  responsible  for  any  mutilation. 

Retiun  this  book  on  or  before  the  last  date  stamped  below. 


-